1. Heard Sri Madhav Jain, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Mahesh Narain Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party.

2. The present transfer application has been filed by the applicant–wife under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking transfer of Matrimonial Petition No. 2130 of 2023, instituted by the opposite party under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, pending before the Court of Additional Family Court No. 5, Ghaziabad, to the Court of competent jurisdiction at Agra.

3. Though the lis arises out of a matrimonial dispute between private parties, the issues which arise for consideration transcend the individual facts of the case and touch upon the nature, scope, and contours of the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Section 24 CPC, particularly in cases where transfer is sought by consent or where the opposite party does not oppose the prayer. The matter, therefore, calls for a consideration of the applicable legal principles governing exercise of powers of transfer under Section 24, on the basis of consent of parties.

4. The factual position brought on record indicates that the marriage between the applicant and the opposite party was solemnized on 18.02.2011 at Agra in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals. Out of the wedlock, a son was born on 31.01.2020. Due to matrimonial discord, the applicant is presently residing at her parental home at Agra along with her minor son. It has been specifically pleaded that the applicant has no regular or independent source of income and is entirely dependent upon her parents for her sustenance as well as that of the minor child. It has further been stated, and not disputed, that the opposite party is not paying any maintenance either to the applicant or to the minor child.

5. The opposite party has instituted Matrimonial Petition No. 2130 of 2023 under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking dissolution of marriage, which is pending before the Court of Additional Family Court No. 5, Ghaziabad. The applicant has asserted that the distance between Agra and Ghaziabad is approximately 200 kilometers and that repeated travel to Ghaziabad would cause grave inconvenience, financial strain, and physical hardship, particularly in view of her limited financial means and her responsibility towards a school-going minor child. It has also been pleaded that the applicant's father, aged about 65 years, is suffering from serious ailments and is not in a position to accompany her during such travel. It has further been pointed out that the opposite party himself is a resident of Agra, where his parental house is also situated. These facts are not controverted and form the factual substratum of the present application.

6. Significantly, the opposite party has categorically stated before this Court that he does not wish to oppose the present transfer application. The prayer for transfer is, therefore, not contested and is, in effect, founded on the consent or at least the unequivocal non-opposition of the opposite party. This aspect assumes considerable importance, as it has a direct bearing on the nature of scrutiny required to be undertaken by the Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 24 CPC.

7. Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, confers wide and discretionary jurisdiction upon the High Court and the District Court to transfer or withdraw any suit, appeal, or other proceeding at any stage, either on the application of any of the parties or even suo motu. The provision is couched in broad and enabling language and does not prescribe rigid conditions or straitjacketed parameters for the exercise of power. The legislative intent underlying Section 24 CPC is to vest the superior courts with sufficient flexibility to ensure fairness of procedure, to avoid hardship, inconvenience, or oppression, and to secure the proper administration of justice. The power is remedial, equitable, and supervisory in character and is intended to prevent failure of justice that may otherwise result from a rigid adherence to procedural form.

8. It is no doubt a settled principle that ordinarily the plaintiff, being dominus litis, has the right to choose the forum of institution and that such choice is not to be interfered with lightly. This principle recognises the autonomy of a litigant to prosecute his cause in a forum permitted by law. However, the doctrine of dominus litis is not an inflexible or absolute rule. Section 24 CPC itself constitutes a statutory exception to this principle and empowers the Court to override the plaintiff's choice on an application for transfer by any of the parties or of its own motion. The right of forum selection cannot be elevated to a position where it defeats substantive justice or imposes undue hardship upon the opposite party. Where the insistence on the chosen forum results in inequity, prejudice, or denial of effective access to justice, the doctrine of dominus litis must necessarily yield in order to prevent hardship and ensure fairness in proceedings.

9. Though Section 24 CPC does not expressly employ the expression "transfer by consent", nothing in the provision prohibits the Court from ordering a transfer where both parties agree or where the opposite party raises no objection. The provision is enabling and permissive, not restrictive. Procedural rights, including the right to object to a particular forum, are capable of being waived. When a party expressly consents to transfer or states that he or she has no objection to the prayer, the procedural privilege flowing from the principle of dominus litis stands voluntarily relinquished. In such a situation, the foundational concern of prejudice, which ordinarily animates contested transfer applications, stands substantially diluted, if not entirely removed.

10. Where parties are ad idem on the question of transfer, the necessity for an elaborate comparative examination of balance of convenience stands considerably reduced. Consent reflects a mutual acceptance of the proposed forum and carries with it a presumption that no party apprehends injustice or disadvantage. In such cases, the Court is not required to engage in a hyper- technical or mechanical exercise of weighing relative inconvenience. A consensual transfer ordinarily advances the interest of justice by avoiding unnecessary procedural contest, conserving judicial time, and facilitating expeditious adjudication. Where no legal impediment is shown to exist, insistence on continuation of proceedings at the original forum serves no substantive or meaningful purpose.

11. The requirement that judicial orders must be reasoned is well settled. However, the nature and extent of reasons required depend upon the context and the nature of controversy involved. In consent-based or unopposed transfer applications, the requirement of recording reasons is sufficiently met by noting the consent or non-opposition of the parties and the Court's satisfaction that the transfer is lawful, fair, and does not occasion injustice. The law does not mandate an elaborate reasoning exercise where the factual foundation of contest is absent and where the parties themselves invite the Court to exercise its jurisdiction.

12. Matrimonial disputes occupy a distinct position in transfer jurisprudence owing to their personal nature and the socio-economic realities that attend them. In such matters, the "balance of convenience" assumes particular significance and must be assessed not in abstract or theoretical terms but in the context of lived realities. In the Indian socio-economic milieu, it is often the wife who bears primary responsibility for the care and upbringing of minor children and who is more likely to be financially constrained or dependent. Courts have, therefore, consistently recognised that while convenience is a relative concept, the convenience of the wife deserves priority consideration in matrimonial transfer petitions. This approach is rooted not in any presumption of preference but in pragmatic considerations of access to justice and fairness. The overarching and controlling principle remains that the ends of justice must be subserved.

13. From the statutory framework and the foregoing discussion, the following general principles may be stated:

                  13.1    Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers wide, discretionary, and equitable power upon the Court to transfer proceedings at any stage in order to secure the ends of justice.

                  13.2    The plaintiff's right as dominus litis to choose the forum of institution is subject to judicial control and may be overridden where adherence to such choice would result in hardship or injustice.

                  13.3    Transfer of proceedings by consent or where the opposite party raises no objection is legally permissible and well within the scope of Section 24 CPC.

                  13.4 Consent to transfer operates as a voluntary waiver of objection to the forum, and in such cases, the apprehension of prejudice stands substantially mitigated.

                  13.5 Where transfer is sought by consent or is unopposed, the necessity for an elaborate comparative analysis of balance of convenience stands diluted, though the Court must be satisfied as to the legality and fairness of the transfer.

                  13.6 In consent-based transfer orders, the requirement of recording reasons is adequately satisfied by noting the consensual stand of the parties and the Court's satisfaction that the transfer advances the ends of justice.

                  13.7 In matrimonial proceedings, having regard to social realities, the convenience of the wife, particularly where her personal, familial or economic circumstances place her at a comparative disadvantage, deserves priority consideration.

                  13.8 The ultimate and controlling test for exercise of power under Section 24 CPC is whether the transfer prevents hardship and subserves the cause of justice.

14. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the applicant-wife resides at Agra with her school-going minor son. It is stated that she has no independent source of income, and is dependent upon her parents. The distance between Agra and Ghaziabad would necessitate repeated travel entailing financial strain and physical hardship. The applicant has also pleaded lack of adequate assistance and the ill-health of her aged father. The opposite party has categorically stated that he does not oppose the transfer. No prejudice, actual or apprehended, is shown to be caused to either side. The transfer sought is bona fide, consensual, and clearly in furtherance of justice.

15. For all the reasons aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present case is a fit one for exercise of power under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

16. Accordingly, the Civil Misc. Transfer Application is allowed with the following directions:

                  (ii) Matrimonial Petition No.2130 of 2023, pending before the Court of Additional Family Court No. 5, Ghaziabad, is hereby withdrawn and transferred to the Court of competent jurisdiction at Agra.

                  (iii) The Court at Ghaziabad shall transmit the entire original record of the case to the transferee court within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.

                  (iv) The transferee Court shall proceed with the matter from the stage at which it is transferred and shall endeavour to decide the same expeditiously, in accordance with law.