1. Present writ petition is filed seeking following relief:

                  “… to issue a Writ, order or direction, more particularly, one in the nature of Writ of Certiorari as under: a) Call for the records relating to and connected with proceeding No.SKU/EE-1/2005, dated 24-05-2005, of the respondents and quash or set a side the same holding it as unconstitutional and illegal; B) consequently, direct the respondents to treat and continue the writ petitioner in the service of the 1st respondent University as Professor of Management Studies without any regard being had to the impugned proceedings No.SKU/EE-1/2005, dated 24-05- 2005, and pass ….”

2. (a) Petitioner initially was appointed as Associate Professor through direct recruitment in pursuance to the notification issued by respondent University. Such appointment was made on 11.12.1989. While in service, in pursuance to yet another notification, which notified the posts for selection of Professors in Management, as advertised on 11.03.1992, petitioner was successful and accordingly, came to be appointed as Professor of Management by proceedings, dated 13.08.1992. Such appointment was subject to completion of probation period of two years. On completion of two years, the respondents have declared probation by proceedings, dated 07.01.1995, to be effective from 14.08.1994.

                  (b) Petitioner, thereafter, stated to have been appointed as Director, Centre for Distance Education. In the process of discharging duties as such in the said capacity, certain complaints were made alleging financial irregularities to the tune of Rs.24.00 Lakhs on account of negligence and dereliction of duties by the petitioner. Preliminary enquiry committee was appointed on 19.11.2001 to examine aforesaid allegations. Eventually, a report was submitted and on account of the same, petitioner was issued charge memo, dated 27.06.2002, setting out four articles of charges. Petitioner had submitted explanation to those charges refuting the same. The enquiry committee, which comprised of Retired Judge of this Court along with two other members, after going into the specifics of charges held that charges 1 and 3 were not proved and charges 2 and 4 were proved.

                  (c) Based on the said report, show-cause notice, dated 22.01.2005, came to be issued to the petitioner proposing punishment, for which petitioner had submitted explanation, dated 24.02.2005. Upon considering the same, the Executive Council of respondent University passed order, dated 21.05.2005, imposing punishment of reverting the petitioner permanently to lowest rank of Associate Professor to which he was originally recruited directly and placed in lowest seniority in the said cadre, besides effecting minimum of time scale of pay of Associate Professor at Rs.12,000/- on such reversion. The said punishment was purported to have been imposed in exercise of powers under Rule 6(iv) of the S.V. University Service (Discipline, Control and Appeal) Rules (for short, “the Rules”), which was adopted by the respondent University. Assailing aforesaid order of 1st respondent, present writ petition came to be preferred.

3. This Court by interim order, dated 20.06.2005, suspended the operation of the impugned punishment order. Now, it is stated that petitioner has attained the age of superannuation in the month of June, 2013.

4. Heard Sri C.Srinivasa Baba, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri O.Udaya Kumar, learned standing counsel for the respondent University.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while reiterating the averments those that are made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, confined his submissions on two aspects as mentioned below:

                  (i) He contended that the proposed punishment of permanent reversion to the post of Associate Professor is clearly in contravention to Rule 6(iv) of the Rules for the reason that, firstly, inasmuch as petitioner has been recruited to the post of Professor, any such reversion could have been only to the lowest post as recruited initially i.e., Professor, but not Associate Professor at any rate, and secondly, the Rule does not envisage permanent reversion, therefore, on that count, the impugned order has to be set aside;

                  (ii) Though a specific plea was raised in grounds (e) and (f), the respondents did not choose to deal with aforesaid submission, therefore, he urged to allow the writ petition in-toto.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent University, on the other hand, has tried to support the order under challenge, by contending that the punishment that has been imposed by the University was strictly in accordance with Rule 6(iv) of the Rules. It is contended that as petitioner initially, in pursuance to the first notification, was appointed as Associate Professor, even if he later got selected and appointed as Professor, the entry into service of University should be taken into consideration for the purpose of construing Rule 6(iv) of the Rules, but not the post to which he has been directly recruited, therefore, the punishment of reversion of petitioner to the lowest post i.e., Associate Professor is validly justified. It is further contended that insofar as reverting permanently, as Rule is silent on the said aspect, the University is well within its power to effect permanent reversion and hence, tried to justify the orders of the University.

7. Both the learned counsels have confined their arguments only to aforesaid aspects and nothing on merits of the charges were argued, as it was felt not necessary at this stage.

8. Perused the record and considered the respective submissions of both the learned counsels.

9. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contentions, it is apt to refer to Rule 6(iv) of the Rules, as entire controversy revolves around it, which reads as follows:

                  “6. The following penalties may for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed upon the members of the University service namely:-

                  (i) ….

                  (ii) ….

                  (iii) ….

                  (iv) Reduction to a lower rank in the seniority list or to a lower post not being lower than to which she/he is directly recruited, whether in the same service or in the some other service or to a lower time scale not being lower than that to which she/he is directly recruited or to a lower stage in a time scale.”

10. It is an admitted fact that petitioner initially was directly recruited as Reader (Associate Professor) on 11.12.1989. Later, in pursuance to yet another notification, he got directly recruited as Professor by appointment order, dated 13.08.1992. The probation also came to be declared by proceedings, dated 07.01.1995, confirming the probation with effect from 14.08.1994.

11. In the said backdrop, now it has to be seen whether the punishment that has been imposed on petitioner by way of reversion to lowest post of Associate Professor is well within the scheme of the Rules and that the Rules envisaged such reversion to be made permanently.

12. A close glance of the Rules, in particular, Rule 6(iv), goes to show that the same envisages specific punishments/penalties which the disciplinary authority empowered to impose on the delinquent employees. It is empowered to impose punishment of censure/fine, withholding of increments/ promotion, reversion to lower rank etc. We are concerned with sub-rule (iv) of Rule 6, which envisages reversion to lower post not being lower than to which the person has been directly recruited. A close analysis of the said sub-rule goes to show that the language employed therein clearly envisages the disciplinary authority to exercise the power to impose punishment to the extent of effecting reduction to a lower post not being lower than to which the delinquent was directly recruited. Conspicuously, it does not mention or use the expression “first recruited”, to hold otherwise.

13. Though, learned counsel for the respondent University tried to persuade this Court by contending that if in case the delinquent had been directly recruited to a post initially and later yet again got selected and directly recruited in higher post, the punishment contemplated under sub- rule (iv) of Rule 6 should relate back to the direct recruitment to the lowest post, but not in the highest position. This Court is afraid by adoption of such course of construction would amount to adding words to the Rule which otherwise is impermissible. A plain reading of the Rule clearly indicates that the punishment of reversion shall be confined to the lowest post to which he/she was directly recruited. As petitioner later has been directly recruited as Professor and continuing so as on the date of initiation of disciplinary proceedings, and probation was also declared as such to the post of Professor, the lowest post to which he could have been reverted would be the very same post of direct recruit, but not to any other post inferior to.

14. Further, the Rule also does not envisage reversion to a lower rank on permanent basis. What all it envisages is to place a person in the lowest post to which he/she was originally directly recruited. Since penal provisions are required to be strictly construed, unless there is a specific intendment of imposing a punishment of reversion permanently, nothing can be read and imported into the Rule.

15. It is trite law that the disciplinary authority has to exercise the powers of imposing penalty within the framework of the Rules and cannot travel beyond and punishment imposed outside the purview of the statutory framework is nullity and cannot be enforced. (Vijay Singh v. State of U.P.1 and Union of India v. Pranab Kumar Nath2).

16. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that the punishment imposed by the respondent University in the teeth of Rule 6(iv) of the Rules is unsustainable and hence, the impugned order is hereby set aside. It is needless to say that the petitioner shall be construed to have been in service as Professor, and his service should be construed as such for the purpose of awarding the retirement benefits.

17. Accordingly, the writ petition stands disposed of. No order as to costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending consideration, if any, in this case shall stand closed.