Muralee Krishna S., J.

1. This Civil Revision Petition is filed by the 1st respondent in Appeal No.2 of 2004 on the file of the Kerala University Appellate Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram (the ‘Tribunal’ in short), under Section 60(9) r/w Section 63 of the Kerala University Act, 1974 (the ‘Act’ in short), against the judgment dated 08.11.2004 passed by the Tribunal in that appeal.

2. The 1st respondent herein, who is the appellant in Appeal No.2 of 2004 before the Tribunal, was a Last Grade Staff in N.S.S. College, Nilamel. The College had its PTA account in the State Bank of Travancore, Nilamel. A cheque leaf was stolen from the college, and affixing the forged signature and seal of the Principal, the cheque was encashed for Rs.1,30,000/- on 28.12.2002. On getting a complaint from the Principal, the Police registered a crime and arrested the 1st respondent and his friend Rajesh Kannan in connection with the theft of the cheque and withdrawal of the amount from the Bank. Meanwhile, on 28.12.2002, the 1st respondent deposited a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- in his bank account. Following the registration of the crime and the arrest of the 1st respondent by the Police, the 1st respondent was placed under suspension, and a departmental enquiry was conducted against him. The enquiry officer submitted his report, wherein the charges levelled against the 1st respondent were reported as proved. Therefore, ultimately, the 1st respondent was dismissed from service by the order dated 10.11.2003 of the petitioner herein. Challenging the dismissal from service, the 1st respondent filed Appeal No.2 of 2004 before the Tribunal under Section 60 of the Act. Before the Tribunal, the petitioner herein filed a detailed counter affidavit. From the side of the 1st respondent, the impugned order of his dismissal from service was marked as Exhibit A1 and from the side of the petitioner herein, the entire files relating to the disciplinary enquiry were marked as Exhibit B1 series. The Tribunal raised necessary points for consideration and, after hearing both sides and on appreciation of the materials on record, by the impugned judgment dated 08.11.2004, allowed the appeal, by setting aside the order of the petitioner dated 10.11.2003, dismissing the 1st respondent from service with effect from 25.01.2003 and directed the Management to await the disposal of the original case registered against the 1st respondent in connection with the same incident. It was also ordered that in the meanwhile, the 1st respondent shall continue in suspension from the service of the petitioner. Liberty is granted to the petitioner to pass a fresh order in the disciplinary proceedings against the 1st respondent in tune with the findings of the criminal court.

3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the Tribunal, the petitioner is now before this Court with the present revision petition.

4. On 28.03.2005, when this revision petition came up for consideration, this Court admitted the same and issued notice to the respondents. However, despite service of notice, none appeared for the 1st respondent. The learned Senior Government Pleader entered appearance for the 3rd respondent.

5. When the appeal records are called for by the order dated 05.11.2025, it was informed by the Tribunal that the records were destroyed, following the Rules as per the Office order dated 10.06.2020.

6. Since the records in Appeal No.2 of 2004 have already been destroyed by the Kerala University Appellate Tribunal, on 04.12.2025, the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader have made available for the perusal of this Court a copy of the records in Appeal No.2 of 2004.

7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Senior Government Pleader. At the time of hearing the revision petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner produced the copies of available records of the appeal before the Tribunal for our perusal.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Tribunal considered the disciplinary proceedings by equating the same with that of the criminal proceedings. The Tribunal proceeded as if in the disciplinary proceedings, the rigour of proof is as that of a criminal case. The learned counsel vehemently submitted that there is no bar in proceeding with the disciplinary proceedings before the conclusion of the criminal case, since both are independent proceedings. The learned counsel invited our attention to the evidence tendered by the witnesses examined by the enquiry officer to argue that the enquiry officer reached to a finding that the 1st respondent has committed gross dereliction of duty and misconduct, taking advantage of his presence in the office room wherein the stolen cheque was kept by the Principal. In support of his arguments regarding the independent existence of disciplinary action taken against the 1st respondent, the learned counsel relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya [(1997) 2 SCC 699], State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya [(2011) 4 SCC 584], and Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. M.G. Vittal Rao [(2012) 1 SCC 442].

9. The learned Senior Government Pleader also supported the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that if the judgment of the Tribunal is permitted to stand, the State will be bound by the said decision and will be burdened, since the State is the pay master.

10. We have carefully perused the available records of the appeal, including disciplinary proceedings produced by the petitioner and also perused the materials placed on record in this Civil Revision Petition. From the impugned judgment of the Tribunal, we notice that, as rightly argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Tribunal proceeded as if the rigor of proof required in the case of disciplinary proceedings is equal to that of a criminal trial. Similarly, the Tribunal reached to a conclusion that since a criminal case is pending against the 1st respondent, it would be appropriate to wait till the finalisation of the said criminal case to conclude the departmental enquiry also. At this juncture, it is relevant to note the judgments cited at the Bar on this point.

11. In Mohd. Yousuf Miya [(1997) 2 SCC 699], while considering the appeal by special leave against the stay of departmental proceedings till the completion of the prosecution launched by the Police for an offence punishable under Section 304, Part II, IPC, against the driver of a double-decker bus of A.P. Road Transport Corporation, the Apex Court held thus;

                  “6. The rival contentions give rise to the question; whether it would be right to stay the criminal proceedings pending departmental enquiry? This Court in Meena's case, [1996 AIR SCW 4160], had elaborately considered the entire case law including Kusheshwar Dubey's case, [AIR 1988 SC 2118], relieving the necessity to consider them once over. The Bench, to which one of us, K. Venkataswami, J., was a member, had concluded thus: (Paras 14 and 17 of AIR) "It would be evident from the above decisions that each of them, starts with the indisputable proposition that there is no legal bar for both proceedings to go on simultaneously and then say that in certain situations, it may not be 'desirable' 'advisable' or 'appropriate' to proceed with the disciplinary enquiry when a criminal case is pending on identical charges. The staying of disciplinary proceedings, it is emphasised, is a matter to be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of a given case and that no hard and fast rule can be enunciated in that behalf. The only ground suggested in the above decision as constituting a valid ground for staying the disciplinary proceedings is "that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced." This ground has, however, been hedged in by providing further that this may be done in cases of grave nature involving questions of fact and law. In our respectful opinion, it means that not only the charges must be grave but that the case must involve complicated questions of law and fact. Moreover, 'advisability', desirability' or 'propriety, as the case may be, has to be determined in each case taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances, of the case. The ground indicated in D. C. M., [AIR 1960 SC 806] and Tata Oil Mills [AIR 1965 SC 155], is not also an invariable rule. It is only a factor which will go into the scales while judging the advisability or desirability of staying disciplinary proceedings. One of the contending consideration is that the disciplinary enquiry cannot be and should not be delayed unduly. So far as criminal cases are concerned, it is well known that they drag on endlessly where high officials or persons holding high public officers are involved. They get bogged down on one or the other ground. They hardly even reach a prompt conclusion. That is the reality in spite of repeated advise and admonitions from this Court and the High Courts. If a criminal case is unduly delayed that may itself be a good ground for going ahead with the disciplinary enquiry even where the disciplinary proceedings are held over at an earlier stage. The interests of administration and good Government demand that these proceedings are concluded expeditiously. It must be remembered that these proceedings are concluded expeditiously. It must be remembered that undesirable elements are thrown out and any charge of misdemeanor is enquired into promptly. The disciplinary proceedings are meant nor really to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad elements. The interest of the delinquent officer also lies in a prompt conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. If he is not guilty of the charges, his honour should be indicated at the earliest possible moment and if he is guilty, he should be dealt with promptly according to law. it is not also in the interest of administration that persons accused of serious misdemeanour should be continued in office indefinitely, i.e., for long periods awaiting the result of criminal proceedings. It is not in the interest of administration. It only serves the interest of the guilty and dishonest. While it is not possible the enumerate to various factors, for and against the stay of disciplinary proceedings, we found it necessary to emphasise some of the important considerations in view of the fact that very often the disciplinary proceedings are being stayed for long periods pending criminal proceedings. Stay of disciplinary proceedings cannot be, and should not be, a matter of course. All the relevant factors for and against, should be weighed and a decision taken keeping in view the various principles laid down in the decisions referred to above." There is yet another reason. The approach and the objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings, the question is whether the offences registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Indian Penal Code, if any) are established and, if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending criminal proceedings, to repeat, should not be a matter of course not a considered decision. Even if stayed at one stage, the decision may require reconsideration if the criminal case gets unduly delayed."

                  We are in respectful agreement with the above view. The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of commission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may no be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. The enquiry in the departmental proceedings relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is not as high as in an offence in criminal charge. It is seen that invariably the departmental enquiry has to be conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate efficiency in public administration and the criminal trial will take its own course. The nature of evidence in criminal trial is entirely different from the departmental proceedings. In the former, prosecution is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the touchstone of human conduct. The standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial. The evidence also is different from the standard point of Evidence Act. The evidence required in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by Evidence Act. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances. In this case, we have seen that the charge is failure to anticipate the accident and prevention thereof. It has nothing to do with the culpability of the offence under Section 304 A and 338 IPC. Under these circumstances, the High Court was not right in staying the proceedings.”

[Underline supplied]

12. In Nemi Chand Nalwaya [(2011) 4 SCC 584], while considering the issue pertaining to the dismissal of the respondent therein who was working as a clerk in the appellant Bank for misappropriation of amount, the Apex Court held thus;

                  “6. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (vide B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, [(1995) 6 SCC 749], Union of India v. G. Gunayuthan, [(1997) 7 SCC 463], and Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, [(1999) 5 SCC 762], High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shahsi Kant S Patil, [(2001) 1 SCC 416].

                  8. Several witnesses were examined to prove the charge. One of them was H.S. Sharma who conducted the preliminary inquiry and to whom the respondent had made a statement broadly admitting the facts which constituted the subject matter of the second charge. I.M. Rawal, who was the cashier and I.C. Ojha, the officiating Branch Manager were also examined. Based upon their evidence, the Inquiry Officer found the respondent to be guilty of the second charge and that has been accepted by the disciplinary authority. The High Court has interfered with the said finding without expressly holding that the said finding of guilt was erroneous. The High Court has proceeded as if it was sitting in appeal over the departmental inquiry and interfered with the finding on a vague assumption that the respondent must have acted bonafide in an "increasing customer friendly atmosphere". There was no justification for the division bench to interfere with the finding of guilt.

                  9. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceedings invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the departmental proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non - challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him.”

[Underline supplied]

13. In M.G. Vittal Rao [(2012) 1 SCC 442], while considering the appeal against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, by which the appeal preferred by the appellant therein against the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition of the respondent-workman against the award of the Labour Court, the Apex Court held thus;

                  “8. DEPARTMENTAL ENQUIRY AND ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL CASE

                  The question of considering reinstatement after decision of acquittal or discharge by a competent criminal Court arises only and only if the dismissal from services was based on conviction by the criminal Court in view of the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, 1950, or analogous provisions in the statutory rules applicable in a case. In a case where enquiry has been held independently of the criminal proceedings, acquittal in a criminal Court is of no help. The law is otherwise. Even if a person stood acquitted by a criminal Court, domestic enquiry can be held, the reason being that the standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry and that in a criminal case are altogether different. In a criminal case, standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt while in a domestic enquiry it is the preponderance of probabilities that constitutes the test to be applied. In Nelson Motis v. Union of India and another, [AIR 1992 SC 1981 : 1992 (4) SCC 711], this Court held :

                  'The nature and scope of a criminal case are very different from those of a departmental disciplinary proceeding and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceeding.'

                  19. Thus, there can be no doubt regarding the settled legal proposition that as the standard of proof in both the proceedings is quite different, and the termination is not based on mere conviction of an employee in a criminal case, the acquittal of the employee in criminal case cannot be the basis of taking away the effect of departmental proceedings. Nor can such an action of the department be termed as double jeopardy. The judgment of this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) does not lay down the law of universal application. Facts, charges and nature of evidence etc. involved in an individual case would determine as to whether decision of acquittal would have any bearing on the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry.”

                  [Underline supplied]

14. From the principle that can be discernible from the aforesaid judgments, it is clear that for the conclusion of departmental enquiry, the disciplinary authority need not wait till the conclusion of the criminal proceedings initiated against the delinquent. The departmental enquiry as well as the criminal proceedings are on different footing. The acquittal in a criminal case registered in respect of the very same incident will have only a limited bearing in the disciplinary proceedings, which also, in exceptional circumstances.

15. In the instant case, the evidence of MWs 1, 3, 4, 5 and M18 statement were relied by the enquiry officer to find the 1st respondent responsible for the stealing of the cheque from the office room of the Principal of the College and presentation of the same to the Bank after forging the signature and seal of the Principal. The attending circumstances brought out in evidence by the examination of the witnesses were also taken into consideration by the enquiry officer to find the 1st respondent guilty of the charges levelled against him in the departmental proceedings. But the impugned judgment of the Tribunal would show that the Tribunal brushed aside the findings of the enquiry officer without proper appreciation of the evidence of these witnesses. In fact, the Tribunal ought not have reappreciated the evidence like a criminal trial, especially in the matter of departmental proceedings.

16. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, in the light of the judgments referred to supra, we find that the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is passed without proper appreciation of the evidence and materials on record, and hence it is liable to be set aside.

                  In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment dated 08.11.2004, passed by the Tribunal in Appeal No.2 of 2004 and the appeal stands dismissed.