1. The sole accused in Crime No.22 of 2023 of Kollam East Police Station, has filed this appeal under Section 14A of the Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (as amended), 2018 (`SC/ST(POA) Act', for short) challenging the order in Crl.M.P.No.121/2025 whereby the learned Special Court under the SC/ST (POA) Act, Kottarakkara, dismissed the regular bail application filed by the appellant.

2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/accused as well as the learned Senior Public Prosecutor in detail. Although notice was served upon the 3rd respondent, she did not turn up. Perused the impugned order.

3. The prosecution case is that the accused committed offences punishable under Sections 376, 302 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code (`IPC’ for short) as well as under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST(POA) Act. The case of the prosecution is that the accused, who doesn’t belong to either Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community, had taken the deceased, who is the daughter of the defacto complainant, a member of a Scheduled Caste community, at 4.30 p.m on 29.12.2022 to Kollam beach and he had committed rape on her. Thereafter he murdered the daughter of the defacto complainant by causing asphyxia. Besides that the accused robbed Rs.2,500/- and mobile phone of the victim also from her bag.

4. While seeking interference in the order impugned, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that, the order of the learned Special Judge dismissing the second bail application filed by the appellant on the ground of dismissal of Crl.Appeal No.124/2025 earlier filed, challenging dismissal of the earlier bail application as per order dated 11.02.2025, is not justifiable. The learned Special Judge ought to have considered the same on merits and passed an appropriate order in accordance with law. He also argued that in consideration of the custody of the appellant from 05.01.2023 and the delay in trial, the appellant may be released on bail.

5. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor strongly opposed interference in the order impugned and submitted that the accused could not be released on bail when considering the manner in which he had committed the offence. According to him, the accused has involvement in another case, viz., Crime No.2040/2019 of Kadakkal Police Station, Kollam, where the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Sections 376 AB of IPC and Sections 3(b), 4(2), 5(m)(n) and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (`POCSO Act’ for short) and the victim therein is none other than the sister of the accused. Therefore, the release of the petitioner in this case cannot be considered and he doesn’t deserve bail. Moreover, the plight of the sister, who is the victim in Crime No.2040/2019, would also be in peril if he would be released on bail.

6. On perusal of the prosecution records, it is well discernible that the accused, who is not a member of the SC/ST community, had taken the daughter of the defacto complainant to Kollam beach at 4.30 p.m at 29.12.2022 and thereafter he sexually molested her in a house. Thereafter the accused murdered the daughter of the defacto complainant at the kitchen of the house, by closing her nose and mouth, and thereby causing asphyxia to avoid hue and cry of the victim. Thereafter the dead body was abandoned by the accused. Therefore, the allegations are very serious, particularly, the manner in which the murder had been committed is significant. It is true that the appellant has been in custody from 05.01.2023. It is relevant to note that the accused alleged to have sexually molested his own sister and for which Crime No.2040/2019 for the offences punishable under Sections 376 AB of IPC and Sections 3(b), 4(2), 5(m)(n) and 6 of the POCSO Act was also registered. Thus, the appellant/accused got involved in two crimes of serious nature, including sexual molestation and the commission of murder of the victim of sexual assault by causing asphyxia. These are aggravating factors when considering bail.

7. Although the facts involved are as stated above, the point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant would deserve consideration. In the instant case, when an application for regular bail had been filed by the appellant herein for the second time, the learned Special Judge dismissed the same on the sole ground that the Criminal Appeal filed challenging the dismissal of the earlier bail application was dismissed by this Court. In this context, it is pertinent to note that in ordinary cases, when an appeal challenging a verdict was dismissed by the appellate court, the trial court could not consider the issues or points decided by the appellate or revisional court in view of the doctrine of merger, resjudicata etc. and the said legal position is well settled. The essentials to apply the principle of merger are :

                  (1) Exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction.

                  (2) Issuance of notice to the respondents.

                  (3) Hearing of the issue raised in the appeal or revision

                  (4) Pronouncement of a verdict in the appeal or revision either by confirming or by reversing the verdict.

                  Thus when an appellate court or a court of revision actually examines the merit of the case, and passes a verdict, the doctrine of merger may come into play and the same disarm the trial court to revisit the issues involved and the finding in the appeal or revision.

8. But there are exceptions to the doctrine of merger. When coming to SC/ST (POA) Act, the same is a special enactment. As per Section 14A of the SC/ST (POA) Act, an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order to the High Court. Therefore, an order dismissing a bail application by the Special Judge is `an order’ appealable under Section 14A of the SC/ST (POA) Act. When considering a bail application filed by an accused before the Special Court for the second time or after dismissal of successive bail applications and dismissal of the appeals thereof, if the doctrine of merger is made applicable, the right of the accused to move for bail on changed circumstances would be taken away. Be it so, after dismissal of an application for bail filed by the accused involved in a case under the SC/ST (POA) Act, if he fails to get an order granting bail to him upto the Apex Court, he could not move before the Special Court with the plea of bail at all on change in circumstances and other grounds. Therefore, the doctrine of merger or the dismissal of appeal or appeals by the appellate court challenging dismissal of the earlier bail applications by an accused in a case involving SC/ST (POA) Act offence/s would not bar the accused for filing a subsequent bail application before the Special Court on pleading change in circumstances and if such bail application/bail applications would be filed, the Special Court should consider the same on merits and pass orders thereof, for which doctrine of merger or resjudicata has no application.

9. Therefore, as argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Special Judge should not have dismissed the second bail application moved by the accused and should have considered it on merits, since the dismissal of the appeal filed against the earlier order rejecting bail could not be a bar for consideration of the second bail application moved urging change in circumstances, on merits. Therefore, the order is held to be illegal, and as a necessary consequence thereof, the said order is set aside. The bail application is remanded back to the Special Court to consider and pass orders on merits.

10. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The appellant is directed to appear before the Special Court on 23.02.2026.

                  Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Special Judge  for  Offences  under  SC/ST  (POA)  Act  offences,

                  Kottarakkara, for information and compliance.