(Prayer: This writ appeal is filed u/s 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, praying to set aside the impugned order dated 24/09/2020 in WP no.13630/2014 passed by the learned single judge. allow this appeal as prayed for with costs. issue such other writ or order or direction granting further relief to the appellant, as the Honourable court may deems fit and proper, in the interest of justice and equity.)

Cav Judgment:

Vijaykumar A. Patil. J.

1. This appeal is filed by the appellants under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, challenging the order dated 24.09.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.13630/2014 (SC/ST).

2. Sri.V.K.Narayana Swamy, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in allowing the writ petition without appreciating the material available on record in its proper perspective. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the findings recorded by respondent Nos.2 and 3, wherein the appellant's application for restoration was allowed and the appeal of respondent Nos.4 and 5 was dismissed. It is further submitted that the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is a welfare legislation with a specific object to protect the interests of the grantee and there is no limitation provided under the Act to file an application for restoration and resumption. It is contended that the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition during the covid-19 pandemic without hearing the counsel appearing for the appellant herein. Hence, the review petition was filed, which also was dismissed. It is further contended that the appellant has filed an application for production of additional documents and along with the said application, the representations dated 10.05.1984 and 01.12.1988 are produced, which indicate that the appellant sought resumption of land well within the time, hence, he seeks to allow the appeal.

3. Per contra, Sri.M.Shivaprakash, learned counsel for respondent Nos.4 and 5 supports the order of the learned Single Judge and submits that the Division Bench of this Court has considered the relevant aspects and held that if there is any unreasonable delay in filing an application for restoration, the same is liable to be rejected.

4. Learned counsel for impleading applicant / proposed respondent No.6 submits that the proposed respondent No.6 has purchased 2 acre of land out of 4 acres in Sy.No.31 from Lakshmidevamma/respondent No.4 vide registered sale deed dated 28.03.2022, which is not challenged by the appellants. Hence, he seeks to come on record and further submits that he being the purchaser, supports the order of the learned Single Judge.

5. Learned AGA appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 3 supports the orders passed by respondent Nos.2 and 3 by contending that the appellants are the legal representatives of grantee and are entitled for resumption and restoration of land in their favour as the sale is in violation of the mandate of law.

6. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants, the learned counsels for respondents and meticulously perused the material available on record. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions advanced on both sides.

7. The material on record indicates that the land measuring 4 acres 4 guntas in Sy.No.31 situated at Nayanahalli Village, Ambajidurga Hobli, Chintamani Taluk, Chikkaballapura District, was granted to Sri.Muniga S/o.Avulappa in the year 1935-36 as he belonged to scheduled caste. The records further indicate that the legal representatives of the grantee initiated the proceedings under Section 5 of the Act. The respondent No.3 vide order dated 22.02.2010, allowed the application for restoration of land; being aggrieved, the purchasers filed appeal before the respondent No.2 and the said appeal came to be dismissed vide order dated 04.12.2013. Being aggrieved, the purchasers filed the writ petition assailing both the orders, wherein the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition.

8. The records also indicate that the initiation of proceedings under Section 5 of the Act is in the year 2006-07, which is more than 28 years after the Act came into force and restoration of the land is sought which was sold in the year 1943. The aforesaid delay cannot be termed as a reasonable delay in filing an application under Section 5 of the Act. Learned counsel for the appellants makes a reference with regard to additional documents produced along with the application. The document Nos.1 and 2 are the representations dated 10.05.1984 and 01.12.1988 alleged to have been sent to the Tahasildar seeking for restoration of land. In our considered view, the said documents cannot be looked into as there is no whisper with regard to sending of such representation to the Tahisldar in this appeal or there is any mention before the Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. Nothing has prevented the appellant to press the documents referred supra, if they are really submitted and they would have sought for restoration by filing of the application under Section 5 of the Act in the year 2006-07. Filing of an application later itself makes it clear that no attempt has been made by the grantee or the legal representatives of the grantee for restoration of land within the reasonable time. Alleged representations are submitted to the Tahasildar and not to the authority under Section 5 of the Act.

9. Insofar as the contention that the counsel for the appellant herein could not represent in the writ proceedings and in his absence, the impugned order is passed, has also no merit. The perusal of the order of the learned Single Judge makes it very clear that the learned counsel for the appellant was represented before the learned Single Judge and thereafter the review petition came to be filed in R.P.No.15/2022 on the same ground and the learned Single Judge by well reasoned order, dismissed the review petition holding that there is no error apparent on the face of the record to review the order dated 24.09.2020.

10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER ((2020) 14 SCC 232) , VIVEK M.HINDUJA AND OTHERS Vs. M.ASHWATHA AND OTHERS ((2019) 1 Kant.L.J. 819 SC) , CHHEDI LAL YADAV AND OTHERS Vs. HARI KISHORE YADAV (D) THEIR LRS AND OTHERS ((2018) 12 SCC 527) and NINGAPPA Vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS ((2020) 14 SCC 236) , wherein it was held that the application for resumption or restoration cannot be entertained beyond a reasonable period. The Co-ordinate Bench in the case of SRI.KESHAVAMURTHY AND ANOTHER Vs. SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS (2025 SCC OnLine Kar 6517) , considering the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred supra as well as the decision in the case of SMT.GOURAMMA @ GANGAMMA Vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, HAVERI AND OTHERS (W.A.No.100101/ 2024 dated 29.07.2024) held that the application seeking restoration should be within a reasonable period of time.

                  In the case of GOURAMMA, referred supra, the Co- ordinate Bench at pargraphs 3(f), 3(g), 3(h) and 3(i) held as under:

                  "3. xxxx

                  (f)      It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas “laches” is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate.

                  (g)      There is a marked difference between ‘delay & laches’ that operate in equity and ‘limitation & delay’ that obtain in law. The following observations of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. N.Murugesan ((2022) 2 SCC 25 at Para 20,21 & 22) make out this point:

                  "Delay, laches and acquiescence

                  20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create nonconsideration of condonation in certain circumstances.… The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court.

                  Laches.

                  21.     The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.

                  22.     Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.”

                  (h) We are told at the Bar that the subject Amendment   has been put  in challenge in W.P.No.27496/2023 and that, matter is pending consideration. We make it clear that construction of a statute is one thing and its validity is another. We do not want to say even a word about the validity, that is being examined by the learned Single Judge before whom the matter is pending. We have only placed our interpretation on the amended provisions of the Act and nothing beyond.

                  (i) Before parting with this case, we are constrained to observe that, legislative process is not simple and easy. It has to be undertaken with a lot of care, caution & expertise. Law speaks through language. If language is not properly employed what is said is not what is meant; if what is said is not what is meant, what needs to be done remains undone or misdone. A linguistic defect thus may defeat the intent of legislation. More is not necessary to specify."

11. The issue with regard to the amendment to the Act is also considered by the Co-ordinate Bench in the case of GOURAMMA, referred supra.

12. In view of the preceding analysis, the unexplained delay of more than 28 years in filing an application under Section 5 of the Act for resumption and restoration of the land from the date of commencement of the Act, cannot be termed as a reasonable time. Therefore, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has rightly considered that there is an inordinate delay and allowed the writ petition by setting aside the impugned orders in the writ proceedings, which does not call for any interference in this intra Court appeal.

13. The appeal is devoid of merits and the same is accordingly dismissed.