1. Heard Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Mr. S.P. Roy, learned counsel appearing for the State of Bihar, Mr. Sushant Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the State of Jharkhand and Ms. Shreesha Sinha, learned counsel appearing for respondent nos. 5 and 6.

2. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the Office Orders dated 18.07.2002, whereby, the petitioners have been discharged from services and the second prayer is made to pay arrears of salary to the petitioners due since April, 1999.

3. Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the petitioner nos.1 to 7 have been appointed on different posts as Night Guard, Assistant, Driver, Typist, Khalasi (Helper), Operator and Assistant respectively in the Bihar State Seed Corporation Limited. He next submits that all the petitioners except petitioner no.7, have preferred a writ petition before this Court being C.W.J.C. No.2185/1991(R) for direction upon the respondents to pay their salary after adopting the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ according to the pay scale fixed by the State Government. He further submits that vide order dated 14.01.1998, this Court was pleased to allow the said writ petition directing the respondents to the effect that the petitioners should be given regular minimum pay scale for the posts they are holding as is available in other Government institutions or Undertakings and if they cannot be regularized against the sanctioned post, the Corporation should also fulfil the principle rationale to the circumstances for absorption of the petitioners against regular post as and when available and till then they should remain in the minimum pay scale. He then submits that when the aforesaid order was not complied with, the petitioners filed a contempt application being M.J.C. No.383/1998(R) and on the assurance of the Corporation, said contempt proceeding was dropped and the contempt application was disposed of vide order dated 01.07.1999. He submits that thereafter the Corporation fixed the pay scale of different posts vide office order dated 16.02.1999, contained in Annexure-6 of the writ petition, however, respondent no.4 requested respondent no.6 vide letter dated 13.12.2000 to maintain status quo with regard to the employees of the Corporation till Corporation/Board is reconstituted by the Government of Jharkhand and method was chalked out to pay salary. In this background, he submits that proper direction may kindly be issued and the impugned order may kindly be quashed. He next submits that another person, namely, Ram Sagar Pandey has approached this Court in C.W.J.C. No.2027 of 1999(R) and his termination order has been quashed by this Court vide order dated 18.08.2003 and proper direction has been issued. According to him, the present case is similar to that case and in view of that, similar order may kindly be passed and the prayer made in this writ petition may kindly be allowed.

4. Mr. S.P. Roy, learned counsel appearing for the State of Bihar submits that the State of Bihar has nothing to do with the Corporation as the Corporation is an independent entity and only the said Corporation can take proper decision.

5. Mr. Sushant Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the State of Jharkhand submits that the said Corporation is not created in the State of Jharkhand and in view of that, no liability can be fastened upon the State of Jharkhand.

6. Ms. Shreesha Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation- respondent nos. 5 and 6 opposed the prayer and submits that so far as the case of Ram Sagar Pandey is concerned, he was working on the sanctioned post and in that background, the said order has been passed by the High Court. She next submits that so far as the salary is concerned, arrears of salary has already been paid to the petitioners. To buttress this argument, she refers to Annexure-A, contained in supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent-Corporation. She also submits that subsequently further counter affidavit has been filed on 30.10.2025, wherein also, Annexure-R/2 series have been annexed, wherefrom, it is clear that arrears of salary has already been paid to the petitioners. She further submits that the said impugned order was tested before the Hon’ble Patna High Court by some of the aggrieved persons in C.W.J.C. No.9681 of 2002 with analogous cases and the prayer made in those cases with regard to quash the said termination order has not been allowed by the Hon’ble Patna High Court vide order dated 24.03.2009. She also submits that the aggrieved persons approached the Hon’ble Patna High Court challenging the impugned order herein in C.W.J.C. No.15549 of 2005 and analogous cases and the Hon’ble Patna High Court has been pleased to dismiss those writ petitions, which were challenged by filing L.P.A. No.841 of 2008 and analogous cases, which were also dismissed by Division Bench of Hon’ble Patna High Court. On these grounds, she submits that this writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

7. The petitioners were appointed as daily wagers. It is an admitted position that the said appointments were made without following the rules for appointment and even advertisement was not made for the appointments. From the order passed by this Court in C.W.J.C. No.2185/1999(R), it is further clear that only direction was issued to pay salary.

8. In course of argument, it has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the State of Jharkhand that the State of Jharkhand has not created Seed Corporation after bifurcation of the State of Bihar.

9. In paragraph 3 of the order passed in the case of Ram Sagar Pandey in C.W.J.C. No.2027 of 1999(R), it has been further disclosed that he was working on the sanctioned post of Night Guard. So far as these petitioners were concerned, that fact is not there and these petitioners were working as daily wagers in the said Corporation and they were not appointed on any sanctioned post and pursuant to the direction of the High Court, they have also received arrears of salary, as contained in Annexure-R/2 series of the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of respondent nos. 5 and 6 as well as Annexure-A in supplementary counter affidavit filed earlier to that counter affidavit. Thus, so far as second prayer of the petitioners is concerned, that has already been fulfilled by the Corporation.

10. It has been disclosed in the counter affidavit dated 30.10.2025 filed by respondent nos. 5 and 6 that during the year 1982-1985, the Corporation was in full swing and business of the Corporation was in size. The permanent employees were small in number and which were not enough to cope up with the voluminous work. It became necessary to engage extra hands for smooth running of the business and, as such, for smooth running of the business, petitioners and others were appointed on completely temporary basis as daily wagers as per the need from time to time. The petitioners and other similarly situated daily wagers were disengaged with a rider that their arrears of salary would be disbursed once the financial condition of the Corporation improves and now in light of Annexure-R/2 series of the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of respondent nos. 5 and 6 as well as Annexure-A of the supplementary counter affidavit, which has been filed earlier to that counter affidavit, arrears of salary has already been paid to the petitioners. It is also an admitted position that in absence of any advertisement, the petitioners have been appointed by the Corporation for certain period.

11. The said Ram Sagar Pandey was working on the sanctioned post. The Hon’ble Patna High Court has tested the impugned order herein in C.W.J.C. No.15549 of 2005 and analogous cases and has been pleased to dismiss those writ petitions vide order dated 08.09.2008, which were challenged before the L.P.A. Court in the Hon’ble Patna High court and the Division Bench has been further pleased to dismiss the L.P.A. No.841 of 2008 and analogous cases affirming the order of the writ Court in the aforesaid C.W.J.Cs vide order dated 07.11.2008. Thus, the matter has already been settled with regard to the said impugned order, which is subject-matter of the present writ petition.

12. In a catena of decisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as High Courts have deprecated the back door entry in the services. Nowadays, it has emerged that the persons who are holding the high-ranking administrative post, they are appointing few persons on public post, may be kith and kin thereof or may be known to them. If such fact is brought to the knowledge of the Court, and prima facie, it appears that a back-door entry is made in the Government service, those services are required to be brought to an end. Only because a person is more influential, he cannot be allowed to continue on the post even if he is efficient to discharge the duties. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh & others, reported in (2009) 5 SCC 65, wherein at paragraph nos.32, 44, 45, 65 and 67, it has been held as under:

                  “32. Notwithstanding the basic mandate of Article16 that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State, the spoils system which prevailed in America in the 17th and 18th centuries has spread its tentacles in various segments of public employment apparatus and a huge illegal employment market has developed in the country adversely affecting the legal and constitutional rights of lakhs of meritorious members of younger generation of the country who are forced to seek intervention of the court and wait for justice for years together.

                  44. The scenario is worst when it comes to appointment to lower strata of the civil services. Those who have been be- stowed with the power to make appointment on Class III and Class IV posts have by and large misused and abused the same by violating relevant rules and instructions and have in- dulged in favouritism and nepotism with impunity resulting in total negation of the equality clause enshrined in Article 16 of the Constitution.

                  45. Thousands of cases have been filed in the courts by ag- grieved persons with the complaints that appointment to Class III and Class IV posts have been made without issuing any advertisement or sending requisition to the employment ex- change as per the requirement of the 1959 Act and those who have links with the party in power or political leaders or who could pull strings in the power corridors get the cake of employment. Cases have also been filed with the complaints that recruitment to the higher strata of civil services made by the Public Service Commissions have been affected by the virus of spoils system in different dimensions and selections have been made for considerations other than merit.

                  65. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the initial appointments of the respondents were made in gross violation of the doctrine of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 and the provisions of the 1959 Act and the learned Single Judge gravely erred by directing their reinstatement with consequential benefits.

                  67. By now it is settled that the guarantee of equality before law enshrined in Article 14 is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdic- tion of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing wrong order— Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh, Jaipur Development Au- thority v. Daulat Mal Jain, Union of India v. J.V. Subhaiah, Gursharan Singh v. NDMC, State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann, Faridabad CT. Scan Centre v. D.G. Health Services, Style (Dress Land) v. UT, Chandigarh, State of Bihar v. Ka- meshwar Prasad Singh, Union of India v. International Trading Co. and Directorate of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain.”

13. In the above judgment, it has been clearly held that if an illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a ground of individuals or a wrong order is passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke jurisdiction of the higher or superior Court(s) for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality for passing a wrong order.

14. In the case of State of Bihar and Others v. Chandreshwar Pathak, reported in (2014) 13 SCC 232 at paragraph nos.10, 11, 12 and 13, it has been held as under:

                  “10. The order of appointment, in the present case, is as follows:

                  “In the light of the order passed by the Inspector Gen- eral of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Bihar, Patna, vide his Letter No. 6/86 F3 Shri Chandeshwar Pathak, s/o Shri Devnarayam Pathak of Village Haraji, PO Haraji, PS Dimbara, District Chhapra was appointed as Constable temporarily from 14-1-1988 afternoon on the condition that his previous character found satisfac- tory and as and when necessary, his service shall be terminated without assigning any reason or show cause. His pay scale shall be Rs 425-10, 565 EB-10-605 with the basic pay of Rs 425. He has been allotted CT No. 390.” It is clear from the above order that the ap- pointment has been given only on the asking of the In- spector General of Police. There is nothing to show that any advertisement was issued giving opportunity to all eligible candidates to compete or any selection process was undertaken before appointment of the respondent.

                  11. In State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, it was observed as under:

                  “Appointment/employment without advertisement

                  35. At one time this Court had been of the view that calling the names from employment exchange would curb to certain extent the menace of nepotism and cor- ruption in public employment. But, later on, came to the conclusion that some appropriate method con- sistent with the requirements of Article 16 should be followed. In other words there must be a notice pub- lished in the appropriate manner calling for applications and all those who apply in response thereto would be considered fairly. Even if the names of candidates are requisitioned from employment exchange, in addition thereto it is mandatory on the part of the employer to invite applications from all eligible candidates from the open market by advertising the vacancies in newspapers having wide circulation or by announcement in radio and television as merely calling the names from the employment exchange does not meet the requirement of the said article of the Constitution. (Vide Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union v. Delhi Admn., State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, Excise Supt. v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao, Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh, Binod Kumar Gupta v. Ram Ashray Mahoto, National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh, Deptt. Of Telecommunications v. Keshab Deb, State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh and State of M.P. v. Mohd. Abrahim.)

                  36. Therefore, it is a settled legal proposition that no person can be appointed even on a temporary or ad hoc basis without inviting applications from all eligible candidates. If any appointment is made by merely in- viting names from the employment exchange or putting a note on the noticeboard, etc. that will not meet the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such a course violates the mandates of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as it deprives the candi- dates who are eligible for the post, from being consid- ered. A person employed in violation of these provisions is not entitled to any relief including salary. For a valid and legal appointment mandatory compliance with the said constitutional requirement is to be fulfilled. The equality clause enshrined in Article 16 requires that everysuch appointment be made by an open advertise- ment as to enable all eligible persons to compete on merit.”

                  12. No contrary view of this Court has been cited on behalf of the respondent. Moreover, another Division Bench of the same High Court has upheld termination in similar matter as noted earlier against which SLP has been dismissed by this Court as mentioned earlier.

                  13. Accordingly, it has to be held that in the absence of any advertisement or selection process, the appointment of the respondent is not protected and could be validly terminated. The learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the writ petition while the Division Bench erred in interfering with the same.”

15. It has been further held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Renu & others v. District and Sessions Judge Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi & another, reported in (2014) 14 SCC 50 at paragraph nos.6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 as under:

                  “6. Article 14 of the Constitution provides for equality of op- portunity. It forms the cornerstone of our Constitution.

                  7. In I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N., the doctrine of basic fea- tures has been explained by this Court as under:(SCC p.108, para 141)

                  “141. The doctrine of basic structure contemplates that there are certain parts or aspects of the Constitution including Article 15, Article 21 read with Articles 14 and 19 which constitute the core values which if allowed to be abrogated would change completely the nature of the Constitution. Exclusion of fundamental rights would result in nullification of the basic structure doctrine, the object of which is to protect basic features of the Con- stitution as indicated by the synoptic view of the rights in Part III.”

                  8. As Article 14 is an integral part of our system, each and every State action is to be tested on the touchstone of equal- ity. Any appointment made in violation of mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is not only irregular but also illegal and cannot be sustained in view of the judgments ren- dered by this Court in Delhi Development Horticulture Employ- ees’ Union v. Delhi Admn., State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, Prabhat Kumar Sharma v. State of U.P., J.A.S. Inter College v. State of U.P., M.P. Housing Board v. Manoj Shrivastava, M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. v. S.C. Pandey and State of M.P. v. Sandhya Tomar.

                  9. In Excise Supt. v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao, a larger Bench of this Court reconsidered its earlier judgment in Union of In- dia v. N. Hargopal, wherein it had been held that insistence on recruitment through employment exchanges advances ra- ther than restricts the rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. However, due to the possibility of non- sponsoring of names by the employment exchange, this Court held that any appointment even on temporary or ad hoc basis without inviting application is in violation of the said provisions of the Constitution and even if the names of candidates are requisitioned from employment exchange, in addition thereto, it is mandatory on the part of the employer to invite applica- tions from all eligible candidates from open market as merely calling the names from the employment exchange does not meet the requirement of the said articles of the Constitution. The Court further observed:(K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao case, SCC p. 218 para 6)

                  “6. … In addition, the appropriate department … should call for the names by publication in the newspapers having wider circulation and also display on their office notice … and em- ployment news bulletins; and then consider the cases of all candidates who have applied. If this procedure is adopted, fair play would be subserved. The equality of opportunity in the matter of employment would be available to all eligible candi- dates (emphasis supplied)

                  (See also Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh and Kishore K. Pati v. District Inspector of Schools, Midnapore.)

                  10. In Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana this Court upheld the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court wherein 1600 appointments made in the Police Department without adver- tisement stood quashed though the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 did not provide for such a course. The High Court reached the conclusion that process of selection stood vitiated because there was no advertisement and due publicity for inviting ap- plications from the eligible candidates at large.

                  11. In UPSC v. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela this Court held: (SCC p. 490, para 12)

                  “12. … The appointment to any post under the State can only be made after a proper advertisement has been made inviting applications from eligible candi- dates and holding of selection by a body of experts or a specially constituted committee whose members are fair and impartial, through a written examination or in- terview or some other rational criteria for judging the inter se merit of candidates who have applied in re- sponse to the advertisement made … Any regular ap- pointment made on a post under the State or Union without issuing advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates and without holding a proper selec- tion where all eligible candidates get a fair chance to compete would violate the guarantee enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution .”

                  (emphasis supplied)

                  12. The principles to be adopted in the matter of public ap- pointments have been formulated by this Court in M.P. State Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Nanuram Yadav as under: (SCC pp. 274- 75, para 24)

                  “(1) The appointments made without following the ap- propriate procedure under the rules/government circu- lars and without advertisement or inviting applications from the open market would amount to breach of Arti- cles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

                  (2) Regularisation cannot be a mode of appointment.

                  (3) An appointment made in violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute and in particular, ignoring the minimum educational qualification and other essential qualification would be wholly illegal. Such illegality can- not be cured by taking recourse to regularisation.

                  (4) Those who come by back door should go through that door.

                  (5) No regularisation is permissible in exercise of the statutory power conferred under Article 162 of the Con- stitution of India if the appointments have been made in contravention of the statutory rules.

                  (6) The court should not exercise its jurisdiction on mis- placed sympathy.

                  (7) If the mischief played is so widespread and all per- vasive, affecting the result, so as to make it difficult to pick out the persons who have been unlawfully bene- fited or wrongfully deprived of their selection, it will nei- ther be possible nor necessary to issue individual show- cause notice to each selectee. The only way out would be to cancel the whole selection.

                  (8) When the entire selection is stinking, conceived in fraud and delivered in deceit, individual innocence has no place and the entire selection has to be set aside.”

                  13. A similar view has been reiterated by the Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v Umadevi, observing that any appointment made in violation of the statutory rules as also in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution would be a nullity . “Adherence to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is a must in the process of public employment.”

                  The Court further rejected the prayer that ad hoc appointees working for long be considered for regularisation as such a course only encourages the State to flout its own rules and would confer undue benefits on some at the cost of many waiting to compete.”

                  In view of above, it is crystal clear that Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution provide for equality of opportunity.

16. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis, the Court finds that no case of interference is made out and, as such, this writ petition is dismissed.