Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. The sole accused in S.C. No.476/2018 on the file of the Additional Sessions Court-I (Special Court for the trial of cases on Atrocities Against Women and Children), Kasaragod has preferred this appeal challenging the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed against him for offences punishable under Sections 324, 506(2), 376(2)(f)(n) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).

2. The prosecution allegation in the said case is that the accused, who is the stepfather of PW3 a minor girl aged 13 years, on 02.04.2018, between 04:00 a.m and 07:30 a.m, threatened PW3 as well as her mother (PW12), by showing a knife and also inflicted an injury on the left palm of PW3 with the said knife and committed rape on her in the presence of PW12 after putting both of them in fear of death. It is further alleged that on a previous occasion also the accused committed rape on PW3. Hence, the accused is alleged to have committed offences punishable under Sections 324, 506(2), 376(2)(f),(n) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5(l)(n)(p) r/w Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).

3. Based on the statement given by the victim minor girl, a case was registered as Crime No.214/2018 of Kumbala Police Station. Thereafter, the investigation into the crime followed, and pursuant to that, a final report was filed before the Additional Sessions Court-I, Kasaragod (Special Court for the trial of cases related to Atrocities against Women and Children). The learned Special Judge took cognizance of the offences, and the case was taken on file as S.C. No.476/2018. As the accused had been in judicial custody since the time of his arrest in connection with the case, the learned Additional Sessions Judge secured his presence by issuing a production warrant. Upon production of the accused, the procedure prescribed under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was duly complied with.

4. After hearing both sides under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., and perusal of records, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, framed a written charge against the accused for offences punishable under Sections 324, 506(2), 376(2)(f)(n) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).

5. When the charge was read over and explained to the accused, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution thereupon examined 13 witnesses as PW1 to PW13 and marked Exts. P1 to P22. MO1 to MO4 were exhibited and identified. After the completion of the prosecution's evidence, the accused was questioned under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., during which he denied all the incriminating materials brought out against him in evidence. Since it was not a fit case to acquit the accused under Section 232 of the Cr.P.C., the accused was directed to enter on his defence and adduce any evidence that he may have in support thereof. But no evidence whatsoever was adduced from the side of the accused.

6. After trial, the accused was found guilty of offences punishable under Sections 324, 506(2), 376(2)(f),(n) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5(l)(n) r/w Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The accused was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, that is, imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life, and to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) with a default clause to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years under Section 376(2)(f) &(n) of the IPC. For the offences punishable under Sections 324 and 506(ii) of the Indian Penal Code, the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and three years, respectively. By virtue of the provision under Section 42 of the POCSO Act, no separate sentence was awarded for the offence punishable under Section 6 r/w 5(l)&(n) of the POCSO Act.

7. This is a case in which a minor girl aged 13 years was allegedly raped and subjected to penetrative sexual assault by her stepfather, the accused. There is a specific allegation that the accused perpetrated the said act after putting the minor girl as well as her mother in fear of death after showing a knife and inflicting an injury on her left palm with the knife. The law was set in motion in this case on the strength of the FIS given by the victim minor girl, on 02.04.2018 at 10:30 a.m., a few hours after the incident, to the women Police Constable attached to Kumbla Police Station.

8. The victim girl, who lodged the FIS in this case, when examined as PW3, deposed that she is now 14 years of age and has been residing in a Children’s Home since April 2018. Previously, she was residing in a rented house at Panchathotti along with her mother, stepfather and brother. Her father abandoned her mother during her tender age. Thereafter onwards her mother was residing with her stepfather, who is the accused in this case. The accused was a drunkard and was in the habit of assaulting her as well as her mother after drinking liquor. On 02.04.2018, at 04:00 a.m., while she was sleeping in her bedroom, she heard a knocking sound. Hearing the same, she woke up from sleep and opened the door. She then found the accused standing in front of her room, placing a knife on her mother’s neck and threatening to kill her. Thereafter, the accused took her to his room and demanded to remove her dress. But she did not heed his demand. Then the accused brandished a knife towards her and threatened to do away with her as well as her mother if she did not remove the dress. By the act of the accused, the knife fell on her left palm, and she sustained injury. Scared of the accused, she then removed her leggings. Then the accused demanded her to lay on the cot. When she hesitated, the accused caught hold of her neck and forcefully caused her to lie on the cot. Suddenly, the accused removed his dress and lay on her top and penetrated his penis into her vagina and committed rape on her in the presence of her mother. When her mother raised alarm, the accused assaulted her. When she asked the accused to leave her for urinating, the accused allowed her to go to the bathroom. When she returned from the bathroom, the accused made a demand to repeat the same at night also. Thereafter, the accused fell asleep by lying in the hall room. At that time, she, along with her mother, went Kumbla Police Station and gave a statement to the police. Ext.P3 is the statement given by her. Then the police seized the dress materials worn by her after providing her with another dress to wear. PW3 identified MO1 and MO2 as the dress that she wore at the time of the incident in this case. Thereafter, she was taken to General Hospital, Kasaragod. She had disclosed the entire matter to the doctor. Subsequently, she gave a statement to the Judicial Magistrate, Kasaragod. Ext.P4 is the statement given by her. Thereafter onwards she was residing at a shelter home named ‘Mahilamandiram’ at Paravanadukkam. When PW3 was confronted with a knife, she identified it as the same knife used by the accused to threaten and injure her. According to PW3, her date of birth is 30.09.2004. When the incident occurred, she was aged only 13 years old and was studying in the 8th standard. Previously, on 31.03.2018, at night time, the accused had forcibly dragged her to the kitchen and committed rape on her after causing her to lie upon the kitchen floor. Moreover, on many days prior to the first incident, the accused came to her room and had laid on her top, and when she raised voice, he left the room. It is the version of PW3 that her elder sister, who is now 16 years old, had shifted her residence to the house of her grandmother in Karnataka, as she is scared of the accused.

9. When the mother of the victim was examined as PW12, she deposed that the accused is her second husband, and she had three children in her first marriage. PW3 is the younger daughter born in her first marriage. However, regarding the material aspect of the case, she had shown disloyalty to the prosecution by testifying that an incident in which PW3 was sexually assaulted by her second husband had never occurred. Although the learned Public Prosecutor was permitted to put questions as provided under Section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act, nothing was brought out to prove the case of the prosecution. Despite this, PW12 admitted that PW3 is presently residing in a shelter home because she is afraid of the accused, and she further admitted that it was she who took PW3 to the Police Station on 02.04.2018. According to PW12, the accused assaulted her on that date, but nothing was done to PW3. Finally, PW12 admitted that her son was not present in the house on 02.04.2018.

10. Before delving into the question as to whether the solitary testimony of PW3, the victim girl, can form the basis for conviction in this case, it is worthwhile to refer to the medical evidence adduced. The doctor who conducted the medical examination of the victim immediately after the incident was examined as PW2. PW2 deposed before the Court that she examined the victim on 02.04.2018 at 2:30 p.m., and the certificate issued by her was marked as Ext. P2. Referring to Ext. P2, PW2 stated that on examination, she noted an abrasion measuring 1 × 1 cm on the left palm and another abrasion of the same size on the left side of the neck of the victim. According to the doctor, on local examination, the hymen was found torn, fresh, at the 6 o’clock position. PW2 further deposed that the alleged history was one of sexual assault by the stepfather, namely Abdul Kareem, and also assault with a knife. During her examination, the doctor categorically opined that the findings were consistent with the alleged time of occurrence, that there was evidence of vaginal penetration, and that the external injuries appeared fresh and consistent with the alleged time of occurrence.

11. While analyzing the evidence adduced in this case, it can be seen that PW3, the victim of the offence, is the solitary witness to prove the charge levelled against the accused. On examination before the court, PW3 had portrayed the entire matter transpired in the early morning of 02.04.2018, where she was sexually assaulted by her stepfather. She unequivocally deposed that the accused committed the heinous act after placing both her and her mother in fear of death by showing a knife.

12. Notably, there is no preposition of law that the evidence of a prosecutrix must always be corroborated by other independent evidence to be acted upon. On the other hand, uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix can be the sole basis for a conviction in a rape case if the same inspires confidence of the court. In Gurcharan Singh V. State of Haryana [(1972) 2 SCC 749], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that “A prosecutrix cannot be considered as an accomplice and therefore her testimony cannot be equated with that of an accomplice in an offence. As a rule of prudence, however court normally looks for some corroboration of her testimony so as to satisfy its conscience that she is telling the truth and that the person accused of rape on her has not been falsely implicated”.

13.    Likewise, in Aman Kumar and another Vs. State of Haryana[(2004) 4 SCC 379], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that “It is well settled that prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the Court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice would suffice”. The Hon'ble apex court in the State of Punjab V. Gurmit Singh and Others (1996 (2) SCC 384) held that “The courts must, while evaluating evidence remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self inflicted is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable”.

14. Keeping in mind the above principles governing the appreciation of the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence, and reverting to the testimony of PW3, it can be seen that her evidence is of such a nature as to inspire the confidence of the Court. She withstood cross-examination successfully, and her testimony is free from contradictions and omissions, even of a minor nature. Notably, the medical evidence clearly reveals that the victim was subjected to medical examination immediately after the incident. The testimony of the doctor who conducted the examination, coupled with the certificate issued by her, unequivocally demonstrates that the medical findings included a torn hymen, which was a fresh injury. Therefore, we find no hesitation in concluding that the evidence of PW3 is well corroborated by the medical evidence adduced in this case.

15. We are not unmindful of the hostility shown by the victim’s mother towards the prosecution case when she was examined as PW12. However, the same is not a reason to doubt the evidence of PW3, the victim of the offence, particularly since her testimony finds sufficient corroboration from the medical evidence adduced in this case. Moreover, the evidence on record establishes that, subsequent to the incident, the victim has been residing in a shelter home, while her mother continues to live with her second husband. In such circumstances, PW12 may be inclined to preserve her marital relationship and may not be interested in jeopardizing the same. Therefore, the hostility exhibited by PW12 need not influence the mind of the Court so as to disbelieve the evidence of PW3, the victim.

16. Furthermore, the evidence of PW3 reveals that her date of birth is 30.09.2004 and that she was an eighth standard student at the time the offence was committed. The oral testimony of PW3 with regard to her age remained unchallenged during cross-examination. Therefore, the said uncontroverted evidence can safely be relied upon to establish the minority of the victim. Moreover, Ext. P5, the extract of the school admission register maintained by the concerned school and marked through the Headmaster of the school (PW4), also reveals that the date of birth of the victim girl is 30.09.2004. Hence, on the basis of the unchallenged testimony of the victim and the documentary evidence adduced in this case, the prosecution has conclusively established that the victim was a minor on the date of occurrence.

17.    It is now relevant to refer to the principle of reverse burden contained in Section 29 of the POCSO Act, which provides that: “Where a person is prosecuted for committing, or abetting the commission of, any offence under Sections 3, 5, 7, or 9 of the Act, the special court shall presume that such person has committed, abetted, or attempted to commit the offence, as the case may be, unless the contrary is proved.” As the prosecution has proved the foundational facts necessary to attract the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, namely, the minority of the victim, the commission of acts falling within the penal provisions of the Act, and the involvement of the accused, the said statutory presumption stands attracted. However, the accused has miserably failed to rebut the presumption even by the preponderance of probabilities.

18.    The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that PW3, a minor girl, has provided a clear, consistent, and cogent account of the sexual assault committed by her stepfather after intimidating her. Her testimony remains substantially consistent and thoroughly inspires the confidence of this Court. The matter was reported to the police without any delay, and the prompt lodging of the FIR effectively rules out any possibility of exaggeration, embellishment, and deliberation. Furthermore, the medical evidence clearly reveals that a tear of the hymen was noted during the medical examination, and this injury was fresh, thereby lending strong corroboration to the evidence of PW3, the victim. As already stated, the prosecution has successfully proved the foundational facts necessary to attract the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act. The burden thus shifted to the accused to rebut the presumption, which he has failed to discharge. There exists no reason, much less a compelling one, to disbelieve or discard the testimony of PW3.

19. Therefore, we confirm the findings and conviction recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Court–I (Special Court for the Trial of Cases Relating to Atrocities Against Women and Children), Kasaragod, for the offences punishable under Sections 324, 506(ii), and 376(2)(f) & (n) of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 6 read with Section 5(l)(n) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. While considering the sentence imposed, it cannot be ignored that the accused is none other than the stepfather of the minor victim, who occupied a position of trust in relation to her. By violating his legal and moral obligation to protect her, he committed a grave breach of trust. In view of the provisions contained in Section 42 of the POCSO Act, the learned Special Judge sentenced the accused only under Sections 376(2)(f) & (n) of the IPC, and no separate sentence was imposed for the offence punishable under Section 6 read with Section 5(l)(n) of the POCSO Act. The sentences imposed by the trial court were commensurate with the nature and gravity of the offence committed by the accused. Accordingly, no interference is required in respect of the sentence.

                  In the result, the appeal stands dismissed.