1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the following reliefs:

          "i. That the part of the Impugned Order whereby he has been Demoted to the post of Officer Grade-l, fixation at the initial pay of Officer Grade Land the period from 03.03.2015 till the date of passing of order of appellate authority will not be counted in service and no wages, increment and allowance are payable for this period be quashed.

          ii That the respondents be directed to release payment inter alia including the back wages i.e. arrears of salary with increments and other consequential reliefs."

[2]. The petitioner was working as a Scale III Officer in the respondent-Bank. During the period from 06.08.2005 to 11.05.2011, he was posted as Branch Manager at Girwai Branch, while the period from 12.05.2011 to 10.06.2013, he was posted at Main Branch, Morena, of the respondent-Bank. Certain irregularities in the matter of sanctioning and disbursement of loan were noticed. Resultantly, a charge-sheet was issued to him on 04.06.2014, Annexure P/6, whereby as many as 10 charges were levelled. The charges in substance related to:

          "i) Sanctioning/disbursement of loan in the name of dead person without verification of documents.

          ii) Sanctioning/disbursement of loan in the name of fictitious person based upon false and fabricated documents.

          iii) Sanctioning/disbursement of loan without ascertaining the regular source of income of borrower.

          iv) Sanctioning/disbursement of loan by escalating income by adding unconcerned persons as co- borrower.

          v) Sanctioning/disbursement of loan by accepting income tax return submitted on one day, which was prepared only to get the loan and;

          vi) Sanctioning/disbursement of loan without properly assessing the income of the borrower."

[3]. The petitioner denied the charges by submitting reply on 24.01.2015 (Annexure P/9). The reply since was found unsatisfactory, the competent authority decided to conduct a departmental enquiry against the petitioner. In furtherance of the enquiry, Sri K.U. Parate, a Scale IV Officer, was appointed as Enquiry Officer, while Sri Neeraj Saxena, a Scale III Officer, was appointed as Presenting Officer. The enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer, wherein about 112 documents were exhibited, while two prosecution witnesses were examined by the Presenting Officer in support charges. Further, about 26 documents were exhibited at the instance of petitioner. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the Disciplinary Authority on 07.01.2015, whereby all the charges were found proved against the petitioner. The report was forwarded by the Disciplinary Authority to the petitioner vide show-cause notice dated 13.01.2015, and he was asked to give his explanation to the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 24.01.2015, Annexure P/9, wherein he reiterated his defence which was taken in reply to the charge-sheet.

[4]. The Disciplinary Authority thereafter passed the impugned punishment order dated 30.03.2015, whereby punishment of dismissal from service, which shall be disqualification for future employment, was imposed upon the petitioner. This punishment order was communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 09.04.2015, Annexure P/2. The appeal filed against the punishment order suffered dismissal on 27.04.2016, Annexure P4, by the Board of Directors of the bank.

[5]. The petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P. No.4041 of 2016 challenging the punishment orders. This Court was of the opinion that the Appellate Authority has casually dismissed the appeal without recording any reason. Accordingly, vide order dated 07.01.2021, the petition was partly allowed. Setting aside the order passed by the Appellate Authority, the matter was remitted for reconsideration of the petitioner's appeal. The appeal was reconsidered by the Board of Directors of the Bank and vide order dated 28.04.2021, Annexure P/1, while affirming the findings regarding guilt, the punishment has been modified to reversion to the basic pay of a Scale I officer. The period from 30.03.2015 to 28.04.2021 has been treated as not on duty for any purposes. Challenging this order, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.

[6]. The reliefs prayed for by the petitioner in this petition have been reproduced above. From reading the relief clause, it appears that the petitioner is only aggrieved by the quantum of punishment imposed by the Appellate Authority. However, in the petition as also during the course of arguments, the petitioner has canvassed that no misconduct has been committed by him and there is no evidence against him to prove the charges.

[7]. Learned counsel for the petitioner, challenging the punishment orders, submitted that no misconduct is committed by the petitioner. Referring to the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, the learned counsel submitted that none of the charges could be found proved against the petitioner and the Inquiry Officer failed to substantiate his findings by recording reasons. Learned counsel also submitted that the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority failed to consider this aspect of the matter and arbitrarily imposed impugned punishment upon the petitioner. He also submitted that even if the findings are accepted, the charges alleged against the petitioner were procedural in nature and therefore the punishment imposed by the Appellate Authority is disproportionate and harsh. Learned counsel also submitted that no financial loss was caused to the bank and, therefore, on this count also, the punishment order deserves to be set aside.

[8]. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents supported the impugned orders and submitted that the petitioner was working as Branch Manager at Branch Girwai & Morena. While so working, he was expected to adhere to the KYC norms and to be careful while sanctioning and disbursing loan. However, since the petitioner failed to adopt due care, the loans disbursed/sanctioned by him were put to risk. Learned counsel argued that the Inquiry Officer has recorded detailed reasons in his report after appreciating the evidence collected during the course of enquiry. It is his submission that the factual findings recorded by enquiry officer and affirmed by disciplinary/appellate authorities does not warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of powers of judicial review. Learned counsel also submitted that the Appellate Authority has already taken a lenient view by reducing the punishment and, therefore, it can not be said that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner was harsh or disproportionate. Learned counsel thus prayed for dismissal of the petition.

[9]. No other point is pressed by learned counsel for the parties.

[10]. Considered the arguments and perused the record.

[11]. The impugned action of the respondents is not challenged on the ground of any defect in the departmental enquiry. The challenge has been made on the ground that no misconduct was committed by the petitioner and the findings recorded against him are based on no evidence. Therefore, before adverting to the merits of the case, the scope of interference by this Court in such matters needs to be examined. In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India reported in (1995)6 SCC 749, the Apex Court held that the judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is further held that the courts cannot re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at its own independent findings. The Court can interfere only when it is found that the findings are based on no evidence. The observations made by the Apex Court in paras 12 & 13, being relevant, are reproduced hereunder:

          "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

          13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."

[12]. Again in the case of Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015)2 SCC 610, the Apex Court laid down do's and don'ts, in exercise of powers of judicial review in paras 12 & 13 as under:

          "12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

          (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

          (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

          (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

          (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

          (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

          (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

          (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

          (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

          (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

          13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

          (i) reappreciate the evidence;

          (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

          (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

          (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

          (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

          (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

           (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.

[13]. Similar is the case of State of Bihar v. Phulpari Kumari reported in (2020)2 SCC 130 wherein also the Apex Court reiterated that the sufficiency of evidence is not a ground for interference by this Court and even if there is some material available, the findings recorded in the enquiry are to be adhered.

[14]. Keeping in view the aforesaid, if the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority and affirmed by the Appellate Authority are seen, it is gathered that the same are based upon appreciation of evidence. Even though learned counsel for the petitioner tried to convince this Court that no loss was caused to the bank, however, that would not be a ground to exonerate the petitioner. While working as Branch Manager, the petitioner was expected to take all care to safeguard the interest of the bank. Merely because the bank did not suffer loss or has sufficient security to recover its money, would not absolve the petitioner from his responsibility to adhere to KYC norms and further to take care while sanctioning loan. However, a perusal of findings recorded against him in the enquiry shows that he failed to adhere to such laid down norms. The findings are thus based upon proper appreciation of evidence and would not call for any interference by this Court.

[15]. The bank officer holds a special duty inasmuch as he is the custodian of public money. He is required to exercise a high standard of honesty and integrity. The Apex Court made these observations in para 34 in the case of Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur Vs. State Bank of India reported in (2005)1 SCC 13, as under:

          "34. The bank manager/officer and employees of any bank, nationalised/or non-nationalised, are expected to act and discharge their functions in accordance with the rules and regulations of the bank. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and trust and a misconduct. In the instant case Charge 5 framed against the appellant is very serious and grave in nature. We have already extracted the relevant Rule which prohibits the bank manager to sanction a loan to his wife or his relative or to any partner. While sanctioning the loan the appellant did not appear to have kept this aspect in mind and acted illegally and sanctioned the loan. He realised the mistake later and tried to salvage the same by not encashing the draft issued in the maiden name of his wife though the draft was issued but not encashed. The decision to sanction a loan is not an honest decision. Rule 34(3)(1) is a rule of integrity and, therefore, as rightly pointed out by Mr Salve, the respondent Bank cannot afford to have the appellant as bank manager. The punishment of removal awarded by the appellate authority is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. Before concluding, we may usefully rely on the judgment Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC v. Hoti Lal [(2003) 3 SCC 605 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 363] wherein this Court has held as under: (SCC p. 614, para 10) "If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear to be proper. We set aside the same and restore order of the learned Single Judge upholding the order of dismissal."

[16]. Similarly, in the case of State Bank of India vs. Bela Bagchi reported in (2005)7 SCC 435, the Court held in para 15 held as under:

          "15. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [(1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1194] , it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit which resulted in the case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organisation more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. That being so, the plea about absence of loss is also sans substance."

[17]. In view of the aforesaid, even if there is no loss caused to the bank and the bank Officer is found to have acted in violation of laid down norms, the action taken by the bank cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal. In view of the discussion made above, it is found that the Appellate Authority has already taken a lenient view in the matter of imposition of punishment. The finding of facts recorded during the course of inquiry have been affirmed by the Disciplinary Authority as also by the Appellate Authority and therefore, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the same would not call for any interference. Consequently, the order of punishment imposed is upheld. The petition is found to be without any substance and is accordingly, dismissed.