1. The petitioner herein is the wife of one Ashique ('detenu' for the sake of brevity) and her challenge in this Writ Petition is directed against Ext.P1 order of detention dated 05.12.2025 passed by the 2nd respondent under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity). The said order stands confirmed by the Government, vide order dated 13.02.2026, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months with effect from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that on 29.10.2025, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Malappuram, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known goonda' as defined under Section 2(o)(ii) of the KAA(P) Act.

3. Altogether, two cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing Ext.P1 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.542/2025 of Vengara Police Station, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 22(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act.

4. We heard Smt. Saipooja, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

5. Relying on the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another, [1991 (1) SCC 128], the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody, in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decision by the Supreme Court. According to the counsel, as the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it was incumbent upon the authority to satisfy itself that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that on being so released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity. According to the counsel, though in Ext.P1 order, it is mentioned that the detenu was undergoing judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, the possibility of the detenu being released on bail is not properly considered. The learned counsel submitted that there is an unreasonable delay in mooting the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act as well as in passing the impugned order of detention, and the said delay will certainly snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention. It was submitted that while passing Ext.P1 order, the jurisdictional authority failed to take note of the fact that there was a time gap of around four years between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu, and the said time gap itself would show that the detenu is not a person having the propensity to be involved in criminal activities repeatedly. The learned counsel further urged that the jurisdictional authority ought to have taken note of the fact that already proceedings have been initiated against the detenu under Section 126 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (for short “BNSS”), 2023, and the same would have been sufficient to prevent the detenu from being involved in criminal activities. On these premises, it was urged that the detention order is liable to be set aside.

6.  In response, the learned Government Pleader submitted that Ext.P1 detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the learned Government Pleader, the detention order was passed by the competent authority upon being fully satisfied that such detention was the only effective means to prevent the detenu from repeating his criminal activities. It     was further contended that the authority was fully conscious of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. It was only upon being satisfied that there was every likelihood of the detenu being released on bail and that, if so released, he would in all probability indulge in further criminal activities, that the order of detention came to be passed. According to him, therefore, the order of detention will legally sustain irrespective of the fact that the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity while the impugned order was passed. The Government Pleader further submitted that there is no unreasonable delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the detention order, and hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention is snapped cannot be sustained. Similarly, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the impugned order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after being satisfied that proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS would not suffice to prevent the detenu from engaging in criminal activities.

7. From the rival contentions raised, it is gatherable that the main question that revolves around this Writ Petition is whether an order of detention under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act can be validly passed against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. While answering the said question, it is to be noted that, through a series of judicial pronouncements rendered by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court, it is well settled that there is no legal impediment in passing an order of detention against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. However, an order of detention against a person who is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity cannot be passed in a causal manner. Undisputedly, an order of detention under the KAA(P) Act is a drastic measure against a citizen as it heavily impacts his personal as well as fundamental rights. When an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to preventive detention is neither warranted nor permissible. When a detenu is in jail in connection with the last prejudicial activity, obviously, there is no imminent possibility of being involved in criminal activities. Therefore, before passing a detention order in respect of a person who is in jail, the concerned authority must satisfy itself that there is a real possibility that the detenu is on bail, and further, if released on bail, the material on record reveals that he will indulge in prejudicial activity if not detained. The circumstances that necessitate the passing of such an order must be reflected in the order itself.

8. In Kamarunnissa’s case (cited supra), the Supreme Court made it clear that a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed even in the case of a person in custody (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable materials placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in probability indulged in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. If the authority passes an order after recording its satisfaction in this regard, such an order would be valid.

9. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Veeramani v. The State of Tamil Nadu [1994 (2) SCC 337] and in Union of India v. Paul Manickam [2003 (8) SCC 342].

10. Keeping in mind the above proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court, while reverting to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.542/2025 of Vengara Police Station, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 22(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act. The incident that led to the registration of the said case occurred on 18.08.2025, and the detenu was arrested on the same day. Since then, he has been under judicial custody. The impugned order was passed on 05.12.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody.

11. In Ext.P1 detention order, it is specifically stated that at the time of passing the said order, the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the case registered against him with respect to the last prejudicial activity. Therefore, it is decipherable that the detaining authority was fully cognizant of the fact that the detenu was in custody at the time when it passed Ext.P1 order.

12. Similarly, in Ext.P1 order, it is further recorded that the detenu has applied for bail in the said case on 19.11.2025, and there is a possibility of the detenu being released on bail, and if so released, he would be involved in criminal activities again. Evidently, the impugned order reflects that there is a proper application of mind and, based on the materials available on record, the detaining authority subjectively satisfied that there is a reason to believe that there is a possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that, on so released, the detenu will in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities undermining the bail conditions.

13. Now, while coming to the contention of the petitioner regarding the delay that occurred in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the detention order, first of all, it is to be noted that, as already stated, the detenu was arrested in connection with the last prejudicial activity on 18.08.2025. Subsequently, it was on 29.10.2025, the sponsoring authority mooted the proposal for action under the KAA(P) Act. Later, it was on 05.12.2025, the detention order was passed. Evidently, the proposal was forwarded, and the detention order was passed while the detenu was under judicial custody. Since the detenu was in jail, there was no basis for any apprehension regarding imminent repetition of criminal activities by him. Therefore, the minimum delay that occurred in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the order is liable to be discarded, and it could not be said that the said delay is sufficient to snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention.

14. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the jurisdictional authority failed to take note of the fact that there was a time gap of around four years between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu, and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is vitiated. It is true that the last prejudicial activity was committed by the detenu on 18.08.2025, whereas the date of occurrence of the last but one case registered against him (crime No.437/2021) is on 03.06.2021. Thus, there is indeed a gap of around four years between the two incidents. However, it cannot be ignored that the incidents that led to the registration of both cases occurred within seven years of the date of the detention order, and hence, both cases are qualified to classify the detenu as a ‘known goonda’. Therefore, the time gap between the two cases highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of little consequence in the context of the impugned order.

15. While considering the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS would have been sufficient to restrain the detenu from repeating the criminal activities, first of all, it is to be noted that proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS, and action under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act operates in different spheres. Under Section 126 of the BNSS, a person is only called to furnish security for his good behaviour. On the other hand, under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act, a person who is having history of anti-social activities is detained so as to prevent him from repeating criminal activities. Therefore, action under the KAA(P) Act is more effective. It is for the detaining authority to decide whether action under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act is necessary against a person against whom already proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS have been initiated. Proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS will in no way preclude the jurisdictional authority from initiating proceedings under KAA(P) Act. However, when a person against whom Section 126 of the BNSS proceedings is pending, the authority passing the detention order shall be satisfied that the said proceedings are not sufficient to prevent the detenu from repeating criminal activities. In the case in hand, in the detention order, it is specifically mentioned that proceedings under Section 126 of BNSS are not sufficient to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities. Of course, the said explanation in the impugned order justifies the present detention order passed during the pendency of proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS.

16. Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, although the impugned order refers to Crime No. 381/2022 of Parappanangadi Police Station, a perusal of the list of documents relied upon by the competent authority, as appended to the detention order, indicates that the records pertaining to the said crime were not considered while passing the order of detention. It is true that in the list of documents forwarded by the sponsoring authority for consideration by the competent authority, the records relating to Crime No. 381/2022 have not been included. However, it is specifically stated in the detention order itself that the said case was not taken into account for the purpose of classifying the detenu as a “known goonda.” Since the said crime did not form the basis for the subjective satisfaction leading to the issuance of the detention order, there was neither any necessity nor any legal requirement to consider the documents pertaining to that case. Furthermore, as the said documents were not relied upon by the competent authority, there was no obligation to furnish copies thereof to the detenu. In the above circumstances, the contention advanced by the petitioner in this regard is devoid of merit and is liable to be rejected.

                  In the result, we have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner has not made out any ground for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.