1. The petitioner herein is a private limited company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act and its principal place of business is at Gar Ali, Jorhat, Assam. The petitioner company is in the business of wholesale / distribution of cellular phones, etc. which comes under the purview of Chapter 85 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. For the purpose of carrying out its business, the petitioner company got itself registered under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 [‘the CGST Act’, for short] and the Assam Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 [‘the AGST Act’, for short] vide GST Registration no. 18ADCS648OJ1ZX.

2. In this writ petition instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, assail is made to a Show Cause Notice together with a Summary in Form GST DRC–01 having reference no. ZD181124009288G dated 29.11.2024 issued by the Assistant Commissioner of State Tax, Jorhat Zone, Jorhat, Assam [the respondent no. 2].

3. The Show Cause Notice in Form GST DRC–01 bearing Reference no. ZD181124009288G dated 29.11.2024 for the Financial Year : 2020-2021 has come to be issued to the petitioner company under the hand of the respondent no. 2 stating inter-alia that on examination of the information furnished in the Annual Return for the Financial Year : 2020-2021 under various heads and the information furnished in GSTR–01, GSTR–2A, GSTR–3B, EWB and other records available in the office, it has been found that the petitioner company had not declared its correct tax liability while filing the Annual Return in Form GSTR–09. It is stated that the petitioner company had availed excess Input Tax Credit [ITC] from cancelled dealers, returned defaulters and tax non-payers. By the Show Cause Notice, the petitioner has been asked to pay a total liability of Rs. 33,03,968/- [= Rs. 24,012/- (CGST) + Rs. 24,012/- (AGST) + Rs. 32,55,944/- (IGST)] along with interest and penalty under Section 73 of the CGST/AGST/IGST Act.

4. Aggrieved by the issuance of the Show Cause Notice dated 29.11.2024 under Section 73 of the CGST/AGST Act, the petitioner has instituted the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking setting aside and quashing of the Show Cause Notice dated 29.11.2024.

5. I have heard Mr. A. Kanodia, learned counsel for the petitioner; and Mr. B. Gogoi, learned Standing Counsel, Finance & Taxation Department for all the respondents.

6. Mr. Kanodia, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the provisions of Section 73[1], Section 73[2], Section 73[9] and Section 73[10] of the CGST/AGST Act to contend that a Show Cause Notice under Section 73[1] has to be issued atleast three months prior to the time limit specified in Section 73[10] for issuance of an Order. By the Notification no. 40/2021 Central Tax dated 29.12.2021, the due date of filing of the Annual Return in Form GSTR-9 and the Reconciliation Statement in Form GSTR-9C for the Financial Year : 2020-2021 was extended from 31.12.2021 to 28.02.2022. He has submitted that in order to find the meaning of 'month' appearing in Section 73[2], recourse has to be taken to the definition of 'month' provided in Section 3[35] of the General Clauses Act, 1897. He has contended that in the case of the petitioner, the Show Cause Notice under Section 73 ought to have been issued by the proper officer atleast three months prior to the last date of filing of the Annual Return for the Financial Year : 2020-2021, that is, 28.02.2025. According to him, the three-month period going back from 28.02.2025 would fall on 28.11.2024. Thus, the impugned Show Cause Notice issued by the respondent no. 2 as the proper officer on 29.11.2024 had exceeded the prescribed time limit by one day making it, resultantly, non-est in law.

                   6.1. In support of his submissions, Mr. Kanodia, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Bibi Salma Khatoon vs. State of Bihar and others, [2001] 7 SCC 197; State of Himachal Pradesh and another vs. Himachal Techno Engineers and another, [2010] 12 SCC 210; and Commissioner of Customs [Import], Mumbai vs. Dilip Kumar & Company and others, [2018] 9 SCC 1. He has also referred to a Judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Writ Petition no. 1463/2025 [M/s the Cotton Corporation of India vs. Assistant Commissioner (ST)(Audit) (FAC), Regional GST Audit & Enforcement Office, Vijayawada and others], decided on 05.02.2025, and a decision of the House of Lords in Dodds vs. Walker, [1981] 2 All ER 609.

7. Mr. Gogoi, learned Standing Counsel, Finance and Taxation Department, Assam appearing for all the official respondents has submitted that the Show Cause Notice issued on 29.11.2024 was within time. He has submitted that for any proceeding which starts with issuance of a show cause notice, the calculation of time commences from the date of issuance of the show cause notice and taking into account the provisions of the General Clauses Act, the impugned Show Cause Notice was clearly in time. With 28.02.2025 was the prescribed last date for passing an order under Section 73[9], a show cause notice issued even on 30.11.2024 would fulfill all the requirements as per the corresponding date rule. Thus, the challenge made by the petitioner is a misconceived one and therefore, the writ petition must fail.

8. I have given due consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the relevant statutory provisions, referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties.

9. It is the case of the petitioner that it had filed its Annual Return in Form GSTR– 09 along with the Reconciliation Statement in Form GSTR–9C for the Financial Year : 2020-2021 on 27.02.2022.

10. Chapter XV of the CGST Act has provided for ‘Demands and Recovery’ and the Chapter contains Section 73 to Section 84. For the purpose of the case in hand, it is Section 73 which is of pertinence. For ready reference, the relevant provisions of Section 73 are quoted hereinbelow :-

                   CHAPTER XV. DEMANDS AND RECOVERY

                   73. Determination of tax not paid or short paid or erroneously refunded or input tax credit wrongly availed or utilised for any reason other than fraud or any willful-misstatement or suppression of facts.—

                   [1] Where it appears to the proper officer that any tax has not been paid or short paid or erroneously refunded, or where input tax credit has been wrongly availed or utilised for any reason, other than the reason of fraud or any wilful-misstatement or suppression of facts to evade tax, he shall serve notice on the person chargeable with tax which has not been so paid or which has been so short paid or to whom the refund has erroneously been made, or who has wrongly availed or utilised input tax credit, requiring him to show cause as to why he should not pay the amount specified in the notice along with interest payable thereon under Section 50 and a penalty leviable under the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder.

                   [2] The proper officer shall issue the notice under sub-section [1] at least three months prior to the time limit specified in sub-section [10] for issuance of order.

                   * * * * * * *

                   [9] The proper officer shall, after considering the representation, if any, made by person chargeable with tax, determine the amount of tax, interest and a penalty equivalent to ten per cent of tax or ten thousand rupees, whichever is higher, due from such person and issue an order.

                   [10] The proper officer shall issue the order under sub-section [9] within three years from the due date for furnishing of annual return for the financial year to which the tax not paid or short paid or input tax credit wrongly availed or utilised relates to or within three years from the date of erroneous refund.

                   * * * * * * *

11. From the afore-quoted provisions, it is discernible that the proper officer is required to issue the show cause notice under sub-section [1] of Section 73 atleast three months prior to the time limit specified in sub-section [10] of Section 73 for issuance of the order. As per sub-section [10] of Section 73, the proper officer shall issue the order under sub-section [9] of Section 73 within three years from the due date for furnishing annual return for the Financial Year to which the tax not paid or short paid or input tax credit wrongly availed or utilized relates to or within three years from the date of erroneous refund.

12. Section 44 of the CGST/AGST Act has provided for filling of an Annual Return by every registered person for each Financial Year, with the audited Annual Financial Statement for every Financial Year electronically, within such time and in such form and in such manner as prescribed. Sub-rule [1] of Rule 80 : ‘Annual Return’ of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 [‘the CGST Rules’, for short] has prescribed that every registered person, referred above, shall furnish an Annual Return for every Financial Year as specified under Section 44 electronically in Form GSTR–09 on or before the thirty-first day of December following the end of such Financial Year through the common portal either directly or through a Facilitation Centre notified by the Commissioner. As per sub-rule [3] of Rule 80, a registered person, whose aggregate turnover during a Financial Year exceeds five crore rupees, is also required to furnish a self-certified Reconciliation Statement as specified under Section 44 in Form GSTR–9C along with the Annual Return referred to in sub-rule [1], on or before the thirty-first day of December following the end of such Financial Year electronically.

13. In view of Section 44 of the CGST/AGST Act read with Rule 80 of the CGST Rules, 2017 the last date for filing of the Annual Return for the Financial Year : 2020-2021 would have, otherwise, fallen on thirty-first day of December, 2021 [31.12.2021], which was the last day of the month of December, a month having 31 [thirty-one] days. Vide a Notification no. 40/2021 Central Tax [F. No. CBIC-20013/7/2021-GST dated 29.12.2021], the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 164 of the CGST Act and on the recommendation of the GST Council, amended the CGST Rules, 2017 notified the Central Goods and Services Tax [Tenth Amendment) Rules, 2021. By the Central Goods and Services Tax [Tenth Amendment) Rules, 2021, two new sub-rules, [1A] and [3A] have been inserted after sub-rule [1] and sub-rule [3] of Rule 80 of the CGST Rules. The two new sub-rules, [1A] and [3A] read as under:-

                   [1A] Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule [1], for the financial year 2020-2021 the said annual return shall be furnished on or before the twenty-eight day of February, 2022.

                   * * * * * * *

                   [3A] Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule [3], for the financial year 2020-2021 the said self-certified reconciliation statement shall be furnished along with the said annual return on or before the twenty-eighth day of February, 2022.

14. In view of insertion of sub-rule [1A] and sub-rule [3A] in Rule 80 of the CGST Rules by way of the Central Goods and Services Tax [Tenth Amendment] Rules, 2021, the last date for submission of the Annual Return and the self-certified Reconciliation Statement under Section 44 of the CGST/AGST Act in Form GSTR- 9 and Form GSTR-9C became twenty-eight day of February, 2022 [28.02.2022], which was the last day of the month of February, 2022, a month having 28 [twenty-eight] days because the year 2022 was not a leap year.

15. Statutorily, the due date of filing the annual return for the Financial Year : 2020- 2021 had been re-fixed on 28.02.2022 by changing the earlier statutorily fixed mile-post of 31.12.2021 by two months. As a result, the three years’ time period under Section 73[10] is to be recounted from 28.02.2022. Therefore, the time limit to pass the order under sub-section [9] of Section 73 had become 28.02.2025, that is, the twenty-eight day of February, 2025 by way of the corresponding date rule, which will be referred in the later part of this order. Had the timeline been not changed, the time limit to pass the order under sub-section [9] of Section 73 would otherwise have been the 31st day of December, 2024. The period was subsequently extended by a period of two months.

16. The situation which has arisen here is akin to a situation which arises ‘Rule of Three’ in arithmetic involving three parameters and with two of them known, the solution lies in finding out the third parameter. For example, if in an equation with three parameters such as : x + y = z and two parameters are known, for example, x and y, then the third parameter can be easily found out.

17. Terminus a quo and terminus ad quem are Latin phrases used in formal context, particularly, law, to denote the start point and the end point of a period, process, proceeding, or right. As per Black’s Law Dictionary, Tenth Edition, ‘terminus a quo’ means ‘the point from which’ and ‘terminus ad quem’ means ‘the point to which’. The phrase, ‘terminus a quo’ appears in reference to the point from which something is calculated, or the earliest time at which some action is possible. The phrase, ‘terminus ad quem’ is used in reference to the point before which some action must be taken. For simplicity, terminus a quo is the start point and terminus ad quem is the end point.

18. The end point [terminus ad quem] to pass the order under sub-section [9] of Section 73, as per sub-section [10] of Section 73, was 28.02.2025. In view of sub-section [2] of Section 73, the proper officer had to issue the notice atleast three months prior to 28.02.2025.

19. A Constitution Bench in Commissioner of Customs [Import], Mumbai vs. Dilip Kumar and Company and others, [2018] 9 SCC 1, has held that in all the Acts and Regulations, made either by Parliament or Legislature, the words and phrases as defined in the General Clauses Act and the principles of interpretation laid down in the General Clauses Act are to be necessarily kept in view. If while interpreting a statutory law, any doubt arises as to the meaning to be assigned to a word or a phrase or a clause used in an enactment and such words, phrase or clause is not specifically defined, it is legitimate and indeed mandatory to fall back on the General Clauses Act.

20. As no definition of ‘month’ has been provided for in the CGST/AGST Act, it is the definition provided for ‘month’ in the General Clauses Act which is to be looked at. As per Section 3[35] of the General Clauses Act, 1897 [‘the General Clauses Act’, for short], ‘month’ shall mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar. The second parameter is at least three months prior to 28.02.2025. Therefore, the task is to find out the third parameter end point [terminus a quo]. The condition to be fulfilled between start date [terminus a quo] and end date [terminus ad quem], there must be at least three months.

21. The provision of sub-section [1] of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act has provided the manner for calculation of commencement [terminus a quo] and termination [terminus ad quem] of time. For ready reference, Section 9 is quoted hereinbelow :-

                   9. Commencement and termination of time.—

                   [1] In any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word ‘from’, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word ‘to’.

22. From a reading of Section 9, quoted above, it is noticeable that in respect of any Central Act or Regulation, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word ‘from’, and for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word ‘to’. From the plain and simple language of Section 9, it is discernible that if a particular time-period is given from a certain date within which an act, process or proceeding is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded, meaning thereby, the period is to be calculated by excluding the day from which the period is to be reckoned.

23. The provisions of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act have come to be considered in a number of decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

24. Holding that Section 9 of the General Clauses Act gives statutory recognition to the well-established principle applicable to the construction of statutes that ordinarily in computing the period of time prescribed, the rule observed is to exclude the first and include the last day, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Tarun Prasad Chatterjee vs. Dinanath Sharma, [2000] 8 SCC 649, has proceeded to observe as under :-

                   11. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 37th Edn., Vol. 3, p. 92, it is stated as follows :-

                   ‘Days included or excluded — When a period of time running from a given day or even to another day or event is prescribed by law or fixed as contract, and the question arises whether the computation is to be made inclusively or exclusively of the first-mentioned or of the last- mentioned day, regard must be had to the context and to the purposes for which the computation has to be made. Where there is room for doubt, the enactment or instrument ought to be so construed as to effectuate and not to defeat the intention of Parliament or of the parties, as the case may be. Expressions such as ‘from such a day’ or ‘until such a day’ are equivocal, since they do not make it clear whether the inclusion or the exclusion of the day named may be intended. As a general rule, however, the effect of defining a period in such a manner is to exclude the first day and to include the last day.’

                   12. Section 9 says that in any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it shall be sufficient for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word ‘from’, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any period of time, to use the word ‘to’. The principle is that when a period is delimited by statute or rule, which has both a beginning and an end and the word ‘from’ is used indicating the beginning, the opening day is to be excluded and if the last day is to be included the word ‘to’ is to be used. In order to exclude the first day of the period, the crucial thing to be noted is whether the period of limitation is delimited by a series of days or by any fixed period. This is intended to obviate the difficulties or inconvenience that may be caused to some parties. For instance, if a policy of insurance has to be good for one day from 1st January, it might be valid only for a few hours after its execution and the party or the beneficiary in the insurance policy would not get reasonable time to lay claim, unless 1st January is excluded from the period of computation.

                   13. ….. In order to apply Section 9, the first condition to be fulfilled is whether a prescribed period is fixed ‘from’ a particular point. When the period is marked by terminus a quo and terminus ad quem, the canon of interpretation envisaged in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 require to exclude the first day. …..

25. In Saketh India Ltd. and another vs. India Securities Ltd., reported in [1999] 3 SCC 1, it has been held that in computing a period of one month as limitation period, the date of cause of action is to be excluded as per the provisions contained in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act. It has been cited as an example to the effect that if the cause of action arises on 15.10.1995, in computing the one month limitation period, the date 15.10.1995 is held to be excluded and the period of limitation of one month would be complete on 15.11.1995.

26. In Bibi Salma Khatoon [supra], the question that arose for consideration was whether the application under Section 16[3] of the Bihar Land Reforms [Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land] Act, 1961 [‘the Act’] claiming right of pre-emption in respect of a disputed land was within limitation. The appellant filed the application claiming right of pre-emption on 30.04.1988. Section 16[3] of the Act required that the application under reference was to be filed within three months of the date of registration of the concerned document of transfer. The Supreme Court had observed that the date from which the limitation would commence had to be excluded in computing the period of three months and it was held that the application filed by the appellant on 30.04.1988 was within limitation – a period of three months from the date of the registered sale deed dated 30.01.1988. The above observation in Bibi Salma Khatoon [supra], was clearly in conformity with the corresponding date rule with the month of April, 1988 having the corresponding date, 30th day posing no difficulty to apply the corresponding date rule.

27. From what has been laid down in Tarun Prasad Chatterjee [supra] as regards exposition of the provisions of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, the principle has been explained to the effect that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act has to be done, the day of the date is to be excluded. It has been exposited that in order to apply Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, the first condition to be fulfilled is whether a prescribed period is fixed from a particular point. When the period is marked by terminus a quo and terminus ad quem, the interpretation given to Section 9 requires exclusion of the first day.

28. The judgment of the House of Lords in Dodds vs. Walker, [1981] 2 All ER 609, has expounded the rule known as the corresponding date rule. Lord Diplock explaining the corresponding date rule had observed in the following manner :-

                   4. ……, reference to a ‘month’ in a statute is to be understood as a calendar month. …….. It is also clear under a rule that ……… in calculating the period that has elapsed after the occurrence of the specified event such as the giving of a notice, the day on which the event occurs is excluded from the reckoning. It is equally well established, ……… that when the relevant period is a month or a specified number of months after the giving of a notice the general rule is that the period ends upon the corresponding date in the appropriate subsequent month, i.e. the day of that month that bears the same number as the day of the earlier month on which the notice was given.

                   5. The corresponding date rule is simple. It is easy of application. Except in a small minority of cases, of which the instant case is not an example, all that the calculator has to do is to mark in his diary the corresponding date in the appropriate subsequent month. Because the number of days in five months of the year is less than in the seven others the inevitable consequence of the corresponding date rule is that one month’s notice given in a 30-day month is one day shorter than one month’s notice given in a 31-day month and is three days shorter if it is given in February. Corresponding variations in the length of notice reckoned in days occurs where the required notice is a plurality of months.

                   6. This simple general rule,   works perfectly well without need for any modification so long as there is in the month in which the notice expires a day which bears the same number as the day of the month on which the notice was given. Such was the instant case and such will be every other case except for notices given on the 31st of a 31-day month and expiring in a 30-day month or in February, and notices expiring in February and given on 30th or 29th [except in leap year] of any other month of the year. In these exceptional cases, the modification of the corresponding date rule that is called for is also well established : the period given by the notice ends upon the last day of the month in which the notice expires.

29. In Himachal Techno Engineers [supra], the provisions relating to limitation period contained in Section 34[3] and the proviso thereto of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [‘the 1996 Act’, for short] fell for consideration. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act and referring to the corresponding date rule expounding in Dodds vs. Walker, has observed as under :-

                   14. The High Court has held that ‘three months’ mentioned in Section 34[3] of the Act refers to a period of 90 days. This is erroneous. A ‘month’ does not refer to a period of thirty days, but refers to the actual period of a calendar month. If the month is April, June, September or November, the period of the month will be thirty days. If the month is January, March, May, July, August, October or December, the period of the month will be thirty-one days. If the month is February, the period will be twenty-nine days or twenty-eight days depending upon whether it is a leap year or not.

                   * * * * * * *

                   16. Section 3[35] of the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines a ‘month’ as meaning a month reckoned according to the British calendar.

                   17. In Dodds vs. Walker [1981] 2 All ER 609 [HL] the House of Lords held that in calculating the period of a month or a specified number of months that had elapsed after the occurrence of a specified event, such as the giving of a notice, the general rule is that the period ends on the corresponding date in the appropriate subsequent month irrespective of whether some months are longer than others. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Bibi Salma Khatoon vs. State of Bihar [2001] 7 SCC 197].

                   18. Therefore when the period prescribed is three months [as contrasted from 90 days] from a specified date, the said period would expire in the third month on the date corresponding to the date upon which the period starts. As a result, depending upon the months, it may mean 90 days or 91 days or 92 days or 89 days.

30. In the case in hand, the end date [terminus ad que] is 28.02.2025. As per the interpretation for application of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, the end date [terminus ad que] is to be included and therefore, the whole month of February, 2025 is to be included. The whole of the previous two months – December, 2025 and January, 2025 – are included to fulfill the parameter of actual three months, for the prescription contained in sub-section [2] of Section 73.

31. Every process/proceeding including a process of demand and recovery has a start point [terminus a quo] the process is set in motion with the issuance of a notice or show cause notice. The proceeding of demand and recovery contemplated in Section 73 of the CGST/AGST Act culminating in an order under Section 73[9] starts with the issuance of a show cause notice under Section 73[1], which is to be at least three months prior to the last date of passing of the order. In view of the statutory provision incorporated in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, the date of issuance of the show cause notice being the first in the period of time is to be excluded for the purpose of calculating the three months period from the last date of passing of the order. The 28th day of February, 2025 is the last day of the month and also the end date [terminus ad quem] for passing of the order under Section 73[9], CGST/AGST Act. By virtue of Section 9, it is to be included for calculation a period of month. Therefore, the three months which are ‘at least’ to be available were [i] December, 2024; [ii] January, 2025; and [iii] February, 2025. In such a situation, a show cause notice issued on 30.11.2024, which day is to be excluded from consideration in terms of Rule 9 of the General Clauses Act, fulfills the third parameter. Therefore, any show cause notice issued either on 30.11.2024 or on any date prior to 30.11.2024 would satisfy the time-line prescribed under Section 73.

32. The matter can be considered from another standpoint, as explained as exception in Dodds vs. Walker. If 28.11.2024 is taken as the date of commencement [terminus a quo] for issuance of the show cause notice under Section 73[1] with 28.02.2025 is the last date of passing the order [terminus ad quem] under Section 73[9], then the condition of at least three months is fulfilled following the corresponding date rule. Similarly, if 29.11.2024 is taken as the date of commencement [terminus a quo] for issuance of the show cause notice under Section 73[1] with 28.02.2025 is the last date of passing the order [terminus ad quem] under Section 73[9], then also the condition of at least three months is fulfilled following the corresponding date rule. Furthermore, if 30.11.2024 is taken as the date of commencement [terminus a quo] for issuance of the show cause notice under Section 73[1] with 28.02.2025 is the last date of passing the order [terminus ad quem] under Section 73[9], then also the condition of at least three months is fulfilled following the corresponding date rule.

33. The decision in M/s the Cotton Corporation of India [supra] though considered the corresponding date rule explained in Dodds vs. Walker it seems to have ignored the manner in which the corresponding date rule was explained in Dodds vs. Walker from the standpoint of the date of issuance of the notice or the start date of any proceeding or process. Therefore, this Court is not persuaded to agree with the manner in which the corresponding date rule has been applied in the said case.

34. In the light of the discussion made above and for the reasons stated therein, this Court holds that the Show Cause Notice issued on 29.11.2024 was within limitation and therefore, the assail made in that connection fails. Consequently, the writ petition is found unmerited and is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. The interim order stands recalled. There shall, however, be no order as to cost.