Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The applicants in O.A.No.795 of 2025 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram (the ‘Tribunal’ for short) filed this original petition, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P8 order dated 25.09.2025 passed by the Tribunal in that original application.

2. Going by the averments in the original application, the petitioners are aspirants for appointment to the post of Lower Primary School Teachers (Malayalam Medium) in the schools under the 1st respondent in Kannur District. Based on the test and interview conducted by the Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC’ for short), they are all included in the ranked list prepared district-wise for appointment to Lower Primary Schools under the 3rd respondent. Despite having advised several candidates from the ranked list, it is noticed that a large number of substantive vacancies that have arisen during the period of validity of the ranked list are unfilled, on the reasoning that these vacancies will arise only after the present list has expired. Similarly, even though various posts have actually become vacant due to superannuation of the incumbents, the respondents are taking the stand that such vacancies are not available to be filled from the existing ranked list, since the same can be filled as per Rule 7A(2) of Chapter XIV A of the Kerala Education rules 1959 (‘KER’ for short), only after the re-opening of schools. Contending that the aforesaid actions are unjustifiable, the petitioners-applicants filed O.A.No.795 of 2025 under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs:

                  “i. Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus, or any other such appropriate writ, order or direction, commanding the 3rd respondent to immediately report to the 4th respondent for advise and appointment all the vacancies in the post of Lower Primary School Teacher (Malayalam Medium) in Kannur district, which have arisen or are due to arise during the pendency of Annexure-A2 rank list, from the qualified candidates included in that rank list, at any rate prior to 31.05.2025;

                  ii. Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus, or any other such appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the 4th respondent to immediately advise the suitable qualified candidates from Annexure A2 rank list to the 32 vacancies reported by the 3rd respondent to be presently available in the post of Lower Primary School Teacher (Malayalam Medium) in Kannur District, in accordance with law;

                  iii. Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus, or any other such appropriate writ, order or direction, commanding the 3rd respondent to report the anticipated 20 vacancies due to arise on 31.05.2025 on retirement on superannuation of incumbents to the 4th respondent as vacancies arising during the validity of Annexure-A2 list, and consequently, direct the 4th respondent to advise suitable candidates from Annexure-A2 list to these vacancies”.

3. On 19.05.2025 when the original application came up for consideration along with connected original applications, the Tribunal passed Ext.P2 interim order whereby the Deputy Director of Education in all the districts concerned were directed to report all the vacancies of L.P. School Teachers (Malayalam Medium), arising before the expiry of the ranked lists which were brought into force with effect from 31.05.2022, well in advance before expiry of the ranked list to the District Offices of the KPSC concerned.

4. On 23.05.2025, by Ext.P3 interim order, the Tribunal directed the learned Government Pleader to file a statement on or before 27.05.2025 furnishing the details of the vacancies which are already reported and also addressing the contentions raised by the petitioners-applicants with regard to availability of vacancies on retirement, inter district transfer, creation of additional divisions, vacancies on acquisition of Aided Schools etc. However, on 27.05.2025, the learned Government Pleader did not file the consolidated statement as directed in Ext.P3 interim order.

5. On behalf of the 2nd respondent, a reply statement dated 28.05.2025 was filed before the Tribunal opposing the reliefs sought by the petitioners and also detailing the vacancy positions.

6. On 29.05.2025, the Tribunal passed Ext.P6 interim order making it clear that the expiry of the ranked lists on 30.05.2025 or on 31.05.2025 will not stand in the way of the Tribunal directing reporting of vacancies if any ultimately found as existed as on the date of expiry of the ranked lists. The said order reads thus:

                  “In all these Original Applications, there exist strong contentions regarding the non-reporting of existing vacancies to the PSC, for advice and appointment out of the ranked lists produced. There is also a contention regarding the date of expiry of the ranked lists. Contention of the applicants is that the ranked lists will expire only with effect from 31.05.2025; whereas the PSC as well as the Government is taking a stand that the ranked lists will expire on 30.05.2025. Apart from that, it is pointed out that, the State Government had issued GO (MS)No.95/2025/GEDN on today (29.05.2025) sanctioning additional posts with respect to the academic year 2024- 2025, on the basis of verification of students strength and fixation staff strength as recommended by the authorities. It is pointed out that as per the above said Government Order a total number of 915 posts were newly created with respect to 552 Government schools in all the cadre. Contention of the applicants is that creation of the new posts will relate back to 1st of October, 2024. Based on all these, it is contended that, all the vacancies which existed as on the date of expiry of the ranked lists need to be advised out of the ranked lists in question.

                  2. Since validity of ranked lists is expiring as on 30.05.2025 or on 31.05.2025, this Tribunal makes it clear that, the expiry of the ranked lists will not stand in the way of this Tribunal directing reporting of vacancies if any, ultimately found as existed as on the date of expiry of the ranked lists.”

7. The petitioners thereafter filed M.A.No.1086 of 2025 before the Tribunal seeking a direction to the 5th respondent to issue advice to the two vacancies remaining, from Annexure A2 ranked list dated 31.05.2022 published by the KPSC and direct the 3rd respondent to report four vacancies to the 5th respondent for advice and appointment from Annexure A2 ranked list. Along with that interlocutory application, the petitioners have produced Annexures A5 to A9 documents. Thereafter, on 25.09.2025, by the impugned Ext.P8 order, the Tribunal disposed of the original application along with four other connected similar original applications. The said order read thus:

                  “All these cases are filed by candidates included in ranked list for the post of LPST in various districts that is Pathanamthitta, Kottayam, Kannur, and Alappuzha. The ranked lists expired on 30.05.2025. There was no direction to report any vacancies at least on provisional basis to the Public Service Commission before the expiry of the ranked list. In view of the judgment of the Full Bench of the Hon'ble High Court in Vimalakumari v. State [1994(2) KLT 47], this Tribunal would not be in a position to issue any direction to the Public Service Commission (PSC) in the absence of any vacancy reported to them prior to the expiry of the ranked list.

                  2. The learned counsel for the PSC, on instructions, submitted that the advice has already been issued against the vacancies reported as on 30.05.2025 from the ranked list which was in force on 30.05.2025. This is recorded. These Original Applications are accordingly disposed of.”

8. Being aggrieved by Ext.P8 order of the Tribunal, the petitioners-applicants are now before this Court with this original petition.

9. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned Standing Counsel for the Kerala Public Service Commission and the learned Senior Government Pleader.

10. The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that despite the protection granted in Ext.P6 interim order dated 29.05.2025, the Tribunal disposed of the original application without considering the materials on record, solely on the ground that there were no provisionally reported vacancies. From Annexures A5 to A8 documents, it is clear that there are vacancies in existence as contended by the petitioners.

11. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for KPSC, by relying on the judgment of this Court in Kerala Public Service Commission v. Sheejamol M.C. [2020 (5) KHC 555] and also the judgment dated 12.12.2025 in W.A.No.1191 of 2016 submitted that even if vacancies are there, no appointments can be effected after the expiry of the ranked list if the vacancies are unreported.

12. The learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that the vacancies mentioned in G.O.(MS)No.95/2025/GEDN dated 29.05.2025, referred to in Ext.P6 order of the Tribunal, are reported vacancies, against which advices were already been issued before the expiry of the ranked lists and hence no interference is needed to the impugned order of the Tribunal.

13. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

14. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

15. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.

16. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

17. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.

18. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

19. The petitioners are included in the ranked list for the post of Lower Primary School Teacher (Malayalam Medium). The ranked list expired on 30.05.2025. The claim of the petitioners at present is that despite the existence of vacancies, they were not reported to the KPSC for advice and appointment. Likewise, the petitioners contend that through the Tribunal by Ext.P6 interim order made it clear that the expiry of the ranked list will not stand in the way of the Tribunal directing reporting of vacancies if any, ultimately found as existed as on the date of expiry of the ranked lists, the same was not taken into consideration while disposing of the original application relying on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Vimalakumari v. State [1994 (2) KLT 47].

20. While going through Ext.P6 interim order of the Tribunal, we notice that the said order was passed on 29.05.2025. In that order, it was observed that the State Government had issued G.O.(MS) No.95/2025/GEDN on that day, that is on 29.05.2025. But during the course of arguments, the learned Senior Government Pleader produced a copy of the Government Order referred to in Ext.P6 interim order of the Tribunal, from which we notice that the order was endorsed for circulation only at 17.27.45 hours on that day. From the said endorsement, it can only be said that Ext.P6 interim order was passed by the Tribunal without seeing the Government Order dated 29.05.2025, but only relying on the oral submission made at the Bar. The learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that the additional posts created by the said Government Order dated 29.05.2025 are reported vacancies.

21. In Vimalakumari [1994 (2) KLT 47], the Full Bench of this Court held thus:

                  “22. Counsel relied on the following observations of a learned Single Judge of this Court in ILR 1982 (1) Ker. 346:

                  "No doubt, on the question of advice the 3rd respondent has a case that the Public Service Commission would have nothing to do with it, the list having lapsed on 25th January 1981, and also for the reason that no requisition for advice was received from the 2nd respondent. Is the Court helpless in this matter in the situation stated? Having considered the magnitude and complexity of the problem in its depth, I am of the view that the Court has not only the right but also the duty to ensure that the appointing authority does not circumvent its statutory obligation under Rule 31(a)(ii) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules by delaying and defeating the rights of the selected candidates to get appointed to the posts which fall to their lot. Procedure, after all, is meant to further justice, not to frustrate it."

                  With great respect, we find it difficult to agree with the above observations, for firstly giving such a direction will be clearly violating the statutory rules and secondly the mere fact that a person's name has been included in a ranked list does not give him any right to the post or to be appointed to that post. See Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [AIR 1991 SC 1612]. If no request is made by the State to the P.S.C. for advising candidates during the currency of a list, the Court cannot compel the P.S.C. to advise candidates after the expiry of the list.”     (Underline supplied)

22. In Sheejamol M.C. [2020(5) KHC 555], the Full Bench of this Court held thus:

                  “10. Issues (I) & (II)

                  These issues can be conveniently considered together. The question as to whether this Court will direct vacancies to be filled up from a ranked list prepared by the Public Service Commission, after its validity has expired, is no longer res integra. In State of Kerala v. Sreekandan [1993 KHC 23: 1993 (1) KLT 107: 1993 (1) KLJ 401 : ILR 1993 (2) Ker. 90] held that this was not possible, and this view got reiterated when the petition seeking review was dismissed through Vimalakumari (supra). This view appears to have been consistently followed by different benches of this Court sitting in Division. (See Balakrishnan v. PSC, Public Service Commission v. Govindan and Kerala Public Service Commission v. Shanil Kumar which have been referred to above). We are therefore of the view that there can be no direction issued to advise candidates from a ranked list which has expired in terms of the provisions contained in the Rules of Procedure framed by the Kerala Public Service Commission. We are also fortified in taking this view in the light of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Aneesh Kumar V. S. and Others v. State of Kerala and Others (2020 SCC Online SC 398) dismissing the Civil Appeal filed challenging the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Aneesh K. P. and Others v. State of Kerala and Others (2019 (2) KHC 24 : 2019 (1) KLT 896 : ILR 2019 (1) Ker. 775 : 2019 (2) KLJ 152). It was held:

                  "27. The Full Bench also took notice of the fact that the vacancies were reported after a gap of more than eight months on 12/07/2016 and that the last (third) advice was made on 11/11/2015. The Full Bench taking notice of the settled legal position, as expounded in S. S. Balu (supra), Kerala Public Service Commission v. Shanil Kumar, Lal Sudheer v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Secretary, Kerala Public Service Commission v. Sheeja P. R. and Nair Service Society v. Distt. Officer, Kerala Public Service Commission, went on to hold that by now it is well established that the Commission (KPSC) cannot advise any candidate after the expiry of a Ranked List, even to an NJD vacancy, if such vacancies.are reported after the expiry of the list in question. We agree with this opinion of the Full Bench."

                  (Emphasis is ours)

                  11. Then the question is whether the fact that a direction had been issued by this Court to the appointing authority concerned before the expiry and during the validity of the ranked list, to report vacancies to the Public Service Commission should result, as in Sreekandan, a direction to the appointing authority to fill up those vacancies following the ranking in the ranked list which has expired, on the premise that the failure of the appointing authority to comply with such direction, justifies it. Our reading of Sreekandan (supra) does not lead us to conclude that such a direction must necessarily follow. It is true that in Sreekandan (supra) a direction was issued to the appointing authority (the State of Kerala in that case) to appoint four candidates who would have been appointed had all the vacancies been reported pursuant to the interim order referred to in the judgment. Such direction was issued despite the fact that the ranked list had expired. However, we do not see any principle of law of universal application as having been laid down in Sreekandan (supra) that such a direction must follow in every case where there is a failure to report vacancies in spite of a specific direction. This is not to say that the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India would not extend to the issuance of such directions if circumstances warrant such directions being issued. We cannot lay down any parameters for the exercise of such jurisdiction. Whether or not such directions need be issued will depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. We hold that a direction as given in Sreekandan (supra) will be issued only in exceptional cases and in the rarest of situations where this Court comes to the conclusion, on final adjudication of the lis, that the appointing authority had purposefully and with mala fide intentions failed to comply with the directions issued by this Court. We are also of the opinion that the direction issued in Sreekandan (supra) was not on account of the existence of R.39 of Part II of the Kerala State & Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 and that even in the absence of a similar Rule (in cases where the said Rule has no application) this Court can, if circumstances warrant, issue similar directions”.

                  (underline supplied)

23. In the judgment dated 12.12.2025 in W.A.No. 1191 of 2016, a Division Bench of this Court, by relying on the judgment Sheejamol M.C. [2020(5) KHC 555], held thus:

                  “13. The next question to be considered is whether the nonreporting of the vacancy by the Bank even after passing of the interim order by this Court is vitiated by mala fides or any other extraneous reasons. It is true that the Full Bench in Sheejamol's case (cited supra) has held that, this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, can issue directions for appointment even if the rank list has expired, considering the facts and circumstances of each individual case. But, it also held that such a direction can be issued only in exceptional cases and in the rarest of rare situations, wherein it comes to a conclusion on final adjudication of the lis, that the appointing authority has purposefully or with mala fide intention failed to comply with the directions issued by this Court. In the instant case, it is to be seen that there are absolutely no materials available to show that the Bank has purposefully or with mala fide intention, failed to comply with the interim order passed by this Court. There are also no specific pleadings in the writ petition to the effect that the non-reporting of non-joining vacancy by the Bank was with a mala fide intention or on extraneous considerations. That apart, the learned Single Judge has also not found any vitiating circumstances for non compliance of his order and on the other hand, has found that non reporting of the vacancy was only due to the down grading of the bank and creation of surplus staffs. Therefore, the case in hand does not project an exceptional case or a rarest situation wherein the Court could have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and passed the impugned judgment directing that the first respondent be given preference, as if she was included in the rank list of the subsequent recruitment”.

                  (underline supplied)

24. In the instant case, the petitioners have no claim that during the currency of the ranked list, there were unfilled reported vacancies. So also, there is no pleading to the effect that the appointing authority has purposefully or with mala fide intention failed to comply with the direction in the interim order of the Tribunal. In the light of the judgments referred to supra, it is only to be held that since there were no vacancies reported during the currency of the ranked list, there is no illegality in the finding arrived at by the Tribunal.

                  Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we find no illegality or impropriety in the impugned order of the Tribunal which warrants interference of this Court by exercising supervisory jurisdiction.

                  In the result, the original petition stands dismissed.