Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated 30.10.2025 passed against one Shihabudheen, the detenu, under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity). The petitioner herein is the brother of the detenu. The said order of detention was confirmed by the Government vide order dated 06.01.2026, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months, from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that, it was after considering the recurrent involvement of the detenu in criminal activities, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Thrissur City, on 11.09.2025, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known goonda’ as defined under Section 2(o) (ii) of the KAA(P) Act.

3. Altogether, four cases in which the detenu got involved were considered by the jurisdictional authority for issuing Ext.P1 order of detention. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.843/2025 of Kunnamkulam Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 22(b)(ii)(B) and 29 of the NDPS Act, and 111(4) of the Bharaitya Nyaya Sanhita (for short “BNS”) the detenu is arrayed as the 1st accused in the said case.

4. We heard Sri. Vivek P. K., the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri.K.A.Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Ext.P1 order is illegal, arbitrary, and was passed without proper application of mind. The learned counsel further urged that the jurisdictional authority passed the impugned order of detention without taking note of the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity, and the conditions imposed on him at the time of granting bail itself were sufficient to deter the detenu from being involved in further criminal activities. According to the learned counsel, the sufficiency of the bail conditions was not properly considered by the jurisdictional authority, and the impugned order was casually passed. The learned counsel further submitted that the detenu has no involvement in the last case registered against him, and the said case was not a qualified one to be considered for passing a detention order under the KAA(P) Act. The learned counsel also urged that an application seeking cancellation of bail was already pending and, therefore, there was no necessity to invoke the provisions of the KAA(P) Act in haste, as cancellation of bail itself would have been an effective remedy to prevent the detenu from repeating criminal activities. The learned counsel further pointed out that there is a time gap of around two years between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case, and the said time gap itself will show that the detenu is not a person having a propensity to engage in criminal activities repeatedly. On these premises, it was argued that Ext.P1 is liable to be set aside.

6. In response, the learned Government Pleader asserted that the jurisdictional authority passed Ext. P1 order after taking note of the fact that the detenu was on bail in connection with the last prejudicial activity and after being satisfied that the bail conditions imposed while granting bail to the detenu are not sufficient to prevent him from being involved in criminal activities. The learned Government Pleader further contended that the detenu has a significant role in the last case registered against him and, therefore, cannot be heard to contend that the said case does not qualify for the initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act against him. The learned Government Pleader further contended that the mere pendency of a bail cancellation application does not preclude the detaining authority from passing a detention order, as cancellation of bail is not always an effective remedy to curb the criminal activities of habitual offenders. The learned Government Pleader further urged that the order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority upon proper application of mind and after arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction, and hence, warrants no interference.

7. Altogether, four cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing Ext.P1 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.843/2025 of Kunnamkulam Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 22(b)(ii)(B) and 29 of the NDPS Act, and 111(4) of the BNS. The incident that led to the registration of the said case occurred on 12.07.2025, and the detenu was arrested on the same day. It was on 11.09.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the said case, that the sponsoring authority mooted the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act against him. Subsequently, he was released on bail on 22.09.2025. Later, on 30.10.2025, Ext.P1 order of detention was passed. The sequence of the events narrated above clearly shows that there is no unreasonable delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the detention order.

8. As already stated, the main contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that it was without taking note of the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity and without considering the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court at the time of granting bail, the jurisdictional authority passed the impugned order of detention. While considering the contention of the counsel for the detenu in the above regard, it is to be noted that there is no law that precludes the jurisdictional authority from passing an order of detention against a person who is already on bail. However, when an order of detention has to be passed against a person who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on such a person while granting bail by the court are sufficient to restrain him from being involved in criminal activities.

9. Keeping in mind the above, while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that in the impugned order itself, the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered against him with respect to the last prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to. Moreover, in the impugned order, it is stated that the detenu has blatantly violated the stringent bail conditions imposed by the courts and is involved in cases one after another. Likewise, it is stated that the bail conditions are not sufficient to curb the detenu’s criminal activities. However, indeed, the conditions imposed by the court while granting bail are not extracted in the impugned order. However, there is no legal requirement that bail conditions be extracted in the order of detention. However, what is required is that the jurisdictional authority shall consider the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed in the bail order. In the impugned order, it is clearly mentioned that the proceedings already initiated against the detenu under ordinary criminal law did not yield any result, and the detenu is involved in criminal activities repeatedly, disregarding the bail conditions imposed in the earlier cases. A holistic reading of the impugned order further reveals that the act of the detenu violating the bail conditions and being involved in criminal activities is one of the materials which the jurisdictional authority relied on to enter into a subjective satisfaction to pass the detention order. Therefore, it cannot be said that the jurisdictional authority did not consider the sufficiency of the bail condition imposed on the detenu at the time of granting bail to him. The impugned order reveals that the antecedents of the detenu, which included criminal activities and the undermining of earlier bail orders, persuaded the detaining authority to arrive at a subjective satisfaction regarding the necessity of passing the order. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard will fail.

10. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the detenu is totally innocent in the case last registered against him. According to the counsel, as the detenu is totally innocent in that case, the said case ought not have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for arriving at its objective as well as subjective satisfaction. While considering the said contention, it is pertinent to note that in the last case registered against the detenu, very  serious  allegations  are  attributed  to  him.  The  jurisdictional authority passed the detention order after being satisfied that the detenu had active involvement in the said crime. Moreover, from the impugned order and other materials produced along with the writ petition, it is discernible that the detenu detenu was arrayed as the 1st accused. It is well settled that there is no requirement in law that a case should culminate in a conviction or a final report should be invariably filed for treating the same as a qualified case for the purpose of preventive detention. The jurisdiction exercised under the KAA(P) Act is a jurisdiction of suspicion. Likewise, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the jurisdictional authority, being based on relevant materials, cannot be lightly interfered with. We are therefore of the considered view that the satisfaction of the jurisdictional authority regarding the involvement of the detenu in the last prejudicial activity cannot be faulted with.

11. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, though in the detention order it is mentioned that an application has been submitted for cancellation of bail granted to the detenu in one of the cases registered against him, the jurisdictional authority passed Ext.P1 order without considering the said fact properly. According to the counsel, as an alternative remedy of cancellation of bail was available to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities, a drastic measure of preventive detention was not at all necessitated.

12. We are not oblivious to the fact that when an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to detention under preventive detention laws is neither warranted nor permissible. However, merely because a bail cancellation petition is pending, it cannot be said that an order of detention under the KAA(P) Act cannot be passed. When there is an imminent danger of repetition of criminal activities by a person who can be classified as ‘known goonda’ or ‘known rowdy’, cancellation of bail orders already secured by him would not be sufficient to deter such a person from indulging in criminal activities. The reason is that, first of all, the purpose and scope of an application for cancellation of bail and preventive detention are different. That apart, the bail cancellation procedure, having regard to the ground realities, is a time-consuming one. There is no assurance that an order of cancellation of bail could be secured in time before the person concerned indulges in another criminal activity. Preventive detention laws are enacted to address such exigencies. It is on account of these reasons that it has been held by the courts consistently that the authorities under the preventive detention laws need not wait till orders are passed on the application for cancellation of bail, for passing an order of detention. If it is held that, if there is an option for cancellation of bail, a detention order cannot be passed, it would render the preventive detention laws ineffective. Moreover, even after the cancellation of bail, there is no legal impediment in granting bail subsequently. Therefore, the pendency of the bail cancellation petition has no significance and the same, by itself, will not constitute a valid ground to interfere with the detention order.

13. While considering the contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the jurisdictional authority failed to take note of the fact that there was a time gap of around two years between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu, and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is vitiated. According to the counsel, the said time gap itself will reveal that the detenu is not a person having a propensity to engage in criminal activities repeatedly. It is true that the last prejudicial activity was committed by the detenu on 12.07.2025, whereas the date of occurrence of the penultimate case registered against him, i.e., crime No.1175/2023 of Kunnumkulam Police Station, is on 12.08.2023. Thus, there is indeed a gap of around two years between the two incidents. Anyhow, all the cases registered against the detenu and considered for passing the detention order are with respect to incidents that occurred within seven years. Therefore, the time gap of around two years between the last two cases highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of little consequence in the context of the impugned order.

14. From a perusal of the records, we are satisfied that all the necessary procedural requirements before and after passing an order under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act have been scrupulously complied with in this case. We are further satisfied that the competent authority passed the detention order after thoroughly verifying all the materials placed by the sponsoring authority and after arriving at the requisite objective, as well as subjective satisfaction. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act is vitiated in any manner.

                  In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.