Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

1. Since both these appeals are arising out of the same trial being Sessions Trial No.665 of 1998 and, as such, both are taken together.

2. These appeals under section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 are directed against the judgment of conviction dated 18.04.2000 and the order of sentence dated 22.04.2000 passed by the learned VIIth Addl. Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi in Sessions Trial No. 665 of 1998 whereby and whereunder the appellants, above-named, have been convicted under sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo RI for life under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code.

3. The prosecution story, in brief, as per the fardbayan dated 21.04.1998, of the informant Rajendra Sahu (P.W.-7), recorded on 10.45 hrs. at village Karga, wherein informant has stated that at about 6 P.M. in the preceding evening, the father of the informant, namely, Keshwar Sahu went outside of his house in search of labour and he was following his father and was at a distance of about 25 feets. When at about 6.15 P.M, his father reached near the house of Mahrang Lohar (P.W.1), then the appellants, namely, Ramdhan Oraon, Rajendra Oraon, Baria Oraon and Bhanua Oraon, were hiding there from before, attacked his father with balua, sword and tangi and started cutting his father. Then, informant fled away and came to his house and disclosed the occurrence to the family and others. Thereafter, informant again went to the place of occurrence with chowkidar and found his father smeared with blood and he was dead. Informant alleged that Yogia Oraon, elder father of the Bhanua Oraon (appellant) and his father were litigating in High Court in a land related matter. His father and Khairu Oraon were also on litigating term for about 10 years, due to land dispute and due to this reason, the accused persons killed his father.

4. On the basis of the fardbayan of the informant, Bero PS Case No.26 of 1998 dated 21.04.1998 was registered under sections 302/34 of the IPC against the appellants. After investigation, the police submitted the charge sheet against the appellants for the offences under sections 302/34 IPC, and cognizance of the offence was taken and the case was committed to the court of Sessions.

5. Charge was framed under section 302/34 of IPC against the appellants and trial commenced and at the conclusion of trial appellants were convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.

6. The aforesaid order of conviction and sentence is under challenge in these appeals.

Submission of the learned counsel for the appellants:

7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants have taken the following grounds for interfering with the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in the impugned judgment:

                  (i) The prosecution has miserably failed to establish the charge said to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

                  (ii) The further ground has been taken that the conviction is under sections 302 /34 of the Indian Penal Code but no any evidence in order to substantiate the common object among the appellants to the deceased has been laid by the prosecution, as such, there cannot be any conviction against the appellants, in absence of any specific overt act said to be committed by these appellants even if the entire prosecution version will be taken in to consideration in entirety.

                  (iii) It has been contended that though the informant is claimed to be an eye witness but as per the prosecution story, on seeing the assault by these appellants on his father, informant did not come forward to save him nor at the time of occurrence he raised any hullah, rather he returned to his house and informed to his family members and again went to the place of occurrence with village chowkidar and found his father to be dead, which is suspicious itself at all.

                  (iv) It has been stated that the learned trial Court has convicted the appellants for the offence under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code without considering the statement of chowkidar of the village, who while deposing as DW1 has clearly stated that first time when he got information about such incident from the brother of the informant, he went to informant’s house and asked the informant who killed, then, Rajendra told four persons had killed, but, he did not name any of the assailants whereas in his fardbayan the informant has stated that he saw these appellants all armed with balua, sword and tangi attacked his father. If that was so, then, informant would have definitely mention the name of these appellants as assailant and, as such, it falsifies the statement of the informant about assault and, hence, the conviction under sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code is not sustainable.

                  (v) It has been contended that the appellants are alleged to have been convicted on the basis of the statement of sole eye witness, i.e., the informant whose credential is doubtful as informant’s father and appellants father were in inimical term with the family of the deceased and the appellants due to which they have been implicated in the present case and, as such, it has not been justified in the eyes of law.

                  (vi) It has been contended that it has come in the evidence that due to inimical terms with the deceased with the family of the appellants they were litigating with each other’s prior to the date of the alleged occurrence, as such, the false implication of the appellants in this case cannot be ruled out.

                  (vii) It has been contended that that the deposition of the material witnesses on the point of occurrence is doubtful for the reasons that none of the villagers had come at the place of occurrence whereas as per prosecution story the place of occurrence was near the house of the co-villager, namely, Maharang Lohar (P.W-1) and if the appellants had done this, naturally there would have been an uproar or screaming by the deceased, but there was no such happening.

                  (viii) If the occurrence would have been taken place in the manner as alleged by the prosecution, then certainly the co-villagers must have reached at the place of occurrence after hearing halla but it did not happen.

                  (ix) It has been contended that the independent and material witnesses of the case have not been examined by the prosecution for the reasons best known to the prosecution.

                  (x) It has been contended that the witnesses adduced on behalf of the prosecution are highly interested witnesses. The fact that the informant had narrated the story and involvement of the appellants to his family members and his brother had informed the village chowkidar about the incident but upon inquiry, by the chowkidar they had not disclosed the name of these appellants as assailants, as such, the story being concocted with a purpose to falsely implicate the appellants cannot be ruled out.

                  (xi) It has also been contended that as per allegation it is unbelievable that the informant on seeing that appellants brutally assaulting his father near the house of one of the villagers, but, informant did not raise any hallah, rather he returned back silently to his house and narrated the story in spite of the fact that the place of occurrence was within the village and on raising hallah the villagers would definitely have arrived there when there was a commotion and at that time it was 6 PM.

                  (xii) It has been contended that it is also unbelievable that the informant and his other family members did not inform the police at that time rather they informed the chowkidar but they did not disclose the name of these appellants as assailants before him.

8. The learned counsel for the appellants, based upon the aforesaid grounds, have submitted that the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court convicting the appellants under sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, therefore, is not sustainable and be set aside.

Submission of the learned counsel for the State:

9. On the contrary, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State has defended the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence by taking the following grounds:

                  (i) The conviction under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code against these appellants does not suffer from an error, since, ample evidence has been produced by the prosecution. However, he has admitted the fact that the name of these appellants as assailants had not been disclosed by the informant to the village chowkidar when chowkidar was informed about the incident.

                  (ii) Informant himself had seen that the appellants had brutally assaulted his father due to which he had died and, as such, appellants have been rightly convicted under section 302 /34 of the Indian Penal Code, as such, the impugned judgment does not require any interference.

                  (iii) The argument has been advanced that the ample material has been produced by the prosecuting agency who established the case under sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code so far as the appellants are concerned since the fact has come in course of evidence produced by PW6, the informant, that when his father went in search of labour he followed his father (deceased) and seen the occurrence appellants brutally assaulting his father with balua, axe and sword and later on he died.

                  (iv) The argument has also been advanced that PW6 (the informant), who is said to be the eye witnesses has supported the prosecution version supported by the medical evidence.

10. The learned State counsel, based upon the aforesaid premise, has submitted that the impugned judgment so far as these appellants is concerned, does not suffer from any error and does not require any interference under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, hence these criminal appeals are fit to be dismissed.

Analysis

11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the trial Court in the impugned judgment.

12. We have also gone through the testimonies of the witnesses as available in the Trial Court Records as also the exhibits appended therewith.

13. Learned trial Court, based upon the testimonies of witnesses, has passed the judgment of conviction and has convicted the appellants under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo RI for life under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code.

14. This Court, before considering the argument advanced on behalf of the parties, is now proceeding to consider the testimonies of witnesses which have been recorded by the learned trial Court.

15. It is evident from the record that in order to substantiate the case, the prosecution had altogether examined eight witnesses out of whom PW6- Rajendra Prasad Sahu, is the son of the deceased and the informant of the case; PW1-Maharang Lohra is hostile witness; PW2-Mohan Pahan, PW3- Ram Nandan Sahu, PW4- Tulsi Sahu, PW5- Muneshwar Sahu, is the brother of the informant; PW7- S.I. Kameshwar Kumar, is the investigating officer of the case and PW8 Dr. Ram Sewak Sahu.

16. On the other hand, to defend their case one witness has been examined on behalf of the appellants herein who is DW1- Akhtar Ansari (chowkidar of the village).

17. PW6 Rajendra Prasad Sahu is the informant and son of the deceased Keshwar Sahu. PW6 has stated in his evidence that on 20.04.1998 at about 6 PM his father (deceased) had gone in search of labour and he was following him and was at a distance of 25 feet. When his father reached near the house of Mahrang Lohar, accused persons, namely, Ramdhan Oraon, Baria Oraon, Rajendra Oraon and Bhanua Oraon, all residents of Karga, came out armed with balua, sword and tangi and started assaulting his father due to which he died. On seeing the occurrence, he fled away from there and came to his house.

18. This witness had further disclosed that he stated the said occurrence to his brother Muneshwar Sahu, his mother and sister and also disclosed the fact to his neighbours Ram Nandan Sahu, Tulsi Sahu, Krishna Sahu, Mahrang Lohar and Motan Pahan. Informant further stated that his father sustained injuries on right knee, left wrist, below left knee, head, temple and many other places. On being informed, on the next day of occurrence the Sub-Inspector of Police, namely, Kameshwar Babu came at the place of occurrence and took his fardbayan. Informant has identified the fardbayan and his signature on the fardbayan, is marked as Ext.-1. He further deposed that the police officer had prepared an inquest report and sent the dead body for post-mortem.

                  In his cross-examination, informant stated his brother had called the village chowkidar and when chowkidar came at 6:30 PM, the lamp (diya- batti) was not burning at that time. He along with village chowkidar went to the police station in the next morning and reached at the police station at 6.30 A.M. and returned to the village with the daroga jee and village chowkidar at about 10 A.M. to the place of occurrence. Informant has stated that in his fardbayan, the village chowkidar had not put his signature. Informant further stated that he had an inimical term with Rajendra Oraon, Ramdhan Oroan and Waria Oraon due to land dispute. Informant stated that he stated about the land dispute to daroga jee and one litigation is going on between his father and Jogia Oraon at High Court and he had not shown any document relating to land dispute to daroga jee. Informant further stated that on seeing the occurrence of assault on his father, he ran towards his house raising hallah and informed to his brother about the incident whereupon his brother went to bring the village chowkidar and when village chowkidar came he along with village chowkidar, Tulsi Sahu and Ramnandan Sahu went to place of occurrence. Informant stated that he did not tell to daroga jee about the weapon held by the accused person in their hands. When he along with village chowkidar and other persons went to the place of occurrence, then at that time no villagers were present at the place of occurrence. He had further testified that at the place of occurrence, there is a public way and villagers were coming and going. Informant did not inform the village headman and sarpanch with regard to the occurrence. Informant further stated that his father told him that he had inimical term with the appellants due to land dispute but he did not know about the land. Informant has stated that he had seen the occurrence when he was coming from the main road from a distance of 20-25 steps. On seeing the occurrence, he identified the accused persons and ran towards his house raising hallah and thereafter people assembled there and Ramnandan Sah, Tulsi Sah, Liyakat Ansari, Titua Ansari, Maharang Lohar, Mohan Munda, Krishna Sahu, Ram Bhagat Sahu and Sanjay Sahu came to his house and he informed them about the incident. Informant has denied the suggestion that at the time of occurrence, there was dark and he had not seen the occurrence and his father was killed by another person and accused persons has been implicated in this case as the accused persons had inimical term with them.

19. PW1 Mahrang Lohra has been declared hostile.

20. PW2 Mohan Pahan is co-villager had deposed that he knew Kesar Sahu (the deceased), whose son is Rajendra Sahu. He has stated that Kesar Sahu was killed about eight months ago in the month of Baisakh. He stated that on getting information about murder of Kesar Sahu, he reached at the place of occurrence and at that time the police also arrived there. PW-2 further deposed that he had signed on the inquest report.

                  In his cross-examination, PW2 has stated that he had stated that on the next day of the occurrence at 10 AM he came to know that Kesar Sahu had been killed. He has stated that the police took his signature on the plain paper.

21. PW3 Ram Nandan Sahu is the co-villager. He has deposed that at about 6:15 PM Keshwar Sahu had left the house alone in search of labour, and then his son Rajendra Sahu left afterwards and at that time he was studying at his house. He has stated that on being informed by Rajendra Sahu he went to the place of occurrence where he saw that Keshwar Sahu was lying dead and he saw the injuries over his head, temple, right and left knee and left hand. Rajendra Sahu raising hallah had come to his house and informed that Ramdhan, Rajendra Oraon, Bariya Oraon and Bhanua Oraon were assaulting his father with tangi, baluwa and sword. Thereafter, he ran towards the place of occurrence where he found the dead body of Keshwar Sahu and at that time his family members and other villagers had assembled there. There was a land dispute between the family of the deceased and the assailants which led to the said occurrence. He has further deposed that before 3-4 days prior to occurrence, the appellants had threatened the deceased.

                  During cross-examination, PW3 stated that the accused persons had not threatened the deceased in his presence and this fact was told to him by Rajendra Sahu. Rajendra had informed him about the incident by saying that Ramdhan Oroan, Rajendra Oraon, Bhanua Oraon and Bariya Oraon had started assaulting his father with tangi, baluwa and sword and after that he went to place of occurrence with him. The occurrence took place in the middle of village and at the time of occurrence, the sun was about to set.

22. PW4-Tulsi Sahu is also a co-villager and he has deposed that on hearing hallah, he reached at the place of occurrence and saw that Keshwar Sahu was murdered. At that time, Rajendra Sahu was present there and he told him that Rajendra Oraon, Ramdhan Oraon, Bhanua Oraon and Bariya Oraon had murdered his father with sharp cut weapon. He had put his signature on the inquest report.

                  During cross-examination, PW4 has deposed that the deceased was his uncle and when he reached at the place of occurrence, Rajendra Sahu was present there along with 10-12 other persons. At para-15 he has stated that the distance of the place of occurrence from his house is about five yards and it takes time for about two minutes.

23. PW-5 Muneshwar Sahu is the son of the deceased. He has stated in his evidence that at about 6 PM on 20.04.1998, his father had gone in search of labour and Rajendra Sahu was following him. After about 15-20 minutes, Rajendra Sahu came running and told that the father had been killed by the assailants, namely, Ramdhan Oraon, Rajendra oraon, Bhanua Oraon and Bariya Oraon who were holding tangi, baluwa and sword. He went to the place of occurrence, he saw that his father was lying dead in a pool of blood and found that there were cuts on his left wrist, left and right knee and temple. He deposed that the accused persons had killed his father due to inimical term related to land dispute.

                  During cross-examination, he stated that the distance of his house from the place of occurrence is about 100 yards and when his father left the house, he was inside the house. Rajendra had reached at the place of occurrence after 10-15 minutes along with village chowkidar. He stated that from the place of occurrence, he went to village chowkidar wherefrom he went to Rajendra and thereafter Rajendra went to place of occurrence along with the village chowkidar. He had disposed at para 22 of the cross-examination that he having no land dispute with the Rajendra Oraon, Ramdhan Oraon and Bariya Oraon rather the land dispute was with their fathers. His father had land dispute with Khairu Oraon but what was the result of that case, he did not know.

24. PW7 Kameshwar Kumar is the investigating officer of the case. Investigating officer has stated that on 21.04.1998 at about 6.30 hrs. he received information that a person was killed in village Kargea and on such information he went there with Havildar- Vanshidhar Yadav. He found that in the field of Jogia Oraon, a person was lying dead. The informant (PW6) told him that the dead body was of his father Keshwar Sahu. Thereafter, he recorded fardbayan of Rajendra Prasad Sahu. Investigating officer has identified his endorsement and signature on the fardbayan which was marked as Ext.-2 and he proved the formal FIR which have been marked Ext.-3. He prepared an inquest report and during that time he found that there were several wounds at the body of the deceased by sharp cut weapon and thereafter sent the dead body for post-mortem. During investigation, he recorded statement of Tulsi Sahu, Mahrang Lohara, Ramnandan Sahu etc.

25. In his cross-examination, PW7 stated that on arriving at the place of occurrence he firstly recorded fardbayan and thereafter, inspected the dead body. He was told by Rajendra Prasad Sahu that the dead body was of Keshwar Sahu. PW7 further stated that before preparing inquest report the name of the assailants were disclosed by the informant. The informant’s claim that he went to the police station in the morning with chowkidar and reported the incident was false and he never meet with the informant and chowkidar at the police station. Investigating officer denied that after the dead body was taken away, the informant's statement was recorded again at the police station. He did not collect the bloodstained soil from the place of occurrence. He did not record the statement of village chowkidar as he realized that it was not necessary for the investigation. The sole eye witness of the occurrence was Rajendra Prasad Sahu. Investigating officer further stated that he got the information from rumor thereafter he went to the place of occurrence but he did not inform the officer-in-charge as he was not present at that time.

26. PW8-Dr Ram Sevak Sahu is the doctor who conducted post mortem over the dead body of the deceased. He conducted post mortem on the dead body of Keshwar Sahu on 21.04.1998 and found the following injuries:

                  (i) 16 x 3 cm bone deep on left mastoid and occipital region cutting the underline bone and brain matter.

                  (ii) 17 x 3 ½ cm x bone deep in left cheek, left external ear,left externl year, left temporo occipital region of head and brain matter.

                  (iii) 17 x 3 cm x bone deep left temporo pariato frontal region of head cutting the bone and underline brain.

                  (iv) 7 x 2 cm x bone deep left cheek lower part cutting the left side of medible bone.

                  (v) 8 x 2 cm x bone deep front part of the left knee, cutting the underline lower end of timer bone partially.

                  (vi) 7 x 2 cm x bone deep back of left wrist cutting the under- line radius and ulna bone completely.

                  Doctor has opined that: (i) all the injuries were ante-mortem, (ii) caused by sharp cutting heavy weapon, (iii) death was due to above noted injuries, and (iv) Time since death – six to 24 hours from the time of post-mortem examination.

                  The above noted injuries may be caused by weapons like Balua, Sword and Axe.

                  During Cross-examination, the doctor stated that he cannot say as to how many types of weapons were used in causing injuries.

                  Evidence on behalf of the Accused-Defence:

27. On behalf of the appellants-accused persons, one witness has been examined as DW1-Akhtar Ansari, who is the village chowkidar. He has stated that in the evening, the younger brother of Rajendra, namely, Parmeshwar and the son of Hiraman Sahu, namely, Rishi had called him and told that his father was killed and on being asked who had killed then he said that he did not know. Thereafter, he reached at the house of Rajendra Sahu and when he asked him who had killed his father, then he said that four men had killed but he didn't mention anyone's name. Thereafter, he reached at the place of occurrence along with 10-12 persons and found that the dead body was lying at the field of Jogia near the house of Mahrang Lohar. He has further deposed that on the next morning, Rajendra took him to Bero police station through bicycle. He informed the police officer and thereafter the officer-in-charge came to the place of occurrence and sent the dead body for its post mortem.

                  During cross-examination, DW1 stated that police officer Kameshwar Babu went to the village and recorded the fardbayan of Rajendra Sahu and thereafter prepared an inquest report and after getting signature of Mahrang Lohar and Mohan Pahan on it, he sent the dead body for post mortem.

28. This Court, on the basis of aforesaid factual aspect vis-à-vis argument advanced on behalf of parties, is now proceeding to examine the legality and propriety of impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence by formulating following questions to be answered by this Court:

                  (I). Whether the informant PW6 who is the sole eye witness of the case and is trustworthy and reliable, to convict the appellants under Section 302/34 of IPC?

                  (II) Whether contradiction and discrepancies shown in the deposition of Informant P.W-6 and other witnesses particularly investigating officer P.W-7, is enough to disbelieve the case of the prosecution.

Re: First Issue:

29. Regarding the first issue, we find from the impugned judgment that learned trial Court has convicted the appellants relying on the deposition of the informant PW6. Learned trial Court observed that PW6 is the sole eyewitness of the occurrence and he saw his father being assaulted by the appellants with balaua, tangi and sword and on seeing the occurrence, the informant fled away and came to the house and disclosed the facts to others and on the next day informant went to the police station along with chowkidar.

30. But, on the other hand submission has been made by the appellants that informant and his other family members did not inform the police after the occurrence of murder rather they informed the chowkidar, but they did not disclose the name of these appellants as assailants before the chowkidar, whereas in his fardbayan, the informant has stated that he saw these appellants all armed with balua, sword and tangi attacked his father. If that was so, then, informant would have definitely mentioned the name of these appellants as assailant and, as such, it falsifies the statement of the informant about assault and, hence, the conviction under sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code is not sustainable.

31. Before we analyze and appreciate the circumstances that have weighed with the trial Court, we think it apposite to refer to certain authorities pertaining to evidentiary value of the sole eyewitness.

32. It is settled proposition of law that the judgment of conviction can be passed on the basis of the testimony of sole eyewitness but the testimony of said witness should be trustworthy and inspire confidence in the mind of the Court.

33. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony the Courts will insist on corroboration. In fact, it is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honored principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise.

34. The law is well settled that the judgment of conviction can be passed also on the basis of the testimony of sole witness but the testimony of said witness should be trustworthy as per the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B., (2010) 12 SCC 91, paragraphs 30 to 34 of the said judgment are being referred hereunder as :-

                  "30. Shri Bagga has also submitted that there was sole testimony of Sujit Mondal, PW 1, and the rest i.e. depositions of PW 2 to PW 8, could be treated merely as hearsay. The same cannot be relied upon for conviction.

                  31. In Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) this Court repelled a similar submission observing that:

                  (SCC p. 371, para 9) "9. as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But, if there are doubts about the testimony the courts will insist on corroboration."

                  In fact, it is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise.

                  32. In Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra this Court reiterated the similar view observing that it is the quality and not the quantity of evidence which is necessary for proving or disproving a fact. The legal system has laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence.

                  33. In Kunju v. State of T.N., a similar view has been reiterated placing reliance on various earlier judgments of this Court including Jagdish Prasad v. State of M.P. and Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras.

                  34. Thus, in view of the above, the bald contention made by Shri Bagga that no conviction can be recorded in case of a solitary eyewitness has no force and is negatived accordingly."

35. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kuriya and another vs. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433 has held as under: -

                  " 33. ---The Court has stated the principle that, as a general rule, the Court can and may act on the testimony of a single eyewitness provided he is wholly reliable and base the conviction on the testimony of such sole eyewitness. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness."

36. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kalu @ Amit vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 8 SCC 34 held as under: -

                  "11. We find no infirmity in the judgment of the High Court which has rightly affirmed the trial court's view. It is true that the accused have managed to win over the complainant PW 4 Karambir Yadav, but the evidence of PW 5 Ram Chander Yadav bears out the prosecution case. It is well settled that conviction can be based on the evidence of a sole eyewitness if his evidence inspires confidence. This witness has meticulously narrated the incident and supported the prosecution case. We find him to be a reliable witness."

37. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Sheelam Ramesh v. State of A.P., (1999) 8 SCC 369 in Para -18 held as follows:-

                  "18. According to learned counsel for the accused appellants, though PW 3 has deposed that 10-15 persons were in the vicinity at the time of occurrence, no independent witness was examined by the prosecution. There is nothing on evidence to show that there was any other eyewitness to the occurrence. Having examined all the eyewitnesses even if other persons present nearby were not examined, the evidence of the eyewitnesses cannot be discarded. Courts are concerned with quality and not with quantity of evidence and in a criminal trial, conviction can be based on the sole evidence of a witness if it inspires confidence."

38. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid discussion it is apparent that the conviction can be based on the evidence of a sole eyewitness if his evidence inspires confidence reason being that Courts are concerned with quality and not with quantity of evidence and in a criminal trial as per the statute there is no legal impediment on relying upon the testimony of sole eyewitness.

39. At this juncture, this Court thinks fit to revisit the testimony of the witnesses, particularly, the sole eyewitness PW6 Rajendra Sahu, who is also the informant of the case and son of the deceased, in the backdrop of aforesaid legal proposition.

40. In the instant case Informant PW6 Rajendra Sahu, has stated in his fardbayan as well as in his examination-in-chief that on the day of occurrence at about 6 P.M. in the evening, informant’s, father Keshwar Sahu went outside of his house in search of labour and he was following his father and was at a distance of about 25 feet. At about 6.15 P.M, his father reached near the house of Mahrang Lohar (P.W.1), then the appellants, namely, Ramdhan Oraon, Rajendra Oraon, Baria Oraon and Bhanua Oraon, were hiding there from before, attacked his father with balua, sword and tangi and started cutting his father. Then, informant fled away and came to his house and disclosed the occurrence to the family and others. Thereafter, informant again went on the place of occurrence with chowkidar and found his father smeared with blood and he was dead.

41. Hence, in his evidence the informant has stated that he had seen the appellants cutting his father with balua, axe and sword. But, at paragraph- 38 of his cross-examination, informant has deposed that he did not tell to daroga jee about the weapon held by the accused persons in their hands and he did not say so in his re-statement. Further, at paragraph-40 also, informant has deposed that he did not tell to Muneshwar Sahu (PW5), Ram Nandan Sahu (PW3) and Tulsi Sahu (PW4) about the weapons held by the appellants.

42. Hence, on one hand informant in his cross-examination has deposed to have seen the appellants cutting his father with balua, axe and sword from a distance of 20-25 steps and on the other hand informant neither in his statement nor in his re-statement before the police had named about the weapon held by the appellants person in their hands and this raises doubt in testimony of the PW6 informant, who has been projected himself as sole eye eyewitness of the alleged occurrence.

43. Further, the trustworthiness of the sole eye eyewitness PW6 informant comes under cloud as informant in his cross-examination at paragraph-59 had deposed that he had not told the name of the accused persons to the chowkidar. Here, it is pertinent to note that informant in his cross- examination has deposed that house of village chowkidar is at a distance of half kilometer from his house and after the incidence his brother had called chowkidar and chowkidar had come at 6.30 PM and they had again gone to the place of along with the chowkidar. Further, in his cross-examination informant has stated that he along with the chowkidar had gone to the police station to inform about the occurrence.

44. Hence, in his evidence informant had himself admitted that he did not tell the name of the accused persons to the chowkidar though the chowkidar had accompanied him to the police station also, and this admission of the informant raises doubt, about the credibility of statement given by the informant during his examination.

45. It needs to refer herein that in present case village chowkidar, though being a material witness, was not examined by the prosecution and in this regard Investigating Officer has also admitted at paragraph-27 of his cross- examination that during the investigation his senior officer had directed to take statement of the chowkidar and enter it into the case diary but, he did not take statement from the chowkidar.

46. Instead, the said village chowkidar was examined by the defence as DW1 and he deposed that he had asked the informant who had killed his father then informant told that four persons had killed his father, but informant did not say the name of the accused persons.

47. Thus, the evidence of the informant does not find corroboration from the deposition of village chowkidar also, as informant had not told the name of the appellants/accused to the village choukidar .

48. Further, at paragraph-40 and 41 of his cross-examination, informant had deposed that when he along with village chowkidar and other persons had reached to the place of occurrence, then at that time no villagers were present at the place of occurrence and he further stated that the said place of occurrence is near the public way and the villagers were coming and going.

49. Hence, when the place of occurrence is located in the village itself surrounded with houses and public way is near to the place of occurrence and villagers were coming and going on the way and according to the prosecution case the alleged murder took place at 6.15 PM in the month of April, and it not dark in the evening, then, deposition of informant at paragraph-40 of his cross-examination that no villagers were present at the place of occurrence cannot be fully relied.

50. Thus, from the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered view that the testimony of the P.W.6 who had been claimed as sole eyewitness is not trustworthy.

51. Therefore, this Court is of view that learned trial Court had on wrong assumption and surmises and without appreciating the evidence of the sole eyewitness, i.e. PW.6, in proper way had convicted the appellants.

52. Accordingly, Issue no.1 is answered.

Re: Issue no. II

53. The issue no. II is whether contradiction and discrepancies shown in the deposition of Informant P.W-6 and investigating officer P.W-7, is sufficient enough to disbelieve the case of the prosecution.

54. Submission has been made that in the deposition of the Informant P.W-6 and the investigating officer P.W-7, there are vital contradiction. But the learned trial Court has overlooked the contradictions and has convicted the appellants.

55. Before appreciating the aforesaid issue, it would be apt to refer herein the settled position of law regarding the inter-se contradiction among the material witnesses.

56. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnegowda & Ors. Vrs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2017) 13 SCC 98 at paragraph 32 and 33 has held as under:-

                  "32 The minor variations and contradictions in the evidence of the eyewitnesses will not tilt the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused but when the contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses proves to be fatal to the prosecution case then those contradictions go to the root of the matter and in such cases the accused gets the benefit of doubt.

                  33. It is the duty of the Court to consider the trustworthiness of evidence on record. As said by Bentham, "witnesses are the eyes and ears of justice.----”

57. Thus, from the aforesaid proposition of law it is evident that minor discrepancies, embellishments and contradictions in the evidence of the eyewitness do not destroy the essential fabric of the prosecution case, the core of which remains unaffected. But at the same time, it is equally settled that the discrepancies which go to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses that can be annexed with due importance. More so, when there is need of corroboration of the testimony of eyewitness from other available evidences.

58. In the present case, informant at paragraph-10 of his cross-examination had deposed that he along with village chowkidar went to the police station in the next morning and reached at the police station at 6.30 A.M. and informant further retreated at paragraph-56 and 57 of his cross-examination that on the next day of occurrence, he along with chowkidar went to the police station and informed about the occurrence at the police station.

59. But, investigating officer PW7 in his cross-examination at paragraph-15 had specifically deposed that he met the informant at 10.45 A.M. and he had not met the informant earlier and at paragraph-19 Investigating Officer deposed that informant is wrongly saying that in the morning informant and the chowkidar had given information in the police station.

60. Hence, on one hand informant has deposed that he had reported the occurrence at the police station on the next day in the morning at 6.30 A.M., but, on the other hand the Investigating Officer of the case has specifically denied that said statement of the informant and chowkidar that they had given information in the next morning at the police station but the Investigating Officer in contrary to that had stated that he had met the informant at 10.45 A.M and not in the morning at 6.30 A.M.

61. Therefore, this Court is of view that there is material contradiction, in timing of reporting of the matter to the police station which is apparent from the deposition of the informant and the investigating officer.

62. Accordingly, issue no.2 has been answered.

63. Further, doubt is raised in the prosecution case as it is alleged that murder of the informant’s father took place in the evening at 6.15 PM on 21.04.1998 and within half an hour village chowkidar came there but, incidence was not reported at the police station and on the next day information was given at the police station and thereafter FIR was registered.

64. Further, it has come in the testimony of DW.1 village chowkidar that though he asked about the name of the alleged assailant from the informant but informant has not stated the name of the accused/appellants to him. Thus, from this statement of DW.1 the Terra firma of the case of the prosecution case is fully eroded.

65. It requires to refer herein the settled position of law that the defence witness is also to be given equal weightage as is to be given to the prosecution witnesses as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Munshi Prasad v. State of Bihar, reported in (2002) 1 SCC 351 at para 3 which reads hereunder as:--

                  3. Without attributing any motive and taking the evidence on its face value, therefore, it appears that the place of occurrence was at 400-500 yards from the place of Panchayat and it is on this piece of evidence, the learned advocate for the State heavily relied upon and contended that the distance was far too short so as to be an impossibility for the accused to be at the place of occurrence -- we cannot but lend concurrence to such a submission : a distance of 400-500 yards cannot possibly be said to be "presence elsewhere" -- it is not an impossibility to be at the place of occurrence and also at the Panchayat meet, the distance being as noticed above :

                  the evidence on record itself negates the plea and we are thus unable to record our concurrence as regards acceptance of the plea of alibi as raised in the appeal. Before drawing the curtain on this score, however, we wish to clarify that the evidence tendered by the defence witnesses cannot always be termed to be a tainted one by reason of the factum of the witnesses being examined by the defence. The defence witnesses are entitled to equal respect and treatment as that of the prosecution. The issue of credibility and trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to the defence witnesses on a par with that of the prosecution -- a lapse on the part of the defence witnesses cannot be differentiated and be treated differently than that of the prosecutors' witnesses."

66. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the same view in a judgment rendered in the case of Mahendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2022) 7 SCC 157.

67. Herein, from perusal of the impugned order it is evident that the learned trial Court has not given the equal weightage to this witness (DW.1) and not appreciated the testimony of the said witnesses in correct prospective.

68. Further, in the case of sole eyewitness, the witness has to be reliable, trustworthy, his testimony worthy of credence and the case has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Unnatural conduct and unexplained circumstances can be a ground for disbelieving the witness. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Narendrasinh Keshubhai Zala Vs. State of Gujarat [(2023) 18 SCC 783], wherein it has been held as under:

                  “8. It is a settled principle of law that doubt cannot replace proof. Suspicion, howsoever great it may be, is no substitute of proof in criminal jurisprudence (Jagga Singh v. State of Punjab [Jagga Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 463 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1798]). Only such evidence is admissible and acceptable as is permissible in accordance with law. In the case of a sole eyewitness, the witness has to be reliable, trustworthy, his testimony worthy of credence and the case proven beyond reasonable doubt. Unnatural conduct and unexplained circumstances can be a ground for disbelieving the witness.

                  9. This Court in Anil Phukan v. State of Assam [Anil Phukan v. State of Assam, (1993) 3 SCC 282 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 810] has held that : (SCC p. 285, para 3)

                  “3. … So long as the single eyewitness is a wholly reliable witness the courts have no difficulty in basing conviction on his testimony alone. However, where the single eyewitness is not found to be a wholly reliable witness, in the sense that there are some circumstances which may show that he could have an interest in the prosecution, then the courts generally insist upon some independent corroboration of his testimony, in material particulars, before recording conviction. It is only when the courts find that the single eyewitness is a wholly unreliable witness that his testimony is discarded in toto and no amount of corroboration can cure that defect.”

69. This Court, in view of aforesaid discussion and taking into consideration the settled position of law that the prosecution has to prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt, so far the appellants are concerned, is of the view that prosecution has not been able to prove the charges said to be beyond reasonable doubt.

70. The Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of decision has propounded the proposition that in the criminal trial, there cannot be any conviction if the charge is not being proved beyond all reasonable doubts, as has been held in the case of Rang Bahadur Singh & Ors. Vrs. State of U.P., reported in (2000) 3 SCC 454, wherein, at paragraph-22, it has been held as under:-

                  "22. The amount of doubt which the Court would entertain regarding the complicity of the appellants in this case is much more than the level of reasonable doubt. We are aware that acquitting the accused in a case of this nature is not a matter of satisfaction for all concerned. At the same time we remind ourselves of the time-tested rule that acquittal of a guilty person should be preferred to conviction of an innocent person. Unless the prosecution establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt a conviction cannot be passed on the accused. A criminal court cannot afford to deprive liberty of the appellants, lifelong liberty, without having at least a reasonable level of certainty that the appellants were the real culprits. We really entertain doubt about the involvement of the appellants in the crime."

71. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnegowda & Ors. Vrs. State of Karnataka, (supra), has held at paragraph-26 as under: -

                  "26. Having gone through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the findings recorded by the High Court we feel that the High Court has failed to understand the fact that the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and this is a classic case where at each and every stage of the trial, there were lapses on the part of the investigating agency and the evidence of the witnesses is not trustworthy which can never be a basis for conviction. The basic principle of criminal jurisprudence is that the accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt."

72. Further, it needs to refer herein the principle of 'benefit of doubt' belongs exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of 'benefit of doubt' can be invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana Vrs. Bhagirath & Ors., reported in (1999) 5 SCC 96, wherein, it has been held at paragraph- 7 as under: -

                  "7. The High Court had failed to consider the implication of the evidence of the two eyewitnesses on the complicity of Bhagirath particularly when the High Court found their evidence reliable. The benefit of doubt was given to Bhagirath "as a matter of abundant caution". Unfortunately, the High Court did not point out the area where there is such a doubt. Any restraint by way of abundant caution need not be entangled with the concept of the benefit of doubt. Abundant caution is always desirable in all spheres of human activity. But the principle of benefit of doubt belongs exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of benefit of doubt can be invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. It is the reasonable doubt which a conscientious judicial mind entertains on a conspectus of the entire evidence that the accused might not have committed the offence, which affords the benefit to the accused at the end of the criminal trial. Benefit of doubt is not a legal dosage to be administered at every segment of the evidence, but an advantage to be afforded to the accused at the final end after consideration of the entire evidence, if the Judge conscientiously and reasonably entertains doubt regarding the guilt of the accused."

73. It needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat reported in (2002) 3 SCC 57 has laid down the principle that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted, for ready reference, paragraph 6 thereof requires to be referred herein which reads hereunder as :-

                  “6. ------The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. —"

74. It needs to refer herein before laying down the aforesaid view, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 has already laid down the same view at paragraph 163 which is required to be referred which read hereunder as-

                  “163. We then pass on to another important point which seems to have been completely missed by the High Court. It is well settled that where on the evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which goes in favour of the prosecution and the other which benefits an accused, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt.---"

75. This Court, after having discussed the factual aspect and legal position as discussed hereinabove is of the view that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charges against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt as such the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence requires interference by this Court.

76. Accordingly, the impugned judgement of conviction dated 18.04.2000 and the order of sentence dated 22.04.2000 passed by the learned VIIth Addl. Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi in Sessions Trial No. 665 of 1998 is hereby quashed and set aside so far, the present appellants are concerned.

77. Consequently, the instant appeals stand allowed.

78. The present appellants are hereby discharged from all criminal liabilities.

                  Since the aforesaid appellants are on bail and, as such, they are discharged from the liability of the bail bonds.

79. Let the Trial Court Records be sent back to the Court concerned forthwith, along with the copy of this Judgment.