Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, C.J.

1. Heard on the Application seeking condonation of delay of 116 days in filing the Appeal.

2. Learned Counsel for the Applicant/Appellant would submit that the delay occurred as the Appellant was indisposed and on recuperation, he promptly filed the Appeal.

3. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Respondent, referring to the provisions of Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 [PMLA] would submit the Appeal should be filed within 60 days from the date of communication of the order and the said period, on showing sufficient cause, is extendable for a further period not exceeding 60 days. As the Appellant failed to file the Appeal within the stipulated period and no sufficient cause is shown, the delay in filing cannot be condoned.

4. Before adverting to the merits of the submissions made on either side, it is seemly to reproduce Section 42 of the PMLA hereunder:

                   "42. Appeal to High Court.- Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an Appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law or fact arising out of such order:

                   Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the Appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.

                   Explanation : For the purposes of this section, "High Court" means-

                   (i) the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the aggrieved party ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; and

                   (ii) where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the Respondent, or in a case, where there are more than one Respondent, any of the Respondents, ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain."

5. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is luculent that any person aggrieved by the decision of Appellate Tribunal may file an Appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal. Proviso to Section 42 of the PMLA postulates that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the Appeal within the initial period of sixty days, may allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. It is, thus, clear that an Appeal has to be filed within sixty days and, on showing sufficient cause, the High Court can condone the delay up to a further period not exceeding sixty days. The usage of the words "not exceeding sixty days" in the aforesaid Proviso, enjoins the High Court from entertaining an Appeal filed beyond 120 days.

6. Apropos of the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the provisions of PMLA, it is becoming to refer to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as under:

                   "29. Savings.- (1) ? ? ?

                   (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any Suit, Appeal or Application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any Suit, Appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." (Emphasis supplied)

7. On a bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that where any special or local law prescribes for a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply only in so far as and to the extent which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

8. From a conjoint reading of Section 42 of the PMLA and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the inevitable conclusion that could be drawn is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked to condone the delay beyond 120 days prescribed under Section 42 of the PMLA and the proviso thereto. The proviso to Section 42 of the PMLA by mandating that "allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days" adjures exclusion of the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

9. At this juncture, it is propitious to refer to a Supreme Court decision in the case of Ketan V. Parekh v. Special Director, Directorate of Enforcement and another, 2011 (15) SCC 30, wherein, while interpreting Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, which also uses the words "not exceeding sixty days" and is akin to Section 42 of the PMLA, it has been held as under:

                   "17. The question whether the High Court can entertain an Appeal under Section 35 of the Act beyond 120 days does not require much debate and has to be answered against the Appellants in view of the law laid down in Union of India v. Popular Construction Company, 2001 (8) SCC 470; Singh Enterprises v. CCE, 2008 (3) SCC 70; Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise v. Punjab Fibres Ltd., 2008 (3) SCC 73 ..." (Emphasis supplied)

10. In Chhatisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others, 2010 (5) SCC 23, the Supreme Court held that outer limit for filing of an Appeal is 120 days and there is no provision in the Electricity Act, 2003 empowering the Court to entertain an Appeal after more than 120 days delay. The relevant observations are as under:

                   "25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an Appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an Appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing Appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing Appeals under Sections 111(2) & 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of the expression "within a further period of not exceeding 60 days" in the proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an Appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an Appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days.

                   ? ? ?

                   32. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an Appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an Appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and Proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory." (Emphasis supplied)

11. It needs to be emphasised that while interpreting the period of limitation as contemplated under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Proviso thereto which stipulates that "Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the Application within the said period of three months it may entertain the Application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter", the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., 2001 (4) CTC 213 (SC) : 2001 (8) SCC 470, has held that applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to a petition filed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is excluded.

12. We do not intend to burden our Judgment with other authorities. Suffice it to say that the legal position in this regard has been very well settled that the delay cannot be condoned beyond the maximum period of condonation provided under the law, particularly when the law prohibits condonation by using an expression "not exceeding".

13. Accordingly, the Application for condonation of delay is dismissed. Consequently, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal stands rejected at the SR stage.

14. Learned Counsel for the Applicant/Appellant prays that the order-in-original may be returned to him, as he intends to take other remedies, if available to him under the law. Prayer is allowed. The original Order is directed to be returned to the Counsel for the Petitioner after retaining a photocopy.