Oral Order:

1. Heard Sri Sateesh Kumar Eerla, learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner and Sri P. Vengal Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the Municipal Corporation appearing for Respondent No.2. Heard Sri Namineni Pavan Kumar, learned Counsel for the Impleadment Applicant in I.A.No.2 of 2026.

2. The prayer sought in the present Writ Petition is as under:

                  “It is humbly prayed that this Hon‟ble Court may be pleased to issue a Writ, order or direction, especially one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus, declaring the Notice No. 221/1012/TPT/UC/2025, Dated 22.01.2026 issued under Section 636 of AP Municipal Corporations Act, 1955 (for Short the Act') by the 2nd respondent as illegal and arbitrary and without considering the petitioner pending BPS Application No. BP2025/TIR/TPT/1/011835 dated 31-12-2025 as per G.O. M.S. No. 225 dated 12.11.2025 issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and violation of the Arts 14,19, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India and consequently direct the respondents not to take any coercive steps for demolition of the structures made by the petitioner premises D.No.22-5-100, Sy.No. 353/3, Thimmanaidupalem Revenue Village, Tirupati Mandal, Election Ward No-1, Tirupati and pass such other order or orders may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.”

3. The above Writ Petition and Interlocutory Application No.2 of 2026 are being considered together in the present Order.

4. The facts on record, as stated in the Affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, would indicate that one Smt. R. Vani has purchased land by way of Registered Sale Deed dated 12.11.2008 bearing Document No.7304 of 2008. Thereafter, one Sri T. Surendra Babu purchased the subject land from Smt. R. Vani on 23.01.2015 vide Doc.No.322 of 2015. The Writ Petitioner herein has purchased the subject land from Sri T. Surendra Babu on 12.03.2018 vide Doc.No.1275 of 2018; that the Petitioner has been in enjoyment and possession of the said land ever since the date of purchase; that the Petitioner applied for building permit, and the same was approved along with the building plan on 01.02.2025 (Ex.P.3) by Respondent No. 2 (Tirupati Municipal Corporation) for construction of ground floor plus two floors residential building; that the Petitioner, however, has constructed only ground plus one floor instead of ground plus two floors due to insufficient funds and completed the same on or about 01.07.2025; and House-Warming Ceremony was performed by the Writ Petitioner on 26.09.2025.

5. It is further stated in the Affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition that the 2nd Respondent issued a Provisional Notice dated 08.12.2025 notifying various violations in construction, for which the Petitioner submitted her explanation on 09.12.2025 (factually incorrect); that thereafter, Respondent No.2 issued a Notice directing the Petitioner to pull down the illegal construction within seven days from the date of receipt of the Notice; that the 2nd Respondent also issued Notice under Sections 452(2) and 461(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, directing the Petitioner to remove the unauthorized construction within 24 hours, failing which the 2nd Respondent would be constrained to remove/demolish the unauthorized deviations made in the building without any further Notice (Ex.P.1).

6. It is further submitted that the Petitioner submitted an Application for Regularization of deviations in construction under the Building Penalization Scheme - 2025 (hereinafter referred to as BPS - 2025) on 31.12.2025; and that having been aggrieved by the Notices issued by Respondent No. 2 dated 08.12.2025, 02.01.2026 and 22.01.2026, the Petitioner approached this Court and filed the present Writ Petition.

7. In the Lunch Motion moved by the Writ Petitioner, this Court, having examined the facts as presented by the learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner, was pleased to grant an Interim Order on 30.01.2026 suspending the Impugned Proceedings dated 22.01.2026 till the next listing and posted the matter for hearing on 03.02.2026.

8. At this stage, one Smt. Y. Saraswathamma filed I.A.No.2 of 2026 (hereinafter referred to as “the Applicant”) seeking impleadment. The Applicant has made serious allegations against the Writ Petitioner to the effect that the Writ Petitioner has approached this Court with unclean hands. The Applicant has alleged that the Writ Petitioner played fraud on the Court and obtained the Interim Order on 30.01.2026 for the following reasons:

                  i. That the Writ Petitioner is guilty of suppression of material facts and material documents (suppressio veri, suggestio falsi).

                  ii. The Writ Petition is bad for Non-joinder of Necessary Parties and therefore is liable to be dismissed.

9. To substantiate the allegations, Sri Namineni Pavan Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the Applicant stated in the Affidavit filed in support of the Application that there have been long-pending disputes between the Applicant and the Writ Petitioner in respect of encroachment made by the Writ Petitioner into the land belonging to the Applicant; and that in the presence of the Applicant and the Writ Petitioner, a Survey was conducted by the Officials, and the Survey Report clearly indicated that the Writ Petitioner had not only deviated from the sanctioned Plan in violation of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act but had also encroached into the private land belonging to the Applicant.

10. The Applicant has taken pains in describing various Proceedings initiated by her which indicate that the Writ Petitioner and the Applicant are embroiled in serious disputes. Para Nos. 3 to 7 of the Affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.2 of 2026 would disclose the following facts as narrated by the Applicant:

                  i. The Writ Petitioner destroyed the fence of the Applicant’s house (Applicant’s Plot No. 23).

                  ii. The Applicant has approached the Revenue Authorities for Survey of the Plot and for reconfirmation of boundaries.

                  iii. The Applicant has approached the Police Authorities for protection and redressal against the alleged high-handed actions of the Writ Petitioner and her henchmen.

                  iv. Tirupati Municipal Authorities and the Urban Development Authorities proceeded against the Writ Petitioner in respect of deviations from the sanctioned plan as well as the encroachment made into the land belonging to the Applicant.

                  v. In pursuance of the F-line Application No. DER 012501562073 dated 16.07.2025, the Plot belonging to the Applicant was surveyed on 25.08.2025 in the presence of the Applicant and the Writ Petitioner.

                  vi. The Revenue Authorities issued a Survey Report and Map on 29.08.2025 under the seal of the Tirupati (Urban) Mandal Surveyor, which clinches the fact that the Writ Petitioner had encroached into the Plot belonging to the Applicant.

                  vii. Pursuant to the complaint against the Writ Petitioner to the jurisdictional Police Inspector, the case was referred for enquiry to the Tirupati (Urban) Tahsildar.

                  viii. The Tahsildar has conducted an Enquiry after due Notice to both i.e. to the Applicant and the Writ Petitioner and the Tahsildar had confirmed the encroachment by the Writ Petitioner into the said Plot belonging to the Applicant.

                  ix. The Applicant made a Representation on 15.09.2025 to the Tirupati Municipal Corporation against the illegal constructions made by the Writ Petitioner.

                  x. The Applicant gave complaints against the Writ Petitioner to the Respondent Authorities on 31.10.2025, 24.11.2025, 06.12.2025, and 08.12.2025, and only upon such untiring efforts by the Applicant that the Respondent Authorities have finally initiated Legal Proceedings against the Writ Petitioner on 09.12.2025.

                  xi. The Applicant has categorically stated in Para Nos.12 and 13 of the Affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.2 of 2026 that the Writ Petitioner has taken undue advantage by suppression of actual facts and causes of action and obtained an Interim Order on 30.01.2026 from this Court behind the back of the Applicant.

11. Sri Namineni Pavan Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the Applicant, while drawing the attention of this Court to various documents filed along with Interlocutory Application (I.A. No. 2 of 2026), has submitted that the Writ Petitioner has not only played fraud on the Court by non-disclosure of material facts but also succeeded in obtaining undue gain from such non- disclosure of material facts by securing an Interim Order from this Court on 30.01.2026. He would submit that the Writ Petitioner did not approach this Court with clean hands and had deliberately not impleaded the Applicant as a Contesting Respondent. He would further submit that the Affidavit filed by the Applicant (in I.A.No.2 of 2026) would disclose that there has been a long subsisting dispute between the Writ Petitioner and the Applicant and therefore the Applicant ought to have been impleaded as an Unofficial Respondent by the Writ Petitioner himself.

12. Learned Counsel for the Applicant submits that since the Writ Petitioner secured an Order by concealing material facts and by not impleading necessary parties, the Applicant was constrained to file I.A.No.2 of 2026 seeking impleadment. He would submit that the Writ Petition should be dismissed for abuse of process. He would, therefore, urge this Court to implead the Applicant as one of the Respondents and dismiss the Writ Petition by declaring that the Writ Petition is an abuse of process, inasmuch as the Writ Petitioner has approached this Court and secured an Interim Order by concealment of material facts and material documents and by deliberately not impleading the necessary parties.

13. In light of the above contentions of the Applicant, this Court took pains of sifting through the Affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition. Surprisingly, the Affidavit in the Writ Petition does not disclose any of the material facts stated by the Applicant in I.A.No.2 of 2026. This Court is of the opinion that the facts averred in the Affidavit filed in support of the Interlocutory Application are material to the case on hand, and non-disclosure of such facts in the Writ Petition is fatal to the case.

14. This apart, the non-disclosure of material facts led this Court to consider the case only from the angle projected by the Writ Petitioner and compelled this Court to grant Interim Protection on 30.01.2026 (during the Lunch Motiion). In fact, if the Applicant had not approached this Court seeking impleadment (I.A.No.2 of 2026), the Court would not have had the knowledge of the material facts and material documents which are now brought on record by the Applicant.

15. In view of the above facts, this Court is in complete agreement with the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the Applicant to the effect that the Writ Petitioner is guilty of the following:

                  i. Suppression of material facts and material documents;

                  ii. Not impleading the necessary parties deliberately with a view to secure undue advantage; and

                  iii. By committing the above mentioned two illegal acts, the Writ Petitioner secured an Interim Order dated 30.01.2026 in her favour.

16. It is trite law that the Court ought not to show indulgence to parties who approach the Court with unclean hands. The above facts disclose that the Petitioner played fraud upon the Court and secured an Interim Order in her favour in a dishonest manner.

17. In the above premise, this Court is of the opinion that the Writ Petitioner approached this Court with unclean hands. The Writ Petitioner is guilty of suppression of material facts and material documents (suppressio veri, suggestio falsi). The Writ Petitioner is also guilty of obtaining an Interim Order by taking undue advantage of such suppression. Apart from these findings, this Court would hold that the instant Writ Petition is also bad for Non-joinder of Necessary Parties.

18. Relevant case laws applicable to the facts in the instant case are discussed herein below.

Suppressio veri, Suggestio falsi (Suppression of material facts or documents suggests falsehood):

19. In Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society : (2013) 11 SCC 531, the Hon’ble Apex Court held in Para Nos.44 to 47 as under:

                  “44. It is not for a litigant to decide what fact is material for adjudicating a case and what is not material. It is the obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case and leave the decision-making to the court. True, there is a mention of the order dated 2-5-2003 in the order dated 24-7- 2006 passed by the JCC, but that is not enough disclosure.

                  The petitioners have not clearly disclosed the facts and circumstances in which the order dated 2-5-2003 was passed or that it has attained finality.

                  45. We may only refer to two cases on this subject. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das [AIR 1963 SC 1558] stress was laid on litigants eschewing inaccurate, untrue or misleading statements, otherwise leave granted to an appellant may be revoked. It was observed as follows: (AIR p. 1560, para 9)

                  “9. …It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. That is why we have come to the conclusion that in the present case, special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked. Accordingly, special leave is revoked and the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the respondent.”

                  46. More recently, in Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India [(2010) 14 SCC 38 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 889] the case law on the subject was discussed. It was held that if a litigant does not come to the court with clean hands, he is not entitled to be heard and indeed, such a person is not entitled to any relief from any judicial forum. It was said: (SCC p. 51, para 21)

                  “21. The principle that a person who does not come to the court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is that every court is not only entitled but is duty- bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have a bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case.”

                  (Emphasis supplied)

                  47. A mere reference to the order dated 2-5-2003, en passant, in the order dated 24-7-2006 does not serve the requirement of disclosure. It is not for the court to look into every word of the pleadings, documents and annexures to fish out a fact. It is for the litigant to come upfront and clean with all material facts and then, on the basis of the submissions made by the learned counsel, leave it to the court to determine whether or not a particular fact is relevant for arriving at a decision. Unfortunately, the petitioners have not done this and must suffer the consequence thereof.”

20. In Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha : (2024) 4 SCC 432, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Para Nos.2 to 7 held as under :

                  “2. About three decades ago, this Court in Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma [Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 239] was faced with a situation where an attempt was made to deceive the Court and interfere with the administration of justice. The litigant was held to be guilty of contempt of court. It was a case in which the husband had filed fabricated document to oppose the prayer of his wife seeking transfer of matrimonial proceedings. Finding him guilty of contempt of court, he was sentenced to two weeks' imprisonment by this Court. This Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 423-24 & 427, paras 1-2 & 14)

                  “1. The stream of administration of justice has to remain unpolluted so that purity of court's atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the State. Polluters of judicial firmament are, therefore, required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of court's environment; so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned.

                  2. Anyone who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings; or if anything is done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the administration of justice. Such persons are required to be properly dealt with, not only to punish them for the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similar acts which shake the faith of people in the system of administration of justice.

                  ***

                  14. The legal position thus is that if the publication be with intent to deceive the court or one made with an intention to defraud, the same would be contempt, as it would interfere with administration of justice. It would, in any case, tend to interfere with the same. This would definitely be so if a fabricated document is filed with the aforesaid mens rea. In the case at hand the fabricated document was apparently to deceive the court; the intention to defraud is writ large. Anil Kumar is, therefore, guilty of contempt.”

                  3. In K.D. Sharma v. SAIL [K.D. Sharma v. SAIL, (2008) 12 SCC 481] it was observed by this Court : (SCC p. 493, para 39)

                  “39. If the primary object as highlighted in Kensington Income Tax Commrs. [R. v. General Commissioners for the Purposes of the Income Tax Acts for the District of Kensington, ex p Princess Edmond De Polignac, (1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT

                  136 (KB & CA)] is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and “clean breast” cannot hold a writ of the court with “soiled hands”. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the court, the court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the court does not reject the petition on that ground, the court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the process of the court.”

                  4. xxx

                  5. In Moti Lal Songara v. Prem Prakash [Moti Lal Songara v. Prem Prakash, (2013) 9 SCC 199 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 872] ,this Court, considering the issue regarding concealment of facts before the Court, observed that “court is not a laboratory where children come to play”, and opined as under : (SCC p. 208, paras 19-20)

                  “19. The second limb of the submission is whether in the obtaining factual matrix, the order passed by the High Court discharging the respondent-accused is justified in law. We have clearly stated that though the respondent was fully aware about the fact that charges had been framed against him by the learned trial Judge, yet he did not bring the same to the notice of the Revisional Court hearing the revision against the order taking cognizance. It is a clear case of suppression. It was within the special knowledge of the accused. Anyone who takes recourse to method of suppression in a court of law, is, in actuality, playing fraud upon the court, and the maxim suppressio veri, expressio falsi i.e. suppression of the truth is equivalent to the expression of falsehood, gets attracted. We are compelled to say so as there has been a calculated concealment of the fact before the Revisional Court. It can be stated with certitude that the respondent-accused tried to gain advantage by such factual suppression. The fraudulent intention is writ large. In fact, he has shown his courage of ignorance and tried to play possum.

                  20. The High Court, as we have seen, applied the principle “when infrastructure collapses, the superstructure is bound to collapse”. However, as the order has been obtained by practising fraud and suppressing material fact before a court of law to gain advantage, the said order cannot be allowed to stand.”

                  6. xxx

                  7. In a recent matter, this Court again came across a litigant who had tried to overreach the Court by concealing material facts in Saumya Chaurasia v. Enforcement Directorate [Saumya Chaurasia v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 6 SCC 401 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1674 : 2023 INSC 1073] . It was a case where the appellant before this Court had challenged the order [Saumya Chaurasia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine Chh 1907] passed by the High Court [ High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Miscellaneous Crl. Case No. 1258 of 2023] rejecting his bail application. He was accused of committing various crimes under the Penal Code, 1860 and the Prevention of Money- Laundering Act, 2002. His bail application was rejected by the High Court on 23-6-2023 [Saumya Chaurasia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine Chh 1907] . In the pleadings before this Court, it was mentioned that the High Court had committed gross error in not considering the charge-sheet dated 8-6-2023 and the cognizance order dated 16-6-2023, which clearly suggested that there was an error apparent on the fact of it. The fact which was available on record was that an order in the bail application was reserved by the High Court on 17-4-2023 [Saumya Chaurasia v. Enforcement Directorate, 2023 SCC OnLine Chh 5838] and pronounced on 23-6-2023 [Saumya Chaurasia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine Chh 1907] . Having some suspicion, this Court directed the appellant to file an affidavit to clarify the aforesaid position. There was no specific reply given to the aforesaid query to the Court. Rather vague statements were made. Considering the facts available, this Court observed that there was a bold attempt by and on behalf of the appellant therein to misrepresent the facts for challenging the order [Saumya Chaurasia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine Chh 1907] impugned therein, regarding the conduct of the parties and the counsel, this Court made the following observations : (Saumya Chaurasia case [Saumya Chaurasia v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 6 SCC 401 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1674 : 2023 INSC 1073] , SCC para 13)

                  “13. It cannot be gainsaid that every party approaching the court seeking justice is expected to make full and correct disclosure of material facts and that every advocate being an officer of the court, though appearing for a particular party, is expected to assist the court fairly in carrying out its function to administer the justice. It hardly needs to be emphasised that a very high standard of professionalism and legal acumen is expected from the advocates particularly designated senior advocates appearing in the highest court of the country so that their professionalism may be followed and emulated by the advocates practising in the High Courts and the District Courts. Though it is true that the advocates would settle the pleadings and argue in the courts on instructions given by their clients, however their duty to diligently verify the facts from the record of the case, using their legal acumen for which they are engaged, cannot be obliviated.”

                  (Emphasis Supplied)

                  Finally, this Court dismissed the appeal with costs of Rs 1,00,000.”

21. In Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India and Others : (2024) 5 SCC 481, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Para No.141 held as under :

                  “141. Further, fraud can be established when a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii), recklessly, being careless about whether it be true or false. While suppression of a material document would amount to a fraud on the court, suppression of material facts vital to the decision to be rendered by a court of law is equally serious. Thus, once it is held that there was a fraud in judicial proceedings all advantages gained as a result of it have to be withdrawn. In such an eventuality, doctrine of res judicata or doctrine of binding precedent would not be attracted since an order obtained by fraud is non est in the eye of the law.”

                  (Emphasis Supplied)

Non-joinder of Necessary Parties:

22. In Dattatreya and Others v. Mahaveer and Others : (2004) 10 SCC 665, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Para No.10 held as under :

                  “10. In the meantime, in the year 1985 an application in Form I was given by the appellants for registration of occupancy under the provisions of the Karnataka Certain Inams Abolition Act, 1977. Since it remained pending and was not decided, another writ petition was filed, namely, Writ Petition No. 5495 of 1992 but the respondents were not impleaded as parties to the said petition. It is true a direction was sought for the Tribunal to dispose of the application moved by the appellants in the year 1985 and the learned Single Judge being uninformed about the earlier order passed by the Tribunal in 1979 in respect of the same land on an application in which both parties were represented, passed the order for disposal of the application on merits. We, however, feel that the learned Single Judge went wrong one-sidedly in saying that it was incumbent upon the respondents to have got the order reviewed or modified. By not impleading the present respondents as parties in Writ Petition No. 5495 of 1992 the appellants deprived the respondents of an opportunity to challenge that order; rather they were kept in the dark about the whole proceeding. Any order to consider the application of the appellants moved in 1985 was likely to affect the order dated 3-7-1979 passed in favour of the respondents. The appellants knew it, being parties in the earlier proceedings of 1974. The fact thus remains that the material facts were not brought to the notice of the Court and the persons who were ultimately to be affected were avoided to be impleaded as parties. It was merely not a question of non-impleadment of necessary parties technically and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure rather was very much a question of proper parties being there before the court particularly in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The argument tried to be raised otherwise is not tenable. …………………………… The appellants cannot be allowed to claim any bona fides in not impleading the respondents as parties in that writ petition or about non-disclosure of the earlier order dated 3-7-1979 in respect of the same land and within their knowledge on the ground that it was not necessary to disclose it. As observed earlier, they knew well that if any order is passed in their favour the respondents would be the affected persons. The respondents were deprived from raising this point before the learned Single Judge regarding a pre-existing order relating to the same land and non-disclosure of the same. The conduct of the appellants had been far from being fair if not fraudulent. It was a deliberate suppression of material fact which caused prejudice to the respondents. Fair play is the basic rule to seek relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

                  (Emphasis Supplied)

23. In Vishnu Vardhan alias Vishnu Pradhan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1501, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Para Nos. 43 to 46, 48 to 50 held as under :

                  “43. Although the provisions of the CPC do not apply to writ proceedings ex proprio vigore, the principles flowing therefrom, as far as practicable, can be made applicable. Order I Rule 9, CPC, as originally enacted, ordained that a suit shall not be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non- joinder of parties; however, after its amendment in 1976 introducing the proviso, the implication is that non-joinder of a party could, in a given case, prove fatal for the right to relief claimed by the plaintiff, more so when a necessary party is not impleaded, and defeat the suit. Although Order I Rule 10 does empower a court to implead at any stage of the proceedings a party who should have been joined as a defendant, either upon or without the application of either party, a decree passed by the court in the absence of a necessary or proper party to the suit and affecting his interest could be avoided by such party; however, if the decree is such that it acknowledges and declares the right of the decree-holder to the subject matter of the suit and entitles him to its benefits, such a decree has to be carried either in appeal or review by the affected non-party to divest the decree-holder of whatever the decree entitles him to.

                  44. Insofar as writ proceedings are concerned, it is no longer res integra that any order made on a writ petition affecting the interest of a party who has not been arrayed as a respondent could be invalidated on the ground of breach of natural justice.

                  45. We may profitably refer to the decision in Poonam v. State of U.P.39. Although the decision was rendered in connection with a selection process for allotment of a fair price shop, this Court after analysing various previous decisions emphasised:

                  “21. We have referred to the aforesaid passages as they state the basic principle behind the doctrine of natural justice, that is, no order should be passed behind the back of a person who is to be adversely affected by the order. The principle behind the proviso to Order 1 Rule 9 that the Code of Civil Procedure enjoins it and the said principle is also applicable to the writs. An unsuccessful candidate challenging the selection as far as the service jurisprudence is concerned is bound to make the selected candidates parties.”

                  46. A reference may further be made to the decision in Ajay Ishwar Ghute v. Meher K. Patel40 wherein a Bench of two- Judges [of which one of us (Ujjal Bhuyan, J.) was a member] in an appeal against an order made under Article 226 of the Constitution, held thus:

                  “21. In the facts of the case, the senior district-level officials of the State had stated on oath that the construction of the compound wall, in respect of which relief was sought in the Writ Petition, would affect the rights of several third parties. However, the Court completely ignored the same. Even in clause 6(iii) of the “Minutes of Order”, there was enough indication that the compound wall, if not appropriately constructed, would affect the rights of owners of the other lands. Therefore, it was the duty of the Court to have called upon the 1st and 2nd respondents to implead the persons who were likely to be affected. The 1st and 2nd respondents could not have pleaded ignorance about the names of the concerned parties as they have referred to the owners of the other lands in the “Minutes of Order”. However, the Division Bench of the High Court has failed to make even an elementary enquiry whether third parties will be affected by the construction of the compound wall under police protection. Hence, the order dated 16th March 2022 passed in the Writ Petition in terms of the “Minutes of Order” is entirely illegal and must be set aside. The Writ Petition will have to be remanded to the High Court to decide the same in accordance with the law.”

                  47. xxx

                  48. However, it is clarified that we do not seek to make any opprobrious remarks against the High Court as it was incumbent upon Reddy to implead Vishnu and Sudhakar as respondents in his writ petition and the High Court could not have been expected to know the long-standing disputes or the fact that Reddy had procured change in the revenue records on the basis of the compromise decree whereupon further proceedings between Vishnu and Reddy in the shape of a suit were pending unless the same was brought to its notice.

                  49. In any event, having regard to the events preceding presentation of the writ petition by Reddy, out of which the present proceedings have arisen, we have no hesitation to hold that Reddy tailored a situation to suit his convenience by not impleading Vishnu as a party with the sole intention of obtaining an order in respect of not only the quantum of compensation payable for acquisition of the subject land but also a declaration as to his entitlement thereto - all, behind Vishnu's back. An attempt by Reddy to steal a march over Vishnu is clearly discernible which, without reference to anything more, does border on fraud.

                  50. Moving ahead, it is equally well settled that suppression of even a single material fact can be fatal before writ courts. In this context, one may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar42 where the law has succinctly been stated as follows:

                  13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court, whatever view the court may have taken ….”

                  (Emphasis Supplied)

Fraud on Court:

24. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (DEAD) BY LRS. v. Jagannath (DEAD) BY LRS. AND OTHERS : (1994) 1 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Para No.5 held as under :

                  “5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that “there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence”. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank- loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.”

25. In Vishnu Vardhan alias Vishnu Pradhan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1501, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Para Nos.60 to 62 held as under :

                  “60. Be that as it may, obtaining of the impugned order by Reddy in his favour by playing fraud on the High Court is conspicuous by its presence. Thus, we find Vishnu's core argument to be creditworthy and compelling for us to hold that judicial orders procured by Reddy by subverting the judicial process through fraud and concealment of material facts cannot be permitted to stand.

                  61. In decisions abound, the Courts have consistently nullified orders obtained through fraudulent means. Key excerpts from some of these decisions read thus:

                  a. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh47, this Court reiterated that fraud unravels everything:

                  3. “Fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries. Lord Denning observed in a language without equivocation that “no judgment of a court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for, fraud unravels everything” (Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, [[1956] 1 Q.B. 702 : [1956] 1 All

                  ER 341 : [1956] 2 WLR 502 (CA)]).

                  (Emphasis Supplied)

                  b. In Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) v. Shaw Bros.48, it was held:

                  20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct. Michael Levi likens a fraudster to Milton's sorcerer, Comus, who exulted in his ability to, „wing me into the easy- hearted man and trap him into snares‟. It has been defined as an act of trickery or deceit. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary fraud in equity has been defined as an act or omission to act or concealment by which one person obtains an advantage against conscience over another or which equity or public policy forbids as being prejudicial to another. In Black's Legal Dictionary, fraud is defined as an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or surrender a legal right; a false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury……..

                  c. In A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P.49, this Court held:

                  21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed:

                  “Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.”

                  22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order—by the first court or by the final court—has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.

                  23. ***

                  24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading Cases, 13th Edn., p. 644, explaining the nature of fraud, de Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment would be res judicata and not impeachable from within, it might be impeachable from without. In other words, though it is not permissible to show that the court was “mistaken”, it might be shown that it was “misled”. There is an essential distinction between mistake and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction is that an action to set aside a judgment cannot be brought on the ground that it has been decided wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the decision was one which should not have been rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was imposed upon or tricked into giving the judgment.

                  25. It has been said: fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent).

                  d. The judgment by Denning, L.J. in Lazarus Estates Ltd. (supra), which has since been quoted with approval by this Court in a catena of decisions including Nidhi Kaim (supra), asserted intolerance for fraud in legal proceedings in the following words:

                  No court … will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud. […] Fraud unravels everything. The court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved, it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever….

                  62. We are also mindful of the legal principle that if a fact could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, its non-disclosure does not constitute suppressio veri or suggestio falsi. Profitable reference may be made to the decision in Shri Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University50 where this Court observed that “where a person on whom fraud is committed is in a position to discover the truth by due diligence, fraud is not proved”. It would neither be a case of suggestio falsi nor suppressio veri.”

26. This Court, would therefore, hold that the present Writ Petition is a gross abuse of the process of Court. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs.20,000/-. The said costs shall be paid by the Writ Petitioner in favour of the President, Andhra Pradesh High Court Advocates’ Association, within one week from the date of uploading of this Order on the web-site of this Court.

27. Registry is directed to supply a copy of this Order to the President, Andhra Pradesh High Court Advocates’ Association forthwith for effective compliance.

28. At this stage, Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner has sought to withdraw this Writ Petition. Having considered the request and also having considered the facts of this case, this Court has declined to allow the Ld. Counsel for the Writ Petitioner to withdraw this Writ Petition. Accordingly, the request for withdrawal is declined.

29. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed with costs. Interlocutory Application No.2 of 2026 filed for impleadment of Smt. Y. Saraswathamma, as a Party Respondent is hereby allowed for the reasons aforesaid.

30. Registry is directed to suitably amend the Cause Title before issuing the Certified Copy.

31. Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand closed in terms of this order.