(Prayer: Criminal Appeal filed under Section 374 of Cr.P.C. against the judgment dated 28.04.2022 in S.C.No.18 of 2019 on the file of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Perambalur.)
1. This Criminal Appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 28.04.2022 in S.C.No.18 of 2019 on the file of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Perambalur.
2. The appellant, an ex-serviceman, was convicted and sentenced by the trial court as detailed below:
| Penal Provisions | Sentence of Imprisonment | Fine Amount |
| 279 of IPC | 6 Months Rigorous Imprisonment | Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo 1 month simple imprisonment |
| 337 of IPC | 6 Months Rigorous Imprisonment each (3 counts) | Rs.500/- each in default to undergo 1 month simple imprisonment each |
| Sentences shall run concurrently | ||
| 304-A of IPC | 2 Years Rigorous Imprisonment each (9 counts) (total 18 Years) | Rs.5,000/- each in default to undergo 6 months simple imprisonment each |
| Sentence shall run consecutively | ||
4. Due to the rash speed, the car, after hitting the median, toppled and crossed the median and fell on a Chevrolet Tavera car bearing Registration No.TN21 AP 3396, which was coming from the opposite direction. Due to the impact of the accident and damage suffered, 9 persons who were travelling in the Chevrolet Tavera car, including children, women and the owner of the car, had died on the spot and the driver also thereafter died in the hospital. A Toyota Etios car bearing Registration No.PY01 CD 6474, which came behind the Chevrolet Tavera car also hit the vehicle, in which the owner of the Etios car/PW1 and her two daughters, sustained injuries.
5. Based on the complaint/Ex.P1 given by PW1, FIR/Ex.P24 was registered by the Inspector of Police/PW25 under Section 174 of Cr.P.C. PW25 arrested the accused. The Investigating Officer/PW29, on completing the investigation, filed the final report.
6. The learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, Perambalur, took up the case, issued summons to the accused and complied with Section 207 of Cr.P.C. Since the offences are triable by the court of session, the magistrate committed the case to the Principal District Court under Section 209 of Cr.P.C. On committal, the trial court framed the charges under Sections 279, 337 (3 counts) and 304-A (9 counts) IPC and Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. When questioned, the accused pleaded not guilty and stood trial.
7. The prosecution examined PW1 to PW29 and marked exhibits Ex.P1 to Ex.P46. On completion of the prosecution evidence, when the accused was questioned under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. based on the incriminating materials, he denied the same. However, the accused neither examined any witnesses nor produced any documents. The trial court, on appraising the evidences and arguments, convicted the appellant under Sections 279, 337 (3 counts) and 304-A (9 counts) IPC and imposed the sentence as stated supra. However, acquitted the appellant under Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
8. Challenging the conviction and sentence imposed, the accused has preferred the above appeal.
9. Mr.Babu Rangasamy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant made the following submissions:
i. There is absolutely no evidence available on record to prove that the appellant drove the car in a rash and negligent manner, which resulted in the accident.
ii. There is no eye-witness except PW4, who had also turned hostile. The presence of PW4 in the workshop at 12.10 am was highly improbable and even his statement is that only on hearing the sound he went to the accident spot.
iii. The evidence of PW11/Assistant Manager of Toll Plaza, coupled with Ex.P6, establish that the appellant drove the car only at a moderate speed.
iv. The prosecution sought to project the case as though it is drunk and drive but the same was falsified by the blood analysis forensic report.
v. The failure to examine the Road Transport Officer/RTO of Perambalur, who issued the special report/Ex.P43, by conducting a detailed investigation is fatal to the case of the prosecution.
vi. As per the evidence of PW13/Motor Vehicles Inspector who had issued the inspection report/Ex.P9, the steering system was found damaged. PW13 had admitted that if there is a steering jam, then the vehicle cannot be operated.
vii.As per PW13, there was only 66% brake system in operation in the Etios vehicle and further, the driver of the Tavera vehicle did not possess the driving licence and therefore, the appellant was not the cause for the accident.
viii.When the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court had convicted the appellant merely on presumptions and assumptions.
ix. Except for a suggestion of PW13 to the effect that if the steering has not been hold firmly, there is a possibility for the accident to occur by hitting the median, there is no other materials.
x. The trial court, only being swayed by the fact that 9 persons having been died in the accident, had convicted the appellant on presumptions and imposed the maximum punishment, which was also directed to run consecutively.
xi. The learned counsel in support of his contentions relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.M.Appachu Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 4052 and Sanjay Colaro Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1147 for the proposition that the sentence could be modified by imposing adequate compensation.
10. Mr.J.Subbiah, learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) appearing for the respondent/State contended that, even though PW4 has turned hostile, the part of the evidence which supports the prosecution could be relied upon. PW1/owner of the Etios car, PW2 and PW3, who were in the car that got involved in the accident, have been examined and the accident caused by the appellant has been proved. The evidence of PW8, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 27 and 28, who have issued the postmortem certificates/Ex.P10 to Ex.P17, 19, 20, 22, 25 and 33, clearly establish the cause of death of all 9 persons in the car due to the accident. From the evidence of PW13 and inspection report/Ex.P9, it has been proved that there was no mechanical failure/defect in the car, the tyre was intact and the accident resulted only due to the negligent driving of the vehicle by the appellant.
11. He further submitted that the appellant, who also got injured in the accident, was treated by PW26 and he has issued the accident register/Ex.P29. The rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by the appellant having been proved, which resulted in the death of 9 persons and also the injury of 3 persons, the trial court had rightly convicted the appellant and imposed the sentence, which is in tune with the evidence and the legal provisions.
12. Heard the rival submissions and perused the materials available on record.
13. The appellant was driving his Hyundai Verna car that was proceeding in the Trichy to Chennai National Highway. At 12.10 am on 11.05.2018, when the car was near Perambalur four-road overbridge, the car hit the centre median, toppled and fell on the Chevrolet Tavera car, which was coming in the opposite direction. A Toyota Etios car which was coming behind the Tavera car also hit the vehicle. In the impact of the accident 9 passengers in the Tavera car died and 3 passengers in the Etios car suffered injuries.
14. The appellant as such has been charged for offences under Sections 279, 337 (3 counts) and 304-A (9 counts) of IPC. For easy reference, the provisions are extracted as under:
“279. Rash driving or riding on a public way. — Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
337. Causing hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others. — Whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
304A. Causing death by negligence. — Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
15. Though when a case is dealt with under the above provisions, it is seen as to whether the driver of the vehicle drove the car in a rash and negligent manner, the close look of these provisions would show that it is not required for both the ingredients, “rash” and “negligent” to be present for the offence to get attracted. The use of the word “or” instead of “and” signifies that the words in the provision is to be read disjunctively. As per the above provisions, it is sufficient to prove the guilt, even if one of the element is present. Though mere driving in high speed may not be sufficient for the offence to get attracted, it has to be established that the vehicle was driven either in a rash manner or in a negligent manner, which resulted in the accident.
16. There is a marked difference in either of the above two acts. Though both the acts are coined together constituting the offence under Section 304-A, prescribing the maximum punishment of up to 2 years, however while considering the gravity of the offence for imposing sentence the approach and consideration by the court may require different yardstick depending on the fact and circumstances of each case. In rash act, the person being conscious that the act may result or lead to any serious damage or injury, he still ventures to do the same voluntarily unmindful of the consequences. But in negligent act, the person only fail to take adequate care which may result in some unforeseen consequences.
17. In the instant case, the testimony of the witnesses pertaining to the accident is as under:
i. As per PW1, when he was travelling with his two daughters for a marriage and at around 12.10 am, a car came from the opposite direction and colluded with the Tavera car, in which 8 people died on the spot and one person died in the hospital. In the accident, PW1 and her daughters got minor injuries and were treated as out patient. Only since the appellants car hit somewhere, the vehicle could have crossed the median as the vehicle was driven in a rash and negligent manner. PW1 preferred complaint/Ex.P1.
ii. As per PW2/daughter of PW1, they were travelling by chatting and she saw a car falling on another car which was going in front of their vehicle. They heard the sound when the car fell down and all the 3 vehicles got damaged in the accident.
iii. As per PW3/driver of PW1 (Etios car), a Tavera car was proceeding in front at a distance of 20 feet. Only after the vehicle met with the accident, he came to know that the accident was caused by the car coming from the opposite direction and then about the details of the offending car.
iv. As per PW4/owner of the workshop, he came back to the shop after having tea around 12.00 -12.30 am. Only on hearing the sound of accident, he went and saw and as the situation was bad he came back. PW4 was treated as hostile and cross examined by prosecution.
v. PW5 to PW7 are the relatives who were not present at the time of accident.
vi. PW9/Revenue Inspector is the mahazar witness for the mahazar/Ex.P3 prepared by the Investigating Officer/PW29.
vii.As per PW12/Fire Officer, on intimation about the accident, they reached the spot and sent the injured persons to the hospital in an ambulance. A call was received at 00.20 hours and they reached the accident place.
viii.As per PW8, PW14 to PW18, PW27 and PW28 Doctors, on conducting postmortem, they have issued the postmortem certificates/Ex.P10 to Ex.P17, Ex.P19, Ex.P20, Ex.P22, Ex.P25 and Ex.P33. The postmortem certificates reveals that the cause of death was due to the injuries sustained by the deceased in the impact of the accident.
18. From the testimony of the above witnesses, the fact that the accident occurred due to the appellant's car hitting the median, toppled and crossed the median, fell on the Tavera car and further, the Etios car coming behind also got involved in the accident, in which 9 persons died and 3 persons got injured has been established.
19. As per the charges framed, the appellant drove the car after consuming alcohol in a rash and negligent manner. PW26/Doctor had treated the appellant after being taken to the hospital from the accident spot. The blood samples were collected and sent to the laboratory for analysis. As per PW26, when he examined the appellant, there was a smell of alcohol. Appellant was admitted as inpatient and the accident register is Ex.P.29. The blood sample collected was sent to forensic laboratory, Trichy. A report was received on 11.05.2018. PW26 issued Ex.P30 report and he opined that “the appellant consumed alcohol but not under its influence”.
20. In the cross examination, PW26 admits that, as per the forensic blood sample report received, there was no alcohol present. The perusal of Ex.P30 reveals that PW26 has given the report and the forensic analysis report received has not been filed before the court. In the absence of the prosecution producing the forensic blood sample report of the appellant and the admission of PW26 that there was no presence of alcohol in the report received, the allegation that the appellant drove the car after consuming alcohol, is not proved. As such the trial court had rightly disbelieved that the appellant drunk and drove the vehicle.
21. Now the point to be considered is as to whether the appellant drove the vehicle in a rash or negligent manner.
22. PW1/owner of Etios car, PW2/daughter of PW1 and PW3/driver of PW1 (Etios car), who are eye witnesses present in the place of occurrence, did not testify that the appellant drove the Verna car in a rash or negligent manner. The testimony of PW1 to PW3 is only that they heard the sound and saw the car falling on the another car travelling in front of them and therefore it has not been established from their evidence that the appellant drove the car either in a rash or in a negligent manner.
23. Further the possibility of PW4/owner of the workshop, being present in the shop around 12.10 am is not probable, but however PW4 also turned hostile. Even his statement, is only to the effect that on hearing the sound, he went to the place and saw and therefore PW4 did not see the appellant driving the car in a rash or in a negligent manner.
24. The prosecution has examined PW11/Assistant Manager of Toll Plaza and marked Ex.P6. As per Ex.P6, the Verna car had crossed the Toll Plaza at 11.25 pm and the accident had occurred at 12.10 am. The distance between the Toll Plaza and the accident place and the time taken to cover this distance, signifies that the car was driven only in a moderate speed. The Road Transport Officer/RTO had conducted an enquiry and issued a special report/Ex.P43. Ex.P43 has been marked through the Investigating Officer/PW29 and the prosecution did not choose to examine the author of Ex.P43 for the reasons best known to them.
25. As per Ex.P43, it was found that the Verna car had crossed the Toll Plaza near Samayapuram on 10.05.2018 at 11.25 pm in NH 45 and caused this accident at 12.10 am on 11.05.2018. The car had travelled a stretch of 39.6 kms within a time span of 45 minutes, which shows that the average speed travelled is 52.8 kms per hour, which is a permissible moderate speed to drive in the National Highway.
26. There is no other evidence to establish that the appellant drove the car in a rash manner. In fact, from the evidence of PW11 coupled with Ex.P6 and Ex.P43/special report of RTO, it is evident that the appellant had drove the car in the National Highway only at a speed of around 50 kms per hour, which is within the permissible limits. It cannot even be said that the car was driven at a high speed, much less in a rash manner. When there is absolutely no evidence, the prosecution has failed to prove that the appellant drove the car in a rash manner.
27. However to prove the negligence of the appellant, the prosecution has examined PW13/Motor Vehicles Inspector. As per PW13, he had inspected the Verna Car and issued inspection report/Ex.P9, certifying that “there was no mechanical defect and there was no tyre burst”. The tyre was found to be in a satisfactory condition. Ex.P9 only reveals that due to the impact of the accident, the steering system got damaged and several parts of the vehicle as listed in the report got damaged. The damages found were only due to the accident. PW13, on the questions put by the trial court, suggested that if the steering is not hold in a proper manner, there is a possibility of the vehicle hitting the median.
28. Except the evidence of PW13, which suggests that there could be possibility of the vehicle hitting the median if the steering is not hold properly, there is no other materials to prove the charge of rash driving against the appellant. The trial court, simply on presumption concluded that the appellant could have stopped the vehicle after crossing the Toll Plaza and thereafter might have driven the vehicle at a high speed of 120 kms per hour and as a result of which, could have hit the median, toppled and crossed the other side of the road which resulted in the accident.
29. When onus was on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court had merely on assumptions and presumptions, without the prosecution proving the charge of rash driving had convicted the appellant, holding that he drove the car in a rash and negligent manner that resulted in the accident. The trial court probably might have been swayed by the fact that there had been 9 fatalities and 3 injuries. It is also to be noted that initially the prosecution sought to project the case as though it was a case of drunk and drive, which was found otherwise.
30. When the car was driven only at a speed of 50 kms per hour, as established from the evidence of PW11, Ex.P6 and Ex.P43, considering the time of the accident in the wee hours at 12.10 am and also the age of the appellant and he having undertook the long drive after his day long duties, in all probabilities he could have slightly felt fatigue or fallen asleep, due to which the tyre had hit the median that resulted in the accident.
31. The fact that there was no mechanical defect in the car is established through the inspection report/Ex.P9 coupled with the testimony of PW13 and further there was no tyre burst and the tyre was also found in a satisfactory condition. When there was no mechanical failure/defect and the appellant had also not driven the vehicle at a high speed or in a rash manner as it is established, the accident has occurred only due to the negligence on the part of the appellant for want of proper care in not holding the steering properly either due to lethargic approach or having slept, resulting in the right wheel hitting the median, as suggested by PW13. The manner in which the accident occurred speaks for itself clearly establishing the negligence. In the absence of any explanation from the appellant and from the evidence let in, all the materials unerringly point towards the guilt and when there was no other possibility for the accident except the negligence of the appellant, in such circumstances, by invoking the doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur” the fact of negligence can also to some extent be presumed.
32. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Syad Akbar Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 1980 (1) SCC 30, even though the doctrine res ipsa loquitur is to be applied in civil cases, it can be an aid in the evaluation of evidence and to the limited extent the inference of fact is permissible in the criminal case for inferring negligence, from the chain of other facts proved in the case based on evidences. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jacob Mathew Vs. State of Punjab and another, reported in 2005 (6) SCC 1, held that the doctrine cannot be applied for determining liability for negligence in criminal law but may if at all can have limited application in trial on a charge of criminal negligence. Again in the case of Ravi Kapur Vs State of Rajasthan, reported in 2012 (9) SCC 284, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the doctrine of ‘res ipsa loquitur’ is also applicable in criminal cases of accident and further observed that speed of vehicle is not always determinative, reckless and negligent driving at slow speed is also possible.
33. As such in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, where evidence has been let in to establish the other circumstantial facts constituting accident by the car driven by the appellant hitting the median and rolled over to the other side and hit the other vehicle, directly and instantly causing the death of many persons, in the absence of rash driving and mechanical defect in the car or any explanation from the appellant, the fact of negligence on the part of the appellant is inferred to the limited extent of not holding the steering of the car properly, which led to the accident.
34. The appellant, who is working as a Security Officer in the Ramco Cement Factory at Ariyalur, after completing his duty had started from Trichy to Chennai in the evening and was driving his Verna car at 12.10 am in the National Highway. The appellant, if he was tired or needed rest, it was for him to park the vehicle and take appropriate rest. The appellant cannot ignore fatigue and choose to drive the car in the wee hours by risking not only himself but also risking the other road users. The appellant negligently failed to take proper care and decided to drive the car, as a result of which the vehicle hit the median, toppled and crossed the median and fell on the another car coming from an opposite direction. A family consisting of women and children, most of them died on the spot due to the impact of the accident and there had been 9 casualties and further with 3 injuries in the other car. It is to be noted that several accidents in the recent days occur due to the drivers fatigue without adequate break, endangering the lives of other road users.
35. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant himself, being a veteran served in the army and retired, is not able to digest the fact that he has been a cause for the accident in which 9 lives have been lost and he is suffering every day apart from the sentence he has undergone. It is also to be noted that, despite the huge impact of the accident in which the appellant's car had crossed the median and fallen on the other side of the road into the Tavera car by killing 9 persons, but still the appellant had miraculously survived and is convicted for the charges.
36. The trial court had convicted the appellant on all the charges and imposed a sentence of two years on each count for offence under Section 304-A of IPC (9 counts). The sentence is directed to run consecutively and in effect, the appellant has to undergo incarceration for a total period of 18 years.
37. On reappraising the evidences, even though there is absolutely no materials to prove that the appellant drove the vehicle at a high speed or in a rash manner, but still, in view of the above deliberations and considering the fact that there has been negligence on the part of the appellant in driving the car, which led to the car hitting the median and resulted in the death of 9 individuals and injured 3, this Court is not inclined to disturb the decision of the trial Court in convicting the appellant.
38. Coming to the sentence imposed, it is apposite to consider the following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in respect of the offences under Sections 279 and 304-A of IPC,
i. In the case of Surendran Vs. Sub-Inspector of Police(2021) 17 SCC 799) , while affirming the conviction, considering the fact that the accident took place more than 26 years ago, the sentence was substituted for offences under Sections 279 and 388 of IPC from six months to that of fine.
ii. In the case of Muthupandi Vs. State through the Inspector of Police((2024 INSC 950), wherein the accused drove the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and caused the death of one person and six cows, while confirming the conviction for offences under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC, considering the fact that 11 years have elapsed since the incident occurred and the appellant had been on bail throughout, the sentence of three months imprisonment was set aside and ordered for payment of Rs.1,00,000/- as compensation to the victim under Section 357(3) of Cr.P.C.
iii. In the case of George Vs. State of Kerala(SLP (Criminal)No.11041 of 2024) dated 03.09.2024, considering the fact that the appellant had been in custody for about 117 days, while confirming the conviction for offences under Sections 304-A and 338 of IPC, the sentence was modified from six months to that of the period already undergone and also reduced the compensation from Rs.2.5 lakhs to Rs.50,000/-.
iv. In the case of K.M.Appachu Vs. State of Karnataka(2024 SCC Online SC 4052), while confirming the conviction for offence under Section 304-A of IPC, the sentence was commuted from one year to that of compensation of Rupees Five Lakhs to the legal heirs of the deceased.
v. In the case of Sanjay Calaro Vs. State of Karnataka(2025 SCC Online SC 1147), while confirming the conviction for offence under Section 304-A of IPC, the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act was extended to the accused and the sentence of 6 months was set aside by awarding a compensation of Rupees Ten Lakhs to the legal heirs of the deceased.
vi. However in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Balwinder Singh((2012) 2 SCC 182), it is held that the courts cannot deal with the offences relating to motor vehicle accidents by treating the nature of the offence under Section 304-A of IPC as attracting the benevolent provision of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
vii.In the case of State of Punjab Vs. Saurabh Bakshi((2015) 5 SCC 182), it has been held that it cannot be said as a proposition of law that whenever an accused offers acceptable compensation for rehabilitation of a victim, regardless of the gravity of the crime under Section 304-A IPC, there can be reduction of sentence. Passion of mercy cannot be applied with the principle that payment of compensation is a factor for reduction of sentence, which would be only a misplaced sympathy.
viii.In the case of State of Punjab Vs. Dil Bahadur((2023) 18 SCC 183), by referring to various decisions and on considering the proposition laid that the cardinal principle of sentencing policy is that the sentence imposed on an offender should reflect the crime he had committed and it should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the punishment should not be so lenient that it shocks the conscience of the society, sentence of eight months for offence under Section 304-A of IPC was imposed.
ix. In the case of James Vs. State of Karnataka (2024 INSC 1038), considering the rash and negligent act while confirming the conviction for offence under Section 304-A IPC, the court declined to convert the sentence of six months into fine.
39. From the cases referred above, it is clear that to reduce or commute the sentence by awarding compensation for offence under Section 304-A, the Courts had considered the facts and circumstances of the individual case. In Balwinder Singh’s case, it has been proved that the driver drove the vehicle at a high speed and in a rash and negligent manner, which resulted in the accident. In Saurabh Bakshi’s case, the accident resulted due to the vehicle having been driven at a very high speed in a rash and negligent manner which resulted in the loss of life. In Dil Bahadur’s case, the accused drove the vehicle rashly and negligently and overtook an ambulance from the left side, resulting in the accident where the ambulance turned turtle, resulting in the death. In the case of James, the court noted that the vehicle was driven at a high speed that the other vehicle was dragged to a long distance, where the rash and negligent driving was established.
40. Therefore, in all the cases where the Hon’ble Supreme Court had declined to interfere in the sentence, the rash driving of the vehicle had been established and the manner in which the accident happened has been taken note of. In the instant case, as discussed earlier, there is no material to prove that the appellant drove the car in a rash manner or even in a high speed but for his negligence.
41. The mitigating circumstances favouring the appellant are,
(a) Appellant retired ex-serviceman, drove the car at the permissible moderate speed of 50 kms per hour in the National Highway.
(b)There is no iota of evidence to prove that the appellant drove the car in a rash manner or even at a high speed.
(c) It is a negligent act and the appellant himself miraculously escaped from the impact of the accident.
(d)The accident happened in the year 2018 and the appellant has already undergone incarceration for a period of 4 months and since then had all along remained on bail.
(e) The appellant is 64 years old, he is a first time offender and not a case of drunk and drive.
42. The aggravating circumstances are,
(a) In the accident 9 persons including women and children died and 3 persons got injured.
(b)There is huge social and financial impact on the families leading to serious consequences.
(c) The negligent act of the appellant driving the vehicle in wee hours at 12.10 am ignoring fatigue, resulting in a major accident.
43. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case as detailed above, it is not a case where the appellant drove the vehicle at a high speed in a rash manner, but only negligence on the part of the appellant, who took the risk of long driving in the wee hours at 12.10 am after attending his duties, which resulted in the accident.
44. Considering the fact that the appellant, being a retired ex-serviceman, had already been suffering due to the impact of the accident and also had been in incarceration for a total period of four months and taking into the mitigating circumstances as stated above, in the considered opinion of this Court, while sustaining the conviction, it would only be just and proper to modify the sentence of imprisonment by awarding adequate compensation to the injured and the legal heirs of the deceased. The learned counsel for the appellant also on instructions submitted that the appellant is prepared and ready to suitably compensate the victims.
45. Considering the mitigating circumstances, the sentence imposed on the appellant by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Perambalur, in S.C.No.18 of 2019 dated 28.04.2022 for offences under Sections 279, 337 (3 counts) and 304-A (9 counts) of IPC is modified to a period of four months for each of the offences and also for each count. The sentence for each count and for each of the offences shall run concurrently. The period already undergone shall be set off under section 428 of Cr.P.C. Since the appellant was in imprisonment for a total period of 4 months, the effect of the modified sentence would amount to the period already undergone. The sentence of imprisonment is modified only on condition that the appellant pays a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- [Rupees Two Lakhs Only] each to the legal heirs of 9 deceased persons and Rs.1,00,000/- [Rupees One Lakh Only] each to 3 injured persons. The sentence of fine imposed by the trial court is confirmed. The compensation is ordered under Section 357(3) of Cr.P.C.
46. The appellant is directed to deposit the compensation amount for a total sum of Rs.21,00,000/- [Rupees Twenty One Lakhs Only] within a period of six (6) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order before the trial court. On such deposit being made, the compensation shall be distributed to the legal heirs of 9 deceased persons and 3 injured persons. The District Legal Services Authority, Perambalur, shall take necessary steps to identify the legal heirs and intimate them and provide necessary assistance for the disbursal of the compensation amounts to the eligible legal heirs. In the event of failure to deposit the compensation amount within the stipulated time as directed, the original sentence as ordered by the trial court would automatically stand restored. It is made clear that this compensation paid, would be in addition to the compensation if any awarded in the accident claim.
47. In the result, this Criminal Appeal stands partly allowed.