logo

This Product is Licensed to ,

Change Font Style & Size  Show / Hide

24

  •            

 
CDJ 2026 Ker HC 303 print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Kerala
Case No : WP(CRL.) No. 14 of 2026
Judges: THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K. JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE JOBIN SEBASTIAN
Parties : Sophia Shaji Versus State Of Kerala Represented By The Chief Secretary, Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: Bimal Prasad, Annie Edna Arakkel, Advocates. For the Respondents: Alka Warriar, CGC ADV, K.A. Anas – GP.
Date of Judgment : 23-02-2026
Head Note :-
Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 - Section 3(1) -

Comparative Citation:
2026 KER 16090,
Judgment :-

Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated 14.08.2025 passed against one Shaji P. C. @ Mayakkam Shaji ('detenu' for the sake of brevity), under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (‘PITNDPS Act’ for brevity). The petitioner herein is the wife of the detenu. The said order stands confirmed by the Government vide order dated 17.11.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of one year with effect from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that, on 14.05.2025, a proposal was submitted by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Kochi City, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the PITNDPS Act before the jurisdictional authority. Altogether, four cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.727/2025 of Aluva Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 22(b) and 29 of the NDPS Act.

3. We heard Sri. Bimal Prasad, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Ext.P6 order is illegal, arbitrary, and was passed without proper application of mind. According to the learned counsel, there is an inordinate delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the detention order, and hence, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention is snapped. The learned counsel further urged that the jurisdictional authority passed the detention order without taking note of the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity, and the conditions imposed on him at the time of granting bail itself were sufficient to deter the detenu from being involved in further criminal activities. According to the learned counsel, the sufficiency of the bail conditions was not properly considered by the jurisdictional authority, and passed the impugned order in a mechanical manner. The learned counsel further submitted that, though the impugned order was passed on 14.08.2025, the same was executed only on 08.09.2025. According to the counsel, the said delay in executing the order is unjustifiable and will breach the statutory provision regarding the execution of such an order. On these premises, the learned counsel submitted that the detention order is liable to be set aside.

5. In response, the learned Government Pleader asserted that there is no delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the Ext.P6 detention order. The learned Government Pleader further submitted that the jurisdictional authority passed the Ext.P6 order after taking note of the fact that the detenu was on bail in connection with the last prejudicial activity and after being satisfied that the bail conditions imposed while granting bail to the detenu are not sufficient to prevent him from being involved in criminal activities. The learned Government Pleader further urged that the order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction, and hence, warrants no interference.

6. The records reveal that the detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after considering the recurrent involvement of the detenu in narcotic criminal activities. As already stated, four cases in which the detenu got involved formed the basis for passing the detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.727/2025 of Aluva Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 22(b) and 29 of the NDPS Act. The incident that led to the registration of the said case occurred on 30.03.2025, and the detenu was caught red-handed with the contraband on the same day itself. As evident from the records, he was granted bail in the said case on 05.07.2025. It was on 14.05.2025 that the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the PITNDPS Act was forwarded by the sponsoring authority. We are cognizant of the fact that there is a delay of around one and a half months in mooting the proposal from the date of the last prejudicial activity. However, while considering the said delay, it cannot be ignored that till 07.07.2025, the detenu was under judicial custody. Since the detenu was in jail till 07.07.2025, obviously, there was no basis for any apprehension regarding the imminent repetition of criminal activities by him. Moreover, the proposal was forwarded on 14.05.2025, i.e., while the detenu was under judicial custody. Therefore, the delay that occurred in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the detention order is only negligible and is of little consequence.

7. One of the main contentions taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that it was without taking note of the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity and without considering the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court at the time of granting bail, that the jurisdictional authority passed the the impugned order of detention. While considering the contention of the counsel for the petitioner in the above regard, it is to be noted that there is no law that precludes the jurisdictional authority from passing an order of detention against a person who is already on bail. However, when an order of detention is passed against a person who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on such a person while granting bail by the court are sufficient to restrain him from being involved in criminal activities. Undisputedly, an order of detention is a drastic measure against a person. Therefore, when there are other effective remedies available under the ordinary criminal law to deter a person from engaging in criminal activities, an order of preventive detention is neither necessitated nor legally permissible. Therefore, when a person is already on bail, the compelling circumstances that necessitated passing an order of detention should be reflected in the order itself.

8. Keeping in mind the above, while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that in the impugned order itself, the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the cases registered against him is specifically adverted to. Moreover, in the impugned order, the sufficiency of the bail conditions is also seen properly considered by the jurisdictional authority. In the impugned order, it is specifically mentioned that the bail conditions and other preventive measures are not sufficient to crub detenu’s drug peddling activities, as similar bail conditions have been violated by him in the past. Similarly, in Ext.P6 order, it is further stated that from the detenu’s past criminal activities, it is evident that if he is released on bail with conditions, he is likely to violate those conditions, and there is a high propensity that he will indulge in drug peddling activities in the future. Moreover, the conditions imposed by the court while granting bail are also extracted in the impugned order. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the sufficiency of the bail conditions was not considered by the jurisdictional authority cannot be sustained.

9. From a perusal of the records, it is evident that the detention order, though passed on 14.08.2025, was executed only on 08.09.2025. Thus, there is a delay of approximately one month in the execution of the impugned order. While examining the said delay, it is relevant to note that in the last case registered against the detenu, he was granted bail on 05.07.2025 subject to certain stringent conditions. One of the conditions required him to appear before the Investigating Officer for interrogation between 10.00 a.m. and 11.00 a.m. every Saturday for a period of three months. There is absolutely no convincing material on record to show that the detenu violated any of the said conditions. Furthermore, had the detenu failed to comply with the condition requiring his appearance before the Investigating Officer, it was always open to the Investigating Officer to move an application for cancellation of bail. Admittedly, no such application has been filed. The only reasonable inference, therefore, is that the detenu was scrupulously complying with the bail conditions and was available within the local jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the delay in executing the detention order remains unexplained and unjustified. Consequently, the submission of the learned Government Pleader that the detenu had absconded after the passing of the detention order, and that such abscondence occasioned the delay in its execution, cannot be accepted. The delayed execution of the impugned order is fatal, particularly when no convincing explanation whatsoever has been assigned for the said delay. When there is no special reason that justifies the delayed execution, the same is a ground to interfere with the impugned order.

10. In the result, this Writ Petition is allowed and the Ext.P6 detention order is set aside. The Superintendent of Central Prison, Poojappura, Thiruvananthapuram, is directed to release the detenu, Sri. Shaji P. C. @ Mayakkam Shaji, forthwith, if his detention is not required in connection with any other case.

                  The Registry is directed to communicate the order to the Superintendent of Central Prison, Poojappura, Thiruvananthapuram, forthwith.

 
  CDJLawJournal