S. Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The appellants, who are respondents 1 and 2 in O.P.(DRT) No.398 of 2025, filed this intra-court appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the order dated 19.12.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in that O.P.(DRT).

2. As per the pleadings in the original petition, the 1st respondent availed a housing loan from the 2nd appellant Bank, for the purpose of constructing the residential house for his daughter, the 2nd respondent, mortgaging an extent of 3.44 Ares of property in Sy.No.516/2B of Pathanapuram Village and the respondents 2 and 3 are the sureties for the said loan transaction. The appellant Bank issued a Notice to the respondents, wherein it is stated that the amount in arrears is to be cleared before 25.05.2023, and another notice was issued to the respondents, stating that the loan was classified as Non-Performing Asset (NPA) on 02.06.2023. The Bank issued a notice under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’ in short) and informed the respondents that they are proceeding for taking out the property and thereupon the 1st respondent approached this Court by filing W.P.(C)No.19933 of 2024 and this Court by the judgment dated 04.06.2024 disposed of the matter, permitting the 1st respondent to pay off the overdue amount in 10 instalments. Thereafter, the respondents remitted the amount as fixed by this Court towards the outstanding liability of Rs.3,30,491/-, and the entire amount was paid. Though the payment was accepted by the Bank up to 04.04.2025, thereafter, the Advocate Commissioner has issued notice stating that he has been authorised to take possession of the property based upon Ext.P3 order dated 06.05.2025 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Kollam, in M.C.No.760 of 2025. On receipt of the notice, the 1st respondent filed W.P.(C)No.20089 of 2025 before this Court, and this Court did not interfere in the matter and gave liberty to the respondents to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam (the ‘Tribunal’ for short). On the basis of the direction issued by this Court, the respondents approached the Tribunal by filing S.A.No.447 of 2025 and also filed Ext.P4 interim application for stay. But the Tribunal dismissed the interim application. Challenging the said order, respondents 1 and 2 filed O.P.(DRT)No.221 of 2025, and by Ext.P6 judgment dated 06.10.2025, this Court again directed the matter to be considered by the Tribunal. But the Tribunal, as per Ext.P8 order dated 10.11.2025, dismissed the S.A. and interim application for stay. With these pleadings, respondents 1 and 2 - petitioners filed O.P.(DRT)No.398 of 2025 seeking the following reliefs :

                  “i) To set aside Ext.P8 order dated 10.11.2025 in S.A.No.447 of 2025 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-2, Ernakulam;

                  ii) To issue direction to the respondent Bank not to proceed for taking possession of the property, on the basis of Ext.P3 order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Kollam in M.C.No.760 of 2025.”

3. On 19.12.2025, when the O.P.(DRT) came up for consideration, the learned Single Judge passed the impugned order, which reads thus:

                  “The petitioners shall remit an amount of Rs.35,000/- (Rupees thirty five thousand only) on or before 05.02.2026 and shall pay the instalment due on 3rd of every month. Post on 06.01.2026.”

4. Being aggrieved, the appellants - respondents 1 and 2 have filed this intra-court appeal.

5. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 - petitioners in the O.P.(DRT).

6. The learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the respondents 1 and 2 are trying to stall the proceedings initiated by the Bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act by filing repeated writ petitions. When the loan availed by the 1st respondent became NPA, the Bank issued a demand notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act on 01.08.2023. Thereafter, symbolic possession of the secured asset was taken by the Bank. However, without making the payment, the respondents approached this Court by filing W.P.(C)No.19933 of 2024, which was disposed of vide, judgment dated 04.06.2024, permitting the respondents to clear the overdue amount in ten equal monthly instalments. The respondents did not comply with the directions in that judgment. Thereafter, on the application of the Bank under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, in M.C.No.760 of 2025, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kollam, appointed an Advocate Commissioner who had issued notice for taking physical possession of the secured asset. The respondents again approached this Court by filing W.P.(C)No.20089 of 2025, challenging the said notice. Apart from that, the respondents filed an interlocutory application seeking stay of the SARFAESI proceedings in W.P.(C)No.19933 of 2024, and that interlocutory application bearing I.A.No.3 of 2025 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 10.06.2025. Subsequently, W.P.(C)No.20089 of 2025 was also dismissed on 18.06.2025. Thereafter, the respondents filed S.A.No.447 of 2025 before the Tribunal. Since the Tribunal did not grant an interim stay, the respondents filed O.P.(DRT)No.221 of 2025 before this Court, which was disposed of by the judgment dated 06.10.2025 with a direction to the Tribunal to pass orders on the stay application within three weeks. The Tribunal disposed of the stay application bearing I.A. No.2609 of 2025, directing the appellant Bank not to take coercive steps until the final disposal of S.A.No.447 of 2025. Thereafter, the S.A. was heard and finally disposed of by the Tribunal by Ext.P8 dismissal order dated 10.11.2025. It is challenging the said order, the present O.P.(DRT) was filed by the respondents 1 and 2. The learned counsel further submitted that as on 05.01.2026, an amount of Rs.21,37,787.95/- is outstanding in the loan account. The learned counsel vehemently submitted that, against Ext.P8 order of the Tribunal, the remedy available to respondents 1 and 2 is an appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. It is further argued by the learned counsel, relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal [(2008) 17 SCC 491], that the learned Single Judge ought not have granted the relief beyond the pleadings. The learned counsel, by relying on the judgment of this Court in State Bank of India v. M/s. Kinship Services (India) (P) Ltd. [2013 (4) KHC 21] submitted that since the relief granted in the impugned interim order is by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, writ appeal is maintainable. It is the submissions of the learned counsel that since an equal and efficacious remedy is available to respondents 1 and 2 before the Debs Recovery Appellate Tribunal, the learned Single Judge ought not to have passed the impugned order stalling the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act.

7. The learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 would submit that it is only by way of an indulgence that the learned Single Judge passed the impugned interim order dated 19.12.2025. Therefore, no interference is needed on the impugned order of the learned Single Judge. By relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in South Indian Bank Ltd v. Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], the learned counsel submitted that in exceptional circumstances, a writ petition is maintainable against the proceedings initiated under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, and such an exceptional circumstance exists in the present case. The learned counsel further relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in Assistant Commissioner of State Tax v. Commercial Steel Ltd.[(2022) 16 SCC 447], Ibrat Faizan v. Omaxe Buildhome Private Ltd. [(2023) 11 SCC 594], Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) (P) Ltd.[(2024) 2 SCC 1], and Allahabad High Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2024) 6 SCC 267], in support of his arguments.

8. The appellants are challenging an interim order dated 19.12.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in the original petition filed by respondents 1 and 2, challenging the order of the Tribunal in a Securitisation Application filed by respondents 1 and 2 under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. As far as maintainability of a writ appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, against an interim order passed by a learned Single Judge in a writ petition, the Larger Bench of this Court in K.S. Das v. State of Kerala [1992 (2) KLT 358] held that the word ‘order’ in Section 5(i) of the Act includes, apart from other orders, orders passed by the High Court in miscellaneous petitions filed in the writ petitions provided the orders are to be in force pending the writ petition. An appeal would lie against such orders only if the orders substantially affect or touch upon the substantial rights or liabilities of the parties or are matters of moment and cause substantial prejudice to the parties. The nature of the ‘order’ appealable belongs to the category of ‘intermediate orders’ referred to by the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551]. The word ‘order’ is not confined to ‘final order’ which disposes of the writ petition. The ‘orders’ should not however, be ad-interim orders in force pending the miscellaneous petition or orders merely of a procedural nature.

9. In Thomas P.T. and another v. Bijo Thomas and others [2021 (6) KLT 196], a Division Bench of this Court noticed that the view that was upheld by the Larger Bench in K.S. Das [1992 (2) KLT 358] was that even though an appeal could be filed against an interlocutory order passed in a writ petition, in order to be qualified for challenge in an appeal, the order shall be either substantially affecting or touching upon the substantial rights or liabilities of the parties or which are matters of moment and cause substantial prejudice to the parties. According to the Larger Bench, the nature of the order appealable belongs to the category of intermediate orders referred to by the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye [(1977) 4 SCC 551]. It was, however, clarified by the Larger Bench that such orders should not, however, be ad interim orders or orders merely of a procedural nature.

10. This Court in State of Kerala v. Pradeepkumar A.V. [2025 (1) KHC 672], after considering the issue of maintainability of a writ appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, against an interim order, by noting the principles laid down in K.S Das [1992 (2) KLT 358], Madhu Limaye [(1977) 4 SCC 551] and Thomas P.T. and another [2021 (6) KLT 196], held that the interim order of the learned Single Judge in that particular case not being an order merely procedural in nature interim and being an order touching upon the substantial rights and liabilities of the parties and causing substantial prejudice to the appellants is an interim order qualified for challenge in an appeal filed under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act.

11. While coming to the question of maintainability of the writ appeal, in view of the fact that the impugned order was passed by the learned Single Judge in an original petition filed under Article 227 of the constitution of India, it is to be noted that the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge is of the nature that it can only be treated as one passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of India [2013 (4) KHC 21], a Division Bench of this Court, considered the appeal filed against an interim order passed by a learned Single Judge staying confirmation of sale till further orders in respect of one item of property which is sought to be sold in an auction scheduled in a proceedings under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. By relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.6 of 2009 in the case of State of M.P. v. Sanjay Keralkar, dated 05.01.2009 [(2009) 17 SCC 766], the Division Bench held that the nature of the interim relief granted therein by the learned Single Judge is nothing but a discretion exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

12. In State of M.P [2009) 17 SCC 766], the Apex Court held thus:

                  “2. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties, we are unable to sustain the order passed by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissing the appeal as preferred by the appellant herein on the ground that the appeal had been preferred against an order passed under Article 227 of the Constitution. We have had occasion to look into the petition which had been filed before the Single Bench of the High Court, which has been styled as writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench of the High Court appears to have not taken into consideration the fact that the petition had been styled as a writ petition under Article 226 as well and that the frame of the petition was that of a writ petition as would also be evident from the prayers made therein.

                  3. We are unable to agree with the High Court that the learned Single Judge had passed order under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and that the appeal was not maintainable”.

13. Jogendra Sinhji Vijay Singhji v. State of Gujarat [(2015) 9 SCC 1], the Apex Court held thus:

                  “Where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226, If the judgment under appeal falls squarely within four corners of Article 227, it goes without saying that intra-court appeal from such judgment would not be maintainable. On the other hand, if the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court for issuance of certain writ under Article 226, although Article 227 is also mentioned, and principally the judgment appealed against falls under Article 276, the appeal would be maintainable. What is important to be ascertained is the true nature of order passed by the Single judge and not what provision he mentions while exercising such powers. A statement by a Single judge that he has exercised power under Article 227, cannot take away right of appeal against such judgment if power is otherwise found to have been exercised under Article 226. The vital factor for determination of maintainability of the intra court appeal is the nature of jurisdiction invoked by the party and the true nature of principal order passed by the Single judge”.

                  (Underline supplied)

14. In the original petition, the respondents 1 and 2 are challenging Ext.P8 order of the Tribunal dated 10.11.2025 in S.A.No.447 of 2025. Though the 1st relief sought in the original petition is to set aside the aforesaid order of the Tribunal, the 2nd relief sought in the original petition is to issue a direction to the appellant Bank not to proceed for taking possession of the property on the basis of Ext.P3 order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kollam, in M.C.No.760 of 2025. The said relief is the one that can be taken as under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Viewed in the light of the principles laid down in these judgments, we are of the opinion that the present intra-court appeal is maintainable under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, since it affects the substantial rights and liabilities of the parties and causes substantial prejudice to the appellants, and the nature of the 2nd relief sought in the original petition and nature of the impugned order can only be treated as one under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

15. From the pleadings and materials on record, we notice that the 1st respondent had already approached this Court with another writ petition, i.e., W.P.(C)No.20089 of 2025, against the possession notice issued by the Advocate Commissioner in M.C.No.760 of 2025 and that writ petition ended in dismissal. Therefore, it is appropriate to extract some of the judgments regarding the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the proceedings initiated under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.

16. In Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], the Apex Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain a writ petition only under exceptional circumstances and that it is a self-imposed restraint by the High Court. The four exceptional circumstances such as, where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, were re iterated in paragraph 6 of the said judgment by relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603].

17. In South Indian Bank Ltd. (M/s.) v. Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], after discussing the various judgments on the point as to circumstances in which the High Court can interfere with matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act, it is held by the Apex Court as under:

                  “Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi - judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute”.

18. In PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank [(2024) 6 SCC 579] the Apex Court held that it is more than a settled legal position of law that in matters arising out of the RDB Act and the SARFAESI Act, the High Court should not entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution, particularly when an alternative statutory remedy is available.

19. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Jasmin K. v. State Bank of India [2024 (3) KHC 266] reiterated the position of law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments.

20. From the judgments quoted above, it is clear that unless the four exceptional circumstances mentioned by the Apex Court in Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], the respondents cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, though the respondents 1 and 2 filed the Original Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as if the relief sought is by exercising supervisory jurisdiction, the relief No.(ii) would show that it is of the nature that can be granted by exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, the 1st respondent has already challenged the issuance of possession notice by the Advocate Commissioner in pursuance to Ext.P3 order of the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, in W.P.(C)No.20089 of 2025, and this Court relegated them to the Tribunal. Thereafter the challenge raised by the respondents was considered by the Tribunal in the securitisation application filed by them and decided against the respondents.

21. While coming to the point of availability of an equal and efficacious remedy of appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal against an order passed by the Tribunal in a securitisation application, and the maintainability of an original petition under Article 227 or a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is relevant to note Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act and also some of the judgments of the Apex Court as well as this Court on the point.

22. Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act reads thus:

                  “18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal:

                  Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower:

                  Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less:

                  Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent of debt referred to in the second proviso.

                  (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder.”

23. In Sreedhar K. v. M/s Raus Constructions Pvt. Ltd. [(2023) 11 SCC 169], the Apex Court, while considering the requirement of deposit of 25% of the debt due before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal to avail the statutory remedy of appeal, held thus:

                  “6. At the outset, it is required to be noted that what was challenged before the High Court by the borrower in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was the judgment and order passed by the DRT-I. Against the judgment and order passed by the DRT-I dismissing the application, the borrower had a statutory remedy available by way of appeal before the DRAT. If the borrower would have preferred an appeal before the DRAT, he would have been required to deposit 25% of the debt due. To circumvent the provision of appeal before the DRAT and the pre-deposit, the borrower straightway preferred the writ petition before the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. Therefore, in view of alternative statutory remedy available by way of appeal before the DRAT, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India challenging the judgment and order passed by the DRT- I. By entertaining the writ petition straightway under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order passed by the DRT-I, the High Court has allowed/permitted the borrower to circumvent the provision of appeal before the DRAT under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act."

24. In Narayan Chandra Ghosh v. Uco Bank [(2011) 4 SCC 548], while considering the question as to whether Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal has the jurisdiction to exempt a person preferring an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act from making any predeposit in terms of the said provision, the Apex Court held thus:

                  “8. S.18(1) of the Act confers a statutory right on a person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under S.17 of the Act to prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. However, the right conferred under S.18(1) is subject to the condition laid down in the second proviso thereto. The second proviso postulates that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less. However, under the third proviso to the sub-section, the Appellate Tribunal has the power to reduce the amount, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, to not less than twenty - five per cent of the debt, referred to in the second proviso. Thus, there is an absolute bar to entertainment of an appeal under S.18 of the Act unless the condition precedent, as stipulated, is fulfilled. Unless the borrower makes, with the Appellate Tribunal, a pre-deposit of fifty per cent of the debt due from him or determined, an appeal under the said provision cannot be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal. The language of the said proviso is clear and admits of no ambiguity. It is well - settled that when a Statute confers a right of appeal, while granting the right, the Legislature can impose conditions for the exercise of such right, so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions, rendering the right almost illusory. Bearing in mind the object of the Act, the conditions hedged in the said proviso cannot be said to be onerous. Thus, we hold that the requirement of pre - deposit under sub-section (1) of S.18 of the Act is mandatory and there is no reason whatsoever for not giving full effect to the provisions contained in S.18 of the Act. In that view of the matter, no court, much less the Appellate Tribunal, a creature of the Act itself, can refuse to give full effect to the provisions of the Statute. We have no hesitation in holding that deposit under the second proviso to S.18(1) of the Act being a condition precedent for preferring an appeal under the said Section, the Appellate Tribunal had erred in law in entertaining the appeal without directing the appellant to comply with the said mandatory requirement.

                  9. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant that as the amount of debt due had not been determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, appeal could be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal without insisting on pre-deposit, is equally fallacious. Under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of S.18 of the Act the amount of fifty per cent, which is required to be deposited by the borrower, is computed either with reference to the debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors or as determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less. Obviously, where the amount of debt is yet to be determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the borrower, while preferring appeal, would be liable to deposit fifty per cent of the debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors. Therefore, the condition of pre-deposit being mandatory, a complete waiver of deposit by the appellant with the Appellate Tribunal, was beyond the provisions of the Act, as is evident from the second and third proviso to the said Section. At best, the Appellate Tribunal could have, after recording the reasons, reduced the amount of deposit of fifty per cent to an amount not less than twenty-five per cent of the debt referred to in the second proviso. We are convinced that the order of the Appellate Tribunal, entertaining appellant's appeal without insisting on pre-deposit was clearly unsustainable and, therefore, the decision of the High Court in setting aside the same cannot be flawed”.

25. In Union Bank of India, Kottayam, v. M/s Suwique Traders [2025 (4) KLT 455], while considering the above issue, by considering the relevant provisions under the SARFAESI Act and also relying on the decision in Narayan Chandra Ghosh [(2011) 4 SCC 548], this Court held thus:

                  “20. When complete waiver of pre-deposit is beyond the provisions of Section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act, it cannot be contended that, a person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17, can prefer an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, within the time limit specified in Section 18(1), along with an application for complete waiver of pre-deposit under the second proviso to Section 18(1), after remitting only the fee provided under Section 18(1), since the Appellate Tribunal cannot grant complete waiver of pre-deposit, which is beyond the scope of the provisions contained in the second and third provisos to Section 18(1). In that view of the matter, in an appeal filed under Section 18 of the Act, which is accompanied by an application invoking the provisions of the third proviso to Section 18(1) for waiver of pre-deposit, as stipulated in the second proviso to Section 18(1), the appellant has to deposit with the Appellate Tribunal twenty-five per cent of the debt referred to in the second proviso to Section 18(1). The Appellate Tribunal cannot entertain, i.e., give judicial consideration of an appeal filed under Section 18 and the interlocutory application filed under the third proviso to Section 18(1) for waiver of predeposit, as stipulated in the second proviso to Section 18(1), unless the appellant has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal twenty-five per cent of the debt referred to in the second proviso to Section 18(1). Therefore, we find absolutely no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents- petitioners that the respondents are required to remit only the prescribed fee as provided under Section 18(1) of the Act, at the time of preferring Ext.P2 appeal and the question of deposit with the Appellate Tribunal the pre-deposit provided under the second proviso to Section 18(1) arises only on an order being passed by the Appellate Tribunal on the application for waiver”.

26. From the materials placed on record and the arguments addressed at the Bar, we notice that respondents 1 and 2 have approached this Court with the O.P.(DRT) against the impugned Ext.P8 order of the Tribunal without exercising their remedy under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, under Section 18 of the said Act. When an equal and efficacious remedy is available to the respondents, an original petition against Ext.P8 order is not maintainable before this Court, unless the special circumstance as noted above is made out, which is conspicuously absent in the instant case. In such circumstances, the learned Single Judge ought not have granted the interim relief in favour of respondents 1 and 2. The intention behind non-availing of remedy before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal by the respondents appears as to avoid the payment of required pre-deposit to file the appeal, and also to stall the recovery proceedings initiated by the Bank by adopting a shortcut method. We are constrained to make the aforesaid observation for the reason that the respondents have approached this Court repeatedly with the very same relief by filing different writ petitions such as W.P.(C)No.19933 of 2024 and W.P.(C)No.20089 of 2025, as noted above. Even after the dismissal of their prayer against the proceedings initiated under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act by virtue of the judgment in W.P.(C)No. 20089 of 2025, the very same relief is again sought in the present original petition, i.e., in O.P.(DRT)No.398 of 2025. Prima facie, no sufficient reason is stated by respondents 1 and 2 in the original petition for not invoking the jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal against the impugned Ext.P8 order of the Tribunal. During the course of arguments, though both sides have cited some other judgments as mentioned above, they are irrelevant as far as the decision of this writ appeal is concerned.

27. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we are of the opinion that the appellants have made out sufficient ground to set aside the impugned order dated 19.12.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in O.P.(DRT) No.398 of 2025, and we do so.

28. In the result, the writ appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 19.12.2025 in O.P.(DRT) No.398 of 2025. It is made clear that the parties to this writ appeal are at liberty to move the learned Single Judge for early disposal of the original petition itself on merits, pointing out the urgency, if they are advised to do so.

                  The pending interlocutory application, i.e., I.A.No.1 of 2026, filed by respondents 1 and 2 for reception of some additional documents stands closed since unnecessary for deciding this appeal.