1. Appellants have filed this application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking to condone the delay of 493 days in filing the M.F.A.(RCT). Respondent filed a counter affidavit objecting condonation of delay. When the application was taken up for hearing, the learned Central Government Counsel Adv.Rohith R.Kartha raised an objection that the power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not available to this Court in the case of an appeal filed under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987. The learned counsel cited some judgments of other High Courts in support of his contention. The learned counsel for the appellants Adv.Simi S.Ali per contra submitted that the delay can be condoned invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act and relied on some other judgments rendered by different High Courts. No pronouncement directly dealing with the legal issue raised by the learned Central Government Counsel rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court or this Court could be noticed. Hence, this Court appointed Adv.K.C.Harish as Amicus Curiae and heard him as also the learned counsel appearing for the parties extensively.

2. I shall address the arguments after noting the relevant statutory provisions. Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 provides for appeals from every order not being an interlocutory order of the Claims Tribunal to the High Court. The provision is extracted hereunder: -

                  “23. Appeals.—(1) Save as provided in sub- section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every order, not being an interlocutory order, of the Claims Tribunal, to the High Court having jurisdiction over the place where the Bench is located.

                  (2) No appeal shall lie from an order passed by the Claims Tribunal with the consent of the parties.

                  (3)      Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of the order appealed against.”

3. It is pertinent to remark that no power to condone delay in filing the appeal is expressly provided under Section 23 or any other provisions of the Act.

4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads as under:-

                  “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

                  Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

5. Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act also needs to be referred. It reads as under:-

                  “29. Savings.-

                  …..................

                  (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. ”

6. As submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned Central Government Counsel, different High Courts have expressed conflicting views regarding the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987. Following judgments were cited by the learned counsel for the appellants wherein the respective High Courts held that the provisions of Section 5 will apply:-

                  i) Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sahoo

                  [2013 SCC OnLine Ori 635].

                  ii) Kapil and Others v. Union of India and Others [2017 SCC OnLine MP 795].

                  iii) Gurbachan Kaur and Another v. Union of India [2019 SCC OnLine P&H 7474].

7. In Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sahoo [2013 SCC OnLine Ori 635] a learned Single Judge of the Orissa High Court held as under:-

                  “9. In the instant case, it is found on analyzing the scheme of the Act that the provision under Section 17(2) of the Act has been made giving the jurisdiction to the Tribunal to entertain an application after the period specified under sub-section (1) thereof on showing sufficient cause for not making the application within such period & there is no such provision in Section 23 in respect of an appeal preferred against an order of the Tribunal. In the absence of any specific provision excluding the applicability of the Limitation Act, this Court is of the view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an appeal preferred under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act.”

8. In Kapil and Others v. Union of India and Others [2017 SCC OnLine MP 795] a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court considered a reference on the question regarding applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and answered thus:-

                  “66. To summarize, it is stated that in the absence of any specific exclusion of the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, either in the form of a specific provision or by necessary intendment or inference in the Claims Tribunal Act which is not a complete code in itself, specifically in view of the fact that the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 are not directly or indirectly in conflict with any provisions relating to filing of an appeal before the High Court contained in the Claims Tribunal Act nor do the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act render any provision relating to the filing of an appeal contained in the Claims Tribunal Act otiose or redundant, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to the filing of an appeal under Section 23 of the Claims Tribunal Act by virtue of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Act.

                  67. We are also of the considered opinion that reading the provisions of Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act in terms of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act into the provisions of the Claims Tribunal Act, which we have held is not a complete code in itself, would in fact further the object and purpose for enacting the Claims Tribunal Act which is a benevolent beneficial and welfare legislation and is enacted with the avowed purpose of providing adequate and speedy remedy for decision in respect of claims arising out of untoward incidents and railway accidents and other disputes.

                  68. In the light of the above discussion we hold that the decision of the learned single Bench in the case of Kunjmati (supra) does not lay down the correct proposition of law and is accordingly overruled and in answer to the question referred to us we state that in view of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is included in and has to be read into the provisions of the Claims Tribunals Act as it has not been expressly excluded therefrom either by a specific statutory provision or by necessary intendment or inference and, therefore, the High Court has the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal filed under Section 23 of the Claims Tribunal Act in exercise of powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, on sufficient cause being shown by an appellant.”

9. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Gurbachan Kaur and Another v. Union of India [2019 SCC OnLine P&H 7474] considered the same issue. The learned Single Judge referred to the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Kapil and others (supra) and also a judgment of the Patna High Court and concluded as follows:-

                  “17. Being respectfully in full agreement with the aforesaid views expressed by Patna High Court and Madya Pradesh High Court, this Court would also hold that the provisions of Limitation Act are applicable only to the Courts and the Appellate Forum under Section 23 of the Act being High Court can definitely be held to be a Court, thus, the provisions of Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would be applicable and the High Court would have power to extend the period of limitation in a given case.”

10. The learned Central Government Counsel cited a judgment of the Madras High Court in Union of India v. G.Chandrasekharan [MANU/TN/4285/2010]. A learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court concluded as under:-

                  “17. On a careful consideration of respective contentions and in view of the fact that Section 28 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, which enjoins that the "provisions of this Act shall have effect not withstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act" and also bearing in mind a very essential fact that Section 23 of the Railway Claims Act, 1987, relating to appeals does not provide for condonation of delay in preferring the appeals, this Court is of the considered view that the limitation of 90 days for filing of an appeal as per Section 23(3) of the Act cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and viewed in that perspective, the present Miscellaneous Petition fails.”

11. The learned Central Government Counsel relied on a judgment of the Guwahati High Court also. In Union of India v. Jasiruddin Talukdar [2010 SCC OnLine Gau 67] a learned Single Judge of the Guwahati High Court analysed the same question of law and held as under:-

                  “27. In the instant case, however, the period of limitation prescribed under the Railway Claims Tribunal Act and under the Limitation Act for filing an appeal before the High Court and application before the appellate authority is same, i.e., 90 days. As indicated hereinabove, the legislative enacted the Act with the specific object of speedy adjudication of the claim cases by setting forth railway tribunal. Section 17 of the Act empower to the tribunal to condone the delay in filing the application in the event of showing sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period. However, no such right has been recognized in case of filing an appeal. The Legislature certainly being conscious of the relevant facts and considering the object of the Act did not make [Corrected vide order dated 13.12.2010.] any provision for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Accordingly, the provision of Section 29(2) of the Act is held to be not applicable in the instant case.

                  28. An appeal is a creature of the statute. Unless there is statutory right of an appeal, no appeal lies. Accordingly, the necessary period of limitation prescribed or fixed for filing the appeal would also be required to be followed as per mandate of the statute itself. As because the procedure of filing and disposal is contemplated to be done under the provision of order 41, rule 1, CPC but that would not confer the power to condone the delay in filing the appeal by filing necessary application for condonation of delay. For such purpose, the appellant must look to the provisions of the Act itself which confers the right of appeal.

                  29. If certain such special statutes like Workmen's Compensation Act, 1951, Consumer Protection Act, 1956 and Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, are surveyed, it is found that while making provisions for filing appeal against the order/award passed by the authority, the Legislature provided the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal so prescribed which is manifestly absent in the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, which is also an indicative of the fact that the Legislature consciously omitted to provide in case of an appeal filed under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act.

                  30. Therefore, considering all these aspects and the various provisions of the Act, the court is of the opinion that Legislature has intended to exclude the provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act or to provide power to condone the delay in filing the appeal against an award of the Railway Claims Tribunal. The expressed intention of the Legislature is not entitled to substitute by the court. Where a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in certain way, it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other modes of performances are necessarily forbidden. (Ref. Hukan Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 128 : AIR 1976 SC 789). Further, it would also not proper for the court to direct the authority to act in contravention of the provision of law and direction beyond the provision of the statute would be destructive of the Rule of law.

                  In the case of Mandira Sita Ramji v. Governor of Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC 298 : AIR 1974 SC 1868, the Apex Court held that when a procedure is prescribed by the Legislature, it is not for the court to substitute a different one according to its notion of justice. When the Legislature has spoken, the judges cannot afford to be wiser.

                  31. For all the discussions made hereinabove, I do not find that the statute [ Corrected vide order dated 13.12.2010.] has provided any power to this court for condoning the delay in filing the appeal under section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987.”

12. The learned Amicus Curiae cited the following judgments:-

                  i) Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker [(1995) 5 SCC 5].

                  ii) Superintending Engineer/Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Beas Management Board (pw) Slapper & Anr. v. Excise And Taxation Officer, Sundernagar/assessing Authority [AIRONLINE 2019 SC 1380].

                  iii) Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar [(2008) 9 SCC 527].

                  iv) Consolidated Engineering Enterprises and Another v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and others [(2008) 7 SCC 169].

                  v) K.K.Pushpakaran v. Union of India [2007 SCC OnLine Ker 157].

                  vi) Union of India v. U.M.F. Industries Ltd. [2015 SCC OnLine Gau 908].

                  vii) Kujmati (Smt.) v. Union of India [2015 SCC OnLine MP 7453].

                  viii) Gurbachan Kaur and Another v. Union of India [2019 SCC OnLine P&H 7474].

13. In Mukri Gopalan (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the applicability of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the case of an appeal to the Rent Control Appellate Authority under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:-

                  “10. In the light of the aforesaid analysis of the relevant clauses of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, let us see whether Section 18 of the Rent Act providing for a statutory appeal to the appellate authority satisfies the aforesaid twin conditions for attracting the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It cannot be disputed that Kerala Rent Act is a special Act or a local law. It also cannot be disputed that it prescribes for appeal under Section 18 a period of limitation which is different from the period prescribed by the Schedule as the Schedule to the Limitation Act does not contemplate any period of limitation for filing appeal before the appellate authority under Section 18 of the Rent Act or in other words it prescribes nil period of limitation for such an appeal. It is now well settled that a situation wherein a period of limitation is prescribed by a special or local law for an appeal or application and for which there is no provision made in the Schedule to the Act, the second condition for attracting Section 29(2) would get satisfied. As laid down by a majority decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel [AIR 1964 SC 1099 : (1964) 6 SCR 129], when the First Schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes no time-limit for a particular appeal, but the special law prescribes a time-limit for it, it can be said that under the First Schedule of the Limitation Act all appeals can be filed at any time, but the special law by limiting it provides for a different period, while the former permits the filing of an appeal at any time, the latter limits it to be filed within the prescribed period. It is therefore, different from that prescribed in the former and thus Section 29(2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act.

                  11. It is also obvious that once the aforesaid two conditions are satisfied Section 29(2) on its own force will get attracted to appeals filed before appellate authority under Section 18 of the Rent Act. When Section 29(2) applies to appeals under Section 18 of the Rent Act, for computing the period of limitation prescribed for appeals under that Section, all the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. Section 5 being one of them would therefore get attracted. It is also obvious that there is no express exclusion anywhere in the Rent Act taking out the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals filed before appellate authority under Section 18 of the Act. Consequently, all the legal requirements for applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals in the light of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act can be said to have been satisfied. That was the view taken by the minority decision of the learned Single Judge of Kerala High Court in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma [AIR 1974 Ker 162 : 1973 KLT 138]. The majority did not agree on account of its wrong supposition that appellate authority functioning under Section 18 of the Rent Act is a persona designata. Once that presumption is found to be erroneous as discussed by us earlier, it becomes at once clear that minority view in the said decision was the correct view and the majority view was an erroneous view.

                  …...........................................................................

                  14. In view of the aforesaid provision of Section 29(2) as found in Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Section 5 would not have applied to appellate authorities constituted under Section 18 as Section 5 would not get attracted as per the then existing Section 29(2) of Indian Limitation Act, 1908 which did not include Section 5 as one of the provisions to be applied to such special or local laws. That appears to be the reason why during the time when the Limitation Act, 1908 was in force, the Rent Act of 1959 which is the forerunner of present Rent Act of 1965 contained a provision in Section 31 of that Act which read as under:

                  “31. Application of the Limitation Act.— The provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), shall apply to all proceedings under this Act;”

                  15. After repealing of Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and its replacement by the present Limitation Act of 1963 a fundamental change was made in Section 29(2). The present Section 29(2) as already extracted earlier clearly indicates that once the requisite conditions for its applicability to given proceedings under special or local law are attracted, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 both inclusive would get attracted which obviously would bring in Section 5 which also shall apply to such proceedings unless applicability of any of the aforesaid sections of the Limitation Act is expressly excluded by such special or local law. By this change it is not necessary to expressly state in a special law that the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to the determination of the periods under it. By the general provision contained in Section 29(2) this provision is made applicable to the periods prescribed under the special laws. An express mention in the special law is necessary only for any exclusion. It is on this basis that when the new Rent Act was passed in 1965 the provision contained in old Section 31 was omitted. It becomes therefore apparent that on a conjoint reading of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act of 1963 and Section 18 of the Rent Act of 1965, provisions of Section 5 would automatically get attracted to those proceedings, as there is nothing in the Rent Act of 1965 expressly excluding the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals under Section 18 of the Rent Act.”

14. He also cited the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Superintending Engineer/Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Beas Management Board (pw) Slapper & Anr. v. Excise And Taxation Officer, Sundernagar/ Assessing Authority [AIR ONLINE 2019 SC 1380]. The question considered by the Apex Court was regarding applicability of the provisions of the Section 5 of the Act to revision petitions under the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act, 2005. Reference to the following paragraph of the judgment is profitable:-

                  “22. The High Court has relied upon the decision of this Court in Patel Brothers (supra) in the context of the Assam VAT Act in which the abovementioned provision of section 84 made the difference, which makes specific provision that only sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act are applicable. Consequently, it follows that other provisions are not applicable. The decision in Hongo India Private Limited (supra) also turned on the scheme of the Excise Act. The scheme of the Excise Act is materially different than that of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act. Thus, the decision in Hongo India Private Limited (supra) also cannot be said to be applicable to interpret the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act. As the revision under the Act of 2005 lies to the High Court, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable, and there is no express exclusion of the provisions of section 5 and as per section 29(2), unless a special law expressly excludes the provision, sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are applicable. When we consider the scheme of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act, 2005, it is apparent that its scheme is not ousting the provisions of the Limitation Act from its ken which makes principles of section 5 applicable even to an authority in the matter of filing an appeal but for the said provision the authority would not have the power to condone the delay. By implication also, it is apparent that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act have not been ousted; they have the play for condoning the limitation under Section 48 of the Act of 2005. Suo motu provision of revisional power is also provided to the Commissioner within 5 years. Thus, the intendment is not to exclude the Limitation Act. We condone the delay in filing of revision.”

15. As rightly pointed out by the learned Amicus Curiae the above judgment was rendered after an extensive survey of various previous judgments on the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to proceedings under different enactments.

16. To buttress his contention that the provisions of Section 23 deserve liberal interpretation taking into account the fact that the Railway Claims Tribunal Act is a welfare legislation, the learned Amicus Curiae relied on the judgment in Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar [(2008) 9 SCC 527]. Following paragraphs of the judgment are relevant to the context of the instant case:-

                  “11. No doubt, it is possible that two interpretations can be given to the expression “accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers”, the first being that it only applies when a person has actually got inside the train and thereafter falls down from the train, while the second being that it includes a situation where a person is trying to board the train and falls down while trying to do so. Since the provision for compensation in the Railways Act is a beneficial piece of legislation, in our opinion, it should receive a liberal and wider interpretation and not a narrow and technical one. Hence, in our opinion the latter of the abovementioned two interpretations i.e. the one which advances the object of the statute and serves its purpose should be preferred vide Kunal Singh v. Union of India [(2003) 4 SCC 524 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 482] (SCC para 9), B.D. Shetty v. Ceat Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 193 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 131] (SCC para 12) and Transport Corpn. of India v. ESI Corpn. [(2000) 1 SCC 332 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 121].

                  12. It is well settled that if the words used in a beneficial or welfare statute are capable of two constructions, the one which is more in consonance with the object of the Act and for the benefit of the person for whom the Act was made should be preferred. In other words, beneficial or welfare statutes should be given a liberal and not literal or strict interpretation vide Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [AIR 1961 SC 647] (AIR para 7), Jeewanlal Ltd. v. Appellate Authority [(1984) 4 SCC 356 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 753 : AIR 1984 SC 1842] (AIR para 11), Lalappa Lingappa v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd. [(1981) 2 SCC 238 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 316 : AIR 1981 SC 852] (AIR para 13), S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager [(2003) 4 SCC 27 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 380] (SCC para 12).

                  13. In Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu Kate [(1995) 6 SCC 326 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1385] this Court observed:

(SCC pp. 347-48, paras 41-42)

                  “41. In this connection, we may usefully turn to the decision of this Court in Workmen v. American Express International Banking Corpn. [(1985) 4 SCC 71 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 940] wherein Chinnappa Reddy, J. in para 4 of the Report has made the following observations: (SCC p. 76)

                  ‘4. The principles of statutory construction are well settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and human rights’ legislation are not to be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian dimensions. In construing these legislations the imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its misapplication must be recognised and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the “colour”, the “content” and the “context” of such statutes (we have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds [(1971) 1 WLR 1381 : (1971) 3 All ER 237 (HL)] ). In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to be left behind in some island of literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond the language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations. In one of the cases cited before us, that is, Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court [(1980) 4 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 16] we had occasion to say: (SCC p. 447, para 6)

                  “6. … Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of ‘bread and butter’ statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions.”

                  42. Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn., has dealt with the Functional Construction Rule in Part XV of his book. The nature of purposive construction is dealt with in Part XX at p. 659 thus:

                  ‘A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by—

                  (a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in this Code called a purposive-and-literal construction), or

                  (b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-strained construction).’

                  At p. 661 of the same book, the author has considered the topic of ‘Purposive Construction’ in contrast with literal construction. The learned author has observed as under:

                  ‘Contrast with literal construction.—Although the term “purposive construction” is not new, its entry into fashion betokens a swing by the appellate courts away from literal construction. Lord Diplock said in 1975 : “If one looks back to the actual decisions of the [House of Lords] on questions of statutory construction over the last 30 years one cannot fail to be struck by the evidence of a trend away from the purely literal towards the purposive construction of statutory provisions.” The matter was summed up by Lord Diplock in this way—

                  … I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it.’ ”

                  (emphasis supplied)

17. The learned Amicus Curiae referred to a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in K.K.Pushpakaran v. Union of India [2007 SCC OnLine Ker 157]. He relied on the following paragraph of the judgment:-

                  “6. Rule 18 of the Railway Claims Tribunal (Procedure) Rules prescribe the time limit of 30 days in filing an application for setting aside an order dismissing the application for default. But, there is no specific exclusion or prohibition in the section for extending the time. Hence, considering the mandate of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable. It is true that before Mukri Gopalan's case, (AIR 1995 SC 2272) (supra) there were large number of decisions to the effect that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable only to a civil Court and not to Courts or tribunals or quasi-judicial authorities which have though all trappings of the Court but not being a Civil Court. Now it has been consistently held that in the absence of specific exclusion or prohibition, if limitation is prescribed in a special law for filing an application, by virtue of Section 5 read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, tribunal which has all the trappings of Court can condone delay on sufficient reasons. This is all the more applicable to the Railway Claims Tribunal in setting aside any order of dismissal for default of the applicant in view of Section 18(3) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987.”

18. In response to the contentions of the learned Amicus Curiae, the learned Central Government Counsel submitted that non-inclusion of a provision enabling condonation of delay in filing the appeals shall be understood as conscious exclusion of the power to condone delay. In support of this contention, he relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar [(2004) 4 SCC 252]. Relevant extracts from the judgment are as follows:-

                  “13. Section 8 of the Act prescribes definite period of limitation of three months or four months, as the case may be, for initiating proceedings for enforcement of right of pre-emption by different categories of people with no provision made for extension or application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. When in the same statute in respect of various other provisions relating to filing of appeals and revisions, specific provisions are made so as to give benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and such provision is not made to an application to be made under Section 8 of the Act, it obviously and necessarily follows that the legislature consciously excluded the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Considering the scheme of the Act being a self-contained code in dealing with the matters arising under Section 8 of the Act and in the light of the aforementioned decisions of this Court in the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav [(1974) 2 SCC 133], Anwari Basavaraj Patil [(1993) 1 SCC 636] and Parson Tools [(1975) 4 SCC 22 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 185 : AIR 1975 SC 1039] it should be construed that there has been exclusion of application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an application under Section 8 of the Act. In view of what is stated above, the non-applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under Section 8 of the Act is certain and sufficiently clear. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act as to the express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the specific period of limitation prescribed under Section 8 of the Act without providing for either extension of time or application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act or its principles can be read together harmoniously. Such reading does not lead to any absurdity or unworkability or frustrating the object of the Act. At any rate, in the light of the three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav case [(1974) 2 SCC 133] and subsequently followed in Anwari Basavaraj Patil case [(1993) 1 SCC 636] even though special or local law does not state in so many words expressly that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings under those Acts, from the scheme of the Act and having regard to various provisions such express exclusion could be gathered. Thus, a conscious and intentional omission by the legislature to apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under Section 8 of the Act, looking to the scheme of the Act, nature of right of pre-emption and express application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the other provisions under the Act, itself means and amounts to “express exclusion” of it satisfying the requirement of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

                  …...........................................................................

                  15. The case of Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker [(1995) 5 SCC 5 : AIR 1995 SC 2272] cited in support of the submission that Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be applied to a proceeding under Section 8 of the Act also does not support the submission for reasons more than one. The short question that arose for consideration in that decision was “whether the Appellate Authority constituted under Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 has power to condone the delay in the filing of appeal before it under the said section.       ”

19. He relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Pvt. Ltd. & others [(2009) 5 SCC 791] also. In the said judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-

                  “30. In the earlier part of our order, we have adverted to Chapter VI-A of the Act which provides for appeals and revisions to various authorities. Though Parliament has specifically provided an additional period of 30 days in the case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent about the number of days if there is sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in the case of revision by the Central Government has been provided. However, in the case of an appeal to the High Court under Section 35-G and reference application to the High Court under Section 35-H, Parliament has provided only 180 days and no further period for filing an appeal and making reference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act.

                  31. In this regard, it is useful to refer to a recent decision of this Court in Punjab Fibres Ltd. [(2008) 3 SCC 73] The Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise, Noida was the appellant in this case. While considering the very same question, namely, whether the High Court has power to condone the delay in presentation of the reference under Section 35-H(1) of the Act, the two-Judge Bench taking note of the said provision and the other related provisions following Singh Enterprises v. CCE [(2008) 3 SCC 70] concluded that: (Punjab Fibres Ltd. case [(2008) 3 SCC 73] , SCC p. 75, para 8)

                  “8. … the High Court was justified in holding that there was no power for condonation of delay in filing reference application.”

                  32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.

                  33. Even otherwise, for filing an appeal to the Commissioner, and to the Appellate Tribunal as well as revision to the Central Government, the legislature has provided 60 days and 90 days respectively, on the other hand, for filing an appeal and reference to the High Court larger period of 180 days has been provided with to enable the Commissioner and the other party to avail the same. We are of the view that the legislature provided sufficient time, namely, 180 days for filing reference to the High Court which is more than the period prescribed for an appeal and revision.

                  34. Though, an argument was raised based on Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming that Section 29(2) would be attracted, what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this section are expressly excluded in the case of reference to the High Court.

                  35. It was contended before us that the words “expressly excluded” would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court.

                  36. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 supports the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 35-H(1) to make a reference to the High Court is absolute and unextendible by a court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well-settled law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”

20. The learned Central Government Counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Bhagwandas B. Ramchandani v. British Airways [(2024) 14 SCC 489] also. In the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the issue as to whether the Air Act, 1972, particularly Rule 30 of the second Schedule expressly excludes the applicability of the Limitation Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:-

                  “68. Where a period of limitation is prescribed in a special law, by virtue of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, such period will apply as if it was provided in the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Consequently, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 will apply for the purpose of computation of period of limitation. This provision is subject to a bright exception that the Limitation Act will not apply if it is “expressly excluded” by the Special Act.

                  69. Section 29 of the Limitation Act to the extent that is necessary is as under:

                  “29. Savings.—

                  (1)................................................................

                  (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”

                  70. The statutory requirement of express exclusion is considered by this Court in a number of decisions [Needle Industries (India) Ltd. v. Needle Industries Newey (India) Holding Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 333] . Express empowerment is not to be understood in a pedantic manner. Express empowerment is to be gathered from the provisions of the statute.

                  71. In Nalla Karumburu Kayambu Shanmugam v. Commr. for Registration of Indian and Pakistani Residents [1962 AC 515 : (1962) 3 WLR 200 (PC)] , the Privy Council held that:

                  (AC pp. 526-27)

                  “It is argued that the Act does not contain the “express provision” required by the Interpretation Ordinance to make it applicable. Their Lordships do not agree. Upon the meaning of the words “express provision” counsel relied upon in Meredith, In re [(1898) 67 LJ Ch 409] and stated that it must be provision the applicability of which did not arise by inference. He argued that there was no “express provision” as no reference had been made to pending proceedings. Their Lordships are of the view that it is correct to state that express provision is a provision the applicability of which does not arise by inference. The applicability, however, of the provision under discussion to the present case does not arise by inference; it arises directly from the language used. The Fact that the language used is wide and comprehensive and covers many points other than the one immediately under discussion does not make it possible to say that its application can arise by inference only. To be “express provision” with regard to something it is not necessary that thing should be specially mentioned; it is sufficient that it is directly covered by the language however broad the language may be which covers it so long as the applicability arises directly from the language used and not by inference therefrom. The argument fails.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

                  72. In Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra [(1974) 2 SCC 133 : (1974) 3 SCR 31], the court held as under: (SCC p. 146, para 17)

                  “17. … Even assuming that where a period of limitation has not been fixed for election petitions in the Schedule to the Limitation Act which is different from that fixed under Section 81 of the Act, Section 29(2) would be attracted, and what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this section are expressly excluded in the case of an election petition. It is contended before us that the words “expressly excluded” would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. As usual the meaning given in the Dictionary has been relied upon, but what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation.

(emphasis supplied)

                  ...................................................................................

                  84. Having considered the matter in detail, we are of the opinion that Rule 30 of the Carriage by Air Act, 1972, expressly excludes the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963. Issue 2 is answered accordingly.”

                  The learned CGC submitted that the omission to integrate any provision enabling the High Court to condone delay in filing the appeal under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act can be construed only as a conscious legislative measure and the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act shall also be deemed to have been excluded.

21. Recently the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the scope and applicability of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act in Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. S.V. Global Mill Limited [2026 SCC OnLine SC 171]. The Hon’ble Court held as follows: -

                  “58. Part III of the 1963 Act speaks of the computation of the period of limitation. An extension under Section 5 is distinct and different from exclusion as provided under this Part. For computation of the period of limitation, what is relevant is only the exclusion of certain time periods as provided under Sections 12 to 24. Therefore, once the Court is satisfied that a case is made out for exclusion of time, the resultant period becomes the period of limitation. However, this is not so in the case of the application of Section 5. In other words, the application of Section 5 results in the extension of the period of limitation and cannot bring the delay within the fold of the period of limitation, whereas the application of Part III results in exclusion, which brings the same within the fold of the period of limitation. Therefore, Section 5, on the one hand and Sections 12 to 24, on the other, operate in different fields.

                  Section 29 of the 1963 Act

                  “29. Savings.— (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).

                  (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

                  (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law.

                  (4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of “easement” in Section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may for the time being extend.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

                  59. Much has been said and argued on this provision. This provision throws light on the interplay between the 1963 Act and special or local laws. It comes into play when the period of limitation is prescribed by a special or local law. This provision applies to a suit, an appeal, or an application. The first part of this provision speaks of the application of Section 3 over which there is no quibble. It gives due recognition to the period of limitation provided under the special or local law and imports it into the Schedule. In fact, it provides for an automatic change in the Schedule by the invocation of Section 3. However, for determination of the period of limitation, Sections 4 to 24, pertaining to extension and exclusion, shall apply. Thus, Section 29(2) is the provision that triggers the activation of Sections 4 to 24. This applies ordinarily to every special or local law, unless such law contains an express exclusion of the 1963 Act. To put it differently, the intention to exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act has to be clear, apparent and manifest. Therefore, the language of Section 29(2), indicates the intention of the Legislature to extend the application of Sections 4 to 24 to all special or local laws. A specific exclusion alone would take away its application. The application of Sections 4 to 24 can be excluded by such laws either individually or in totality. The provisions pertaining to the exclusion of time can also be applied at different stages. Suffice it is to state that Sections 4 to 24 will not apply only when their exclusion is expressly provided by such special or local law. In other words, there is a debarment of the exercise of any implied exclusion as a matter of rule. However, it can be done by the Court only in exceptional situations and that too, when the person claiming so discharges the burden of proving the same through the scheme of the legislation. Mere incorporation of a specific period of limitation under the special or local law does not amount to express exclusion of the 1963 Act. Rather, it must indicate that Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act are excluded. As a matter of rule, the said words must be present in the special or local law. Otherwise, it would amount to nullifying Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act.

                  60. When the Legislature has consciously incorporated Section 29(2) in the 1963 Act, its application cannot be ousted in an indirect manner. Applying this provision only for the purpose of extension while ignoring exclusion cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Also, one part of this provision alone cannot be followed while failing to adhere to the other part. When one can say that, the first part of this provision, which imports the period of limitation of the special or local law into the Schedule, can be accepted, the other carved part cannot be ignored. Hence, a piecemeal application of this provision shall not be permitted.

                  61. Section 29(2) is not limited to the current laws but also covers laws that may be enacted in the future while they are in force and therefore must be interpreted harmoniously with other provisions rather than in isolation. When two enactments are to be interpreted, a court must construe them together, ensuring that both can co-exist and be given effect. Both must operate as a helping hand to each other and therefore, an approach that may lead to a conflict must be avoided. Reading a special or local law by ignoring Section 29(2) would be contrary to the object of the 1963 Act, making it seem as though the said provision does not exist in the statute.

                  62. To sum up:—

                  From the aforesaid analysis of the provision, we hold that the compliance of Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act is mandatory, with the exception arising only by way of an express exclusion. Therefore, in the absence of the same, Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act can be read into such special or local law. This, we say so, notwithstanding the principle governing harmonious construction as Section 29(2) is a very unique provision which seeks to be taken note of in the interpretation of other statutes.

                  …..............................................................................

                  90. On a reading of the aforementioned judgment, we find that express exclusion is the general rule and implied exclusion is only an exception that comes into play depending on the nature and scheme of the concerned legislation. Therefore, the onus lies heavily on the party claiming an implied exclusion to show the same. We have no qualms in holding that a case of implied exclusion has not been made out insofar as the 2013 Act is concerned, owing to its unique scheme. However, on facts, we find that in Hukumdev (supra), this Court was concerned with a unique legislation being the Representation of the People Act, 1951 which contains an express provision in the form of Section 86 which states that if one misses the bus of limitation, then any election petition filed thereafter shall be dismissed summarily. Therefore, the legislation itself clearly mentions the consequences of a belated filing. Hence, the said judgment is clearly distinguishable insofar as its facts are concerned.

                  91. In the other judgments relied upon by the parties, this Court was dealing with different enactments such as the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Central Excise Act, 1944, the Customs Act, 1962, the Electricity Act, 2003, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, the Special Courts (Trial of Offences relating to transaction in Securities) Act, 1992, the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and even the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

                  92. These enactments travel on totally different fields involving different parties, different mechanisms and different authorities. In some cases, the appeals were preferred before the statutory authorities for distinct reliefs under the respective enactments. In many of them, this Court was concerned with statutory rights, and the respective statutes being dealt with did not contain any provision as contained in Section 103 of the 2013 Act. A statute involving financial implications and, in some cases, a penalty, also stands on a totally different footing. There, the issue would be one of action taken, while we are concerned with the entitlement of a party.

                  93. In Popular Construction (supra), as distinguished in Consolidating Engineering Enterprises (supra) and taken note of in Kalpraj (supra), the issue was with respect to the application of the law of limitation to a proceeding under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which is purely a commercial dispute between two individuals.

                  94. In New India Assurance Company (supra), the facts are totally different. This Court was dealing with a complaint given for the first time before the consumer forum. Therefore, the said proceedings were original in nature. On the contrary, we are dealing with the application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act to an appeal against a deemed decree. Furthermore, neither the scope of Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act nor that of Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which is a pari materia provision to Section 103 of the 2013 Act, was considered and discussed in the said decision. Thus, we are inclined to state that the said decision, not having considered the issues dealt with by us, cannot be termed as a binding precedent. Reference can be made to the following decisions:

                  Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 1 SCC 494

                  “14. On the subject of precedents Lord Halsbury, L.C., said in Quinn v. Leathem [[1901] A.C. 495 : [1900- 1903] All ER Rep 1 (HL)] : (All ER p. 7 G-I)

                  “Before discussing Allen v. Flood [[1898] A.C. 1 : [1895-1899] All ER Rep 52 (HL)] and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make; and one is to repeat what I have very often said before—that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

                  We entirely agree with the above observations.

                  15. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC 213] (vide SCC p. 221, para 18) this Court observed:

                  “18. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it.”

                  16. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 111] (vide SCC p. 130, para 59) this Court observed:

                  “59. … It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

17. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani [(2004) 8 SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778] a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment this Court also observed: (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-12)

                  “9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [[1951] A.C. 737 : [1951] 2 All ER 1 (HL)] (AC at p. 761), Lord MacDermott observed: (All ER p. 14 C-D)

                  ‘The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge, …’

                  10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [[1970] A.C. 1004 : [1970] 2 WLR 1140 : [1970] 2 All ER 294 (HL)] Lord Reid said,

                  ‘Lord Atkin's speech … is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.’ (All ER p. 297g)

                  Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) [[1971] 1 WLR 1062 : [1971] 2 All ER 1267], observed: (All ER p. 1274d)

                  ‘One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament;’

                  And, in British Railways Board v. Herrington [[1972] A.C. 877 : [1972] 2

WLR 537 : [1972] 1 All ER 749 (HL)] Lord Morris said: (All ER p. 761c)

                  ‘There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.’

                  11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.

                  12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: (Abdul Kayoom v. CIT [AIR 1962 SC 680], AIR p. 688, para 19)

                  ‘Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.’

                  *        *        *

                  ‘Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.’”

                  (emphasis supplied)

                  18. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions and the principles laid down therein, because often decisions are cited for a proposition without reading the entire decision and the reasoning contained therein. In our opinion, the decision of this Court in Sarguja Transport case [(1987) 1 SCC 5 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 19 : AIR 1987 SC 88] cannot be treated as a Euclid's formula.”

                  95. In Mohd. Abaad Ali (supra) which has followed Mangu Ram (supra) while distinguishing Hukum Dev (supra), this Court was dealing with the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, which is a general law applicable to criminal proceedings only.

                  96. As repeatedly mentioned in our judgment, we are concerned with a special law which provides for just and fair compensation, along with the relief of rehabilitation or resettlement. Therefore, without discussing the decisions relied upon by the parties any further, we only say that one must see the exclusive mechanism provided under a statute to be used for achieving the goal. Suffice it is to state that after the exhaustive and threadbare analysis of the provisions available under both the 2013 Act and the 1963 Act, we find that the decisions cited by the Bar do not have any application to the present batch of matters and therefore, deserve to be discarded.”

22. The learned counsel for the applicants/appellants made a fervent submission that the Railway Claims Tribunal Act is a beneficial legislation and therefore while interpreting the provisions of the Act the Court shall always favour an interpretation which will extend the benefit to the claimant. She submitted that in many cases the victims of accidents may not be in a position to file appeal in time. She submitted that under such circumstances if it is concluded that there is no power to condone the delay in filing the appeal, the same will cause serious prejudice to genuine claimants and also dependants who lost the case before the Tribunal. She submitted that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to the proceedings before this Court also arising from the orders passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal. The learned Central Government Counsel on the other hand submitted that the legislature consciously omitted to provide power to the High Court to condone the delay in filing the appeals. He submitted that a specific provision has been incorporated in the Railway Claims Tribunal Act enabling the Tribunal to condone the delay in filing the application and such a provision was not incorporated to provide the same power to the High Court to condone the delay in filing the appeals. He therefore contended that the legislative policy is very clear and in view of the principles laid down in the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited by him, it should be deemed that the legislature intended to exclude the application of the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act.

23. The learned Amicus Curiae made in-depth preparation and advanced elaborate submissions. The learned Amicus Curiae supported the contention of the applicants/appellants that the Railway Claims Tribunal Act is a beneficial legislation. He submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this Court has considered the scheme of the Act and held in various judgments that the Act is a beneficial legislation. He therefore submitted that the Court may keep in mind the object of the legislation and adopt an interpretation which will advance the same. He submitted that an appellate remedy is provided by the statute to the party aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal and in many cases, parties may be not in a position to file the appeal in time. In genuine cases of delay, if the same is not condoned and appeals are not entertained, it would result in injustice. He made elaborate reference to the judgments cited and argued that as there is no specific exclusion in the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would definitely apply in the case of an appeal arising from the Railway Claims Tribunal Act to the High Court. He submitted that the exclusion should be specific as mentioned in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and the judgments pointed out by the learned Central Government Counsel are distinguishable.

24. I have considered the submissions made by both sides as well as the learned Amicus Curiae. To be precise, whether the provisions of Section 29(2) would apply in the case of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act and power under S.5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked to condone the delay in filing appeals under S.23 of the Act to the High Court is the core issue arising for decision in the present application. It is true that in some of the judgments cited by the learned Central Government Counsel, the Hon'ble Supreme Court adopted the view that though there were no express provisions in the relevant enactments which were involved in those cases, excluding the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, in the scheme of the relevant Acts such exclusion could be inferred. The view adopted in the cases cited by the learned CGC at first blush appear to be inconsistent with the view in Mukri Gopalan (supra) and some other judgments cited by the learned Amicus Curiae. As noted above, the Hon'ble Supreme Court again considered the same question with respect to the scheme and provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation Act, 2013 in the recent judgment in Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra). In my view, the above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court offers light to resolve the controversy involved in this case and perceived difference of views expressed in the judgments cited by the learned Amicus Curiae and the learned CGC.

25. In Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court analysed various previous judgments wherein it was held that the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would not apply and held that such observations were made in the context of the legislations which were under consideration in the respective cases. The Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that the law laid down in a judgment should be understood in the context of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Analytical reading of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra) undoubtedly shows that the Apex Court has clarified that no general proposition was laid down by the Hon'ble Court in the previous judgments regarding applicability of the provisions of Section 29(2) to various enactments. It is also worthy to note that the Hon'ble Court stressed that an interpretation which will result in exclusion of the provisions of the Limitation Act without express exclusion in the relevant statute would defeat the very objective of incorporating Section 29(2) in the Limitation Act. The Hon'ble Court held that such a construction will not be harmonious. Thus, it was held that Section 29(2) applies ordinarily to every special or local law, unless such law contains an express exclusion of the Limitation Act. Further the Apex Court has held in emphatic terms that the intention to exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act has to be clear, apparent and manifest. In unequivocal terms it has been clarified that the language of Section 29(2), indicates the intention of the Legislature to extend the application of Sections 4 to 24 to all special or local laws and only a specific exclusion would take away its application.

26. The Railway Claims Tribunal Act does not contain any provision that explicitly excludes the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act. It can be held without any hesitation that the Railway Claims Tribunal Act is a beneficial piece of legislation. Primary goal of the Act is to provide compensation in deserving cases. It must be kept in mind that a victim of a rail accident may in most of the cases sustain grave injuries and at times permanent disability also. In cases of death, many a time the dependants will be in a very precarious situation. In other words, most of the litigants who approach the Tribunal for compensation for accidents will be in a disadvantageous position. If their claims are rejected or adequate compensation is not granted by the Tribunal, the remedy is to file appeal before the High Court. On account of the disadvantageous position and genuine difficulties, many of the litigants may not be in a position to approach the High Court in time. In cases where sufficient cause actually exist for the delay and the appeals are rejected as time barred for want of power to condone delay, the outcome would be injustice. Hence, if it is laid down that the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the proceedings under the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, the proposition will be a harsh one. In my view the same would not be in consonance with the avowed object of the Act. In the light of the law as clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of late in Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra), such an interpretation will not be legally correct also as no express exclusion of the provisions of the Limitation Act is ingrained in the Railway Claims Tribunal Act. It is also pertinent to point out that in paragraph 63 of the said judgment, the Apex Court has clearly indicated that in the case of interpretation of a law providing for granting of just and fair compensation, endeavours shall be to see that the exclusive mechanism provided under the statute achieve the goal in its operation.

27. In the light of the discussion afore, I hold that the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act are attracted in the case of the proceedings under the Railway Claims Tribunal Act. As a result, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would be applicable and the High Court can invoke the provisions of Section 5 of the Act to excuse delays in the submission of appeals under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act in appropriate cases.

28. Coming to the reasons stated in the affidavit filed in support of the application to condone the delay, the deponent has stated that he lost the contact details of the counsel who was appearing before the Tribunal and hence could not contact the counsel and make arrangements to file the appeal without delay. The learned CGC contended that the delay is not properly explained. However, I find that the Tribunal has noted in the impugned order that the applicants herein, parents of the victim of the accident, are from a village and from a very poor background. Hence, I find that the explanation offered in the affidavit is plausible and a lenient view can be adopted. The delay of 493 days in filing the appeal is hence condoned. The C.M.Application is thus allowed.

                  Commendable efforts were made in this matter by three young lawyers, Adv.Simi Ali for the appellants, Adv.Rohith Kartha for the Railway and Adv.K.C.Harish, the Amicus Curiae. I formally acknowledge my appreciation to the learned Amicus Curiae for the valuable assistance rendered to the Court.