S. Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The applicant in O.A.No.55 of 2026 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram, (‘the Tribunal’ for short) has filed this original petition, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, being dissatisfied with the declining of the interim order sought by the petitioner, as per Ext.P2 order dated 16.01.2026 passed by the Tribunal.

2. The petitioner approached the Tribunal with O.A.No.55 of 2026 filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs:

                  “1. To call for records connecting to Annexure A1 and to set aside the age restriction clause in Annexure A1 insofar as it prescribes an upper age limit for Assistant Professor (Pharmacy).

                  2. Declare that the prescription of an upper age limit of 41 years in Annexure A1 notification (Category No.691/2025) for the post of Assistant Professor (Pharmacy) is illegal, arbitrary and unenforceable.

                  3. Direct the 3rd Respondent to permit the Applicant to apply for and be considered for selection to the post of Assistant Professor (Pharmacy), ignoring the impugned upper age limit.

                  4. Direct the 3rd Respondent to re-notify or suitably modify Annexure A1 in conformity with the UGC Regulations and

PCI norms.”

3. By Annexure A1 notification dated 31.12.2025, the Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC for short) invited applications for the post of Assistant Professor (Pharmacy). The upper age limit prescribed for the post in Annexure A1 notification is 41 years. According to the petitioner, she possesses M.Pharm (basic academic qualification for the post of Assistant Professor) and also PhD in Pharmaceutical Science and satisfies all the eligible criteria for the post of Assistant Professor (Pharmacy), notified as per Annexure A1 notification, except the age criteria. The petitioner is now working as a Pharmacist Grade-I in the District Tuberculosis Centre and is very experienced in the discipline. According to the petitioner, the fixation of a low upper age limit has the effect of systematically eliminating experienced hands, while disproportionately favouring younger and less experienced candidates. Contending that the age restriction prescribed in Annexure A1 notification is contrary to the UGC Regulations, 2018, and the PCI Regulations, 2014, both of which consciously do not prescribe any upper age limit for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor, the petitioner filed the original application. In the original application, the petitioner has sought for an interim relief to stay the operation of Annexure A1 notification till the disposal of the original application or in the alternate permit the petitioner to submit her application and to participate in the selection process provisionally, subject to the final outcome of the original application. On 16.01.2026, when the original application came up for consideration, the Tribunal passed the impugned Ext.P2 order, which reads thus:

                  “Applicant is a Post Graduate in Pharmacy with PhD in Pharmaceutical Science. She is aggrieved by the rejection of her application based on the upper age limit prescribed for the post of Assistant Professor in Pharmacy, in Annexure-A1 notification. Applicant submits that neither the UGC, nor the Pharmacy Council of India prescribes any upper age limit for induction as Assistant Professor. The applicant further points out that vide Annexure-A3, judgment, the Hon'ble High Court has struck down the stipulation of an upper age limit for appointment as Professor. It is also stated that Government has enhanced the upper age limit to 50 in the Department of Higher Education on the ground that UGC does not prescribe an upper age limit. Applicant has produced Annexure-A6 series of notifications by the PSC wherein age relaxation has been given to different posts of Assistant Professors ranging from 44 to 50. Applicant seeks an interim direction to participate in the selection process provisionally, subject to the final outcome of the Original Application.

                  2. Learned Standing Counsel for the PSC submits that Annexure-A1 notification is issued in accordance with the existing executive orders in this regard. PSC is in no position to deviate from such orders of the Government. It is also argued that Annexure-A6 series of notifications are jn respect of Medical Doctors in specialised streams. There the required qualifications are attained after several years of study and therefore a need was felt to enhance upper age limit. In the case of Assistant Professor in Pharmacy, the qualification required is only a Post Graduate Degree in Pharmacy which can be obtained even at the age of 22. Therefore there is no rationale in enhancing the upper age limit in the instant case. It is further submitted that UGC never prescribes upper age limit for any post and it is left to the State Government to prescribe appropriate standards considering various relevant factors. The post of Assistant Professor is the entry level post and therefore the upper age limit prescribed is appropriate. PSC is not in a position to admit anyone who does not qualify as per the standards set by the Government.

                  3. In view of the submission of the learned Standing Counsel for the PSC, the prayer for interim order is declined.

                  Public Service Commission to file a statement.

                  Post after two weeks.”

4. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present original petition.

5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Standing Counsel for the Kerala Public Service Commission and the learned Senior Government Pleader.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the upper age limit was consciously omitted in the UGC Regulations 2018. The illegality of such age restriction has been settled by the judgment of this Court in Sebastian Joseph v. University of Kerala [2022 (6) KLT 525], and in furtherance of the principles stated in that judgment, the State Government issued Annexure A4 Government Order dated 11.04.2023, enhancing the upper age limit for the post of Assistant Professor to 50 years. The learned counsel for the petitioner further relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Professor (Dr.) Sreejith P.S. v. Dr.Rajasree M.S. [2022 (6) KLT 147] in support of his arguments.

7. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for the Kerala Public Service Commission would submit that the age and qualification for a particular post are fixed by the Government and not by the Kerala Public Service Commission. The learned Standing Counsel pointed out that by G.O.(MS)57/80/Health dated 07.03.1980, the Government has enhanced the upper age limit for the posts of Associate Professor, Assistant Professor and Tutors in pharmacy department as 50, 45 and 40 respectively. By the order dated 20.06.2012, the Government has enhanced the age limit to various categories of posts, the selection of which is conducted by the Kerala Public Service Commission, whether by special rules or executive orders, uniformly by one year subject to the condition that in no case, the maximum age limit exceed 50 years, except in the case of a widow/widower who was dependent on the Government service died-in-harness. Usual relaxation to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe and other backward classes was also permitted by the said order. The Apex Court in Dr.J.Vijayan v. State of Kerala [(2022) 17 SCC 177] held that the fixation of the upper age limit is the policy decision of the Government and the primacy of the Rules framed by the State Government under Article 309 of the Constitution over the UGC Regulations.

8. The learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that the State is empowered to prescribe the upper age limit. Annexure A4 order pertaining to the fixation of upper age limit for the appointment of Assistant Professor in Government and Aided Colleges as 50 years is not applicable to Annexure A1 notification, since Annexure A1 notification pertains to the Medical Education Department. The learned Government Pleader placed reliance on the judgment of this Court dated 27.03.2023 in W.A.No.523 of 2023 in support of his arguments.

9. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

10. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

11. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.

12. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

13. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.

14. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

15. In the original application, the petitioner is challenging the upper age limit of 41 years fixed in Annexure A1 notification by the Kerala Public Service Commission for the post of Assistant Professor (Pharmacy). Admittedly, Annexure A1 notification is issued in accordance with the existing executive orders issued by the Government pointed out by the learned Standing Counsel for the Kerala Public Service Commission. As submitted by the learned standing Counsel for the Kerala Public Service Commission, the Kerala Public Service Commission is not fixing any upper age limit but issuing the notification based on the qualification, including age restrictions prescribed by the Government. The contention of the petitioner is that the fixation of the upper age limit by the Kerala Public Service Commission is against the UGC Regulations 2018. In Professor (Dr.) Sreejith P.S. [2022 (6) KLT 147], the Apex Court held thus:

                  “8. Identical question came to be considered by this Court in the case of Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi (supra) and Kalyani Mathivanan (supra). Now, the issue whether the UGC Regulations shall prevail vis - a - vis the State legislation / State Act, identical question came to be considered by this Court in the recent decision of this Court in the case of Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi (supra). While considering the appointment of the Vice Chancellor in the Sardar Patel University, Gujarat, it is specifically observed and held by this Court that the appointment of Vice Chancellor cannot be made dehors the applicable UGC Regulations, even if the State Act concerned prescribes diluted eligibility criteria, vis - a - vis the criteria prescribed in the applicable UGC Regulations. It is further observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision that the State Act if not on a par with the UGC Regulations, must be amended to bring it on a par with the applicable UGC Regulations and until then it is the applicable UGC Regulations that shall prevail. It is further observed and held that being a subordinate legislation, UGC Regulations become part of the Act. It is further observed and held that in case of any conflict between the State legislation and the Central legislation, the Central legislation, i.e., the applicable UGC Regulations shall prevail by applying the principle of repugnancy under Art.254 of the Constitution as the subject “education” is contained in the Concurrent List of Schedule VII of the Constitution. The observations made in relevant paras are as under:

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                  8.3. The decision of this Court in the case of Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi (supra) has been subsequently followed by this Court in the recent decision of this Court in the case of Anindya Sundar Das and Others (supra) while considering the appointment of the Vice Chancellor of Calcutta University. In the said decision, it is also observed and held in paragraph 56 that in view of the decision in the case of Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi (supra), even if the provisions of the State Act allowed the appointment of the Vice Chancellor by the State government, it would have to be as per the UGC Regulations and any appointment of Vice Chancellor in violation of the UGC Regulations shall be void ab initio. It is further observed that the UGC Regulations shall become part of the statute framed by Parliament and, therefore, shall  prevail.

                  8.4. In view of the above two binding decisions of this Court, any appointment as a Vice Chancellor made on the recommendation of the Search Committee, which is constituted contrary to the provisions of the UGC Regulations, shall be void ab initio. If there is any conflict between the State legislation and the Union legislation, the Union law shall prevail, even as per Art.254 of the Constitution of India, to the extent the provision of the State legislation is repugnant. Therefore, the submission on behalf of the State that unless the UGC Regulations are specifically adopted by the State, the UGC Regulations shall not be applicable, and the State legislation shall prevail unless UGC Regulations are specifically adopted by the State cannot be accepted”.

16. In the judgment dated 27.03.2023 in W.A.No.523 of 2023, a Division Bench of this Court held thus:

                  “12. It is seen that in O.P.(KAT) No.133 of 2019 and connected cases, this Court has held that the provisions in the Special Rules for the Kerala Technical Education Service framed under the Kerala Public Services Act under Article 309 of the Constitution applicable to teachers of Government and aided Polytechnics in the State will not prevail over the Regulations framed by the AICTE insofar as it relates to the qualifications, method of appointments etc. of the members of the service and the provisions in the said Special Rules to the extent the same is repugnant to the Regulations framed by the AICTE would be void and inoperative. In O.P.(KAT) No.542 of 2019, the question that arose for consideration was whether the method of appointment or the source from which appointment could be made to the post of lecturers in technical streams in Polytechnics, as prescribed in the Regulations framed by the AICTE, would prevail over the relevant provisions contained in the Special Rules for the Kerala Technical Educational Service. After referring to the decision in O.P.(KAT) No.133 of 2019 and connected cases as also the decision of the Apex Court in Jagdish Prasad Sharma, this Court took the view that a distinction has to be drawn between cases where the stipulation in the Regulations relates to maintenance of the standards of technical education and cases where the stipulation relates to the age of superannuation of teachers and other staff of Technical Institutions, and held that the stipulation in the Regulations framed by the AICTE as regards the method of appointment to the post of lecturer being a requirement relating to maintenance of standards of technical education, the same will prevail over the corresponding provisions in the Special Rules.

                  13. One of the questions considered by the Apex Court in Jagdish Prasad Sharma was whether the Regulations framed by the University Grants Commission(UGC) under the University Grants Commission Act (UGC Act) which relate to Entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, could alter the conditions of service of teachers and other staff of the Universities and colleges affiliated to the Universities prescribed by the State in terms of enactments under Article 309 of the Constitution and the said question was answered by the Apex Court in the negative, holding that Under Entry 25 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the State is entitled to enact its own laws with regard to the service conditions of teachers and other staff of universities and colleges within the State and the same will have effect unless they are repugnant to any Central legislation. Paragraph 70 of the judgment in Jagdish Prasad Sharma dealing with the said question reads thus:

                  “70. The authority of the Commission to frame regulations with regard to the service conditions of teachers in the Centrally-funded educational institutions is equally well established. As has been very rightly done in the instant case, the acceptance of the Scheme in its composite form has been left to the discretion of the State Governments. The concern of the State Governments and their authorities that UGC has no authority to impose any conditions with regard to its educational institutions is clearly unfounded. There is no doubt that the Regulations framed by UGC relate to Schedule VII List I Entry 66 to the Constitution, but it does not empower the Commission to alter any of the terms and conditions of the enactments by the States under Article 309 of the Constitution. Under List III Entry 25, the State is entitled to enact its own laws with regard to the service conditions of the teachers and other staff of the universities and colleges within the State and the same will have effect unless they are repugnant to any Central legislation.”       (underline supplied)

                  It is seen that it was contended before this court in W.P.(C) Nos.10257 and 11511 of 2016 instituted by a few private college teachers that in view of the adoption of the Regulations issued by the UGC under the UGC Act by the State of Kerala, the Universities and affiliated colleges in the State are bound to comply with the same in its entirety including the provision therein as regards the age of superannuation of teachers, and sought identical reliefs as claimed by the petitioners in the present writ petitions. This court rejected the said contention and dismissed the said writ petitions, placing reliance on Jagdish Prasad Sharma, holding that the Regulations framed by the UGC under the UGC Act, which relate to Entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution cannot alter the conditions of service of persons serving a State prescribed in terms of the enactments under Article 309 of the Constitution. The said decision was affirmed by the Division Bench, and Civil Appeal No.5037 of 2022 preferred against the decision of the Division Bench before the Apex Court was dismissed on 02.08.2022, holding that the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Jagdish Prasad Sharma still hold the field. In the light of the decisions of the Apex Court in Jagdish Prasad Sharma and Civil Appeal No.5037 of 2022, there cannot be any doubt to the proposition that the Regulations framed under enactments which relate to Entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution cannot alter the conditions of the employees of the State Government prescribed in terms of enactments under Article 309 of the Constitution. Of course, those are judgments rendered in the context of the Regulations issued by the UGC under the UGC Act. As we are dealing with the Regulations issued by the AICTE under the AICTE Act in the cases on hand, the question to be considered is as to whether there exists any reason to take a view different from the view taken by the Apex Court in Jagdish Prasad Sharma.

                  14. Even though the power to legislate on all matters relating to State Public Services is included in Entry 41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution read with Article 246 of the Constitution, it is now settled that Article 309 is a special provision in respect of two specific matters namely, recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or the State. As such, there cannot be any doubt that in terms of enactments issued under Article 309 of the Constitution, the State is entitled to make rules regulating recruitment and conditions of service its employees, including the age of superannuation. As noted, the question considered by the Apex Court in Jagdish Prasad Sharma was whether the Regulations framed by the UGC under the UGC Act which relate to Entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution could alter any of the conditions of service of teachers and other staff of the Universities and colleges within the State prescribed in terms of the enactments under Article 309 of the Constitution. As already noticed, in Jagdish Prasad Sharma, the Apex Court answered the said question in the negative. In other words, the provisions in the Regulations framed under the Statutes relatable to Entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, to the extent the same encroach upon the power of the State Government to prescribe the conditions of service of its employees in terms of Article 309 of the Constitution, would be invalid. We do not find any reason why the said proposition cannot be applied in the context of the Regulations issued by the AICTE under the AICTE Act. Needless to say, the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Jagdish Prasad Sharma would squarely apply to the Regulations issued by the AICTE under the AICTE Act as well.”

17. In Dr.J.Vijayan [(2022) 17 SCC 177], the Apex Court held thus:

                  “27. As found by the Single Bench of the High Court, the decision to issue the Circular dated 14th August 2012, withdrawing the regulation regarding enhancement of the age of superannuation, was taken by the Central Government, in consultation with the States and in deference to the powers given to the States to prescribe the service conditions of its employees, which would fall within the ambit of policy decision, undisputedly within the exclusive domain of the respective State Governments. The Single Bench held that the Policy of the State Government, which is evidenced by the statutory provisions mandating teachers of aided affiliated colleges to retire at the age of 56 years, and that of the Universities at the age of 60 years, has been crystalized by enactments under Article 309 of the Constitution of India.

                  28. The Division Bench of the High Court, after hearing the respective parties found, and rightly, that most of the issues raised in the appeals were concluded against the Appellants by the judgment and order of this Court in Jagdish Prasad Sharma (supra). The Division Bench observed that this Court had held that it was mandatory for the UGC to be guided by the directions issued by the Central Government on questions of policy relating to national purposes by discharging its functions under the UGC Act. The Division Bench found that the UGC was bound to follow the directions issued by the Central Government in view of Section 20 of the UGC Act.

29. The Division Bench of the High Court also found that the State Governments had the discretion to accept the scheme proposed under the UGC Regulations relying on the judgment in Jagdish Prasad Sharma (supra) and in particular Paragraph 72, thereof. The Division Bench held:-

                  "14. It is in the light of the above authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court, that the present contentions of the counsel for the appellants are required to be considered. The contention that the UGC Regulations were made in exercise of the power under Entry 66 List l Schedule VII of the Constitution, while the State enactments are made under Entry 25 List III Schedule VII and for the said reason, in the event of repugnancy, the Central enactment would prevail, has to fail for more reasons than one. in the first place, the State Laws prescribing the age of retirement of teachers are made in exercise of the power under Article 309 of the Constitution.

                  The Apex Court has found Jagdish Prasad Sharma (supra) that such enactments would remain unaffected by the stipulations contained in the UGC Regulations. Secondly, it has been further held by the Court in the said decision that the UGC does not have any power to stipulate the service conditions of teachers. Therefore, such power is vested entirely in the State. Thirdly, obviously in recognition of the above position of law the UGC Regulations have conferred a discretion on the State Governments to decide whether to implement the Regulations or not. in view of the conferment of the discretion as noted above, no question of repugnancy arises in these cases. Therefore, we do not think it necessary to consider the above contention in any further detail.

                  15. On the next contention that the Scheme under the UGC Regulations, 2010 has to be accepted in full as a composite one and that adoption of the Scheme without enhancing the retirement age of teachers was bad, we find that the said issue has been concluded by the Supreme Court. Though a similar contention was put forward in Jagdish Prasad Sharma (supra) with respect to the Government Order dated 10.12.2010, the same did not find favour with the Court. The said Government Order evidenced herein as Ext. P10 in W.A. No. 854 of 2016 provides at paragraph 6 as follows:-

                  6. Government are also pleased to order that where there are any provision in the Regulations inconsistent with the provisions in the G.O. read as 1st paper above, those provisions in the G.P. would override the provisions in the Regulations to the extent of such inconsistency. Reference No. 1 in the said Government Order is to G.O.(P) NO. 58/2010/H.Edn. Dated 27.3.2010 (Ext.P8 in W.A. No. 854 of 2016). It is the said Government Order that is directed to prevail as per Clause 6 extracted above. It has been ordered by the said Government Order that the age of superannuation shall continue as at present. In the above context, it is necessary to notice that as per letter No. F.1- 7/2010-U.ll dated 14.08.2012 of the MHRD (a copy of which has been handed over to us by the Counsel in the Court), it has been clarified that the issue regarding age of retirement has been left to the decision of the State Governments. Paragraph 5 that deals with the above aspect is extracted hereunder for convenience of reference:

                  5. Bearing in mind that the question of enhancement of age of retirement is exclusively within the domain of the policy making power of the State Governments, the issue of age of retirement has been left to the State Governments to decide at their level. The condition of enhancement of age of superannuation to 65 years as mentioned in this Ministry's letter dated 31.12.2008 may be treated as withdrawn, for the purpose of seeking reimbursement of central share of arrears to be paid to State University and College teachers. However, the other conditions as mentioned in the letter cited above shall continue to apply.

                  Though a contention has been put forward by the counsel for the Appellants that, the condition has been withdrawn for the purpose of seeking reimbursement of the central share of arrears alone, we are not prepared to accept the same in view of the opening sentence in the said clause which declares in unambiguous terms that enhancement of age of retirement is exclusively within the domain of the powers of the State Government and that for the said reason, the issue of age of retirement has been left to the State Governments to decide at their level.

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                  17. In the view that we have taken above, we do not consider it necessary to refer to or discuss the other decisions on which reliance has been placed. The question of fixing the retirement age of teachers is essentially a matter of policy. The said policy would have to be adopted by the State Government taking into account a number of factors. As contended before us by the learned Additional Advocate General, the State of Kerala does not suffer from a dearth of qualified candidates to be appointed as teachers. There are a large number of qualified teachers, including Ph.D. Holders who are waiting for employment. They are persons trained in advanced methods of instruction and teaching techniques. At the same time, teachers like the appellants who are approaching retirement age are not persons who could be described as aged or infirm. They are in their prime of life, endowed with the rich experience both in teaching as well as in guiding research projects. The wisdom of the decision to superannuate them at such a prime point of time in their lives is also questionable. A decision can be taken only by balancing both the above aspects as well as other relevant factors that may require to be taken into account. Such an informed decision would have to be taken by the law makers and not by courts. As at present, the UGC Regulations, 2010 cannot affect the State laws governing the age of superannuation. UGC Regulations have in recognition of the above position granted a discretion to the State to take a decision with respect to the manner of implementation of the Regulations. Accordingly, the State Government has decided not to enhance the age of retirement. We notice that, a similar claim for enhancement in retirement age has been considered by another Division Bench of this Court and rejected in Mathai M.M. v. Elizabeth Xavier 2011 (2) K.L.T. 468. The said decision is also binding on

                  30. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants referred to paragraphs 68 and 72 of the judgment of this Court in Jagdish Prasad Sharma (supra) set out hereinbelow:-

                  "68. Another anxiety which is special to certain States, such as the States of Uttar Pradesh and Kerala, has also come to light during the hearing. In both the States, the problem is one of surplusage and providing an opportunity for others to enter into service. On behalf of the State of Kerala, it had been urged that there were a large number of educated unemployed youth, who are waiting to be appointed, but by retaining teachers beyond the age of 62 years, they were being denied such opportunity. As far as the State of U.P. is concerned, it is one of job expectancy, similar to that prevailing in Kerala. The State Governments of the said two States were, therefore, opposed to the adoption of the UGC Scheme, although, the same has not been made compulsorily applicable to the universities, colleges and other institutions under the control of the State authorities.

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                  72. As far as the States of Kerala and U.P. are concerned, they have their own problems which are localised and stand on a different footing from the other States, none of whom who appear to have the same problem. Education now being a List III subject, the State Government is at liberty to frame its own laws relating to education in the State and is not, therefore, bound to accept or follow the Regulations framed by UGC. It is only natural that if they wish to adopt the Regulations framed by the Commission under Section 26 of the UGC Act, 1956, the States will have to abide by the conditions as laid down by the Commission."

                  31. It is not understood how those paragraphs are of assistance to the Appellant. There is no finding in paragraph 68, but only discussion of facts, which led to the decision, and paragraph 72 is clearly against the Appellants. This Court unequivocally held that the State was not bound to accept or follow the UGC Regulations”.

18. As mentioned above, Annexure A1 notification issued by the Kerala Public Service Commission is in accordance with the executive orders issued by the Government. Whether the petitioner has to challenge those executive orders or whether the petitioner can challenge a particular stipulation in Annexure A1 notification alone is a matter yet to be considered by the Tribunal in the original application. Moreover, the reply statements of the respondents are also yet to be placed on record before the Tribunal. Therefore, at this stage, we are not entering into any finding on the issue involved in the original application, based on the contentions raised by the parties as mentioned above, as it will be a premature decision without the necessary pleadings. At this preliminary stage, the Tribunal cannot be found fault in declining the interim relief in favour of the petitioner as prayed in the original application. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner has not made out any sufficient ground to interfere with the declining of the interim reliefs by the Tribunal, and instead, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal can be directed to dispose of the original application itself on merits.

                  In the result, this original petition is disposed of, directing the respondents to file their reply statements before the Tribunal as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, if the reply statements are not already filed. The petitioner is entitled to move before the Tribunal for an early hearing of the original application itself on merits, pointing out the urgency, if so advised.