1. The petitioner herein is the mother of one Vineesh Kunjumon ('detenu' for the sake of brevity), and her challenge in this Writ Petition is directed against Ext.P1 detention order dated 16.09.2025, passed by the 2nd respondent under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAAP Act’ for brevity). The said detention order stands confirmed by the Government vide order dated 24.11.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of one year with effect from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that it was on 30.07.2025 that a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Kottayam, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the KAA(P) Act, before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. Altogether, four cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing Ext.P1 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.1628/2025 of Changanassery Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 333, 110, 118(1), 296(b), 351(2) of the Bharathiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short “BNS”).

3. We heard Sri. Abhijith Sreekumar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

4. Relying on the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another, [1991 (1) SCC 128], the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody, in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decision by the Supreme Court. According to the counsel, as the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it was incumbent upon the authority to satisfy itself that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity. According to the counsel, though in the Ext.P1 order, it is mentioned that the detenu was undergoing judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it is nowhere mentioned that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail in connection with the last prejudicial activity. The learned counsel submitted that the jurisdictional authority passed Ext.P1 order in a hasty manner without considering the fact that there was an effective remedy of cancellation of the bail granted to the detenu. According to the counsel, as an alternative remedy was available to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities, a drastic measure of preventive detention was not at all necessitated. On these premises, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

5. In response, the learned Government Pleader submitted that Ext. P1 detention order was issued by the jurisdictional authority after complying with all procedural requirements and upon arriving at the requisite objective, as well as subjective satisfaction. The learned Government Pleader contended that, at the time of issuing the detention order, the authority was fully aware that the detenu was already in judicial custody in connection with his most recent prejudicial activity. It was only after being satisfied that there existed a real and imminent likelihood of the detenu being released on bail and that, if so released, he would, in all probability, engage in further criminal activities, that the authority proceeded to pass the detention order. Therefore, according to the learned Government Pleader, the detention order remains legally sustainable notwithstanding the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody when the impugned order was issued, and hence, no interference is warranted in the impugned order.

6. From the rival contentions raised, it is gatherable that the main question that revolves around this petition is whether a detention order under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act can be validly passed against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. While answering the said question, it is to be noted that, through a series of judicial pronouncements rendered by the Apex Court as well as by this Court, it is well settled that there is no legal impediment in passing an order of detention against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. However, an order of detention against a person who is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity cannot be passed in a mechanical manner. Undisputedly, a detention order under the KAA(P) Act is a drastic measure against a citizen as it heavily impacts his personal as well as his fundamental rights. When an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to preventive detention is neither warranted nor permissible. When a detenu is in jail in connection with the last prejudicial activity, obviously, there is no imminent possibility of being involved in criminal activities. Therefore, before passing a detention order in respect of a person who is in jail, the concerned authority must satisfy itself that there is a real possibility that the detenu will be released on bail, and if released on bail, the material on record reveals that he will again indulge in prejudicial activities, if not detained. The circumstances that necessitate the passing of such an order must be reflected in the order itself.

7. In Kamarunnissa’s case (cited supra), the Supreme Court made it clear that a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed even in the case of a person in custody (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable materials placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in probability indulged in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. If the authority passes an order after recording its satisfaction in this regard, such an order would be valid.

8. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Veeramani v. The State of Tamil Nadu [1994 (2) SCC 337] and in Union of India v. Paul Manickam [2003 (8) SCC 342].

9. In view of the said decisions, in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decisions by the Supreme Court.

10. As evident from the records, altogether four cases in which the detenu got involved have formed the basis for passing Ext.P1 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime 1628/2025 of Changanassery Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 333, 110, 118(1), 296(b), 351(2) of the BNS. The incident that led to the registration of the said case occurred on 29.07.2025. From 12.08.2025 onwards, the detenu has been under judicial custody in connection with the said case. It was on 30.07.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody, that the proposal for proceedings under the KAA(P) Act was initiated. Later, it was on 16.09.2025, the impugned order was passed.

11. In Ext.P1 detention order, the fact that at the time of passing the said order, the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to. Likewise, it is mentioned that from the past criminal activities of the detenu, it is evident that even if he is released on bail with conditions, he may likely violate those conditions and will indulge in antisocial activities in the future. Moreover, the impugned order records that a preventive detention order had earlier been passed against the detenu and that, after his release from jail upon completion of the period of detention specified therein, he again got involved in criminal activities. Similarly, the impugned order states that the antecedents of the detenu reveal that, on previous occasions, after being released on bail, he again engaged in criminal activities, thereby violating the conditions imposed in the respective bail orders passed in those earlier cases. Likewise, in the detention order, it is stated that it is absolutely imperative to detain the detenu to prevent him from engaging in such activities.

12. We do agree that the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that “detenu is likely to be released on bail”. Dealing with a similar situation, the Supreme Court in Union of India and another vs. Dimple Happy Dhakad (2019 KHC 6662), after considering the dictum laid down in Kamarunissa (cited supra) in paragraph 35 of the judgment, observed as follows;

                  “in the light of the well settled principles, we have to see, in the present case, whether there was awareness in the mind of the detaining authority that detenu is in custody and he had reason to believe that detenu is likely to be released on bail, and if so released, he would continue to indulge in prejudicial activities. In the present case, the detention orders dated 17.05.2019 record the awareness of the detaining authority that (i) the detenu is in custody, (ii) that the bail application filed by the detenus have been rejected by the court.  Of course, in the detention order, the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that the “detenu is likely to be released. It cannot be said that the detaining authority has not applied its mind merely on the ground that in the detention orders, it is not expressly stated as to the “detenu’s likelihood of being released on bail” and if so released, he is likely to indulge in the same prejudicial activities. But the detaining authority has clearly recorded the antecedents of the detenu and its satisfaction that the detenus, Happy Dhakad and Nisar Aliyar, have the high propensity to commit such offences in the future.”

13. Keeping in mind the above principles laid down by the Supreme Court while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that, in the impugned order, it is not specifically recorded that the detenu is likely to be released on bail. Nevertheless, the satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is already in custody and if he is released on bail, he is likely to indulge in prejudicial activity, is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, and normally, the subjective satisfaction is not to be interfered with. A holistic reading of the impugned order reflects that there is a proper application of mind and, based on the materials available on record, the detaining authority subjectively satisfied that there is a reason to believe that there is a possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that, on so released, the detenu will in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities undermining the bail conditions. The impugned order clearly suggests that there was awareness in the mind of the detaining authority that the detenu is in custody, and the authority had reason to believe that the detenu is likely to be released on bail. A holistic reading of the impugned order further reveals that the act of the detenu violating the bail conditions and being involved in criminal activities is one of the materials which the jurisdictional authority relied on to enter into a subjective satisfaction to pass the detention order. Therefore, merely because the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that “the detenu is likely to be released on bail,” it cannot be held that there was non-application of mind on the part of the jurisdictional authority regarding the possibility of the detenu obtaining bail.

14. One of the main contentions taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the purported hasty action on the part of the jurisdictional authority in passing an order under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act is not justified, as there was remedy under ordinary criminal law to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities. According to the counsel, if the authority was concerned about violations of bail conditions imposed on the detenu in the cases registered against him and his recurrent involvement in criminal activities, the proper course open was to file a petition to cancel the bail granted to the detenu and to detain him in terms of the provisions contained under Cr.P.C.

15. We are not oblivious to the fact that when an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to detention under preventive detention laws is neither warranted nor permissible. However, merely because a remedy of bail cancellation is available, it cannot be said that a detention order under the KAA(P) Act cannot be passed. When there is an imminent danger of repetition of criminal activities by a person who indulges in drug peddling activities, cancellation of bail orders already secured by him would not be sufficient to deter such a person from indulging in criminal activities. The reason is that, first of all, the purpose and scope of an application for cancellation of bail and preventive detention are different. That apart, the bail cancellation procedure, having regard to the ground realities, is a time-consuming one. There is no assurance that an order of cancellation of bail could be secured in time before the person concerned indulges in another criminal activity. Preventive detention laws are enacted to address such exigencies. It is on account of these reasons that it has been held by the courts consistently that the authorities under the preventive detention laws need not have to wait till orders are passed on the application for cancellation of bail, for passing an order of detention. If it is held that, if there is an option for cancellation of bail, a detention order cannot be passed, it would render the preventive detention laws ineffective. Moreover, even after the cancellation of bail, there is no legal impediment to granting bail subsequently. Therefore, it cannot be said that cancellation of bail is an effective alternative remedy, and when such an alternative remedy is available, a detention order is not at all necessitated.

                  In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.