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CDJ 2026 Kar HC 128
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| Court : High Court of Karnataka |
| Case No : Criminal Petition No. 9093 of 2025 |
| Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA |
| Parties : Lofty Khanna & Others Versus The State Of Karnataka By South East Women Police Station, Represented By State Public Prosecutor, High Court Of Karnataka Bengaluru & Another |
| Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: B. J. Hitesh Gowda, Advocate. For the Respondents: R1, B.N. Jagadeesha, Addl.Spp, R2, R. Nagaraj, Advocate. |
| Date of Judgment : 04-02-2026 |
| Head Note :- |
BNNS, 2023 - Section 528 -
Comparative Citation:
2026 KHC 6520,
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| Judgment :- |
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(Prayer: This Crl.p is filed 528 BNNS, 2023 praying pleased to quash the fir and complaint against the petitioners in crime no.0042/2025 registered by south east women PS for the offences p/u/s 85 of BNS, 2023 and section 3 and 4 of dowry prohibition act, 1961 pending on the file of the Honourable xxxix ADDL. CJM at Bengaluru.)
Oral Order:
1. Petitioners are before this Court calling in question registration of a crime in Crime No.42 of 2025 registered for offences punishable under Section 85 of the BNS and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
2. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows:
The 2nd respondent is the complainant. The complainant and the accused No.1/1st petitioner get married on 27-2-2017. From the wedlock a son is born on 10-6-2022. The relationship between the two flounders. The floundering of the relationship leads the 2nd respondent/complainant to shift to Bangalore to her parents house, after leaving the matrimonial house at Haryana. On 26-4-2024, the husband institutes proceedings for dissolution of marriage and further a proceeding under the G and WC 83 of 2024 seeking custody of the minor child. After these proceedings, the 2nd respondent-complainant registers a complaint. Thereafter, several communications, correspondences, exchange of legal notices happen between the 1st petitioner and the complainant. Mediation was also advised and on 10-6-2025 and 11-6-2025 efforts to mediate were taken up and failed. After all the aforesaid proceedings, the 2nd respondent registers a fresh complaint before the jurisdictional police, which now becomes a crime in Crime No.42 of 2025. It is this that is called in question by the 1st petitioner/husband and others, accused No.2, 3 and 4, father- in-law, mother-in-law, and sister-in-law.
3. Heard Sri Hitesh Gowda B.J., learned counsel appearing for petitioners and Sri B N Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri Nagaraj R, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that a perusal at the complaint would not indicate an iota of offence against any of the accused. After the mediation talks failed for over 6 months, the crime comes to be registered. Accordingly, seeks quashment of the proceedings.
5. Both the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel appearing for 2nd respondent, would in unison, refute the submissions contending that the matter is still at the stage of investigation and the harassment by the husband and the in-laws is clearly brought out in the complaint, as such, investigation in the least must be permitted in the case at hand. He would seek dismissal of the petition.
6. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. Since the entire issue has now triggered from the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. The crux of the complaint lies in paragraphs 20 to 26, they read as follows:
“…. …. ….
20. On January 24th 2024, I received call from my husband, he asked me to return back to home and I refused to the same as I was stress by his treatment was utterly inhumane. But to my surprise shock my husband and his family members visited to my Uncle Mr Om Prakash's house and started spreading false information and tarnish my character. My husband and his family members complained that I'm not a good daughter-in-law or wife and I was been raised poorly and I'm very disrespectful towards elders and also made false allegations on my father too. Further they went to Mr. Ganda Uncle's residence for a panchayat, and they summoned my uncle, Mr. Om Prakash. During this gathering, they once again set out to defame me and my parents, subjecting me to immense social pressure. Further my Husband started sharing the voice conversations which was been recorded without my knowledge, to my friend and my father's friends, his act of unauthorized sharing of our private dialogue has compounded my emotional distress, making me feel further violated and exposed. My Husband and his family members have made all attempts to defame me and my parents by spreading false information and accusing me of running away with the gold and also allegations of me that I could bring a petition for separation to extract money from them. They also mislead the villagers and the panchayat that I have initiated a divorce proceeding but it was my Husband who had filed a divorce petition and also want to separate my child from me, hence has filed the petition for custody of the child as well.
21. I needed the car in Bangalore for my son's needs and convenierice, but my husband refused to provide it. Despite the fact that I had paid the entire amount for the car. However, he outright refused, stating that as my legally wedded wife, he had full authority over the car and would not relinquish it. He further mentioned that the car was required for his personal use and for his parents, completely disregarding my child's needs.
22. On multiple occasions, I made sincere efforts to mend my relationship with my husband and his family, but they repeatedly dismissed me, stating that they no longer needed me and could easily get their son remarried since he earns a high salary. Furthermore, they deliberately shared fabricated details of our private conversations in public, tarnishing my reputation and causing irreparable damage to my dignity. Their actions not only destroyed our bond but also left me feeling deeply disrespected, humiliated, and completely shut out.
23. The constant stress and cruelty from my husband and his family caused immense trauma to my father. The emotional toll took a serious effect on his health. Even though my father was highly unwell, my husband and his family continued to humiliate both me and him in front of our relatives, showing no empathy or respect during such a difficult time. Tragically, my father passed away on 8th March 2025, but the emotional pain and the lack of dignity we were subjected to still linger.
24. The last residence of my husband and I in Bangalore was B-106, 1st Floor, Manar Elegance, HSR Layout Sector 2, Bangalore - 560102.
25. Hence, I request the SHO to recover the gold ornaments of ~600 grams along with diamond studded ornaments from my father-in law, Mother in-law joint locker in SBI, near Ratia Chungi, Ratia road, Fatehabad, Haryana 125050. Another bank locker in Punjab National Bank/Oriental Bank of Commerce bank, Tohana Road, Anaj Mandi, Aggarwal Colony, Ratia, Haryana.
I also have joint locker with my husband i.e., Locker No.388, HDFC, No. G/149 & F/244, Sapphire 90, Sector 90, Gurugram, Haryana 122505.
I also request the SHO to get the possession of my car HR 59 F 4444 (Tata Nexon Grey-colour) currently it is with my husband and Father in-law control and possession.
26. Further, I had lodged a complainant on 24.04.2025 against my husband, father in-law, Mother in-law and sister in-law. Upon that the SHO- South-east women Police station had registered. LPT.No.231/2025. Thereafter, Notice was sent to all the Accused. After receiving 2 Notice only my husband and father in-law had come to police station on 10.06.2025 and 11.06.2025. There was 4 hours of Mediation along with my husband from Parihar Vanitha Sahayavani Santhwana Kendra inside the South East Women Police station. Inspite of all the efforts my husband and father in-law attitude did not change therefore the mediation was ended abruptly. I request the SHO South East Women Police station to file an FIR against all the person whose names have been mentioned above at the earliest.”
Rest of the other paragraphs are all events that have happened in 2021 and 2022. If the afore-quoted paragraphs are noticed, it nowhere attracts the ingredients of Section 85 of the BNS. It is seen that not only the husband is dragged into these proceedings, but even the father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law of the husband, who had nothing to do with the relationship between the husband and the wife are roped into the proceedings. In this regard, it would become apposite to refer to the law as laid down by the Apex Court in plethora of judgments, few of which, are relevant to be noticed.
7.1. The Apex Court in the case of BELIDE SWAGATH KUMAR v. STATE OF TELANGANA (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2890) , has held as follows:
“….. ….. …..
18. Section 498A of the IPC deals with offences committed by the husband or relatives of the husband subjecting cruelty towards the wife. The said provision reads as under:
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”
19. Further, Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act talk about the penalty for giving or taking or demanding a dowry.
“3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.—
- If any person, after the commencement of this
Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more.
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in relation to,—
(a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bride (without any demand having been made in that behalf):
Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act;
(b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bridegroom (without any demand having been made in that behalf):
Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act:
Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given.
4. Penalty for demanding dowry.— If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees:
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.”
20. An offence is punishable under Section 498A of the IPC when a husband or his relative subjects a woman to cruelty, which may result in imprisonment for a term extending up to three years and a fine. The Explanation under Section 498A of the IPC defines “cruelty” for the purpose of Section 498A of the IPC to mean any of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) or (b). The first limb of clause (a) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC states that “cruelty” means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide. The second limb of clause (a) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that cruelty means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman. Further, clause (b) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC states that cruelty would also include harassment of the woman where such harassment is to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.
21. Further, Section 3 of the DP Act deals with the penalty for giving or taking dowry. It states that any person who engages in giving, taking, or abetting the exchange of dowry, shall face a punishment of imprisonment for a minimum of five years and a fine of not less than fifteen thousand rupees or the value of the dowry, whichever is greater. Section 4 of the DP Act talks of penalty for demanding dowry. It states that any person demanding dowry directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardians of a bride or bridegroom shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees.
22. The issue for consideration is whether, given the facts and circumstances of the case and after examining the FIR and the Complaint Case, the High Court was correct in refusing to quash the ongoing criminal proceedings against the appellants arising out of FIR No. 29 of 2022 dated 27.01.2022 and the Complaint Case No. 1067 of 2022 under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act.
23. Courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases where the allegations have to be scrutinized with greater care and circumspection in order to prevent miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of law. The allegations put forth by the complainant-respondent No. 2 have been considered by us. In our view, they reflect the daily wear and tear of marriage and can, in no way, be categorised as cruelty. The act of the accused-appellant of sending money back to his family members cannot be misconstrued in a way that leads to a criminal prosecution. The allegation that the accused- appellant forced the complainant-respondent No. 2 to maintain an excel sheet of all the expenses, even if taken on the face value, cannot come under the definition of cruelty. The monetary and financial dominance of the accused-appellant, as alleged by the complainant-respondent No. 2, cannot qualify as an instance of cruelty, especially in the absence of any tangible mental or physical harm caused. The said situation is a mirror reflection of the Indian society where men of the households often try to dominate and take charge of the finances of the women but criminal litigation cannot become a gateway or a tool to settle scores and pursue personal vendettas. Furthermore, the other allegations of the complainant-respondent No. 2 such as lack of care on the part of the husband-the accused-appellant during pregnancy and postpartum and constant taunts about her after-birth weight, if accepted prima facie, at best reflect poorly upon the character of the accused-appellant but the same cannot amount to cruelty so as to make him suffer through the process of litigation.
24. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by the complainant-respondent No. 2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that the husband and his family along with the accused-appellant herein mentally harassed her with a demand of dowry, the complainant-respondent No. 2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. Although she has alleged that an amount totalling to Rupees One Crore was demanded by the accused-appellant and his family members, the complainant-respondent No. 2 has failed to put forth any evidence or material on record to elaborate or substantiate the same. Furthermore, the complainant-respondent No. 2 has failed to impress the court as to how the said alleged harassment has caused her any injury, mental or physical. There has been no remote or proximate act or omission attributed to the accused-appellant that implicates him or assigns him any specific role in the said FIR for the offence of 498A of the IPC. Merely stating that the accused-appellant has mentally harassed the complainant-respondent No. 2 with respect to a demand of dowry does not fulfil the ingredients of Section 498A of the IPC especially in the face of absence of any cogent material or evidence on record to substantiate the said allegations. The term “cruelty” cannot be established without specific instances. The tendency of invoking these sections, without mentioning any specific details, weakens the case of prosecution and casts serious aspersions on the viability of the version of the complainant. Therefore, this Court cannot ignore the missing specifics in an FIR which is the premise of invoking criminal machinery of the State. In such cases involving allegations of cruelty and harassment, there would normally be a series of offending acts, which would be required to be spelt out by the complainant against perpetrators in specific terms to involve such perpetrators into the criminal proceedings sought to be initiated against them and therefore mere general allegations of harassment without pointing out the specifics against such persons would not be sufficient to continue criminal proceedings.
25. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to paragraph 102 therein, where this Court observed:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
26. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial dictum, we find that none of the offences alleged against the accused-appellant herein is made out. In fact, we find that the allegations of cruelty, mental harassment and voluntarily causing hurt against the accused-appellant herein have been made with a mala-fide intent with vague and general allegations and therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and particularly sub-paragraphs (1) and (7) of paragraph 102, extracted above, squarely apply to the facts of these cases. It is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution emanating from the FIR and consequent Complaint Case No. 1067 of 2022 to continue.
27. Furthermore, at this juncture, we find it appropriate to quote the judgment of this Court in Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735 wherein it was observed:
“27. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well- recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband's family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, Appellants 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of Appellant 1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of Appellant 1 and Respondent 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.
xxx
30. The inclusion of Section 498-A IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498-A IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinised, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm- twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498-A IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them.
31. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498-A IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant, husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498-A IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.”.”
(Emphasis supplied)
7.2. The Apex Court in the case of MARAM NIRMALA v. STATE OF TELANGANA (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2913) , has held as follows:
“….. ….. …..
12. The appellant(s) herein are the mother-in-law and father- in-law of respondent No. 2. They had filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quashing of the proceedings instituted against them in C.C. No. 338/2023 pending on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate (Prohibition and Excise offence) at Nalgonda alleging offences punishable under Sections 498- A, 323, 504 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act.
13. By the impugned order, the said criminal petition has been disposed of reserving liberty to the appellant(s) herein to seek discharge in accordance with law. Hence, this appeal.
14. The case at hand pertains to allegations of cruelty and dowry demand made by the respondent No. 2 against the appellant(s) herein. A bare perusal of the FIR however, shows that the allegations made by respondent No. 2 are vague and omnibus inasmuch as there is an absence of any specific instance or occasion detailed with particulars wherein the appellant(s) demanded dowry from respondent No. 2 and on refusal of the same, subjected her to mental and physical cruelty. The only allegations levelled by respondent No. 2 against the appellants herein are that subsequent to the birth of her daughter, the conduct of her husband underwent a change, which is stated to have been on account of the alleged inducement exercised by the in-laws including the appellant(s) herein for the purpose of demanding additional dowry and that pursuant to the counselling conducted at the Women Police Station, Nalgonda, although the husband of respondent No. 2 and his family assured that she would be treated properly, they nevertheless continued to subject respondent No. 2 to mental and physical cruelty.
15. We therefore find that the aforesaid allegations levelled against the appellant(s), even if taken at their face value, do not prima facie disclose the commission of the alleged offences so as to warrant the initiation of criminal proceedings.
16. During the course of submissions, learned counsel for the appellant(s) brought to our notice the judgment of this Court in the case of Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735 (“Dara Lakshmi Narayana”) as well as other judgments which squarely apply to this case. We have perused the same.
17. This Court speaking through one of us (B.V. Nagarathna, J.) in Dara Lakshmi Narayana, while dealing with the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings instituted by the respondent wife therein against her husband and in- laws who were charged with offences punishable under Sections 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act, 1961, held as follows:
“27. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well- recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband's family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, Appellants 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of Appellant 1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of Appellant 1 and Respondent 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.
xxx
30. The inclusion of Section 498-A IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498-AIPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinised, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498-A IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them.
xxx
31. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498-A IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant, husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498-A IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.
xxx
34. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned FIR No. 82 of 2022 filed by Respondent 2 was initiated with ulterior motives to settle personal scores and grudges against Appellant 1 and his family members i.e. Appellants 2 to 6 herein. Hence, the present case at hand falls within Category (7) of illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426]. Therefore, the High Court, in the present case, erred in not exercising the powers available to it under Section 482CrPC and thereby failed to prevent abuse of the Court's process by continuing the criminal prosecution against the appellants.”
(underlining by us)
18. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that the judgment of this Court in Dara Lakshmi Narayana would apply. Hence, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The proceedings instituted against the appellant(s) in C.C. No. 338/2023 pending on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate (Prohibition and Excise offence) at Nalgonda stand quashed in relation to the appellants herein.”
(Emphasis supplied)
7.3. The Apex Court in the case of GHANSHYAM SONI v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1301) , has held as follows:
“….. ….. …..
10. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by the complainant are that in the year 1999, the Appellant inflicted mental and physical cruelty upon her for bringing insufficient dowry. The Complainant refers to few instances of such atrocities, however the allegations are generic, and rather ambiguous. The allegations against the family members, who have been unfortunately roped in, is that they used to instigate the Appellant husband to harass the Complainant wife, and taunted the Complainant for not bringing enough dowry; however, there is no specific incident of harassment or any evidence to that effect. Similarly, the allegations against the five out of six sisters that they used to insult the Complainant and demanded dowry articles from her, and upon failure beat her up, but there is not even a cursory mention of the incident. An allegation has also been made against a tailor named Bhagwat that he being a friend of the Appellant instigated him against the Complainant, and was allegedly instrumental in blowing his greed. Such allegations are merely accusatory and contentious in nature, and do not elaborate a concrete picture of what may have transpired. For this reason alone, and that the evidence on record is clearly inconsistent with the accusations, the version of the Complainant seems implausible and unreliable. The following observation in K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana Represented by Its Secretary, Department of Home, fits perfectly to the present scenario:
“6. The Courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out.”
11. As regards the Appellant, the purportedly specific allegations levelled against him are also obscure in nature. Even if the allegations and the case of the prosecution is taken at its face value, apart from the bald allegations without any specifics of time, date or place, there is no incriminating material found by the prosecution or rather produced by the complainant to substantiate the ingredients of “cruelty” under section 498A IPC, as recently observed in the case of JaydedeepsinhPravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat and Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The Complainant has admittedly failed to produce any medical records or injury reports, x-ray reports, or any witnesses to substantiate her allegations.We cannot ignore the fact that the Complainant even withdrew her second Complaint dt. 06.12.1999 six days later on 12.12.1999. There is also no evidence to substantiate the purported demand for dowry allegedly made by the Appellant or his family and the investigative agencies in their own prudence have not added sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to the chargesheet.
12. In this respect, the Sessions Court has applied its judicial mind to the allegations in the FIR & the material on record, and has rightly discharged the Appellants of the offences under section 498A & 34 IPC. Notwithstanding the said observation by the Sessions Court that the possibility of false implication cannot be ruled out, the discharge of the Appellant merely because the Complainant is a police officer is erroneous and reflects poorly on the judicial decision making, which must be strictly based on application of judicial principles to the merits of the case. On the other hand, the High Court vide the Impugned Order has traversed one step further and overtly emphasised that simply because the Complainant is a police officer, it cannot be assumed that she could not have been a victim of cruelty at the hands of her husband and in-laws. We agree with the sensitive approach adopted by the High Court in adjudicating the present case, however a judicial decision cannot be blurred to the actual facts and circumstances of a case. In this debate, it is only reasonable to re-iterate that the Sessions Court in exercise of its revisionary jurisdiction and the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC, must delve into the material on record to assess what the Complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. In the present case, such scrutiny of the allegations in the FIR and the material on record reveals that no prima facie is made out against the Appellant or his family. It is also borne from the record that the divorce decree of their marriage, has already been passed, and the same has never been challenged by the Complainant wife, and hence has attained finality. Upon consideration of the relevant circumstances and that the alleged incidents pertain to the year 1999 and since then the parties have moved on with their respective lives, it would be unjust and unfair if the Appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial.
13. It is rather unfortunate that the Complainant being an officer of the State has initiated criminal machinery in such a manner, where the aged parents-in- law, five sisters and one tailor have been arrayed as an accused. Notwithstanding the possibility of truth behind the allegations of cruelty, this growing tendency to misuse legal provisions has time and again been condemned by this Court. The observations in Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana, Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhandaptly captures this concern.”
(Emphasis supplied)
7.4. The Apex Court in the case of RAJESH CHADDHA v.STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1094) , has held as follows:
“….. ….. …..
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the record, the question remains whether the High Court vide Impugned Order dt. 14.11.2018 whilst exercising its revisionary jurisdiction, was correct in upholding the conviction of the Appellant under Section 498A IPC & Section 4 D.P. Act, 1961. In that respect, it is prudent to examine the statutory provisions, which are as under:
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”
3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— (1) If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more. Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years. (2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall apply to, or in relation to,— (a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bride without any demand having been made in that behalf : Page 12 of 26 Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act; (b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bridegroom without any demand having been made in that behalf : Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act : Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given.
4. Penalty for demanding dowry.— If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees : Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.”
8. At the outset, an act of ‘cruelty’ for the purpose of Section 498A, corresponds to a willful conduct of such nature, that may cause danger to the life, limb and health of the woman, which is inclusive of the mental and physical health and the harassment caused to her, by coercing her to meet unlawful demands or impossible standards. Further, the demand for dowry in terms of Section 3 and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 refers to both a direct or indirect manner of demand for dowry made by the husband or his family members. In order to meet the threshold of the offences under Section 498A IPC & Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961, the allegations cannot be ambiguous or made in thin air.
9. In the present case, the allegations made by the Complainant are vague, omnibus and bereft of any material particulars to substantiate this threshold. Apart from claiming that Appellant husband harassed her for want of dowry, the Complainant has not given any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. The allegations in the FIR, and the depositions of the prosecution witnesses suggest that on multiple occasions, the Complainant wife was ousted from the matrimonial house, and kicked and punched in the presence of her father, PW-2 herein and she was repeatedly tormented with dowry demands, and when she was unable to honor them, the Appellant and her family physically beat her up; whereas she has not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. It is alleged that the Complainant suffered a miscarriage, as she fell down, when the Appellant and her family who pushed her out of the house; however, no medical document from any medical institution or hospital or nursery was produced to substantiate the allegations.
10. Upon carefully considering the record, we find that apart from the statements of PW-1 and PW-2, there is no evidence to substantiate the allegations of harassment and acts of cruelty within the scope of Section 498A of IPC, and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961. For this reason, we find merit in the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant, and are of the considered view that there is no material on record to establish the allegations of hurt or miscarriage, and of hurt and criminal intimidation in terms of Section 323 r/w 34 and Section 506 IPC respectively. The Trial Court has rightly held that evidence of the Complainant is the only strong evidence that she sustained injuries on various parts of her body due to the physical assault by the accused persons, and that there was no medical examination conducted by the Complainant, so as to prove that the miscarriage was a consequence of the physical assault.
11. The Trial Court has indeed applied its judicial mind to the material on record whilst acquitting the Appellant and the co-accused parents-in-law for offences under Section 323 r/w 34 & Section 506 IPC. However, it appears that the Trial Court had passed the order of conviction of the Appellant under Section 498A IPC & Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961, merely on the possibility that the allegations and the depositions of the PW-1 corroborated by PW2, are true and correct. Although one cannot deny the emotional or mental torture that the Complainant may have undergone in the marriage, however a cursory or plausible view cannot be conclusive proof to determine the guilt of an individual under Section 498A & Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961, especially to obviate malicious criminal prosecution of family members in matrimonial disputes. In this respect, we also cannot ignore that the FIR dt. 20.12.1999 was registered after the Appellant had filed the Divorce Petition under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on 06.02.1999. In consideration thereof and that the Complainant had cohabited with the Appellant only for a period of about a year, it appears that the FIR registered by the Complainant was not genuine.
12. In respect thereof, the High Court while exercising its revisionary jurisdiction ought to have examined the correctness of decision of the Trial Court in light of the material on record, which reveals nothing incriminatory against the Appellant to sustain a conviction under Section 498A IPC or Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961. Although we do not agree with the submission on behalf of the Appellant that the Impugned Order dt. 14.11.2018 was passed in absentia, however the High Court was well within its revisionary powers to discern whether an FIR and the proceedings emanating therefrom were sustainable. In all certainty, it could have saved 6 years' worth of time for the Appellant, who has endured litigation for over 20 years as of today.
13. Notwithstanding the merits of the case, we are distressed with the manner, the offences under Section 498A IPC, and Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 are being maliciously roped in by Complainant wives, insofar as aged parents, distant relatives, married sisters living separately, are arrayed as accused, in matrimonial matters. This growing tendency to append every relative of the husband, casts serious doubt on the veracity of the allegations made by the Complainant wife or her family members, and vitiates the very objective of a protective legislation. The observations made by this Hon'ble Court in the case of Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana appropriately encapsulates this essence as under:
“25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well- recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband's family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos. 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No. 1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No. 1 and respondent No. 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.”
14. The term “cruelty” is subject to rather cruel misuse by the parties, and cannot be established simpliciter without specific instances, to say the least. The tendency of roping these sections, without mentioning any specific dates, time or incident, weakens the case of the prosecutions, and casts serious suspicion on the viability of the version of a Complainant. We cannot ignore the missing specifics in a criminal complaint, which is the premise of invoking criminal machinery of the State. Be that as it may, we are informed that the marriage of the Appellant has already been dissolved and the divorce decree has attained finality, hence any further prosecution of the Appellant will only tantamount to an abuse of process of law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
7.5. The Apex Court in the case of KAMAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1726) , has held as follows:
“….. ….. …..
10. A perusal of the impugned FIR would disclose that the complainant at the time of lodging the FIR had been living with her own parents. The allegations are that initially, after marriage, there were no issues. Later, when parents in law started living with her husband, she had to suffer taunts at their end on trivial issues. When she complained about this to her husband, he sided with his parents and even assaulted the complainant. It is alleged that she informed her parents and uncle about this, who counselled her to have patience in the interest of the family. FIR also discloses that since 2008 she is having a job. Initially with Ugam Solutions and, later, as a lecturer for nine years. She admits of having stayed at different places in rented accommodation post her marriage. However, she alleges that she used to hand over her salary to her father-in-law who used to deprive her of her money. Besides that, she alleges of her husband having an affair with his business partner for the last two years and because of that he had been constantly torturing her, both physically and mentally, to end the relationship and with that motive divorce petition has been filed.
11. What is important, for the purposes of deciding this case, is that in the FIR there is no specific allegation of demand of dowry by the accused. Further, the allegation of harassment of the complainant at the instance of the parents in law is limited to extending taunts and custody related issues of minor children. However, there is no disclosure about the nature of those taunts. Admittedly, the second respondent was married to the first appellant in the year 2005 and for last several years since before lodging the FIR, the complainant had been working and staying in rented accommodations at different places.Besides that, the FIR was lodged on 20.07.2019, just three days after service of summons of the divorce proceedings initiated by the first appellant. In these circumstances, we will have to consider whether the impugned proceedings are vexatious and mala fide, particularly in the context of a matrimonial dispute where time and again Courts have been cautioned to be circumspect to obviate malicious prosecution of family members of the main accused.
12. Even if we assume that there are some allegations of assault and of physical and mental torture of the complainant, but they are against the husband. As against the parents in law, the allegations are only of extending taunts and of not parting with the money for managing household expenses. Specific details in respect of those taunts have not been disclosed. Moreover, a few taunts here and there is a part of everyday life which for happiness of the family are usually ignored. Interestingly, as per own allegations in the FIR, the complainant admits that when she reported those issues to her parents and uncle, she was counselled to bear patience. In the circumstances, in our considered view, no case to proceed against the parents in law, namely, the second and third appellant is made out. In so far as the first appellant is concerned, there are allegations of physical and mental torture of the complainant at his behest. Consequently, the case may proceed qua the first appellant.”
(Emphasis supplied)
8. In the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgments, it becomes necessary to notice whether there is any allegation worth against the petitioners for investigation to be permitted or otherwise. The complaint is quoted herein above. The complaint narrates incidents from 2021 to 2024, all alleging humiliation, accusations and tarnishing the reputation. The constant stress and cruelty from the husband is what is said. The fact remains that after lodging the complaint against all, the husband and the father-in-law were sent to mediation and the mediation failed. Even before the registration of the complaint, several steps were taken to mediate between the parties. If that be so, it was not an irretrievable collapse of relationship. In the light of the ingredients that would become punishable under Section 498A of the IPC not being met even to its prima facie sense, though the matter is still at the stage of investigation, I deem it appropriate to exercise my jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and obliterate the crime against the petitioners, failing which it would undoubtedly become an abuse of the process of the law.
9. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii) Proceedings in Crime No.42 of 2025 pending before the XXXIX Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru stand quashed qua the petitioners.
(iii) The observations made in the course of the order is only for the purpose of consideration of the case of the petitioners under section 482 of Cr.P.C. and would not become applicable, influence or bind any proceeding pending before the parties before any fora.
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