Oral Judgment:

1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.

2. The learned Counsel for the parties agree that a common judgment and order can dispose of these petitions. In any event, these petitions arise from a common charge-sheet which was issued to each of the Petitioners, followed by a common inquiry report. Therefore, all these petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment and order.

3. The Petitioners are challenging the penalty of reduction in pay by one stage and grade pay for a period of one year, bearing effect on future increments of pay from the date of issue of such order impugned by the Disciplinary Authority pursuant to a departmental inquiry for charges of indulging in, inter alia, corrupt practices.

4. The Petitioners were served with a common charge-sheet dated 04.06.2010 under the provisions of Goa Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975 – (“said Rules”), alleging the following:

                   “Article-1

                   That while performing duty at Cortalim side of the Zuari bridge on 21.08.2009 from 9.50 hrs. they were found stopping the vehicles under the pretext of MV checking but when checked at 13.15 hrs. by PCB Team of Directorate of Vigilance, Panaji, all of them were found indulging in corrupt practices and had already taken an amount of Rs.1000/- from Honda Activa scooterist by name Javier Gonzales, a Spanish National without issuing a challan or receipt of having accept the said amount. Shri Gonzalves was riding the scooter without documents and also without wearing helmet/head gear. After receiving Rs.1000/- as bribe, they allowed him to go away. They have also not declared exact amount of cash in the personal cash register at the time of resuming duty and when found excess/less cash in their possessions, they could not give satisfactory account of their cash in their possession. Besides this on seeing the PCB Team overtaking and stopping the Interceptor vehicle at Verna all of them threw an amount of Rs.2340/- for which all of them are jointly and severely responsible for indulging in corrupt practices.

                   Article-II

                   That during the above period i.e. on 21.08.2009 the said PSI, Shamba 5. Desai was allotted Challan Books Nos. 30409, 30388 and 30378.and he had issued 17 challans from Sr. Nos, 1 to 17 from Book No.30409, 17 Challans from Sr. No.1 to 17 from Book No.30388 and 17 challans from Sr. Nos. 31 to 47, from Book No.30378 for the day for various volations of M.V. Pct. When the amount compounded challans for the day was calculated, it was found to be Rs.2400 from, Book No:30490, Rs.1700/-from Book No.30378, whereas on counting the actual cash collected it was found to be Rs.5800/-.

                   From the position, it is clear that an excess amount of Rs. 1065/- was collected by illegal means by the said PSI, Shamba S. Dessai. Since he had declared an amount of Rs.3650/- at Traffic Cell, Vasco at the time of leaving for duty on interceptor vehicle No.4.

                   Article-III

                   That during aforesaid period i.e. on 21.08.2009 PSI, Shamba S. Dessai has signed blank M.V. Challans in binded M.V. Books Nos.48 to 51 and kep M.V. Challan Nos.30409 and 30378 with PC-4374, Sandeep Konadkar and PC-4972, Tukaram Narvekar, respectively, which was highly objectionable and giving scope for mal/corrupt practices.”

5. The Petitioners denied the charges and the P.I. of the Traffic Cell, Ponda, was appointed as the Inquiring Authority to inquire into the charges framed against the Petitioners.

6. During the inquiry, the department examined, in all, seven witnesses. Despite opportunity, the Petitioners chose neither to examine themselves nor any witnesses in support of their defence.

7. The Inquiring Authority submitted a report on 24.08.2011 holding that the charges against the Petitioners were “partly proved”. The Petitioners were given an opportunity to comment on the report, and upon considering their response, the above-referred penalty was imposed upon each of the Petitioners.

8. The Petitioners’ appealed the penalty order dated 27.01.2011 to the Inspector General of Police (Goa). However, by order of 19.03.2012, these appeals were dismissed by the Appellate Authority. Undeterred, the Petitioners filed a revision in the Court of Chief Secretary, Government of Goa. But by order dated 15.03.2013, even these revisions were dismissed by the Chief Secretary, i.e. the Revisional Authority. Hence, these petitions.

9. Ms Govenkar, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, argued the matter very ably and submitted that the Inquiring Authority had, in fact, recorded that most of the charges against the Petitioners were not proved. The conclusion regarding the charges being “partly proved” is neither here nor there, and based upon the same, no penalty could have been imposed upon the Petitioners.

10. Ms Govenkar submitted that one of the main charges against the Petitioners was that one of them, i.e., P.C. Konadkar, demanded and recovered an amount of Rs.1,000/- from Mr Javier Gonzales, a Spanish National, for riding an Active scooter without a helmet and without a licence. The allegation is that such an amount was recovered by way of a fine, but without issuing any challan or a receipt. He submitted that there was no evidence in support of this charge. Neither was the tourist examined, nor was any official or witness who was supposed to have seen this incident examined. He submitted that even the witness, before whom Mr Javier is alleged to have made such a statement, was not examined. He, therefore, submits that this was a case of no evidence on this crucial aspect and based upon the same, no penalty could have been imposed upon the Petitioners.

11. In any event and without prejudice, she submits that there was no evidence whatsoever that the other charged officials were connected with PC Konadkar or that this was some concerted action by all the Petitioners. She submitted that there was no finding in this regard. Still, the Disciplinary Authority, without following the procedure for disagreeing with the findings of the Inquiring Authority, proceeded on the basis that all the Petitioners were involved in the alleged corrupt activities, and imposed penalties. She submits that these are serious errors, inter alia, violating the principles of natural justice and, therefore, the penalty imposed upon the Petitioners warrant interference.

12. She submitted that there were serious discrepancies in the evidence regards the quantum of cash amounts allegedly found. She submitted that after accounting for the declarations and the cash amounts that the Petitioners were carrying and the amounts received by the Petitioners through challans, there was a shortage of cash amounts found on the Petitioners. She submitted that this was explained by the Petitioners by giving full details. Some of the explanations included payment of amounts to breakfast, expenses towards lunch, fuel, etc. All these explanations were entirely ignored. This means that material evidence was excluded from consideration, thereby rendering the findings perverse.

13. Ms. Govenkar submitted that there are serious discrepancies regarding the testimonies of the various departmental witnesses. Such testimonies are not corroborated and in fact contradict each other. She submitted that even the Inquiry Officer has held that most of the charges were not proved beyond doubt. He submitted that the Disciplinary Authority has not considered these aspects and proceeded on the premise that most of the charges were proved. She submits that these are serious errors which vitiate the penalty imposed.

14. Ms. Govenkar submitted that the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority have not considered the Petitioners’ contentions and, therefore, even their orders warrant interference. She submitted that the penalty imposed upon the Petitioners was shockingly proportionate and, thus, warrants interference.

15. For all the above reasons, Ms. Govenkar submitted that these petitions be allowed, impugned penalty orders be set aside, and all consequential benefits be restored to the Petitioners.

16. Mr Neehal Vernekar and Ms Sulekha Kamat, the learned Additional Government Advocates, submitted that the scope of interference with findings recorded in the disciplinary proceedings is quite minimal. They submitted that in this case, there was overwhelming evidence to prove the charges levelled. In any event, they submitted that such findings of fact can be interfered with only if it is found that there was no evidence whatsoever and not on the ground of mere inadequate evidence. They submitted that re- appreciation of evidence is normally not undertaken, and this is more so, when the Appellate and the Revisional Authorities have also agreed with the Disciplinary Authority. They relied on Union of India and Others v. P. Gunasekaran((2015) 2 SCC 610), to support this contention.

17. The learned Additional Governments submitted that there were no discrepancies as submitted by Ms. Govenkar. They submitted that the evidence on record overwhelmingly establishes that the amounts declared by the Petitioners before leaving for the spot to challan traffic offenders and the amounts collected by the Petitioners after issuing challans and receipts did not tally. The explanations offered by the Petitioners were frivolous and in any event, the Petitioners led no evidence to even attempt to make good those frivolous explanations.

18. The learned Additional Government Advocates submitted that there was clear evidence about the Petitioners throwing out notes of approximately Rs.2,500/- in the nearby bushes to avoid the charge of excess amounts found on their person. The pointed out that most of the evidence was not even challenged by way of cross-examination or rebutted by the Petitioners leading any evidence.

19. The learned Additional Government Advocates submitted that during the surprise raid, it was found that the Petitioners, who had, inter alia, collected Rs.1,000/- from the Spanish tourist, had failed to issue him a challan or a receipt. They submitted that it was neither possible nor feasible to examine the Spanish tourist in the departmental proceedings. However, the pancha witnesses and other officials before whom the Spanish tourist made his statement, were duly examined. They relied on State of Haryana and Another v. Rattan Singh((1977) 2 SCC 491), and Hira Nath Mishra and Others v. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranch and Another((1973) 1 SCC 805), to support their ontentions.

20. The learned Additional Government Advocates submitted that the penalty imposed was proportionate and no case is made out to interfere with the penalty.

21. The rival contentions now fall for determination.

22. As noted above, the charges against the Petitioners were quite serious. The Petitioners were given a full opportunity to defend themselves reasonably. There was no breach of the principles of natural justice and fair play, though the argument was raised that the Petitioners had demanded the opening of the sealed envelopes containing the notes in their presence, but this was not allowed.

23. There is no evidence that such a demand was made before the Inquiry Officer. In any event, the notes were attached under the panchanama. The panchas have deposed in the inquiry proceedings. There was no challenge to their deposition by way of cross- examination. No evidence was led in rebuttal. Therefore, the alleged failure to open some of the envelopes during the inquiry, purportedly at the request of some of the Petitioners, hardly constitutes a breach of natural justice. Such a ground finds no reflection in an appeal or revision memo. In any event, such a ground does not even appear to have been pressed before the Appellate or the Revisional Authority. Apart from this contention, there was no contention passed on any failure of natural justice.

24. Most of the challenges were based on an invitation to reassess and re-evaluate the evidence on record and interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Inquiry Officer, agreed to by the Disciplinary Authority and confirmed by the Appellate and the Revisional Authority. The scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings is quite minimal. The scope of interference with findings of fact recorded in a disciplinary inquiry is even more so.

25. In the case of P. Gunasekaran (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the scope regarding what the High Court, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, may do or may not do in a petition seeking judicial review of disciplinary proceedings or the findings recorded during disciplinary proceedings.

26. The discussion in the above regard is summarised in paragraphs 12 and 13 of P. Gunasekaran (supra), and the contents of these paragraphs are transcribed below for the convenience of reference:

                   “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

                   (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

                   (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

                   (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

                   (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

                   (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

                   (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

                   (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

                   (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

                   (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

                   13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

                   (i) reappreciate the evidence;

                   (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

                   (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

                   (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

                   (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

                   (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

                   (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”

27. Therefore, the contentions on behalf of the Petitioners will have to be examined within the confines of the limited scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings. This is more so because here, the Inquiring Authority, Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority have all agreed that most of the charges against the Petitioners have been proved by applying the test of preponderance of probabilities. The Inquiring Authority’s report itself says that the charges are partly proved or that the charges are not proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, in such matters, we cannot go only by the terminology used by the Inquiring Authority. The inquiry report has to be read in its entirety and upon so reading the same, it is evident that most of the charges have been proved by way of preponderance of probabilities.

28. As noted above, the Petitioners wish this Court to re-appreciate the evidence, go into issues of adequacy and reliability of the evidence, correct alleged errors of fact or otherwise interfere with the conclusions in the inquiry, even though such inquiry has been taken in accordance with law. All this is impermissible as held in para 13 of P. Gunasekaran (supra). In any event, even upon evaluation of Ms. Govenkar’s contention, the so-called discrepancies or alleged failure to consider some evidence, are hardly grounds to interfere with factual findings recorded in the present case.

29. In this case, despite opportunity, the Petitioners chose not to examine themselves or any witnesses in support of their bare denials of the charge. Assuming that the Petitioners had the right to remain silent, the Petitioners should have at least cross-examined the departmental witnesses, or in the very least, challenged their testimony during cross. Factual evidence has gone unchallenged, and no dent is made to the departmental witnesses' testimony during cross. Therefore, the Petitioners cannot now urge re-appreciation of evidence or attack the findings of fact.

30. The findings of fact in this case, are well supported by the evidence on record, and this is certainly not a case of perversity. This is also not a case where the Inquiring Authority has failed to admit admissible and material evidence. The findings and conclusions are reasonable, and this is not a case of arbitrary and capricious exercise of power, which no reasonable person could have ever undertaken or carried out.

31. There is evidence about the Petitioners, either not declaring the correct amounts in the cash registers before they left for their duties or in any event, accounting for the serious discrepancies after they were raided. The issue is not whether some of the Petitioners were found to have a shortage of cash, and others, some excess. The issue is that there were discrepancies in the cash positions which were not tallying with the declaration made by the Petitioners and the challans and receipts issued by them. This, coupled with the recovery of cash amount from the nearby bushes, was more than sufficient to hold the charges against the Petitioners proved.

32. Mr Vernekar explained that there were instances in which flying squad team members would short-declare the cash on their person before proceeding to duty, so that if they were apprehended, they could attempt to account for the excess. In other cases, the team members used to give all sorts of mostly unverifiable explanations for the excess or shortages. Therefore, the circulars were issued providing for correct declarations. The onus then fell on the team members to explain the discrepancies observed at the scene. The circumstance that in some instances the amounts found were not very significant.

33. The explanation offered by Mr Vernekar commends acceptance. Here, admittedly there were discrepancies between the declared amounts and the amounts found on the person of the petitioners when apprehended. Some of the Petitioners did try to explain how amount was spent for lunch or given to a nephew or used to fill fuel in the vehicle. But no evidence was led to make good these defences. No material was produced in support of such jejune defences. Besides, here, there is evidence of the discovery of about Rs.2,500 and odd amount in cash from the nearby bushes. This was attached under a panchanama in the presence of the Petitioners. The panchas ware examined in the enquiry. The allegation was that the petitioners offloaded this amount no sooner they sway the apprehending team approach. All these aspects have been duly considered and in any event cannot be overlooked simply because the enquiry report may not have been artistically crafted.

34. The arguments that Javier Gonzales was not examined and, therefore, the charges could not be sustained deserves no acceptance. Admittedly, Javier Gonzales was a Spanish tourist come to Goa for some days. There is evidence about his hiring an Activa scooter. There is evidence that he was seen talking with the Petitioners and then moving on. There is evidence that he gave a statement to the Police about paying Rs.1,000/- to PC Konadkar and how no challan or receipt was issued to him. The witnesses before whom such statement was made have been examined. There was no cross- examination on behalf of the Petitioners on this crucial evidence. In fact, the Petitioners have not even denied interaction with the Spanish tourist.

35. In Rattan Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that strict rules of Evidence Act do not apply to domestic inquiries. Therefore, where the Flying Squad discovers that some passengers were not issued tickets, though they had paid their fares, by the delinquent bus conductors, the non-examination of those passengers was held as not fatal to the findings recorded in the inquiry proceedings.

36. The relevant discussion is to be found in paragraphs 4 and 5 and the contents of these paragraphs are incorporated below for the convenience of reference:

                   “4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Pct may not apply. Pil materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Pct. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding,even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below mis-directed themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The 'residuum' rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passengers from Pmerican jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair common-sense way as men of understanding and wordly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Pbsence of any evidence in support of a ending is certainty available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the flying squad, is some evidence which has elevance to the charge leveled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.

                   5. Reliance was placed, as earlier stated, on the non-compliance with the departmental instruction that statements of passengers should be recorded by inspectOrs. These are instructions of prudence, not rules that bind or vitiate in the violation. In this case, the Inspector tried to get the statements but the passengers declined, the psychology of the latter in such circumstances being understandable, although may not be approved. We cannot hold that merely because statements of passengers were not recorded the order that followed was invalid. Likewise, the reavaluation of the evidence on the strength of co-conductor's testimony is a matter not for the court but for the administrative tribunal in conclusion, we do not think the courts below were right in over-turning the finding of the domestic tribunal.”

37. Similarly, in Hira Nath Mishra (supra), in a charge against the male student of the Medical College, non-examination of girls, with whom such students had misbehaved, in front of such male students, was held unnecessary and did not vitiate the findings recorded in the domestic inquiry.

38. There are no serious discrepancies in the versions of the departmental witnesses. Some minor variations here and there are insufficient to interfere with the conclusions reached. They, to some extent, are the hallmarks of genuineness. The so-called discrepancies in the amounts on the petitioners’ persons were for the petitioners to explain. They have failed to do so. The department has proved the allegations by applying the test of preponderance of probabilities and even more. There is no requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in such matters.

39. There is no question of any disproportionality involved in this matter. In any event, the penalties are not shockingly disproportionate to be styled as arbitrary or capricious. In fact, the Petitioners have been let off with penalties that are relatively lower than what the situation warranted. Therefore, no case is made out to interfere with the penalties.

40. The Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority have dealt with the contentions raised before them. They have applied the correct test and correctly concluded that, in such matters, the test to be employed is that of preponderance of probabilities and not in proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This was also not a case where the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the findings of the Inquiring Authority. The Inquiring Authority’s report, as pointed out earlier, has to be read in its entirety, and too much focus is not necessary only on the terminology used by the Inquiring Authority.

41. For all the above reasons, there is no case made out to interfere with the impugned penalty orders or the orders made by the Appellate and the Revisional Authority.

42. The petitions are liable to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed, but not without recording the able efforts put in by Ms. Kalpa Govekar, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners. The rule in each of these petitions is discharged. There shall be no order for costs.