(Oral):

1. The order dated 24.09.2025 (Annexure P-8) passed by the learned District Judge, Fatehgarh Sahib, is under challenge, whereby the application filed by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of a delay of 2 years, 1 month and 24 days in filing the appeal was dismissed.

2. A brief reference to the relevant facts is necessary. The respondent-plaintiff, Jasbir Singh, had instituted a suit for possession by way of specific performance. The learned trial Court vide judgment dated 26.09.2022, while declining the relief of specific performance, decreed the suit for the alternative relief of recovery of ₹5,00,000/- along with interest.

3. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the defendant Bhupinder Singh (petitioner herein) preferred an appeal in December 2024 along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of the inordinate delay as noticed above.

4. The application for condonation of delay was dismissed by the Appellate Court, leading to the filing of the present petition.

5. Assailing the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate. It was submitted that the petitioner had gone abroad on 22.01.2020 and returned only on 14.08.2024, and that during his stay abroad he remained in touch with his counsel, who kept assuring him that his presence was not required and did not inform him about the judgment passed by the trial Court. On this premise, it is argued that the learned Appellate Court erred in declining the prayer for condonation of delay.

6. After hearing learned counsel and perusing the record, this Court does not find any merit in the present petition.

7. It is a settled principle of law that for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the applicant must establish “sufficient cause” which prevented him from approaching the Court within the prescribed period of limitation. The expression “sufficient cause” cannot be construed liberally in cases of inordinate delay, unless the explanation offered inspires confidence and reflects due diligence on the part of the litigant.

8. A perusal of the judgment dated 26.09.2022 (Annexure P-4) passed by the learned trial Court would show that the petitioner-defendant was duly represented by his counsel, namely, Sh. A.K. Bansal, Advocate. Except for a bald assertion that the counsel did not inform him about the outcome of the case, there is no material on record to substantiate the said plea. Significantly, there is no averment that any steps were taken by the petitioner to verify the status of the case or that any action, civil or disciplinary, was initiated against the counsel for the alleged lapse. When specifically queried by this Court, learned counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded that no complaint had been filed against the erstwhile counsel.

9. The plea that the petitioner was residing abroad also does not advance his case. Merely being outside the country does not absolve a litigant of his duty to remain vigilant about his pending litigation. In the age of modern communication, it was always open to the petitioner to make inquiries regarding the status of the case either through counsel or otherwise. The respondent-plaintiff, who had succeeded before the trial Court, cannot be made to suffer on account of the petitioner’s lack of diligence.

10. It is well settled that negligence, inaction, or a casual approach on the part of a litigant does not constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The learned Appellate Court has rightly taken note of the inordinate delay and the unsatisfactory explanation offered by the petitioner and has exercised its discretion judiciously in declining the prayer for condonation.

11. This Court does not find any illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error in the impugned order dated 24.09.2025 warranting interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction.

12. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.