(Prayer: This Crl.p is filed , u/s 528 of BNSS (new) , u/s.482 of Cr.p.c.(old), praying to quash the initiation of proceedings in c.c.no.296/2025 (crime no.319/2024 of jewargi ps) for the offences punishable u/sec. 189(2), 191(2), 126(2), 352, 351(1) r/w section 190 of bns-2023, registered by Jewargi P.S, which is now Pending on the file of learned senior civil judge and JMFC jewargi, in the interest of justice and Equityi.)

Oral Order:

1. This petition is filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking to quash proceedings against the petitioner/accused No.18 in C.C.No.296/2025 (Crime No.319/2024) registered by Jewargi Police Station, for the offence punishable under Sections 189(2), 191(2), 126(2), 352, 351(2) r/w Section 190 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNS 2023’), pending on the file Civil Judge Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Jewargi.

2. The abridged facts of the case are that, a tender was approved by the Government of Karnataka for Mallabad Lift Irrigation Project and the Notification was issued for inviting the applicants for the tender project. However, after the formation of new Government, the tender project was stopped. Due to the stoppage of same and also demanding for fixation of price for toor dal @ Rs.15,000/- per quintal and also demanding to provide crop compensation amount and other demands, a group of farmers including the petitioner participated in a protest and submitted a representation to the Government through Tahsildar, Jewargi on 16.12.2024 at about 11:35 a.m. It is stated that the petitioner and others were protesting near Chigarahalli Cross NH-150A by blocking the movement of the vehicles. According to the complainant, the petitioner and others did not obtain any permission from the concerned authority to conduct protest. As such, the Police Sub-Inspector of the respondent-Police informed the same to respondent-Police and also advised the petitioner and others to disburse from the road. Despite, they continued their protest and caused disturbance to the public and movement of the vehicles. Accordingly, the complaint was lodged against the petitioner and others on 18.12.2024 in Crime No.319/2024 for the aforementioned offences. The respondent-Police after completing investigation, laid charge sheet against the petitioner and others for the aforementioned offences by arraying the petitioner as accused No.18. The learned Magistrate took cognizance for the aforesaid offences. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred this petition.

3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent No.1 - State. Though notice is served to respondent No.2, he remained absent.

4. Apart from urging several contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that, the petitioner being a legal practitioner has obtained necessary permission from the Tahsildar, Jewargi, to conduct the said protest on 16.12.2024. Thereafter, submitted a representation to the Tahsildar for conducting protest without disturbing the public peace or the movement of the vehicles. Despite the same, a false complaint has been lodged against the petitioner and others on a political rivalry. He also contended that the petitioner held the protest as per the Fundamental Right envisaged under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India. In catena of judgments, the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court have held that, such right cannot be curtailed by the Police and there is no absolute prohibition from holding public meetings, processions, demonstrations, etc. Such activities are to be restricted in larger public interest. When the petitioners have obtained such permission, the Police cannot file a complaint against them. In such circumstance, the proceedings initiated against the petitioner is nothing but abuse of process of Court. Accordingly, he prays to allow the petition.

5. Per contra, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1-State opposed the petition by contending that, now the investigation is completed and charge sheet has been filed and there are prima facie materials forthcoming against the petitioner. Accordingly, prays to dismiss the petition.

6. I have given my anxious consideration both on the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the documents made available on record.

7. As could be gathered from records, the petitioner and others approached the Tahsildar on 16.12.2024 and submitted a representation for protest against the Government Order and also fixation of fair price to toor dal. Thereafter, they joined together and conducted protest against the Government. Admittedly, the complaint was lodged after two days from the date of protest, except Police complaint, no other complaints have been received by the Police against the protest conducted by the petitioner and others for creating public disturbance or public nuisance. In such circumstances, this Court in the case of Ronaldo Agastine S. and Others Vs. State of Karnataka in Criminal Petition No.201745/2025 dated 06.01.2026, quashed the criminal proceedings by referring the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Mazdoor Kisan Sakti Sangathan Vs. Union of India & another (2018) 17 SCC 324, at paragraph Nos.48 to 68, which reads as follows;

                  “48. We may state at the outset that none of the parties have joined issue insofar as law on the subject is concerned. Undoubtedly, holding peaceful demonstrations by the citizenry in order to air its grievances and to ensure that these grievances are heard in the relevant quarters, is its fundamental right. This right is specifically enshrined under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India. Article 19(1)(a) confers a very valuable right on the citizens, namely, right of free speech. Likewise, Article 19(1)(b) gives the right to assemble peacefully and without arms. Together, both these rights ensure that the people of this country have the right to assemble peacefully and protest against any of the actions or the decisions taken by the Government or other governmental authorities which are not to the liking. Legitimate dissent is a distinguishable feature of any democracy. Question is not as to whether the issue raised by the protestors is right or wrong or it is justified or unjustified. The fundamental aspect is the right which is conferred upon the affected people in a democracy to voice their grievances. Dissenters may be in minority. They have a right to express their views. A particular cause which, in the first instance, may appear to be insignificant or irrelevant may gain momentum and acceptability when it is duly voiced and debated. That is the reason that this Court has always protected the valuable right of peaceful and orderly demonstrations and protests.

                  49. In Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra [Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 16 : (1961) 3 SCR 423] , this Court observed: (AIR p.891, para 31)

                  “31. The right of citizens to take out processions or to hold public meetings flows from the right in Article 19(1)(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms and the right to move anywhere in the territory of India.”

                  50. In Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar [Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (3) SCR 369 : AIR 1962 SC 1166] the Court was mainly dealing with the question whether the right to make a demonstration is protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and (b) and whether a government servant is entitled to this right. This Court held: (AIR p. 1171, para 13)

                  “13. … A demonstration might take the form of an assembly and even then the intention is to convey to the person or authority to whom the communication is intended the feelings of the group which assembles. It necessarily follows that there are forms of demonstration which would fall within the freedoms guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b). It is needless to add that from the very nature of things a demonstration may take various forms; it may be noisy and disorderly, for instance stone-throwing by a crowd may be cited as an example of a violent and disorderly demonstration and this would not obviously be within Article 19(1)(a) or (b). It can equally be peaceful and orderly such as happens when the members of the group merely wear some badge drawing attention to their grievances.”

                  51. The Supreme Court has also gone beyond upholding the right to protest as a fundamental right and has held that the State must aid the right to assembly of the citizens. In the Constitution Bench judgment, Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commr. of Police [Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commr. of Police, (1973) 1 SCC 227 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 280] , while dealing with the challenge to the Rules framed under the Bombay Police Act regulating public meetings on streets, held that the Government has power to regulate which includes prohibition of public meetings on streets or highways to avoid nuisance or disruption to traffic and thus, it can provide a public meeting on roads, but it does not mean that the Government can close all the streets or open areas for public meetings, thus denying the fundamental right which flows from Articles 19(1)(a) and (b). The Court held: (SCC pp. 239 & 248, paras 33 & 70)

                  “33. This is true but nevertheless the State cannot by law abridge or take away the right of assembly by prohibiting assembly on every public street or public place. The State can only make regulations in aid of the right of assembly of each citizen and can only impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order.

                  70. Public meeting in open spaces and public streets forms part of the tradition of our national life. In the pre- Independence days such meetings have been held in open space and public streets and the people have come to regard it as a part of their privileges and immunities. The State and the local authority have a virtual monopoly of every open space at which an outdoor meeting can be held. If, therefore, the State or Municipality can constitutionally close both its streets and its parks entirely to public meetings, the practical result would be that it would be impossible to hold any open-air meetings in any large city. The real problem is that of reconciling the city's function of providing for the exigencies of traffic in its streets and for the recreation of the public in its parks, with its other obligations, of providing adequate places for public discussion in order to safeguard the guaranteed right of public assembly. The made by Justice Holmes is that a city owns its parks and highways in the same sense and with the same rights as a private owner owns his property with the right to exclude or admit anyone he pleases. That may not accord with the concept of dedication of public streets and parks. The parks are held for public and the public streets are also held for the public. It is doubtless true that the State or local authority can regulate its property in order to serve its public purposes. Streets and public parks exist primarily for other purposes and the social interest promoted by untrammelled exercise of freedom of utterance and assembly in public street must yield to social interest which prohibition and regulation of speech are designed to protect. But there is a constitutional difference between reasonable regulation and arbitrary exclusion.”

                  52. While adjudicating with respect to the validity of police action against protestors, this Court again reiterated that right to protest was a fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens under Article 19. In Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re [Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re, (2012) 5 SCC 1 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 820 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 241 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 810] , the Court observed that the right to assembly and peaceful agitations were basic features of a democratic system and the Government should encourage exercise of these rights: (SCC p. 99, para 245)

                  “245. Freedom of speech, right to assemble and demonstrate by holding dharnas and peaceful agitations are the basic features of a democratic system. The people of a democratic country like ours have a right to raise their voice against the decisions and actions of the Government or even to express their resentment over the actions of the Government on any subject of social or national importance. The Government has to respect and, in fact, encourage exercise of such rights. It is the abundant duty of the State to aid the exercise of the right to freedom of speech as understood in its comprehensive sense and not to throttle or frustrate exercise of such rights by exercising its executive or legislative powers and passing orders or taking action in that direction in the name of reasonable restrictions. The preventive steps should be founded on actual and prominent threat endangering public order and tranquillity, as it may disturb the social order. This delegated power vested in the State has to be exercised with great caution and free from arbitrariness. It must serve the ends of the constitutional rights rather than to subvert them.”

                  53.     Further, in Anita Thakur [Anita Thakur v. State of J&K, (2016) 15 SCC 525 : (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 695] , the Court recognised that the right to peaceful protest was a fundamental right under Articles 19(1), (b) and (c) of the Constitution, subject to reasonable restrictions. It was finally held that in that while the protestors turned violent first, the police used excessive force: (SCC pp. 533-34, paras 12-13 & 15)

                  “12. We can appreciate that holding peaceful demonstration in order to air their grievances and to see that their voice is heard in the relevant quarters is the right of the people. Such a right can be traced to the fundamental freedom that is guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b) and 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. Article 19(1)(a) confers freedom of speech to the citizens of this country and, thus, this provision ensures that the petitioners could raise slogan, albeit in a peaceful and orderly manner, without using offensive language. Article 19(1)(b) confers the right to assemble and, thus, guarantees that all citizens have the right to assemble peacefully and without arms. Right to move freely given under Article 19(1)(d), again, ensures that the petitioners could take out peaceful march. The “right to assemble” is beautifully captured in an eloquent statement that “an unarmed, peaceful protest procession in the land of “salt satyagraha”, fast-unto-death and “do or die” is no jural anathema”. It hardly needs elaboration that a distinguishing feature of any democracy is the space offered for legitimate dissent. One cherished and valuable aspect of political life in India is a tradition to express grievances through direct action or peaceful protest. Organised, non-violent protest marches were a key weapon in the struggle for Independence, and the right to peaceful protest is now recognised as a fundamental right in the Constitution.

                  13. Notwithstanding above, it is also to be borne in mind that the aforesaid rights are subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, as well as public order. It is for this reason, the State authorities many a times designate particular areas and routes, dedicating them for the purpose of holding public meetings.

                  15. Thus, while on the one hand, citizens are guaranteed fundamental right of speech, right to assemble for the purpose of carrying peaceful protest processions and right of free movement, on the other hand, reasonable restrictions on such right can be put by law. Provisions of IPC and CrPC, discussed above, are in the form of statutory provisions giving powers to the State to ensure that such public assemblies, protests, dharnas or marches are peaceful and they do not become “unlawful”. At the same time, while exercising such powers, the authorities are supposed to act within the limits of law and cannot indulge into excesses.”

                  54. The right to protest is, thus, recognised as a fundamental right under the Constitution. This right is crucial in a democracy which rests on participation of an informed citizenry in governance. This right is also crucial since it strengthens representative democracy by enabling direct participation in public affairs where individuals and groups are able to express dissent and grievances, expose the flaws in governance and demand accountability from the State authorities as well as powerful entities. This right is crucial in a vibrant democracy like India but more so in the Indian context to aid in the assertion of the rights of the marginalised and poorly represented minorities.

                  55. At the same time, the aforesaid rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution are not untrammelled and unlimited in their scope. Articles 19(2) to (6) make a specific provision for imposing reasonable restrictions on the rights conferring restrictions on the exercise of such rights. Articles 19(2) and (3), in this behalf read as under:

                  “19. (2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, insofar as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

                  (3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.”

                  56. It can be deciphered from the aforesaid provisions that exercise of right to speech conferred in clause (a) and right to assemble peaceably and without arms in clause (b) is made subject to reasonable restrictions which can be imposed, inter alia, in the interests of sovereignty andintegrity of India or public order. This legal position is also accepted by all the parties.

                  57. In this hue, we have to examine as to whether total ban of demonstrations, etc. at Jantar Mantar Road amounts to violation of the rights of the protestors of the Constitution or this would amount to a reasonable restriction in the interest of “public order”. There would be also an incidental and interrelated issue, namely, whether the manner in which the demonstrations, etc. are held at Jantar Mantar, they violate the fundamental right of the residents guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. If the answer is in the affirmative, it would raise another issue, namely, balancing of the two rights. The right of the protestors under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution and the rights of the residents under Article 21 of the Constitution, as both the rights are fundamental rights.

                  58. In the aforesaid context, it would be pertinent to point out that there may be situations where conflict may arise between two fundamental rights. Situation can be conflict on inter-fundamental rights, intra-fundamental rights and, in certain peculiar circumstances, in respect of some person one fundamental right enjoyed by him may come in conflict with the other fundamental right guaranteed to him. In all such situations, the Court has to examine as to where lies the larger public interest while balancing the two conflicting rights. It is the paramount collective interest which would ultimately prevail.

                  59. We may reproduce the following discussion from the judgment of this Court in Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India [Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 1] : (SCC pp. 318-19, paras 136-37)

                  “Balancing of fundamental rights

                  136.    To appreciate what we have posed hereinabove, it is necessary to dwell upon balancing the fundamental rights. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the right conferred under Article 19(1)(a) has to be kept at a different pedestal than the individual reputation which has been recognised as an aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution. In fact the submission is that right to freedom of speech and expression which includes freedom of press should be given higher status and the individual's right to have his/her reputation should yield to the said right. In this regard a passage from Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. [Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305] has been commended to us. It says: (AIR pp. 313-14, para 37)

                  ‘37. … Freedom of speech can be restricted only in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. It cannot, like the freedom to carry on business, be curtailed in the interest of the general public. If a law directly affecting it is challenged, it is no answer that the restrictions enacted by it are justifiable under clauses (3) to (6). For, the scheme of Article 19 is to enumerate different freedoms separately and then to specify the extent of restrictions to which they may be subjected and the objects for securing which this could be done. A citizen is entitled to enjoy each and every one of the freedoms together and clause (1) does not prefer one freedom to another. That is the plain meaning of this clause. It follows from this that the State cannot make a law which directly restricts one freedom even for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom.’

                  137.    Having bestowed our anxious consideration on the said passage, we are disposed to think that the above passage is of no assistance to the petitioners, for the issue herein is sustenance and balancing of the separate rights, one under Article 19(1)(a) and the other, under Article 21. Hence, the concept of equipoise and counterweighing fundamental rights of one with other person. It is not a case of mere better enjoyment of another freedom. In Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji Anandprasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat [Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji Anandprasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat, (1975) 1 SCC 11] , it has been observed that a particular fundamental right cannot exist in isolation in a watertight compartment. One fundamental right of a person may have to coexist in harmony with the exercise of another fundamental right by others and also with reasonable and valid exercise of power by the State in the light of the directive principles in the interests of social welfare as a whole. The Court's duty is to strike a balance between competing claims of different interests. In DTC v. Mazdoor Congress [DTC v. Mazdoor Congress, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1213] the Court has ruled that articles relating to fundamental rights are all parts of an integrated scheme in the Constitution and their waters must mix to constitute that grand flow of unimpeded and impartial justice; social, economic and political, and of equality of status and opportunity which imply absence of unreasonable or unfair discrimination between individuals or groups or classes. In St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi [St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 558 : 1 SCEC 404] this Court while emphasising the need for balancing the fundamental rights observed that: (SCC p. 612, para 96)

                  ‘96. … It is necessary to mediate between Article 29(2) and Article 30(1), between letter and spirit of these Articles, between traditions of the past and the convenience of the present, between society's need for stability and its need for change.’”

                  60. In Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar [Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 397 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 376] , this test of larger public interest to balance two rights has been explained in the following manner: (SCC pp. 432-35, paras 57- 62)

                  “57. The aforesaid decision [Ed.: The reference is to ‘X’ v. Hospital ‘Z’, (1998) 8 SCC 296] is an authority for the proposition that there can be a conflict between two individuals qua their right under Article 21 of the Constitution and in such a situation, to weigh the balance the test that is required to be applied is the test of larger public interest and further that would, in certain circumstances, advance public morality of the day. To put it differently, the “greater community interest” or “interest of the collective or social order” would be the principle to recognise and accept the right of one which has to be protected.

                  58. In this context, reference to the pronouncement in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P. [Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P., (1977) 1 SCC 677 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 147] would be instructive. In the said case, the Constitution Bench was dealing with two sets of appeals, one arising from Madhya Pradesh that related to Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantraya Adhiniyam, 1968 and the other pertained to the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967. The two Acts insofar as they were concerned with prohibition of forcible conversion and punishment therefor, were similar. The larger Bench stated the facts from Madhya Pradesh case which eventually travelled to the High Court. The High Court ruled [Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P., 1974 SCC OnLine MP 16 : AIR 1975 MP 163] that there was no justification for the argument that Sections 3, 4 and 5 were violative of Article 25(1) of the Constitution. The High Court went on to hold that those sections ‘establish the equality of religious freedom for all citizens by prohibiting conversion by objectionable activities such as conversion by force, fraud and by allurement’. The Orissa Act was declared to be ultra vires the Constitution by the High Court. To understand the controversy, the Court posed the following questions: (Rev. Stainislaus case [Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P., (1977) 1 SCC 677 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 147] , SCC p. 681, para 14)

                  ‘14. … (1) whether the two Acts were violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 25(1) of the Constitution, and (2) whether the State Legislatures were competent to enact them?’

                  59. It was contended before this Court that the right to propagate one's religion means the right to convert a person to one's own religion and such a right is guaranteed by Article 25(1) of the Constitution. The larger Bench dealing with the said contention held: (Rev. Stainislaus case [Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P., (1977) 1 SCC 677 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 147], SCC p. 682, para 20)

                  ‘20. We have no doubt that it is in this sense that the word “propagate” has been used in Article 25(1), for what the article grants is not the right to convert another person to one's own religion, but to transmit or spread one's religion by an exposition of its tenets. It has to be remembered that Article 25(1) guarantees “freedom of conscience” to every citizen, and not merely to the followers of one particular religion, and that, in turn postulates that there is no fundamental right to convert another person to one's own religion because if a person purposely undertakes the conversion of another person to his religion, as distinguished from his effort to transmit or spread the tenets of his religion, that would impinge on the “freedom of conscience” guaranteed to all the citizens of the country alike.’ And again: (SCC p. 682, para 21)

                  ‘21. … It has to be appreciated that the freedom of religion enshrined in the Article is not guaranteed in respect of one religion only, but covers all religions alike, and it can be properly enjoyed by a person if he exercises his right in a manner commensurate with the like freedom of persons following the other religions. What is freedom for one, is freedom for the other, in equal measure, and there can therefore be no such thing as a fundamental right to convert any person to one's own religion.’

                  60. The aforesaid judgment in Rev. Stainislaus case [Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P., (1977) 1 SCC 677 :1977 SCC (Cri) 147] clearly lays down, though in a different context, that what is freedom for one is also the freedom for the other in equal measure. The perception is explicated when the Court has said that it has to be remembered that Article 25(1) guarantees freedom of conscience to other citizens and notmerely to followers of particular religion and there is no fundamental right to convert another person. The right is guaranteed to all citizens. The right to propagate or spread one's religion by an exposition of its tenets does not mean one's religion to convert another person as it affects the fundamental right of the other. We have referred to this authority as it has, in a way, dwelt upon the “intra-conflict of afundamental right”.

                  61. Be it stated, circumstances may emerge that may necessitate for balancing between intra-fundamental rights. It has been distinctly understood that the test that has to be applied while balancing the two fundamental rights or inter-fundamental rights, the principles applied may be different than the principle to be applied in intra-conflict between the same fundamental right. To elaborate, as in this case, the accused has a fundamental right to have a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. Similarly, the victims who are directly affected and also form a part of the constituent of the collective, have a fundamental right for a fair trial. Thus, there can be two individuals both having legitimacy to claim or assert the right. The factum of legitimacy is a primary consideration. It has to be remembered that no fundamental right is absolute and it can have limitations in certain circumstances. Thus, permissible limitations are imposed by the State. The said limitations are to be within the bounds of law. However, when there is intra-conflict of the right conferred under the same article, like fair trial in this case, the test that is required to be applied, we are disposed to think, it would be “paramount collective interest” or “sustenance of public confidence in the justice dispensation system”. An example can be cited. A group of persons in the name of “class honour”, as has been stated in Vikas Yadav v. State of U.P. [Vikas Yadav v. State of U.P., (2016) 9 SCC 541 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 621] , cannot curtail or throttle the choice of a woman. It is because choice of woman in choosing her partner in life is a legitimate constitutional right. It is founded on individual choice that is recognised in the Constitution under Article 19, and such a right is not expected to succumb to the concept of “class honour” or “group thinking”. It is because the sense of class honour has no legitimacy even if it is practiced by the collective under some kind of a notion. Therefore, if the collective interest or the public interest that serves the public cause and further has the legitimacy to claim or assert a fundamental right, then only it can put forth that their right should be protected. There can be no denial of the fact that the rights of the victims for a fair trial is an inseparable aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution and when they assert that right by themselves as well as the part of the collective, the conception of public interest gets galvanised. The accentuated public interest in such circumstances has to be given primacy, for it furthers and promotes “Rule of Law”. It may be clarified at once that the test of primacy which is based on legitimacy and the public interest has to be adjudged on the facts of each case and cannot be stated in abstract terms. It will require studied scanning of facts, the competing interests and the ultimate perception of the balancing that would subserve the larger public interest and serve the majesty of rule of law. In this regard, we are reminded of an ancient saying:

                  ‘Yadapi siddham, loka viruddham

                  Na adaraniyam, na acharaniyam’

                  The aforesaid saying lays stress on public interest and its significance and primacy over certain individual interest. It may not thus have general application, but the purpose of referring to the same is that on certain occasions it can be treated to be appropriate.

                  62. There may be a perception that if principle of primacy is to be followed, then the right of one gets totally extinguished. It has to be borne in mind that total extinction is not balancing. When balancing act is done, the right to fair trial is not totally crippled, but it is curtailed to some extent by which the accused gets the right of fair trial and simultaneously, the victims feel that the fair trial is conducted and the court feels assured that there is a fair trial in respect of such cases. That apart, the faith of the collective is reposed in the criminal justice dispensation system and remains anchored.”

                  61. Undoubtedly, right of people to hold peaceful protests and demonstrations, etc. is a fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. The question is as to whether disturbances, etc. caused by it to the residents, as mentioned in detail by the NGT, is a larger public interest which outweighs the rights of protestors to hold demonstrations at Jantar Mantar Road and, therefore, amounts to reasonable restriction in curbing such demonstrations. Here, we agree with the detailed reasoning given by the NGT that holding of demonstrations in the way it has been happening is causing serious discomfort and harassment to the residents. At the same time, it is also to be kept in mind that for quite some time Jantar Mantar has been chosen as a place for holding demonstrations and was earmarked by the authorities as well. Going by the dicta in Asha Ranjan [Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 397 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 376] , principle of primacy cannot be given to one right whereby the right of the other gets totally extinguished. Total extinction is not balancing. Balancing would mean curtailing one right of one class to some extent so that the right of the other class is also protected.

                  62. We feel that the pathetic conditions which were caused as a result of the processions, demonstrations and agitations, etc. at the Jantar Mantar were primarily because of the reason that the authorities did not take necessary measures to regulate the same. Had adequate and sufficient steps been taken by the authorities to ensure that such dharnas and demonstrations are held within their bounds, it would have balanced the rights of protestors as well as the residents. For example, the dharnas and protests were allowed to be stretched almost on the entire Jantar Mantar Road, on both sides, and even across the width of the road. Instead, a particular area could have been earmarked for this purpose, sufficiently away from the houses, etc. so that there is no unnecessary blockage of roads and pathways. Likewise, the demonstrators were allowed to go on with non- stop slogans, even at odd hours, at night, and that too with the use of loudspeakers, etc. The authorities could have ensured that such slogans are within the parameters of noise pollution norms and there are no shoutings or slogans at night hours or early morning hours. Again, these dharnas, agitations and processions could be prohibited on certain occasions, for example, whenever some foreign dignitaries visit and pass through the said area or other such sensitive occasions. The authorities could also ensure that the protestors do not bring their trucks/buses, etc. and park those vehicles in and around the residential buildings; the protestors are not allowed to pitch up their tents and stay for days together; they are not allowed to bathe or wash their clothes using Delhi Jal Board tankers or defecate in the open, on pavements; and do not create any unhygienic situations. The authorities could also examine, while allowing such demonstration, as to the number of protestors who are likely to participate and could refuse permission to hold any such demonstration, etc. when the number is going to be abnormally large which, if allowed, would per se create hardships of various kinds to the residents. These are some of the examples given by us. The underlying message is that certain categories of peaceful protests and demonstrations, in a guarded and regulated manner, could be allowed so as to enable the protestors to exercise their right and, at the same time, ensuring that no inconvenience of any kind is caused to the residents.

                  63.     Before the NGT, the authorities took the position that such demonstrations are to be allowed as the area was earmarked for such purposes. The residents, on the other hand, in the petition filed by them, highlighted the infringement of their rights which were caused by these demonstrations. In this kind of adversarial approach adopted by the parties before the NGT, the NGT went by the ground realities and the pathetic situation faced by the residents because of such demonstrations. Though this analysis of the NGT is without blemish, we, however, feel that the solution was not to ban the demonstrations altogether. Instead, the NGT would have directed the authorities to adopt such measures (some of which are indicated by us above) so that there is a balancing of the rights of both the sections of the society.

                  64.     At this juncture, while discussing the aspect of balancing of the two rights, we have to keep in mind certain other relevant factors as well. In the first instance, what needs to be noted is that a portion of Ramlila Maidan has been earmarked for such demonstrations, etc. Therefore, that space is already available. One of the arguments raised by the petitioner in the writ petition and the appellants in the appeal is that Ramlila Maidan is far away from that portion of New Delhi area where there is a concentration of “power” and, therefore, holding protests and demonstration at a far place in Ramlila Maidan would have no impact or very little effect. It was stressed that the purpose of holding such demonstrations and raising slogans is that they reach persons concerned for whom these are meant. This may be correct. However, it is also to be borne in mind that we are living in an era of technology where a concerned voice by a group of persons can reach the right quarters by numerous means. Electronic and print media play a pivotal role. Then, we have social media and various applications like “WhatsApp”, “Twitter”, “Instagram”, etc. which take no time in spreading such events. Secondly, though holding protests and demonstrations is an accepted right, at the same time, nobody can claim that I have a right to hold demonstration at one particular area only. While regulating such demonstrations in public interest, particular areas can be earmarked. On the other hand, it is also to be acknowledged that Ramlila Maidan may not be sufficient to cater to this requirement. Again, this place in old Delhi is a part of very congested area and it has its own limitations when it comes to using this area for such purposes. Therefore, some other area is required. Since, Jantar Mantar was the area chosen by the authorities and has been in use for quite some time, balancing can be done by permitting a limited part of this area for holding peaceful public meetings, processions, etc., at least to small groups and, in such a manner, that there is no disturbance or inconvenience of any nature whatsoever, insofar as residents are concerned.

                  65. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, we direct the Commissioner of Police, New Delhi in consultation with other agencies concerned, to devise a proper mechanism for limited use of the area for such purposes but to ensure that demonstrations, etc. are regulated in such a manner that these do not cause any disturbance to the residents of Jantar Mantar Road or the offices situated there. Detailed guidelines in this respect can be formulated. We may also clarify that a provision can be made for taking requisite prior permission from the Police Commissioner (or his delegated authority) for holding such demonstration by a particular group and while examining such proposals the parameters can be laid down which shall be looked into in order to decide whether the permission is to be granted or not. Two months' time is given to the Commissioner of Police, New Delhi for formulating such guidelines.

                  66. The petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1153 of 2017 wants boat club area to be available for demonstrations, etc. The petitioner has successfully demonstrated that it is their fundamental right under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. At the same time, it is also not denied that there can be reasonable restrictions on exercise of this right in the larger public interest. The respondents have also highlighted in equal measure the sensitivity of this area because of its proximity to the Parliament House, North and South Blocks and other Central Government offices, including frequent visits of Heads of foreign States and other such factors. The respondents are also justified in pointing out that alarmingly large number of requests for holding demonstrations at this place are made. Further, intelligence reports reveal that some of such demonstrations, if allowed, may cause serious law and order situation. The respondents are also correct to the extent that this Court has not adopted “clear and present danger test” [Ed.: Devised by Justice Holmes in 1919, see Schenck v. United States, 1919 SCC OnLine US SC 62 : 63 L Ed 470 : 249 US 47 (1919)] , as applied by the US courts, and instead it is the “apprehension of breach of peace test” which is to be used in order to decide as to whether a particular demonstration/dharna is to be allowed or not. When orders passed under Section 144 CrPC are examined in this context, one may not find foul with such orders. These orders do not, on their face, appear to be infected with any illegality as they prohibit public meetings, assembly of five or more persons, processions, demonstrations, dharnas, etc. “without written permission”. Further, such orders are passed on the basis of intelligence reports which indicate that “unrestricted holding of public meetings”, processions, demonstrations, etc. in the area are likely to cause obstruction to traffic, danger to human safety and disturbance of public tranquillity.

                  67.     The tenor or these orders and the specific language used therein bring about the following two features:

                  (a) there should not be “unrestricted” holding of public meetings, processions, etc.; and

                  (b) as a corollary, the order mentions that such public meetings, processions, demonstrations, etc. would not be allowed “without written permission”.

                  68. The reading of these orders, thus, would indicate that there is no absolute prohibition from holding public meetings, processions, demonstrations, etc. Such activities are to be restricted in larger public interest and, therefore, before any group of persons or person wants to carry out any such processions and dharnas, it has to take prior written permission. This clearly implies that whenever such a request is made, the authority is to examine the same and take a decision as to whether it should allow the proposed demonstration, public meeting, etc. or not, keeping in view its likely effect, namely, whether it would cause any obstruction to traffic or danger to human safety or disturbance to public tranquillity, etc. If requests made are considered and then allowed or rejected keeping in view the aforesaid considerations, there cannot be any quarrel as to the validity of such an order made under Section 144 CrPC. That is, however, not the ground reality.”

8. By applying the principles of the above judgments to the facts and circumstances of this case, admittedly there is no such complaint of violence or obstructions made by the petitioner to the public, since he along with other farmers peacefully participated in the protest against the Government Order and also fixation of fair price to toor dal, that too, after submitting a representation to the concerned authorities, I am of the considered view that, if entire allegations in the FIR and other documents taken into consideration on its face value, even then, no case has been made against the petitioner for the offences charged against him. Hence, continuation of proceedings against him is abuse of process of Court. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following;

                  ORDER

                  (a) The petition is allowed.

                  (b) The proceedings initiated against the petitioner/accused No.18 in C.C No.296/2025 (Crime No.319/2024) registered by Jevargi Police Station, for the offences punishable under Sections 189(2), 191(2), 126(2), 352, 351(2) r/w Section 190 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, pending on the file Civil Judge Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Jevargi, is hereby quashed.