Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The applicant in O.A.No.2182 of 2018 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram (the ‘Tribunal’, in short) filed this original petition, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P4 order dated 18.12.2019 passed by the Tribunal in that original application.

2. Going by the averments in the original petition, the petitioner approached the Tribunal by filing O.A.No.2182 of 2018 invoking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking an order to set aside Annexure A10 order dated 03.09.2018 issued by the Government rejecting the request of the petitioner, praying to reckon his entire service in Kerala State Land Use Board (‘KSLUB’ in short) from 01.04.1998 till he was regularised in service on 25.08.2005 for pensionary benefits. The petitioner has further sought an order directing the respondents to modify Annexure A5 order dated 25.08.2005 issued by the Government sanctioning creation of six supernumerary posts of Geological Assistants in KSLUB to accommodate the senior Scientists working on contract basis with effect from 01.04.1998; and also an order directing the respondents to modify Annexure A7 order dated 12.10.2011 regularising the petitioner in the KSLUB with effect from 01.04.1998.

3. According to the petitioner, he was appointed as Stipendary Earth Scientist for the Panchayath level Resources Mapping Programme in accordance with G.O.(MS) No.48/90/Plg. dated 15.12.1990 in the Centre for Earth Science (‘CESS’ in short) from 22.04.1991 onwards. The Panchayat Resources Mapping (‘PRM’ in short) was done by the CESS till 31.03.1998, which was later transferred to KSLUB under the Planning Board. As directed by the Government, he reported in the KSLUB on 01.04.1998 in the post of Project Scientist. He was appointed as Senior Scientist in KSLUB on 22.04.1999 after undergoing a selection process, including an interview. The 1st respondent by Annexure A7 order dated 12.10.2011 regularised his service from 25.08.2005. The petitioner retired from service on 31.05.2018. Before his retirement, he approached the Government, praying to reckon his entire service in KSLUB from 01.04.1998 for pensionary benefits, and also filed O.A. No.448 of 2018 before the Tribunal, which was disposed directing the Government to pass appropriate orders on his representation. The 1st respondent by Annexure A10 order dated 03.09.2018 rejected his claim. Thereafter the petitioner approached the Tribunal with the present original application.

4. In the original application on behalf of the 1st respondent, a reply statement dated 14.08.2019 was filed opposing the reliefs sought by the petitioner. To that reply statement, the petitioner filed a rejoinder dated 25.09.2019.

5. After hearing both sides and on appreciation of materials on record, the Tribunal, by the impugned Ext.P4 order dated 18.12.2019, dismissed the original application. Paragraphs 7, 8 and the last paragraph of that order read thus:

                  “7. Heard both sides. The applicant relies on the judgment in Netram Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh (in Civil Appeal No.1254 of 2018), a copy of which has been produced as Annexure A11. In that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider an appeal filed by a Pump Operator from Chhattisgarh. He worked on a temporary basis from 01.04.1986 till he was regularised on 06.05.2008 and retired from service on 30.07.2011. His claim for gratuity during the period of temporary service had been allowed by the Controlling Authority, and the appeal filed by the State was dismissed by the appellate authority. However, the Writ Petition filed by the State before the Hon'ble High Court of Chhattisgarh was allowed, and a Writ Appeal filed by the employee was dismissed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the claim for gratuity, considering that the employee had regular service for 25 years and that his appointment had since been regularised. We are of the view that the case of the applicant was different, in that he was working under different entities during his temporary service. He was first appointed on daily wage basis under CESS and later under the State Land Use Board. The posts in these two departments were also different, as well as post in which the applicant was finally regularised. It would be clear from the materials produced that the appointments under CESS and the State Land Use Board were for the purpose of a project, and not regular appointments against sanctioned posts.

                  8. As regards the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala referred to above also, we are of the view that the facts are distinguishable. The petitioners therein were recruited and continued in service at a time when trained Leprosy Health Inspectors were not available. The Hon'ble High Court had also considered the national and social importance of the Leprosy Eradication Programme as crucial factors in granting the benefits sought by the appellants. We are of the view that the facts of that case were totally different from the facts of the present case. Therefore, the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble High Court in that case is not applicable here.

                  In view of the above, we find that the applicant has not been able to substantiate his contentions. The Original Application is accordingly dismissed”.

6. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the original application, the petitioner is now before this Court with this original petition.

7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Senior Government Pleader.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner worked in KSLUB from 01.04.1998 in the post of Project Scientist. He was appointed as Senior Scientist on 22.04.1999. However, his service was regularised only from 25.08.2005. He retired from service on 31.05.2018. He is entitled to reckon his past service in KSLUB till regularisation, which was not favourably considered by the Government in spite of repeated representations. The learned counsel further submitted that there were no special rules in KSLUB till the year 2013, and the special rules were published only by Annexure A8 Government Order dated 30.10.2013. In support of his argument regarding entitlement to reckon his entire service in KSLUB on contract basis from 01.04.1998 till 25.08.2005, the learned Counsel relied on the judgments of the Apex Court as well as this Court, such as Laila T.M v. State of Kerala [2014 (3) KLT 754], Francis K.L v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Tvm [2015 (2) KHC 1], Netram Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh [2018 (5) SCC 430], Uday Pratap Thakur v. State of Bihar [ AIR 2023 SC 2971], Vinod Kumar v. Union of India [2024 (9) SCC 327] and Girija C v. State of Kerala [2025 KHC Online 10459].

9. On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that from Annexure A2 order, it is clear that the petitioner was appointed in KSLUB with effect from 01.04.1998 only on a daily wage basis. It was on consolidated pay of Rs.5000/-, the petitioner was engaged in KSLUB. Annexure A3 and A4 orders passed by the Land Use Commissioner also prove the same. As per Annexure A5 Government Order dated 25.08.2005, while absorbing some persons by creating six supernumerary posts of Geological Assistants in the KSLUB, it was made clear that the said absorption will have a prospective effect only. All persons will be fitted at the starting stage in the scale of pay mentioned in that order, and the eldest will be considered as the senior most. From Annexure A6 order dated 01.03.2011 issued by the Government it is evident that as per the Government Order dated 07.09.2009, as directed in W.P.(C)No.10623 of 2006 by this Court the request of the petitioners therein for absorption in service was considered and the Government rejected the request on finding that they have no legal right or claim under any law for regularisation against any post in the KSLUB. However, the Government converted the six supernumerary posts of Geological Assistants sanctioned in KSLUB into regular posts prospectively and absorbed the six Geological Assistants working against the above posts. The order dated 07.09.2009 rejecting the request for regularisation was not challenged by the petitioner. In fact, Annexure A9 order dated 02.04.2018 was obtained by the petitioner from the Tribunal by suppressing the order dated 07.09.2009 passed by the Government. The learned Senior Government Pleader vehemently argued that there is no illegality in the impugned order of the Tribunal, and hence no interference is needed in the said order. In support of the contentions of the respondents that the petitioner is not entitled to regularisation of the period he worked on a contract basis, the learned Senior Government Pleader relied on the judgment of this Court dated 18.06.2025 in O.P.(KAT) No.97 of 2025, and that of the Apex Court dated 07.10.2021 in Civil Appeal Nos. 5689-5690 of 2021.

10. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the request of the petitioner is not for regularisation but for reckoning the temporary service period for pensionary benefits. Without regularisation, the said benefit can be given to the petitioner.

11. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

12. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

13. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.

14. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

15. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.

16. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or Tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or Tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

17.    A Division Bench of this Court in Laila T.M. [2014 (3) KLT 754], while considering the effect of the Government order that the appellants therein who were working as Leprosy Inspectors in the Health Service Department were not entitled to count their past service while regularising their service, held thus:

                  “16. Writ petitioners and others who were temporarily appointed as Leprosy Inspectors have worked for nearly two decades discharging such duties and responsibilities after being put to six months' training for such purpose. Though they would have executed bonds as dictated by the executive hierarchy in Government and governance, we cannot ignore their then abysmal bargaining power in that regard. Having extracted labour, they cannot be left high and dry. The need based recruitment and the training conferred on the temporary appointees were with the specific purpose of getting them trained and making themselves available to discharge duties and functions in connection with the implementation of a cardinal and crucial project of national importance, namely, leprosy management. In this land of India, much need not be stated to recall the necessity of such programmes and the requirement of people to man those projects. Efforts taken by national icons of yesteryears, including the Father of the Nation, Mahatma Gandhiji, should provide constitutional pulsation in such a situation. The refusal to count past services of the writ appellants for any service benefits, including pension is irrational, inhuman, illogical, unreasonable and arbitrary. It amounts to negation of the Fundamental Rights enshrined in Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India. It is unreasonable and arbitrary to exclude the appellants from the benefits of counting their past services for all service benefits including pension.”

(Underline supplied)

18. A Full Bench of this Court in Francis K.L. [2015 (2) KHC 1], while answering a reference made by a three-Judge Bench, doubting in the correctness of a Full Bench decision in District Transport Officer v. Kunchan [2009 (3) KHC 891], in answering the issue whether the petitioners therein were entitled to reckon their daily wage period of working as a driver in the KSRTC for the purpose of pension and other issues held thus:

                  “49. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that the Full Bench judgment does not lay down the correct law. Our answer to the issues as framed above are as follows:

                  "i) The Full Bench judgment of this Court in District Transport Officer v. Kunchan, 2009 (3) KHC 891 : 2009 (3) KLT 954 (FB) : ILR 2009 (3) Ker. 808 does not lay down the correct law in holding that daily wage period of Drivers, Conductors and mechanical staff in the KSRTC is eligible for the purpose of pension only when the appointment was made subsequent to the recommendation in favour of the employees by the Kerala Public Service Commission. No such restriction can be read in Clause XXIII - 3 of the settlement.

                  ii) The petitioners in the Writ Petitions before us, including in WA Nos.149 and 150 of 2010 were entitled to reckon their daily wage period of working for the purpose of pension in addition to their period of regular service.

                  iii) Clause XXIII - 3 of the settlement dated 13.04.1999 is binding on the KSRTC. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi (3) and Others [2006 KHC 507 : 2006 (4) SCC 1 : 2006 (2) KLT SN 70 : AIR 2006 SC 1809 : JT 2006 (4) SC 420 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753 : 2006 (3) LLN 78 : 2006 (3) SLR 1 : 2006 (2) CLR 261 : 2006 (42) AIC 935 (SC)] was not applicable while interpreting Clause XXIII - 3 of the settlement dated 13.04.1999.

                  In the result, all the above cases are decided in the following manner:

                  (a) W.P.(C) Nos.31599 of 2009, 7910 of 2013 and 15379 of 2013 are disposed of with the following directions:

                  I) The decision of the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation rejecting the claim of the petitioners to reckon their period of provisional/daily wage services is set aside.

                  II) We hold that the petitioners are entitled to count their provisional/daily wage services rendered prior to their regular appointment for the purpose of pensionary benefits.

                  III) The Managing Director of the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation is directed to issue necessary consequential orders by adding the provisional/daily wage services of the petitioners for pensionary benefits within a period of one month from the date of production of a copy of this judgment before the Managing Director.

                  IV) The Managing Director of the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation is further directed to release the consequential pensionary benefits to the petitioners within a further period of two months.

                  (b) WA Nos. 149 and 150 of 2010 are dismissed. However, there shall be directions in WP (C) Nos. 30374 of 2008 and 2596 of 2009, giving rise to WA Nos. 149 and 150 of 2010, to the same effect as noted above in direction No. (a).

                  (c) WP (C) Nos. 7032 and 7816 of 2013 are disposed of with the following directions:

                  i) The petitioners shall be entitled to reckon their provisional period of service prior to their regular appointment on the advice of the Kerala Public Service Commission for the purpose of pension.

                  ii) The petitioners' claim for adding their provisional period for the purpose of seniority is left open to be decided by the Managing Director of the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, in the event the petitioners submit representation to that effect within a period of one month from today”.        (underline supplied)

19.    In Netram Sahu [2018 (5) SCC 430] the question which arose for consideration before the Apex Court is whether the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur was justified in holding that the appellant therein was not entitled to claim gratuity from the State for the services rendered by him or in other words whether the appellant can be held to have rendered qualified service that is continuous service as specified in Section 2(e) read with Section 2A of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, so as to make him eligible to claim gratuity from the State. In the said judgment, the Apex Court held thus:

                  “16. In our considered opinion, once the State regularized the services of the appellant while he was in State services, the appellant became entitled to count his total period of service for claiming the gratuity amount subject to his proving continuous service of 5 years as specified under Section 2A of the Act which, in this case, the appellant has duly proved.

                  17. In the circumstances appearing in the case, it would be the travesty of justice, if the appellant is denied his legitimate claim of gratuity despite rendering "continuous service" for a period of 25 years which even, according to the State, were regularized. The question as to from which date such services were regularized was of no significance for calculating the total length of service for claiming gratuity amount once the services were regularized by the State.”      (underline supplied)

20. In Uday Pratap Thakur [AIR 2023 SC 2971] the Apex Court considered the issue whether the entire service rendered by the work charged employees, who were subsequently regularised under the Work Charged Establishment shall have to be counted and/or considered for the determination of the amount of pension after the work charged employees are regularised as per Work Charged Establishment Revised Service Conditions (Repealing) Rules, 2013. In that judgment, the Apex Court, by relying on the judgment in Prem Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2019) 10 SCC 516], held that in Prem Singh, the Apex Court has not observed and held that the entire service rendered as work charged shall be considered/counted for the quantum of pension/pension. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Prem Singh, therefore, would be restricted to the counting of service rendered as work charged for qualifying service for pension.

21. In Vinod Kumar [(2024) 9 SCC 327], the Apex Court, while considering the claim of the appellants therein to recognise the substantive nature of their duties which align with regular employment rather than temporary or scheme-based roles they were originally appointed for, held thus:

                  “8. In light of the reasons recorded above, this Court finds merit in the appellants' arguments and holds that their service conditions, as evolved over time, warrant a reclassification from temporary to regular status. The failure to recognize the substantive nature of their roles and their continuous service akin to permanent employees runs counter to the principles of equity, fairness, and the intent behind employment regulations.”

(Underline supplied)

22. In Girija C. [2025 KHC Online 10459], a learned Single Judge of this Court, while considering the claim of Spinning/Weaving Instructors of Kerala Khadi and Village Industries Board for counting prior service before regularisation for pensionary benefits, held thus:

                  “29. Taking note of the parameters laid down in the judgments noted above and also the observations made above, I deem it appropriate to direct the Government to reconsider the case of the petitioners for counting their period of service before their regularisation as qualifying service for the purpose of pensionary benefits without changing the date of regularisation. A relook is necessary given the position of law stated above. To enable the above exercise, the impugned orders are quashed. There will be a direction to the Principal Secretary of Industries or the competent among the Government Secretaries to reconsider the claims of the petitioners after giving notice to them or their representatives and other affected parties and to take a fresh decision within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment”.

(Underline supplied)

23. We have carefully perused the materials placed on record, the impugned order of the Tribunal and appreciated the arguments addressed at the Bar. The petitioner was appointed on a daily wage basis under the Centre for Earth Science from 22.04.1991 onwards. He started working in KSLUB on a daily wage basis with effect from 01.04.1998. By Annexure A7 order, his service was regularised with effect from 25.08.2005. He superannuated on 31.05.2018. It is true that in Annexure A7 order dated 12.10.2011, it was stated that the petitioner and other employees who were absorbed along with him are entitled to service benefits with effect from 25.08.2005 alone. Similarly, from Annexure A6 order dated 01.03.2011, it is clear that the request for regularisation previously made by the petitioner and the other five employees was rejected by the Government as per order dated 07.09.2009. This fact was not disclosed by the petitioner while filing O.A.No.448 of 2018 before the Tribunal, in which Annexure A9 order dated 02.04.2018 was passed. The petitioner did not challenge the Government order dated 07.09.2009 or the subsequent Government orders referred to supra, rejecting his request for regularisation. In such circumstances, it is only to be held that the petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of the period he worked as a daily wage employee. At the same time, from the principle that can be drawn from the aforementioned judgments such as Laila T.M [2014 (3) KLT 754], Francis K.L [2015 (2) KHC 1], Netram Sahu [2018 (5) SCC 430], Uday Pratap Thakur [AIR 2023 SC 2971], Vinod Kumar [2024 (9) SCC 327], and Girija C [2025 KHC Online 10459], it is only to be held that the petitioner is entitled to count his provisional/daily wage services rendered prior to regular appointment, for the purpose of pensionary benefits, without changing the date of regularisation.

24. Though the learned Senior Government Pleader relied on the judgment of this Court in O.P.(KAT) No.97 of 2025 and that of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos.5689 - 5690 of 2021, those judgments pertain to regularisation. But in the instant case, the claim of the petitioner is to count the past service till the date of regularisation for pensionary benefits. Therefore, the judgments in those cases are not applicable to the facts of the instant case.

25. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and submissions made at the Bar, in the light of the judgments referred to supra, we find that the petitioner has made out sufficient ground to allow the original petition to the above extent by setting aside the impugned order of the Tribunal.

                  In the result, this original petition is allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the Tribunal dated 18.12.2019 in O.A.No.2182 of 2018 and the Original application is allowed in part by directing the respondents to grant pensionary benefits to the petitioner by reckoning his prior service in KSLUB from 01.04.1998 till he was regularised in service on 25.08.2005, as expeditiously as possible at any rate within three months from the date of this judgment.