Oral Order
1. By way of this application filed u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short "the Act", the applicant has prayed to condone the delay of 906 days in filing the captioned second appeal before this Court and heard the appeal on merits, in the interest of justice.
2. For the sake of brevity and convenience, parties to the proceedings are referred to as per their original status before the learned trial Court.
3. The plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No.22 of 2015 before the learned Principal Senior Civil Court, Kalyanpur seeking relief of declaration and permanent injunction on the ground that he is the owner and occupier of land bearing survey No.329 admeasuring 2-42-81 h-a-sq mtr (in short "land in question"), revenue entry of which is also mutated in favour of the plaintiff. The land in question was purchased from the defendant No.1 on 10.12.1990. However, the plaintiff found that the defendant is trying to encroach upon the land in question which he owned and possessed and therefore, he has filed the Regular Civil Suit with the aforesaid relief.
3.1 The learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kalyanpur on 30.4.2018 passed final decree in favour of the plaintiff and declared him as owner and also issued permanent injunction restraining the defendants from entering into the possession of the plaintiff and further restrained the defendants from taking possession without due process of law and also issued injunction not to change hands of the land in question.
3.2 The defendant No.2, within the stipulated time limit, preferred Regular Civil Appeal No.78 of 2020 (Old No.14 of 2018), but she remained unsuccessful. The Regular Civil Appeal was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Devbhoomi Dwarka.
3.3 In the aforesaid premises, the defendant No.2 since was intended to file second appeal challenging the concurrent findings of the learned Courts below, has preferred captioned second appeal.
3.4 Since there is delay in filing the second appeal, the defendant No.2 preferred present CA with a request to condone the delay of 906 days in preferring captioned second appeal.
4. Learned advocate Mr. JM Barot appearing for the defendant No.2, in line of the reasons stated in the CA, submitted that the defendant No.2 is old aged lady, she was not informed about the judgment and decree passed by the learned Courts below by his lawyer. He would further submit that the defendant No.2 came to know about passing of adverse order by the learned Courts below somewhere in January, 2025, thereafter, she discussed the issue with her family members and decided to file appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Courts below. He would further submit that for getting certified copy, the defendant No.2 applied on 22.7.2025 and obtained the same on 13.8.2025 and thereafter, the defendant No.2 through learned advocate who is representing her on 11.9.2025 has filed present CA along with captioned second appeal.
4.1 Learned advocate Mr. Barot would further submit that delay was properly explained by the defendant No.2 and therefore, this Court should take liberal approach and should not throw away the substantial litigation on technical consideration. He would further submit that as the delay has been properly explained by the defendant No.2 where there is no requirement to explain day-to-day delay, this Court by allowing this application should condone the delay and permit the defendant No.2 to raise his contention ins econd appeal.
4.2 Upon above submissions, learned advocate Mr. Barot prays this Court to allow this application and to condone the delay.
5. Though served, none appears for the respondent No.2. Learned advocate for the respondent No.2 did not choose to remain present.
6. Since, the CA is seeking condonation of delay, at the outset, let refer section 5 of the Limitation Act.
"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.--
Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation.--The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section."
7. The applicant was obliged to satisfactorily demonstrate and explicate the colossal delay and to convince the Court that sufficient cause existed for not preferring the appeal / application or moving the requisite application within the statutorily prescribed period. Ordinarily, the Courts adopt a liberal approach while considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, provided that the delay is duly attributable to sufficient cause. Delay cannot be condoned by a mere invocation of "liberal approach," "justice-oriented approach," or "substantial justice." These oft-quoted expressions cannot be deployed to jettison or emasculate the substantive law of limitation.
8. Rule of limitation is based upon principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. Indeed expression 'sufficient cause' should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. This proposition comes into picture when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to party seeking condonation of delay. Whether explanation furnished would constitute 'sufficient cause' or not will depend on facts of each case and there cannot be straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for delay caused in taking steps. While considering the matter, the Court is also required to consider all the fact that why party has not taken steps within time prescribed. The Court should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed time, valuable right has accrued to other party which should not lightly be defeated by condoning delay in routine like manner.
9. Theory of liberal approach should be adjudicated on theory of due diligence. In the present case, length of delay is 906 days. It is quite long delay and on going through application as well as arguments, it remains unexplained. They are propelled by the applicant, it does not seem to be germane one and none of the reasons prevented the applicant from filing CRA within time period. It is to be remembered that pleadings and reasons are not backed out by any documentary evidence.
10. In para 3 of the CA, the applicant made following averments to condone the delay.
"The applicants say and submit that, as the Judgment and Decree was passed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 76 of 2020 (Old Civil Appeal No. 12 of 2018) on 26/12/2022. It is stated that, after the order was passed, the said order was not conveyed to the applicant for long time and the applicant was not aware about the aforesaid order. It is stated that, after long time when the original plaintiff has initiated the proceedings for land in question, the applicant came to know about judgement and decree somewhere January 2025 thereafter the has discuss about the said decision with family member and subsequently decided to file appeal against the decree, therefore, asked the advocate appearing on behalf of applicant before the District Court as well as Civil Court, Kalyanpur to supply all documents with Judgment and Decree of course after long time of the award and accordingly the advocate has applied for the certified copy on 22/07/2025 of Judgment and Decree which is ready on 01/08/2025 and taken on 02/08/2025 and subsequently the same was supplied to the applicants on 13/08/2025. It is stated that thereafter, the applicant has approached under signed advocate for filing appeal before this Honourable Court on 20/08/2025, and the undersigned advocate has demanded all relevant documents to prefer appeal and the same has been received by the advocate on 11/09/2025 and thereafter, the appeal is preferred and file before this Honourable Court on 17/09/2025, however, there is a delay of 906 days in filing of present appeal which is required to be condoned, in the interest of justice."
11. Perusal of the aforesaid explanation offered by the learned advocate for defendant No.2, what appears that firstly the defendant No.2 put a blame upon learned advocate that he has not informed her about passing of judgment and decree in first appeal she did not aware of impugned judgment and decree until the plaintiff has initiated proceedings for land in question. According to the defendant No.2, she came to know about adverse order passed by learned appellate Court only in January 2025. However, it appears that she did not immediately rush to the Court and take copy of the judgment and decree, instead she waited for more than six months for applying certified copy and thereafter getting the same, first appeal was filed.
12. In the pleadings, fact in regards to which kind of proceeding was initiated by the plaintiff is missing. The averments explaining delay are general, vague and specious and there is no reason much less satisfactory reasons assigned by the defendant No.2 to explain the delay. In imprecise way, the petitioner tried to seek condonation of delay, without considering that law of limitation is substantive law and litigant seeking condonation of delay needed to satisfy the Court that he / she had sufficient reason / cause for not preferring appeal or making application within stipulated time period.
13. It was stated by learned advocate Mr. Barot that the defendant No.2 is old aged and infirm lady, however, in support of such submission, no documentary evidence are placed on record. Secondly, what could be noticed that the CA is one of such CAs where party put blame upon learned advocate for delay. This is part of growing tendency. In the present case, it is stated that learned advocate who was representing the defendant No.2 in Regular Civil Appeal did not inform the defendant No.2 about passing of judgment and decree. Even if, such statement is considered to be true and genuine, the fact remains that it is the duty of the defendant No.2 to remain alive to the litigation she has filed in the Court.
14. According to this Court, the applicant has failed to establish any sufficient reasons which has prevented him to file CRA within stipulated time period.
15. Let have a worthy assistance from the following authorities / pronouncements on condonation of delay embodied in section 5 of the Limitation Act.
15.1 In Lanka Venkateswarlu v/s. State of Andhra Pradesh [AIR 2011 SC 1199], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :-
"Generally the Courts including Supreme Court adopt a liberty approach in considering application for condonation of delay on ground of sufficient cause under section 5 of the Act. However, the concept such as "liberal approach", justice oriented approach, "substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation."
15.2 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v/s. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy [2024 (2) GLH 217], after surveying earlier judgments in para 33 and 35 has held as under :-
"33. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v/s. Managing committee of Raghunathpur Nagar Academy (2013) 12 SCC 649, this Court made the following observations :-
21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case."
15.3 Recently, in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. v. Karnataka Housing Board and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in its aureate enunciation, has held thus:-
"259. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
260. From the above exposition of law, it is abundantly clear that the High Court has erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3966 days on account of certain lapses at the administrative levels and of there being no follow-ups in the proceedings, along with finding certain merits in the case of the respondent no. 1 against the maintainability of the suit of the appellant and that of the relief molded by the First Appellate Court. We have no hesitation"[10] It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial Court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief."
[12] As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, reported in 1971 2 SCC 860, wherein this Court held as under:-
'The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims.' (emphasis supplied)." in stating that such grounds are nowhere near to being "sufficient cause" as per Section 5 of the 1963 Act. The High Court lost sight of the fact that the precedents and authorities it relied upon by it had delays of two-digits, or even that of single-digit, more particularly the delay in those cases was supported by sufficient cause. The present case, however, stands on a very different footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence, we are not inclined to accept the condonation of the delay by the High Court."
16. One more judgment deserves notice is in case of Rajneesh Kumar & Anr v. Ved Prakash, reported in 2024 (14) SCALE 406, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has noticed the growing tendency of throwing the blame upon the head of the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner while seeking the condonation of delay. The observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court reads as under:-
"[10] It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial Court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief."
[12] As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, reported in 1971 2 SCC 860, wherein this Court held as under:-
'The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims.' (emphasis supplied)."
17. Thus in the facts and in circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that applicant was not diligent in availing remedy of appeal / application. The averments made in the application seeking condonation of delay in filing appeal do not inspire any acceptable cause much less sufficient cause to exercise discretion in its favour.
18. In view of the aforesaid discussion, and upon a meticulous application of the ratio decidendi adverted to hereinabove, this Court finds that, in absence whereof, the very foundation of the allegations crumbles, there is no cogent or credible explanation forthcoming for the inordinate and colossal delay of 906 days. The application, being sans merits, inexorably merits dismissal and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
19. Consequently, the prayer for registration of the second appeal also stands rejected.
20. Any connected CA, if any, also stands disposed of.
