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CDJ 2026 MHC 774 print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Judicature at Madras
Case No : W.P. No. 29084 of 2025
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SENTHILKUMAR RAMAMOORTHY
Parties : R. Sharmila & Others Versus The State of Tamilnadu Rep. by its Secretary, Tamil Nadu Revenue Department, Chennai & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioners: N. Kavitha Rameshwar, Advocate. For the Respondents: Ramanlal, Addl. Advocate General assisted by Abishek Murthy, Govt. Adv.
Date of Judgment : 05-02-2026
Head Note :-
Constitution of India - Article 226 -

Comparative Citation:
2026 MHC 501,
Judgment :-

(Prayer: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to treat the land ceiling proceedings in respect of the property in Plot No.22, Annai Nagar Annex, Korattur Village, Ambattur Taluk, Tiruvallur District, measuring to an extent of 2017 sq. ft. comprised in Old Survey Nos.209/2, 209/2B and new Survey Nos.209/2A2, 209/2B1, 209/2B2 as abated and to restore the same to the petitioners in accordance with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 and to issue patta in respect of the same in favour of the petitioners.)

1. The petitioners are siblings. Their mother, Susila Rajaram, purchased 2017 sq.ft. of land in old S.Nos.209/2 and 209/2B corresponding to new S.Nos.209/2A2, 209/2B1 & 209/2B2 in Plot no.22, Annai nagar Annexe, Korattur village. Such purchase was under sale deed dated 07.02.2013 executed by one Mrs.V.Gayathri. The petitioners assert that they inherited the property on her death on 15.06.2021 as her only class I legal heirs, and that their family is in possession and enjoyment of the property since the date of purchase. It is also stated that it was discovered that the property is the subject matter of proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 (the TN Urban Land Ceiling Act) when the petitioners' mother had applied for mutation of patta. By further asserting that proceedings under the TN Urban Land Ceiling Act have abated and that the savings clause does not come to the aid of the State, the present writ petition has been filed for a mandamus directing the respondents to treat the land ceiling proceedings as having abated.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the TN Urban Land Ceiling Act provides for the issuance of notice under Section 11(5) to the persons in possession of the land calling upon such persons to surrender or deliver possession thereof. In case such persons refuse to comply with the notice under Section 11(5), she submits that the competent authority is empowered to take possession and that force may be used for such purpose. In this case, she submits that forcible possession under Section 11(6) was not taken, and that the petitioners remain in possession.

3. In the factual context of the petitioners remaining in physical possession, she submits that the savings clause in the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (the Repeal Act) will not come to the aid of the State. She relies upon the order issued by this Court in K.Senthamarai Kannan v. The State of Tamil Nadu and others, MANU/TN/9814/2021. She also relies on a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar and others, 2025 INSC 274 (AP Electrical). With specific reference to pages 117 to 119 of the typed set of papers, she points out that the Supreme Court held categorically that physical possession is contemplated in Section 10 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, which is in pari materia with the corresponding provision of the TN Urban Land Ceiling Act. Therefore, she submits that the petitioners are entitled to the relief claimed.

4. In response to these contentions, learned Additional Advocate General opened with a preliminary objection. He submits that the petitioners are admittedly not the original land owners against whom proceedings were initiated under the TN Urban Land Ceiling Act. Therefore, he contends that the writ petition is not maintainable. By referring to original records, which were handed over for perusal, he submits that notice under Section 11(5) was served on the original land owners and that no objections were received. In those circumstances, he submits that physical possession was voluntarily handed over and taken over.

5. Thereafter, he submits that under land delivery receipt dated 26.02.1997, possession was handed over by the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, Ambattur, to the Village Administrative Officer, Korattur village, Saidapet taluk. In support of his contentions, he relies upon the judgment dated 23.01.2018 of the Division Bench of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu and another v. P.Sundarasamy, W.A.No.2257 of 2013. In that judgment, he points out that the Division Bench held that the sale in favour of the petitioner was null and void in terms of Section 6 of the TN Urban Land Ceiling Act because the conveyance was subsequent to the entry into force of the statute. He also submits that the respondent therein, who asserted claim over the land, was not the owner of the land and that the Court allowed the writ appeal in that factual context.

6. Sub-sections (5) & (6) of Section 11 of the TN Urban Land Ceiling Act read as under:

                   “11. Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit.

                   .. ..

                   (5)Where any vacant land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3), the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or to any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice.

                   (6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be given to the State Government or to any person duly authorised by the Sate Government in this behalf and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.”

                   (emphasis added)

7. From the text of sub-section (5), it is evident that the competent authority is empowered to issue a notice in writing to any person in possession of vacant land, which is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3), and call upon such person to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or a person authorised by such Government. Sub-section (6) enables the competent authority to take possession if a person refuses or fails to comply with the order under sub-section (5). The provision expressly empowers the use of force to the extent necessary for such purpose. The expression 'possession' finds place in both the sub-sections and when these sub-sections are read conjointly, the only logical interpretation would be that the word 'possession' should be construed as physical possession. Otherwise, the express empowerment to take possession, including by taking resort to force, would be meaningless.

8. The Repeal Act contains a savings clause. The said savings clause is as under:

                   “3.Savings.-(1) The repeal of the principal Act shall not affect

                   (a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of section 11, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority;

                   (b) the validity of any order granting exemption under sub-section (1) of section 21 or any action taken thereunder.

                   (2) Where –

                   (a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of section 11 of the Principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; and

                   (b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land, then, such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government. ”

                   (emphasis added)

9. The Repeal Act also provided for abatement of legal proceedings under Section 4, which reads as under:

                   “4. Abatement of legal proceedings. - All proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the principal Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, before any court, tribunal or any authority shall abate:

                   Provided that this section shall not apply to the proceedings relating to sections 12, 13, 14, 15, 15-B and 16 of the principal Act in so far as such proceedings are relatable to the land, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority.”

It is noticeable that the savings clause also uses the expression 'possession'. The word 'possession', as used in land ceiling statutes, including the TN Urban Land Ceiling Act has fallen for consideration in several judgments. Instead of multiplying authorities, it is sufficient at this juncture to refer to the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioners.

10. In AP Electrical, the Supreme Court referred extensively to the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari Ram, MANU/SC/0226/2013. Several paragraphs of the said judgment have been extracted. Thereafter, at paragraph 29, the Supreme Court recorded as under:

                   29. Thus, the dictum, as laid in Hari Ram (supra), is that where the possession of the subject land has not been taken over by the State Government or by any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority, the proceedings under the Act would not survive and mere vesting of the vacant land with the State Government by operation of law, without actual possession, is not sufficient. To put it in other words, the mere paper possession would not save the situation for the State Government unless the State is able to establish by cogent evidence that actual physical possession of the entire land was taken over by evicting each and every person from the land. The onus is on the State to establish the actual physical possession of the excess vacant land was taken over before the repeal.”

11. Thus, the consistent position taken by the Supreme Court and by other Courts is that the savings clause would operate provided physical possession has been taken over. No carve out is made in respect of transfers made after vesting in breach of Section 6 of the TN Urban Land Ceiling Act and, consequently, even in those cases, the repeal would result in abatement unless physical possession was taken. The petitioners, who are successors-in-interest from the original land owners, assert that they are in possession. Hence, the preliminary objection on maintainability is untenable. This leads to the question as to whether physical possession was taken over in this case.

12. Learned Additional Advocate General referred to the notice under Section 11(5) and contended that no objections were received from the original land owners upon service of such notice. Therefore, he submits that an inference should be drawn that physical possession was voluntarily handed over by the original land owners. He relies on the land delivery receipt dated 26.02.1997 in support of this conclusion. The record placed before me does not contain any evidence that proceedings were initiated under Section 11(6). Whether an inference that physical possession was taken on the basis of available records falls for consideration next.

13. The most critical document in this regard is the land delivery receipt. This document indicates that possession was handed over by the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, Ambattur to the Village Administrative Officer, Korattur village, Saidapet taluk. It also records that there is no building and that it is a vacant land. No panchnama or equivalent document evidencing the handing over of physical possession by the original land owners is on record. Learned Additional Advocate General contended that physical possession in respect of vacant land cannot be shown in the same manner as it can be shown with regard to lands with buildings thereon. Urban land ceiling statutes apply to vacant land and the expression ‘possession’ has been interpreted with reference to vacant land. As noticed earlier, the Supreme Court and other Courts have held that possession should be construed as physical possession and that the Repeal Act would come to the aid of the State if it is established that physical possession was taken. On the basis of materials on record, I am unable to conclude that physical possession was taken by the State in respect of lands over which the petitioners assert title and possession.

14. For reasons aforesaid, this writ petition is liable to be allowed in respect of the 2017 sq.ft. of land over which the petitioners assert title and possession. Therefore, I conclude that proceedings in respect of 2017 sq.ft. in new S.Nos.209/2A2, 209/2B1 & 209/2B2 have abated. Nonetheless, by virtue of Section 3(2)(b) of the Repeal Act, the State may claim refund of compensation, if any, paid to the original land owners by issuing a notice to the petitioners and making a demand therefor within 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In case of such demand, subject to payment and otherwise unconditionally, the petitioners are entitled to apply for grant of patta in respect thereof before the jurisdictional tahsildar by submitting a fresh application for patta. Within sixty days from the receipt of such application, the tahsildar shall consider the same and pass orders thereon on merits and in accordance with law after providing a reasonable opportunity to the petitioners.

15. The writ petition stands allowed on the above terms without any order as to costs.

 
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