Common Order:
1. These Criminal Revision Cases filed under Sections 438 and 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023(the BNSS) are heard and disposed of by way of this common order, as they pertain to identical offences involving noticeably the same set of accused, all result from a connected factual condition.
FACTUAL MATRIX:
2. Criminal Revision Case No.1287 of 2025 has been filed feeling aggrieved by the order dated 30.12.2023 rendered in C.C.No.27 of 2023 on the file of the learned IV Additional District & Sessions Judge, Guntur, arising out of a complaint pertaining to a publication dated 20.06.2023 in the Andhra Jyothi Telugu Daily, wherein the accused persons, viz., the Company, its Managing Director, Printer & Publisher, Editor, and Bureau Chief, are alleged to have disseminated defamatory imputations against the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) by portraying a purported decline in passenger patronage, maladministration, and mismanagement under the incumbent dispensation; the State Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, contends that such publication constitutes libel calculated to malign the reputation of the Government and its officials, whereas in rejoinder APSRTC has placed on record official comparative data evidencing enhanced performance in 2022-23 vis-à-vis 2019-20, including augmentation of revenue by 17%, increase in earnings per kilometre by 21%, induction of new diesel and electric buses, provision of compassionate appointments, and receipt of Governmental financial assistance exceeding Rs.10,336 Crores since 2020, while further clarifying that only 214 buses were scrapped as against the misreported figure of 980, and highlighting initiatives such as maintenance of normal fares during festive seasons, expansion of cargo operations, and rationalization of interstate services with Telangana.
3. Criminal Revision Case No.1336 of 2025 has been instituted feeling aggrieved by the order dated 04.07.2023 passed in C.C.No.4 of 2023 on the file of the learned District & Sessions Judge, Guntur, arising out of a complaint relating to a publication dated 15.08.2020 in the Telugu daily Andhra Jyothi under the caption “IMAGE” (“Surveillance on the Judiciary”), wherein imputations were made alleging that the Government of Andhra Pradesh was subjecting Hon’ble Judges of the High Court to surveillance; the complainant, the Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, duly authorized under G.O.Rt.No.874, Home (SC-B) Department, dated 26.09.2022, contends that the said article was unverified, scandalous, and actuated by mala fides with intent to tarnish the reputation of the Government, thereby constituting offences of defamation punishable under Sections 499 and 502 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘the I.P.C.,’) read with Section 120B of ‘the I.P.C.’; it is further averred that a legal notice dated 15.08.2020 was issued to the accused requiring an unconditional apology within fifteen days, which was not complied with, a complaint was filed within the period of limitation as extended by orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court during the Covid-19 pandemic.
4. Criminal Revision Case No.1339 of 2025 has been filed aggrieved by the order dated 10.08.2023 passed in C.C.No.14 of 2023 on the file of the learned V Additional District & Sessions Judge, Guntur, arising out of a complaint relating to a publication dated 03.02.2023 in the Andhra Jyothi Telugu Daily, wherein the accused company together with its editorial team was alleged to have published false and scandalous imputations suggesting that the Chief Secretary of Andhra Pradesh travelled in the company of the Chief Minister’s OSD Krishna Mohan Reddy and one Naveen from Kadapa to Renigunta and thereafter to Vijayawada, purportedly linking the same to the sensitive context of the homicide of Late Y.S. Vivekananda Reddy; the Chief Secretary, by rejoinder dated 05.02.2023, clarified that his travel schedule had been pre-fixed four months in advance and requested that the rejoinder be published prominently on the same page accompanied by an apology, but the rejoinder was instead carried on 06.02.2023 at page 12 with distortions, thereby failing to comply with the demand; consequently, a legal notice dated 28.06.2023 was issued calling upon the accused to tender an unconditional apology, which not having been complied with, led to the institution of the present complaint.
5. Criminal Revision Case No.1340 of 2025 has been instituted feeling aggrieved the order dated 04.07.2023 passed in C.C.No.5 of 2023 on the file of the learned District & Sessions Judge, Guntur, arising out of a complaint pertaining to a publication dated 13.02.2020 in the Andhra Jyothi Telugu Daily, wherein the accused company along with its editorial team is alleged to have published false, malicious, and defamatory imputations to the effect that during the meeting between the (Former) Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, Sri Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy, and the Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi, the latter expressed dissatisfaction with the functioning of the State Government, investor confidence, and alleged threats to Kia Motors by Member of Parliament, by name Gorantla Madhav; the Government of Andhra Pradesh, having issued an official press note dated 12.02.2020 clarifying the factual position of the meeting, contends that the accused nevertheless carried the distorted version as a banner item, thereby intending to malign the reputation of the Government; and upon service of a legal notice dated 12.03.2020 demanding an unconditional apology, which was not complied with, the complaint came to be instituted.
6. All the above-mentioned learned Trial Courts in which the complaints have been pending are referred to ‘the learned Trial Courts’.
CONTENTIONS OF THE COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONERS:
7. Sri Ginjupalli Subba Rao, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, while reiterating the grounds of the Revision submits that the common orders of cognizance passed by ‘the learned Trial Courts’ in C.C.Nos.27 of 2023, 4 of 2023, 14 of 2023 and 5 of 2023 are wholly unsustainable in law and on facts and deserve to be set aside. The impugned orders are assailed as having been rendered mechanically, without due application of judicial mind, in disregard of the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence and the mandatory safeguards enshrined under ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and ‘the I.P.C.’
8. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners further submits that a bare perusal of the complaints and the accompanying material do not disclose a prima facie case for the offences punishable under Sections 499, 500, 501 and 502 read with Section 120-B of ‘the I.P.C.’ The orders of cognizance are completely bereft of reasons, do not advert to the essential ingredients of the alleged offences, and merely reproduce the statutory provisions, thereby demonstrating non-application of judicial mind. ‘The learned Trial Courts’ have failed to satisfy themselves that the allegations, even if taken at face value, satisfy the requirements of intention to harm reputation, publication of imputations concerning a determinate person, and actual or potential injury to reputation.
9. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that the very invocation of the provisions relating to criminal defamation is fundamentally flawed, as the complaints do not disclose the requisite mens rea. The essential ingredient of Section 499 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ namely the intention to harm the reputation of the complainant or knowledge that such imputation will so harm, is conspicuously absent. The publications in question, news items dated 20.06.2023, 15.08.2020, 03.02.2023 and 13.02.2020 related reports, are asserted to be truthful narrations concerning the functioning of APSRTC and matters of public administration, highlighting dwindling passenger numbers, operational issues and governance concerns, made bona fide in public interest. These publications, it is urged, fall squarely within the first, second, third and tenth exceptions to Section 499 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ protecting truth published for public good, fair comment on public conduct of public servants, opinions respecting public questions, and communications made in good faith. In the absence of malice and presence of statutory exceptions, continuation of the prosecution under Sections 499 to 502 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is untenable.
10. Sri Ginjupalli Subba Rao, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the complaints suffer from both mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties. It is pointed out that the impugned news items were admittedly published by Aamoda Publications Private Limited, whereas the arraigned company in some of the cases is Aamoda Broadcasting Company Private Limited, which is a distinct legal entity and had no role in the printing or publication of the newspaper. In the absence of the principal publishing company being impleaded as an accused, the directors of another company cannot be fastened with vicarious liability. ‘The learned Trial Courts’ have no occasion to verify this contention as full edition of the day was not filed. It is further emphasized that the petitioners have neither authored nor published the impugned articles and the complaints do not attribute any specific overt act or role to them; no imputation is stated to have been made by or at their instance, rendering their implication wholly baseless.
11. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners asserts that ‘the learned Trial Courts’ failed to adhere to the mandatory procedure prescribed under Sections 200 and 202 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The complainant and the proposed witnesses were not examined on oath, and no inquiry or investigation was ordered prior to issuance of process, even though several of the petitioners reside outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. The mandatory requirement of postponing issuance of process under Section 202 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ in cases where the accused are residing beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, has been violated, thereby striking at the root of jurisdiction. The failure to follow these provisions vitiates the cognizance, as the Court has assumed seisin of the matter without satisfying the statutory pre-conditions intended to prevent vexatious prosecution.
12. It is further submitted that the complainant has relied only on clippings of the alleged news reports, without producing the complete newspaper issues containing the statutory particulars of printer, publisher and place of printing as mandated under Section 3 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 2023 (for brevity ‘the Act’). In the absence of the full newspaper carrying the requisite declarations and imprints, no statutory presumption could be drawn as to who is the editor, printer or publisher, nor could criminal liability be inferred against the petitioners. The cognizance based on such incomplete and defective material evidence is therefore unsustainable.
13. Sri Ginjupalli Subba Rao, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the complaints suffer from a fundamental lack of locus standi. No specific individual has been identified as defamed, and the pleadings are vague and bereft of particulars as to whose reputation was harmed and in what manner. The complaints are essentially sought to be maintained on behalf of the Government or its instrumentalities, which, it is argued, cannot in law maintain criminal defamation proceedings under Section 499 of ‘the I.P.C.’ The proper recourse, if any public servant was genuinely aggrieved, would lie under Section 199(6) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ at the instance of such individual public servant, and not through the route of Sections 199(2) or 199(4) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ invoking the machinery of the State for protection of its own “reputation”.
14. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners also assails the competence of the Public Prosecutor who instituted the complaints and the validity of the sanction granted under Section 199 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ It is pointed out that the complaints have been filed by a Public Prosecutor appointed under Section 24(1) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ for the High Court, whereas only a Public Prosecutor appointed for the district under Section 24(3) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ or a Special Public Prosecutor appointed under Section 24(8) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is legally authorized to institute a complaint before ‘the learned Trial Courts’ under Section 199(2) and (4) of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The clear statutory distinction between appointments under Section 24(1) and Section 24(3) has been overlooked, resulting in lack of authority to file the complaints. The sanction orders themselves are stated to be mechanical, passed without proper application of mind to the contents of the articles, and in some cases acknowledging that the impugned articles merely reflected operational issues and passenger trends in APSRTC, thereby negating any allegation of malice or falsehood.
15. It is further urged that the prosecutions amount to a direct assault on the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The right to comment on and criticize governmental policies, functioning of public corporations such as APSRTC, and conduct of public officials is an integral facet of democratic discourse, subject only to the reasonable restrictions enumerated in Article 19(2). Criminal prosecution of media houses and their directors for fair, factual and good-faith reporting on matters of public importance, in the guise of protecting the “reputation” of the State or its instrumentalities, amounts to an impermissible chilling effect on free speech. The failure to follow statutory procedure and the mechanical taking of cognizance also infringe the petitioners’ right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, which encompasses the right to a fair, just and reasonable procedure and adherence to principles of natural justice.
16. On the aforesaid grounds, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the common orders of cognizance passed by ‘the learned Trial Courts’ in all the four calendar cases are vitiated by non-application of mind, lack of jurisdiction, procedural illegality and constitutional infirmities, and that the complaints themselves are defective for want of proper parties, locus standi and material particulars. Continuation of the proceedings would subject the petitioners to undue hardship, irreparable loss and grave prejudice, and would operate as an abuse of the process of Court, intended to muzzle legitimate criticism and reportage. It is, therefore, prayed to allow the Criminal Revision Cases, set aside the impugned orders of cognizance, issuance of process on the Petitioners and quash all further proceedings in C.C. Nos.27 of 2023, 4 of 2023, 14 of 2023 and 5 of 2023.
ARGUMENTS OF THE STATE:
17. On the other hand, Mr. Neelotpal Ganji, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor vehemently opposes the Criminal Revision Cases and supports the orders of cognizance passed by ‘the learned Trial Courts’ as being legal, proper and well within the parameters of revisional scrutiny. It is submitted that at the stage of taking cognizance, the Court is only required to ascertain whether the complaints and the material placed along with them disclose a prima facie case warranting issuance of process, and not to embark upon a meticulous appreciation of evidence or adjudication of defences which are matters for trial. The impugned orders record the satisfaction of ‘the learned Trial Courts’ that the allegations constitute offences punishable under Sections 499 to 502 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ read with Section 120-B of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and fall squarely within the framework of Section 199 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and no jurisdictional error, perversity or patent illegality is demonstrated so as to warrant interference in revision.
18. Adverting to Crl.R.C.No.1287 of 2025, the learned Public Prosecutor submits that the publication dated 20.06.2023 in Andhra Jyothi Telugu Daily, portraying an alleged decline in passenger patronage, maladministration and mismanagement of APSRTC under the present dispensation, clearly contains defamatory imputations concerning an identifiable juristic person, namely APSRTC, which is an instrumentality of the State and closely identified with the Government’s public transport policy. The article, by suggesting systemic rot, financial decline and operational failure in the face of official comparative data evidencing enhanced performance in 2022-23 vis-à-vis 2019-20, such as a 17% increase in revenue, 21% rise in earnings per kilometre, induction of new diesel and electric buses, provision of compassionate appointments, substantial financial assistance exceeding Rs.10,336 crores, and the scrapping of only 214 buses as against the misreported figure of 980, demonstrates reckless disregard for truth. The publication is thus not a fair or accurate report but a distorted narrative calculated to lower the reputation of APSRTC and, by necessary implication, the Government and its officials in the estimation of right-thinking members of society, thereby fulfilling the ingredients of Section 499 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and disentitling the accused to any exception premised on truth, good faith or public good.
19. In relation to Crl.R.C.No.1336 of 2025, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submits that the article dated 15.08.2020 titled “ߕङ ŒÞ»Ãà°¤ã eã!” (“Surveillance on the Judiciary”) contains serious, scandalous and wholly unverified allegations that the Government of Andhra Pradesh was subjecting Hon’ble Judges of the High Court to surveillance. Such insinuations, which attribute to the State Government clandestine snooping on the higher judiciary, strike at the very root of constitutional governance and are, on their face, gravely defamatory. The complainant, the Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, duly authorized under G.O.Rt.No.874, Home (SC-B) Department, dated 26.09.2022, has categorically averred that the article is devoid of factual basis and actuated by mala fides with the intent to tarnish the reputation of the Government. The issuance of a legal notice dated 15.08.2020 calling upon the accused to tender an unconditional apology, and their failure to do so, coupled with the institution of the complaint within the period of limitation as extended by orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court during the Covid-19 pandemic, demonstrates not only compliance with procedural requirements but also continuing harm and obdurate refusal to rectify the defamatory wrong. The plea of fair comment or public interest is unavailable when the foundational facts are neither verified nor disclosed, and the imputations are couched in sensational terms directed at scandalizing the State.
20. With respect to Crl.R.C.No.1339 of 2025, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor contends that the publication dated 03.02.2023 in Andhra Jyothi Telugu Daily is ex facie defamatory inasmuch as it seeks to link the official travel of the Chief Secretary of Andhra Pradesh, in the company of the Chief Minister’s OSD Krishna Mohan Reddy and one Naveen, from Kadapa to Renigunta and thereafter to Vijayawada, with the sensitive context of the homicide of Late Y.S. Vivekananda Reddy. By placing these facts in a suggestive narrative, the accused have created a clear innuendo that the Chief Secretary was involved in or privy to questionable activities in relation to the said homicide, thereby casting serious aspersions on his integrity and impartiality. The rejoinder dated 05.02.2023, wherein the Chief Secretary clarified that his travel schedule had been fixed four months in advance and requested prominent publication of the rejoinder on the same page along with an apology, was not honoured; instead, a distorted rejoinder was carried on 06.02.2023 at page 12, without prominence and without any apology. This conduct, followed by the accused ignoring the subsequent legal notice dated 28.06.2023 seeking an unconditional apology, unequivocally establishes mens rea, negates any suggestion of bona fide reportage, and aggravates the defamatory sting of the original publication.
21. In so far as Crl.R.C.No.1340 of 2025 is concerned, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submits that the publication dated 13.02.2020, carried as a banner item, attributes to the Hon’ble Prime Minister an expression of dissatisfaction with the functioning of the State Government, investor confidence, and alleged threats to Kia Motors by Member of Parliament Gorantla Madhav during his meeting with the Hon’ble Chief Minister. These imputations, made in the teeth of an official press note dated 12.02.2020 issued by the Government clarifying the factual tenor of the meeting, are alleged to be false, malicious and calculated to convey that the Central leadership has lost faith in the State Government and that investors are apprehensive on account of political intimidation. The accused, despite being put on notice of the true facts through the press note and a subsequent legal notice dated 12.03.2020 demanding an unconditional apology, persisted in their distorted narrative and declined to make amends. Such conduct, it is urged, reveals a deliberate design to malign the Government in the eyes of the public and the investor community, thereby squarely attracting the mischief of Sections 499 and 502 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and excluding any statutory exception relating to fair comment, truth or public good.
22. The Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor further submits that all the complaints have been instituted strictly in conformity with Section 199 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The State Government and its instrumentalities, including APSRTC, as also identified public officials such as the Chief Secretary, are “persons” within the meaning of Section 499 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ whose reputation is capable of being harmed, and the statute expressly contemplates prosecution for defamation on the basis of a complaint by a duly authorized Public Prosecutor in respect of imputations against the Government. The authorization under G.O.Rt.No.874 empowers the Public Prosecutor of the High Court to present such complaints directly before the Court of Session, and the distinction sought to be drawn between appointments under Section 24(1) and Section 24(3) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is, in the present context, purely academic and devoid of merit. Any alleged irregularity in examination under Sections 200 and 202 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is, at best, a curable procedural lapse which has neither caused prejudice nor vitiates the cognizance, particularly in complaints governed by the special regime of Section 199(2) where the Sessions Court takes cognizance upon a written complaint by the Public Prosecutor.
23. On the constitutional plane, the Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submits that while the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India is a cherished right, it is not absolute and is expressly subject to reasonable restrictions in the interests of defamation. The right of the press to criticize is co-extensive with, but not superior to, the right of individuals and institutions to protect their reputation, which forms an integral part of the right to life under Article 21. The publications in question, it is argued, are not mere bona fide criticisms of governmental policy, but deliberate, false and sensational imputations made in disregard of official clarifications and rejoinders, thereby crossing the line from fair comment into criminal defamation. In these circumstances, the continuation of the prosecutions cannot be branded as an abuse of process; on the contrary, the complaints represent a legitimate invocation of the criminal law to vindicate the reputation of the State, its instrumentalities and its senior functionaries.
24. The Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, therefore, prays that all the Criminal Revision Cases be dismissed, that the orders of cognizance passed in C.C. Nos.27 of 2023, 4 of 2023, 14 of 2023 and 5 of 2023 be affirmed, and that the accused be directed to face trial so that the truth of the imputations and the availability of any statutory exceptions may be adjudicated on evidence before the competent Sessions Courts.
25. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION:
26. Now the point for consideration is:
“Whether the impugned orders are correct, legal, and proper with respect to taking cognizance of the alleged offences? And to what relief?”
27. In this respect, the following table will portray the date and nature of publication of alleged derogatory articles, the pertinent Government Orders authorizing the prosecution with related dates and details of the complaints, Courts and the dates of taking cognizance.
| Sl.NO. | CASE NO. | ALLEGED DEFAMATORY ARTICLES PUBLISHED | GOVERNMENT ORDER SANCTIONINGPROSECUTION AND DATE | DETAILS OF COMPLAINANT AND DATEAND TAKING COGNIZANCE |
| 1. | Crl.R.C.No.1287 of 2025 | APSRTC. (20-06-2023) | G.O.Rt.No.374 14-12-2023 | CC.No.27 of 202330-12-2023 in the Court of the IV Additional District C Sessions Judge, Guntur |
| 2. | Crl.R.C.No.1336 of 2025 | Surveillance on theJudiciary. (15-08-2020) | G.O.Rt.No.874 26-09-2022 | CC.No.4 of 202304-07-2023 in the Court of the Learned District & Sessions Judge, Guntur |
| 3. | Crl.R.C.No.1339 of 2025 | Hello Tadepalli. (03-02-2023) | G.O.Rt.No.1535 02-08-2023 | CC.No.14 of 202310-08-2023 in the Court of the V Additional District & Sessions Judge, Guntur |
28. As per the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Girish Kumar Suneja v. CBI ((2017) 14 SCC 809)Amar Nath v. State of Haryana ((1977) 4 SCC 137) , Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra((1977) 4 SCC 551), K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat((2000) 6 SCC 195), V.C. Shukla v. State(1980 Supp SCC 92) and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam((1999) 3 SCC 134) orders of taking cognizance and summoning the Petitioners/Accused are intermediate in nature and revisable under Section 397(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ Therefore, it is maintained that these Criminal Revision Cases are sustainable.
29. This Court in Ushodaya Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of A.P(2025 SCC OnLine AP 3872)., has categorically held that the Public Prosecutor cannot be reduced to the role of a mere transmitting agency or “post office” of the Executive. The Public Prosecutor is recognized as a quasi-independent statutory functionary, entrusted with a primary and continuing duty to the Court, to the justice system.
This duty must inform every stage of a prosecution for defamation under Section 199(2) and (4) of ‘the Cr.P.C.’
30. In Ushodaya Enterprises supra it has been reiterated that the status of the Public Prosecutor is rigidly structured by the statutory scheme under Sections 24 and 25-A of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ now reflected in Sections 18 and 20 of ‘the BNSS’. The statutory framework bifurcates appointments between Public Prosecutors in the High Court and Public Prosecutors or Additional Public Prosecutors in the District Courts, each with a distinct sphere of operation. A Public Prosecutor appointed in connection with a district cannot, as of right, extend his jurisdiction beyond the district. Likewise, a Public Prosecutor appointed for the High Court cannot ordinarily be deployed to act as complainant and conducting prosecutor in Sessions Courts, except upon a specific and reasoned authorization disclosing “special reasons” and a “special appointment” for that limited purpose.
31. The Public Prosecutor appointed to function as a Public Prosecutor for the High Court under Section 24(1) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ cannot file complaints under Section 199(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ for the alleged offence punishable under Sections 499, 500, 501 and 502 read with 120-B of ‘the I.P.C.,’ unless there is a special appointment in that regard with special reasons, before the ‘learned Trial Courts’ inasmuch as his appointment is restricted to the High Court. This Court in Ushodaya Enterprises supra also held the same.
32. In Ushodaya Enterprises supra it has been further held that there is no statutory creation of any post designated as “State Public Prosecutor” under either ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ or ‘the BNSS’. Complaints filed under such nomenclature are jurisdictionally suspected. When the Government purports to direct a so-called “State Public Prosecutor” to institute complaints before Sessions Courts under Section 199(2), without satisfying the statutory pre-conditions relating to designation, territorial competence, and mode of appointment, the prosecutorial edifice stands vitiated at its foundation.
33. In Ushodaya Enterprises supra it has been furthermore held that the Public Prosecutor is required to scrutinize the materials placed before him, peruse the record, and test whether the ingredients of Section 499 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ are prima facie attracted. He must independently satisfy himself that the alleged imputation is directed against one of the constitutional or public functionaries enumerated in Section 199(2), that the offence relates to conduct in discharge of public functions, and that the proposed prosecution subserves the legitimate interests of the State rather than partisan or collateral objectives.
34. It has been underscored that the Public Prosecutor bears a dual obligation: first, as counsel for the State, and second, as a minister of justice with a direct duty to the Court. In the context of criminal defamation, this dual obligation requires the Public Prosecutor to ensure that the sanctioning authority has correctly appreciated the nature of the alleged imputation, to ascertain that the complainant qualifies as an “aggrieved person” within the meaning of Section 199, and to place before the Sessions Court all relevant material, including exculpatory governmental communications and rejoinders, which may establish that the publication constitutes fair comment, truthful reportage, or good-faith criticism within the statutory exceptions to Section 499 of ‘the I.P.C.’
35. It has been further held that the responsibility of the Public Prosecutor under Section 199(2) does not cease with the lodgment of a written complaint. It extends to submitting himself to examination on oath under Section 200 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ to full cross-examination, and to the rigors of trial, thereby demonstrating that he has exercised the independent evaluative function contemplated by law. Failure to demonstrate such scrutiny, or to appear and be examined as complainant, constitutes an infirmity going to the root of cognizance, since Section 199(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ was upheld as constitutionally valid on the premise that the Public Prosecutor would operate as a substantive safeguard and not as a mere conduit for executive displeasure.
36. The complaints were filed by the ‘State’ Public Prosecutor. It must be pointed out that there is no post like ‘State’ Public Prosecutor under ‘the BNSS.,’/‘the Cr.P.C.’ The sections of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ viz., Sections 2(u), 24, 25-A and 301 of ‘the BNSS.,’/‘the Cr.P.C.,’ must be understood in one singular scheme. They cannot be read bereft of their text and context. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K. Anbazhagan supra, also observed that if the above sections are read as parts of different schemes they are bound to be anomaly. Hence, such an interpretation shall be avoided. Further Class or status of the Public Prosecutor is controlled by Sections 18 and 20 of ‘the BNSS.,’/Sections 24 and 25-A of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ They have restricted the appointment of Public Prosecutor for the High Court and Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor for the districts Courts. There is a separate procedure for appointments of such Public Prosecutor for the High Court and Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor for the district Courts.
37. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K.Anbazhagan supra clearly observed that if a Public Prosecutor appointed in connection with a district, his working sphere must be restricted to the district unless he is specially engaged to appear before the higher Court. Similarly, a Public Prosecutor appointed for the High Court, his working sphere must be restricted to the High Court. Indeed, in the instant impugned Government Orders, while requiring the Public Prosecutor appointed for the High Court to file complaints before the learned Trial Courts, there were no special reasons assigned in the impugned Government Orders. If the Public Prosecutor is appointed exclusively to the High Court, his appointment is a restricted appointment. He cannot be required to do the work of the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutors for the Sessions Courts unless special reasons are assigned and special appointments in that regard is issued.
In the impugned Government Orders, there are neither such special reasons nor special appointments. It was only required in the impugned Government Orders the ‘State’ Public Prosecutor, the High Court to take further immediate action in the matter, accordingly. And later the complainant filed complaints before ‘the learned Trial Courts.’
38. In matters like criminal defamation, the job of the Public Prosecutor to file complaints under Section 199 (2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ would not end with the mere filing of complaints. He needs to be examined by ‘the learned Trial Courts’ before taking cognizance of the alleged offences in all the cases. He should also be required to make himself available and subjected to the entire arduous exercise of trial which includes examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re- examination, if required. Of course, eventually he needs to submit his arguments before the learned Trial Courts in all four complaints. If this is the length and breadth of the work of the Public Prosecutor in the instant cases which he requires to conduct, he cannot devote his assigned work to the High Court properly. To avoid all the above, there must have been either an appointment specifically with the Public Prosecutor for the High Court for filing the complaints and prosecuting them before ‘the learned Trial Courts’ till the complaints reach a logical conclusion or giving sanction to the Public Prosecutors of the district courts concerned.
39. The decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.K. Mishra v. State of M.P.,( (2018) 6 SCC 676) wherein while referring to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Subramanian Swamy supra observed that the Public Prosecutor has got a duty towards the Court to scan the material based on which a complaint for defamation is to be filed. As per the understandings of Sections 199(2) and 199(4) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ there is an in-built safeguard which requires the Public Prosecutor to scan and be specific with the materials based on which a complaint for defamation is to be filed by him acting as the Public Prosecutor of the Court concerned. The Public Prosecutor cannot act like the post office on behalf of the State Government. He is required to pursue the materials on record and form an independent opinion. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Subramanian Swamy case supra at paragraph No.203 in categorical terms observed that the Public Prosecutor is required to act in good faith, he cannot remain oblivious to his lawful obligation under ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and is required to constantly remember his duty to the Court as well as his duty to the collective while filing cases under Section 499 and 500 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ he is expected to maintain that independence and not act as a machine.
40. Regarding the contention that Public Prosecutors are not a mere post office, the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.K. Mishra supra at paragraph Nos.14, 16 & 17 emphasizes that a Public Prosecutor must act independently and responsibly when filing defamation complaints under Sections 499 and 500 of ‘the I.P.C.’ He should not act merely as a representative or “post office” of the government, but must carefully examine the materials, act in good faith, and uphold his duty to both the Court and the public. This independent scrutiny serves as an important safeguard in such prosecutions.
41. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K. Anbazhagan v. State of Karnataka((2015) 6 SCC 158), also at paragraph No.28 lays down that class or status of the Public Prosecutor is controlled by Section 24 and 25A of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The State Government ought to have requested the Public Prosecutor/Additional Public Prosecutor who were appointed under Section 24(3) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ for the learned Trial Courts to file complaints against the Petitioners under Section 199(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ because the Public Prosecutor under Section 199(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is the Public Prosecutor mentioned under Section 24(3) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ but not the Public Prosecutor appointed under Section 24(1) of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ Therefore, the complaints filed by the ‘State’ Public Prosecutor before the learned Trial Courts are not maintainable. The learned Trial Courts ought to have made an objection in that regard at the threshold of filing complaints.
42. After reviewing the submissions and the record, this Court concludes that the Trial Court’s cognizance against the Petitioners is legally unsustainable as defamation under Sections 499 and 500 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ requires an intention to harm reputation, which is absent here, as the complaint neither specifies defamatory statements nor establishes malice. The impugned publications on issues of APSRTC, Surveillance on judiciary and others had merely reported public welfare issues.
43. Further, to constitute defamation, as envisaged in Section 499 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ either the imputation should have been intended to harm the reputation of such person or at least the person making the said imputation should have had knowledge or reasons to believe that the same will harm the reputation of the other. One of the essential ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 499 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is “mens rea”.
44. The constitutionality of criminal defamation was challenged in Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India((2016) 7 SCC 221), wherein the Supreme Court upheld Sections 499 and 500 of ‘the I.P.C.’ The Court emphasized that the right to reputation is a facet of Article 21, Right to Life and Personal Liberty and must be balanced against the right to free speech. However, the judgment also clarified that criticism of government functioning, even if harsh, cannot be equated with defamation unless it is shown to be malicious and false. It is observed that defamation cannot be used as a political tool, and that calling a government inefficient or unfit does not attract criminal liability. This ruling is pivotal in protecting media entities from frivolous defamation suits while preserving the dignity of individuals.
45. In Subramanian Swamy supra at paragraph No. 150 it was observed that the excerpt underscores that while Shreya Singhal v. Union of India((2015) 5 SCC 1)) emphasized the need for narrowly tailored restrictions on free speech, criminal defamation does not fall within that narrow scope. The term “defamation” in Article 19(2) has existed since the inception of the Constitution and includes criminal defamation, which is a pre-constitutional law. Attempts to interpret defamation as requiring a nexus with public disorder are inconsistent with constitutional principles. Precedents like Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P.,( AIR 1957 SC 620) and Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar(AIR 1962 SC 955) pertain to different offences and cannot be extended to redefine defamation. Furthermore, reliance on S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram ((1989) 2 SCC 574) must be contextualized, as that case dealt with censorship of a film addressing caste-based reservation, not defamation, and its observations were specific to the facts and sensitivities involved.
46. The Indian Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a), which includes the freedom of the press. This right is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), including defamation. The press, often referred to as the Fourth Estate, plays a vital role in democracy by scrutinizing public institutions and disseminating information. In a democratic society, freedom of expression is paramount and cannot be curtailed merely due to dissent or criticism of policies or opinions, as such expressions do not amount to defamation. Disapproval alone does not constitute criminal defamation. There is a need to understand its legal contours accurately. The Court's analysis focused on balancing free speech with “special interest” considerations, without engaging in a comparative assessment between Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21.
47. In Subramanian Swamy supra at para-No.168 it was stressed that to constitute the offence of defamation under Section 499 of ‘the IPC.,’ there must be a specific imputation made with intent, knowledge, or reasonable belief that it would harm the reputation of the person concerned, thereby establishing mens rea as a prerequisite. Section 44 of ‘the IPC.,’ defines “injury” to include harm to reputation, thus reinforcing the foundational element of reputational damage in criminal defamation. Additionally, in Sahib Singh Mehra v. State of U.P., (1965 SCC Online SC 256) the Supreme Court clarified that for defamation of a group under Explanation 2 to Section 499, the collection of persons must be clearly identifiable and definite, as was the case with the prosecuting staff of Aligarh or Uttar Pradesh, distinguishing them from the public.
48. In Subramaninan Swamy supra at paragraph No.120 it is held that freedom of speech and expression is a highly treasured value under the Constitution and voice of dissent or disagreement has to be respected and regarded and not to be scuttled as unpalatable criticism. Emphasis has been laid on the fact that dissonant and discordant expressions are to be treated as viewpoints with objectivity and such expressions of views and ideas being necessary for growth of democracy are to be zealously protected. It was further observed that notwithstanding the expansive and sweeping ambit of freedom of speech, as all rights, right to freedom of speech and expression is not absolute. It is subject to imposition of reasonable restrictions. It emphasized that Article 19(2) envisages "reasonable restriction". Right to say what may displease or annoy others cannot be throttled or garroted. There can never be any cavil over the fact that the right to freedom of speech and expression is a right that must get ascendance in a democratic body polity, but at the same time the limit must be proportionate and not unlimited. The principles regard reasonable restrictions as have been stated by the Supreme Court from time to time are that the restriction should not be excessive and in public interest.
49. At paragraph No.195 in Subramaninan Swamy supra it was held that right to freedom of speech and expression is a highly valued and cherished right. In a democracy it is not necessary that everyone should sing the same song; freedom of expression is the rule, and it is generally taken for granted Criticism and commentary on policies, enactments or opinions do not remotely constitute defamation is not defamation. Disapproval is not defamation. Balancing fundamental rights is a constitutional necessity.
50. In Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India ((1985) 1 SCC 641) , the Court emphasized that press freedom is essential to democracy and that economic restrictions must not stifle editorial independence. These cases collectively affirm that the media’s role in critiquing governance is constitutionally protected, and that the threshold for defamation is high when it comes to public institutions.
51. The Hon’ble Apex Court in R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N.,( (1994) 6 SCC 632) lays down foundational principles governing the right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution, emphasizing its scope as a “right to be let alone.” It delineates the boundaries of permissible publication, especially concerning private matters, public records, and the conduct of public officials. The Hon’ble Apex Court also affirms that governmental bodies cannot sue for defamation and that prior restraint on press or media lacks statutory backing, thereby reinforcing the freedom of expression and press in a constitutional democracy. At paragraph No.26, it is held that the right to privacy, implicit in Article 21, protects citizens from unauthorized publication of personal matters such as family, marriage, motherhood, and education, unless they voluntarily enter public controversy; however, once information becomes part of public records, privacy ceases, though victims of sexual offences must be shielded from further exposure. Public officials cannot claim privacy regarding acts tied to their official duties, except where malice is proven, while in personal matters they enjoy the same rights as other citizens. Government bodies themselves cannot sue for defamation, and importantly, no law empowers the State or its officials to impose prior restraint on the press or media.
52. The State, like a parent to its citizens, should exercise patience and tolerance in matters of defamation. Just as parents do not disown children for occasional harsh words, the State must avoid impulsive prosecutions and instead act with restraint and maturity. Criminal defamation under Sections 499 and 500 of ‘the IPC.,’ should be invoked only in exceptional cases, as other legal remedies exist to address wrongdoing. In today’s social media era, where criticism and harsh commentary are rampant, indiscriminate use of defamation law would overwhelm courts with vindictive cases, often driven by political motives. Such an approach would contradict the legislative intent, which was never to enable misuse of the law for settling scores.
53. It is out of place to mention that section 11 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ provides an inclusive definition for determining who can be considered an aggrieved party, but it does not automatically grant the Government the status of a defamation complainant unless statutory conditions are met. Section 199 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ particularly sub-sections (2) to (4), lays down a special procedure for cases involving high constitutional functionaries such as the President, Vice-President, Governor, or Ministers, requiring a complaint by the Public Prosecutor with prior sanction and cognizance by a Sessions Court. This safeguard exists to prevent frivolous or politically motivated prosecutions under the guise of protecting official dignity. In the present cases, these provisions were not invoked. Therefore, the Trial Court must ensure that the prosecutorial process is not misused to suppress legitimate criticism or journalistic expression, especially when the complainant does not qualify as a “person” under Section 11 of the IPC and the procedure under Section 199 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is inapplicable. Mere adverse commentary on government functioning, without more, does not amount to a cognizable offence.
54. The Hon’ble Apex Court in R.Rajagopal supra observed that so far as the Government, local authority and institutions exercising governmental power are concerned, they cannot even maintain a suit for damages for defaming them. In an offence of defamation, unless a specified holder of constitutional office or public servant viz., the President of India, the Vice President of India, the Governor of State, the Administrator of Union Territory, the Minister of Union or of a State or a Union Territory or any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the union or state in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public functions as mentioned in section 199 (2) of the Cr.P.C.,’ is defamed, the Government cannot issue Government Order launching prosecution.
55. In the instant cases, it is not the holders of highest constitutional office or the public servants as contemplated under Section 199(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ are defamed. It was only alleged that in the caption of “AYYO RTC” “హࡹ… '‰Ý¦à°ªà¡¯à¤±! ࢑ۧరణ à°¤%§ à°¤ Pఎ࣒ Þœ కలࣄ ࢗࢀనऱ à°“.ఎ࣒.8” (Hello Thadepalli! After enquiry O.S.D went along with C.S) and other article certain news items were published which neither appear to be defamatory in nature nor likely cause harm to the reputation of the Government nor mar the prestige and dignity of the Government. At the cost of repetition, it must not be held that there is no reference in the impugned Government Orders that which of the constitutional high office holder or public servants referred under Section 199(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ were defamed. Hence, on this count also the complaints before ‘the learned Trial Courts’ are not maintainable.
56. It must be pointed out that ‘the learned Trial Courts’ numbered the complaint as per the orders dated 30.12.2023, 04.07.2023, 10.08.2023 & 04.07.2023 as Calendar Case. No reasons, much less brief reasons were assigned before taking cognizance. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in this regard, in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI((2015) 4 SCC 609), at paragraph No.58 in categorical terms held that before taking cognizance of the offence at least brief reasons must be assigned for taking cognizance against an offence. Therefore, on this count also the orders of cognizance are liable to be interfered and set aside.
57. All the Petitioners are admittedly, even as per the short cause title and the long cause title, are residents of Hyderabad of Telangana State. Therefore, ‘the learned Trial Courts’ ought to have conducted an inquiry or investigation as contemplated under Section 202 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ which is mandatory pursuant to 2005 amendment to the provision of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima Mamtaj ((2014) 14 SCC 638), Udai Shankar Awasthi v. State of U.P((2013) 2 SCC 435), Shivjee Singh v. Nagendra Tiwary((2010) 7 SCC 578), National Bank of Oman v. Barakara Abdul Aziz((2013) 2 SCC 488), Abhijit Pawar v. Hemant Madhukar Nimbalkar((2017) 3 SCC 528). Hence, ‘the learned Trial Courts’ before issuing summons on the Petitioners ought to have conducted either an inquiry by themselves or directed the investigation to determine whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed further.
58. This Court in Ushodaya Enterprises supra at paragraph No.79 held that though the complaint was filed before the learned Court of Sessions, for all practical purposes the learned Court of Sessions is discharging the duties of a Magistrate as it must adopt the procedure of warrant cases. Hence, the procedure contemplated under Section 202 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is mandatorily to be followed by the learned Trial Court.
59. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda((2015) 12 SCC 420), at paragraph No. 20 it was held that since it was a process of taking judicial notice of certain facts which constitute an offence, there had to be application of mind as to whether the allegations in the complaint, when considered along with the statements recorded or the inquiry conducted thereon, would constitute violation of law so as to call a person to appear before the criminal court. Further, at paragraph No. 21 it was observed that under Section 190(1)(b) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ the Magistrate had the advantage of a police report and under Section 190(1)(c) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ he had the information or knowledge of commission of an offence, but under Section 190(1)(a) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ he had only a complaint before him, by relying on the decision of the hon’ble Apex Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate((1998) 5 SCC 749).
60. In Mehmood Ul Rehman supra at paragraph 22, it was further stressed that the steps taken by the Magistrate under Section 190(1)(a) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ followed by Section 204 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ should reflect that the Magistrate had applied his mind to the facts and the statements and he was satisfied that there was ground for proceeding further in the matter by asking the person against whom the violation of law is alleged, to appear before the court. Further it was highlighted that the Magistrate was not to act as a post office assistant in taking cognizance of each complaint filed before him and issue process as a matter of course. It was further stressed that there must be sufficient indication in the order passed by the Magistrate that he was satisfied that the allegations in the complaint constitute an offence and when considered along with the statements recorded and the result of inquiry or report of investigation under Section 202 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ if any, the accused was answerable before the criminal court, there was ground for proceeding against the accused under Section 204 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ by issuing process for appearance. It was further noted that the application of mind was best demonstrated by disclosure of mind on the satisfaction; if there was no such indication in a case where the Magistrate proceeds under Sections 190/204 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ the High Court under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ was bound to invoke it’s inherent power in order to prevent abuse of the power of the criminal court. It was eventually emphasized that to be called to appear before the criminal court as an accused is serious matter affecting one's dignity, self-respect and image in society, and hence, the process of criminal court shall not be made a weapon of harassment.
61. Indeed, in the instant cases the record clearly reveals that the impugned publications were not filed in admissible form of evidence, only paper clippings were filed not full edition of the impugned publications of the day were not filed and perused by ‘the learned Trial Courts’ to know who is the publisher, the editor, and the printer.
62. The complainant has relied solely on clippings of the alleged news reports without producing the complete newspaper edition of that day that contain the statutory details of the printer, publisher, and place of printing as required under Section 3 of ‘the Act.’ In the absence of full editions carrying these mandatory declarations and imprints, no statutory presumption can be drawn regarding the identity of the editor, printer, or publisher, and criminal liability cannot be attributed to the petitioners. Consequently, cognizance based on such incomplete and defective material is unsustainable.
63. The High Court of Delhi in The Wire through Its Editor v. Amita Singh(Crl.M.C.No.2792/2017 dated 29.03.2023) at paragraph No.10 also pointed out that the subject publication/written matter was not before the learned Magistrate in any admissible form. ‘The learned Trial Courts’ also ought to have verified the same to know about the above- mentioned details of the newspaper of the Petitioners to proceed further. ‘The learned Trial Courts’ in a mechanical way took cognizance of the alleged offence. In a case based on complaint under Section 199(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ for the alleged offence of criminal defamation there is neither an FIR nor an investigation. Therefore, the responsibility on ‘the learned Trial Courts’ is more.
64. Even the Hon’ble Apex Court in Subramanian Swamy supra at paragraph No.207 observed the above point. After all, the issuance of process is a matter of judicial determination and before issuing the process ‘the learned Trial Courts’ ought to have examined the complaint i.e., State Public Prosecutor and the witnesses by name P.S.Pradyumna, Principal Secretary, Transport, Roads & Buildings Department, Government of A.P and Dr. K.S.Jawahar Reddy, Chief Secretary, Government of A.P.
65. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajindra Nath Mahato v. T. Ganguly((1972) 1 SCC 450), stressed the above-mentioned procedure to be judiciously followed by the learned Magistrate. Afortiori, it was mentioned by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha(1993 Supp (1) SCC 499) held that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment.
66. The order of the learned Trial Courts did not reflect that they had applied their mind to the facts of the case and the law reflected thereto. The High Court of Madras in Thiru N. Ram v. Union of India(2020 SCC OnLine Mad 1023) at paragraph No.71(g) also held that the level of scrutiny of a Sessions Court under Section 199(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is much higher than the scrutiny of a Magistrate under Section 199(6) of ‘the Cr.P.C.’
67. It is important to note that without the complainant being examined, ‘the learned Trial Courts’ took cognizance of the alleged offences. ‘The learned Trial Courts’, without applying their mind and examining the complainant/State public Prosecutor, the public servant, who issued the Government Orders giving sanctions for prosecution, as mandated under Section 200 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ had taken cognizance of offences. This irregular procedure shall also be found fault with as much prejudice was caused to the Petitioners/Accused.
68. The Hon’ble Apex Court in R. Rajagopal supra at paragraph No.26(3) observed that even publication is based upon facts and statements which are not true, unless the official aggrieved establishes that publication was made (by the defendant) with reckless disregard for truth. In such a case, it would be enough for the member of the press or the media to prove that he or it acted after a reasonable verification of the facts; it was not necessary for him or him or it to prove what was written is true. Of course, the newspaper in question is a media entity representing the fourth estate of the democracy which was exercising its right to report on matters of public interest and governance, and such report is protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India subject to reasonable restrictions.
69. Indeed, the sanctioning of prosecutions granted to the complainant by issuing necessary impugned Government Orders are in utter disregard of the provisions contained in Section 199(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The Sanctions noticeably suffer from complete non-application of mind, and it is nothing but abuse of process of law. As per Section 499 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ Government be State or Union is not a person aggrieved under Section 199 (2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ Before taking cognizance of the offences and issuing process to the Petitioners, the learned Trial Courts’ had not adhered to the provisions of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ by conducting an inquiry or investigation. This inaction on the part of ‘the learned Trial Courts’ being hit by Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees right to life and personal liberty as per the procedure established by law requiring procedural fairness.
70. In the end, while individuals and identifiable institutions can seek remedies under defamation law, the government cannot be defamed unless specific officials or departments are targeted with false and malicious imputations. Media entities, as custodians of public discourse, are empowered to critique governance, expose inefficiencies, and question authority. Their rights are constitutionally protected, but not absolute.
71. The complaints suffer from a fundamental lack of locus standi, as no specific individual has been identified as defamed and the pleadings are vague, lacking particulars of whose reputation was harmed and in what manner. They appear to be instituted on behalf of the Government or its instrumentalities, which, in law, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot maintain criminal defamation proceedings under Section 499 of ‘the I.P.C.’ If any public servant was genuinely aggrieved, the proper remedy would lie under Section 199(6) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ at the instance of that individual, rather than invoking Sections 199(2) or 199(4) to employ the State machinery for safeguarding its own “reputation.”
72. Especially in the facts and circumstances of the case, the prosecutions constitute a direct infringement on the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The right to comment on and criticize government policies, the functioning of public corporations like APSRTC, and the conduct of public officials is a vital component of democratic discourse, subject only to the reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2). Initiating criminal proceedings against media houses and their directors for fair, factual, and good-faith reporting on matters of public importance, under the pretext of protecting the “reputation” of the State or its instrumentalities, creates an impermissible chilling effect on free speech. Moreover, the failure to adhere to statutory procedures and the mechanical approach to taking cognizance violates the petitioners’ right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, which guarantees a fair, just, and reasonable process in accordance with principles of natural justice.
73. It is highly pertinent to mention that Crl.R.C.No.1340/2025 arising out of order of taking cognizance and issuing process in C.C.No.5/2023 on the file of the learned District and Sessions Judge, Guntur, ironically, the complaint was not filed by the Public Prosecutor. The complaint was filed by one T.Vijay Kumar Reddy, Commissioner I & PR and Ex Officio Special Secretary (GA), I & PR, Government of A.P through his power of attorney I.Surya Chandra Rao, working in I & PR, Government of A.P. The complaint under Section 199(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ shall be filed by the Public Prosecutor concerned and not by any official. There is no reference in the complaint that the complainant was authorized to file the complaint by any Government Order.
74. In Crl.R.C.No.1340/2025 the complaint was not filed based on the directions given in the Government Order issued under Section 199(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ Therefore, this is an irregular procedure which vitiates the entire prosecution. Hence, the proceedings in C.C.No.5/2023 on the file of the learned District and Sessions Judge, Guntur are liable to be interfered and set aside. It has to be pointed out that in Crl.R.C.No.1336/2025 there is reference about issuance of Government Order for launching prosecution by filing complaint by the Public Prosecutor under Section 199(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ but there is no mention of filing of that Government Order. Without verifying whether such Government Order was issued and filed, ‘the learned Trial Court’ has taken cognizance and issued process against the Petitioners. This irregular procedure is also liable to be interfered and the criminal proceedings emanating from that C.C.No.4/2023 are also liable to be set aside.
CONCLUSION:
75. In view of the above-mentioned reasons, the orders for taking cognizance of the offences and issuing process to the Petitioners are unsustainable, materially irregular, suffering from flagrant violations of procedure and miscarriage of justice. Hence, these orders are liable to be interfered with and set aside, accordingly they are set aside.
76. With the above observations and directions, these Criminal Revision Cases are allowed, without costs, in the circumstances of the case.
As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.