1. The 1st defendant in O.S.No.385/2006 on the files of the Principal Sub Court, Kottayam, in a suit for setting aside a partnership deed and a declaration of existence of a partnership firm and also the consequential relief in the form of injunction restraining defendants from impairing the rights of the plaintiff over the firm, has come up in the present appeal raising certain intricate questions regarding the applicability of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.
2. Brief facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows:
The plaintiff and the defendants are brothers. The father of the plaintiff and the defendants, named Sri.K.Ramachandra Panicker, died on 8.12.1976. He was a dealer and licensee of a petrol bunk at Vaikom, Valiyakavala junction with No. KL 182 under the name and style ‘M/s. K.R. Panicker and Sons’. On 29.5.1978, a partnership deed was executed between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant, and that being the eldest member of the family, the 1st defendant was managing the affairs of the petrol pump. On 3.3.2004, the plaintiff received a copy of an intimation issued by the BPCL (Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited), dated 27.2.2004, directing the partners to furnish licence renewal form. When the plaintiff enquired about it with the defendants, he was informed that the partnership deed of the year 1978 was cancelled and the firm was reconstituted with a fresh partnership deed dated 7.8.1984 and that the plaintiff has no right over the partnership firm, since he has retired from the partnership firm. But the plaintiff stated that he did not execute or sign any document during the said period, and that he was away and did not know about the new deed and hence, the suit. The plaintiff contended that the partnership deed dated 7.8.1984 is a sham document executed by the defendants, so as to deny any legal right to him, and that the same is not liable to be acted upon and requires to be set aside. The defendants resisted the suit and contended that the plaintiff had to be excluded from the partnership deed of the year 1984 because he was employed in the Indian Railways, and that, going by the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966 an employee of the Railways cannot hold an office of profit. Since the reconstituted firm was registered on 7.8.1984 and the original partnership deed was handed over to M/s. BPCL for renewal of the licence, the plaintiff is not entitled to get any benefit out of the first deed. It was further pointed out that a complaint was lodged before the Police Authorities by the plaintiff, complaining that the signature of the plaintiff had been forged, and the said complaint is pending consideration. On behalf of the plaintiff, Exts.A1 to A13 documents were produced and PW1 was examined. On behalf of the defendants, Exts.B1 to B6 documents were produced and the 1st defendant was examined as DW1. The trial court, on consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, decreed the suit and held that the entire family members are entitled to get proportionate profit of the firm from 29.05.1978 from the 1st defendant and that the plaintiff is entitled to get 1/3 share, and others are entitled to 2/3 share. Since the plaintiff had not remitted the court fee for the settlement of the accounts, he was given liberty to institute a fresh suit for the settlement of accounts. Aggrieved, the 1st defendant preferred AS No.191/2011 which was also dismissed by the Addl. District Court-II (Special), Kottayam by judgment dated 1.10.2014 and hence the second appeal.
3. On 6.6.2016, this Court admitted the case on the following substantial questions of law:
“(1) Whether the court below misunderstood the nature of the suit.
(2) whether the findings of the court below are perverse.”
4. Heard Sri. Sreekumar G. (Chelur), the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/1st defendant and Sri.K.I.Mayankutty Mather, the learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms. Uthara Asokan, the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent/plaintiff.
5. Sri. Sreekumar G. (Chelur), the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, raised the following submissions:
(a) The plaintiff had admittedly retired from the partnership firm, and the firm was reconstituted on 7.8.1984. The reconstitution of the firm was necessitated because the plaintiff had secured employment in the Railways, and therefore, continuation of the plaintiff in the partnership firm was not permissible in terms of the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules,1966.
(b) The reliefs sought in the suit are hit by Section 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Admittedly, the partnership firm, reconstituted in the year 1984, is an unregistered firm. Even in the year of 1978, the partnership firm was also an unregistered firm and therefore, the suit is not maintainable.
(c) In the absence of any documentary evidence to show the nature of the sharing of the profits as regards the 1978 firm, the finding of the courts below that the plaintiff is entitled to 1/3 share of the profits is certainly rendered based on extraneous consideration.
(d) It is further pointed out that the finding of the courts below that the plaintiff had not signed the 1984 partnership deed is per se incorrect, because Ext.A1 document shows that the plaintiff had signed the said document.
(e) The courts below had misread the case projected by the plaintiff. The case of the plaintiff is that Ext.A1 partnership deed is a forged document, but no steps were taken by him to send the document for an expert opinion. The finding of the courts below that the plaintiff is not a party to the partnership deed, is per se incorrect.
(f) Lastly, it is pointed out that the bar under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 is an institutional prohibition which requires the court to take into consideration in a suit relating to a partnership firm and therefore, the prohibition if any will cut to the root of the case projected by the plaintiff and therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed.
6. Per contra, Sri.K.I.Mayankutty Mather, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the 2nd respondent/ plaintiff, countered the submissions of Sri. Sreekumar G. (Chelur) and raised the following submissions:
(i) The bar under Section 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 is attracted only if a suit is instituted for enforcing a right under a contract. In the present suit, what is claimed is the right flowing out of an agreement itself and therefore, the bar is not attracted.
(ii) Insofar as Ext.A1 partnership deed is concerned, the plaintiff is not a party and therefore, even if it is assumed that the said partnership firm is not registered, the bar under Section 69(1) will not apply.
(iii) The finding that the plaintiff has not signed Ext.A1 partnership deed is a finding of fact, which does not call for any interference by this Court, especially since in none of the papers explaining the text of the constitution of the firm, the sign of the plaintiff is not seen to be found, whereas the signature of the plaintiff is found only in the last page which is an unstamped paper and therefore, the finding of the courts below that the document does not contain the signature of the plaintiff, is correct.
(iv) As regards the prayer for a declaration that any transaction after the constitution of the 1984 partnership firm is not binding on the plaintiff is liable to be granted by the courts below in the light of the specific admission in paragraph 13 of the written statement filed on behalf of the 1st defendant.
(v) It is further pointed out that despite the so-called reconstitution of the firm, by Ext.A12 letter, the plaintiff was addressed by the 1st defendant to come forward for execution of the licence renewal agreement for the purpose of running the petrol outlet. As a matter of fact, if the partnership firm was reconstituted, then, the 1st defendant had no occasion to send the said letter to the plaintiff.
7. In the light of these rival claims, this Court by a separate order dated 27.10.2025, assigning reasons for framing an additional substantial question of law, had framed an additional substantial question of law as follows:
“3. Whether the suit is barred by Section 69 of the Partnership Act, 1932, since admittedly the firm is an unregistered firm.”
8. I have considered the rival submissions raised across the bar and perused the judgments rendered by the courts below and also the records of the case.
9. Before proceeding to the intricacies of the arguments raised in this appeal, this Court will first answer the additional substantial question of law. This is because, once it is found that the suit is barred under Section 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, no further deliberation needs to be done in this appeal. If only this Court finds that the objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is unsustainable, then only this Court needs to proceed further.
10. Sri. Sreekumar G. (Chelur), the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/1st defendant raised his arguments relying on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sri. Velji Narayan Patel v. Sri. Jayanti Lal Patel [2008 SCC OnLine Cal 782]. Paragraph No.9 of the said decision reads as under:
“9. Sub-section (1) of Section 69 disentitles a partner or a person on behalf of a partner to sue as a partner against the firm of a person allegedly to be a partner unless the firm is registered with the registrar of firms. Sub-section (2) similarly disentitles the firm to institute a suit against a third party unless the firm is registered. The common feature between sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) is that such suit must relate to enforcement of right arising out of a contract of conferred by the Act. If a suit by a partner against a partner or firm does not relate to enforcement of a right arising out of a contract then there is no legal prohibition because the spirit of Section 69 either of sub-section (1) or of sub-section (2) is that such suit must be related to enforcement of the right arising from a contract. Having gone through the plaint of the suit it clearly appears that the plaintiff instituted the suit as a partner for enforcement of his right arising out of the contract. The entire narrative of the plaint is for declaration that the plaintiff is the owner of 50 per cent of the share of the partnership business and for declaration that he is entitled to enjoy 50 per cent of the said business under the name and style of M/s. Bhagat & Company, for production of books of accounts, statement of accounts, balance sheet and other documents and for declaration that the defendant is liable to disburse and pay plaintiffs share of profit in the business. Plaintiff does not sue in his individual capacity. The prayers in the plaint are basically for enforcement of his right as embodied in the partnership deed which was executed by and between the parties on 15th of April, 2000. In such circumstances, the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 69 appears to have hit the plaint. Order 7, Rule 11(d) contains "where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law". It is not the case in the plaint that the firm was registered with the Registrar of Firms.”
11. Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 creates a bar insofar as the institution of a suit is concerned. Section 69 of the Act reads as under:
“69. Effect of non-registration. — (1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.
(2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.
(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect, —
(a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or
(b) the powers of an official assignee, receiver or Court under the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909, or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, to realise the property of an insolvent partner.
(4) This section shall not apply—
(a) to firms or to partners in firms which have no place of business in the territories to which this Act extends, or whose places of business in the said territories are situated in areas to which, by notification under section 56, this Chapter does not apply, or
(b) to any suit or claim of set-off not exceeding one hundred rupees in value which, in the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in section 19 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, or, outside the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in the Second Schedule to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, or to any proceeding in execution or other proceeding incidental to or arising from any such suit or claim.”
12. A reading of the provision shows that Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 has two parts. The first part deals with the maintainability of a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm. The second part of Section 69 deals with the maintainability of a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract by or on behalf of a firm against a third party. Since this Court is concerned about the first part of Section 69(1) alone, it is felt expedient not to deal with the latter part of Section 69(1).
13. The first part of Section 69 (1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 could be deciphered into two parts; (a) a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract, or (b) conferred by the Act. No doubt, Section 69(1) specifically provides that no such suit is maintainable in a court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm unless the firm is registered. Now, the pertinent question before this Court is whether in the nature of the reliefs sought for in the plaint, the suit is maintainable. In order to consider the said question, one needs to look into the reliefs sought for in the plaint, which, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, would attract the bar under Section 69. The reliefs sought for in the plaint are extracted as below: -
“1. To declare that the partnership deed dated 7/8/04 is a redundent document, and is not binding to the plaintiff and partnership firm
2. To declare that the partnership deed of M/s K.R. Panicker and Sons dated 29/5/78 is still in force and the plaintiff is still continues as partner of the said partnership and the liabilities created by the defendants by using the partnership deed dated 7/8/84, is to be cleared by the defendants and the plaintiff has no liability to clear it and to declare that the entire family members are entitled to get the proportionate profit of the firm from 29/5/78 onwards.
3. Direct the defendants to furnish the true and correct account of the firm from 29/5/78 onwards.
4. Pass a permanent prohibitory order of injunction restraining the defendants from doing anything impairing the right title etc. of the plaintiff over the said M/s K.R. Panicker and Sons Patrol Pump.
5. To direct the first defendant to produce the partnership deed dated 29/5/78 before this Honourable Court.
6. Allow the entire cost of these proceedings.
7. Such other order or orders as are deemed nust and proper to meet the ends of justice may also be passed.”
14. The first relief sought for is to declare that the partnership deed dated 7.8.1984 is a redundant document and is not binding on the plaintiff and the partnership firm. Admittedly, the plaintiff is not a partner of the 1984 firm. Therefore, the bar under Section 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 is not attracted qua the first relief.
15. Coming to the second relief, a declaration is sought for to the effect that the plaintiff continues to be the partner of M/s. K.R. Panicker & Sons dated 29.5.1978 and the partnership deed continues to operate and any liability created pursuant to the partnership deed dated 7.8.1984 is not binding on him. In paragraph No.13 of the written statement filed on behalf of the 1st defendant, there is a clear admission regarding this declaration sought for. Therefore, this Court fails to comprehend as to how the second relief is also hit by Section 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.
16. Insofar as the reliefs 3 to 5 in the plaint are concerned, the bar under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 may have a bearing on the entitlement of the plaintiff to maintain the suit. The thrust of the arguments raised by both counsel across the bar revolves around the entitlement of the plaintiff to maintain relief Nos.3 to 5 in the suit. Apart from supporting his case based on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sri. Velji Narayan Patel v. Sri. Jayanti Lal Patel (supra), the learned counsel Sri. G. Sreekumar (Chelur) had placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sunkari Tirumala Rao and others v. Penki Aruna Kumari [2025 SCC OnLine SC 125] and contended that a suit filed by partners of an unregistered firm against another partner is not maintainable because of the bar under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Placing reliance on the decision of the Division Bench in Capithan Exporting Co. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [2024 (6) KHC 69 (DB)], an argument is advanced by Sri. Sreekumar G. (Chelur) that the bar under Section 69 is an institutional bar which would require the courts to examine suo motu as to whether the suit is maintainable or not.
17. But one must remember that the Supreme Court in Raptakos Brett and Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] held that when a declaratory relief is sought for to the effect that a person continues to be a partner of the partnership firm, the bar under Section 69(2) is not attracted.
18. The larger question to be considered by this Court in the light of these conflicting claims is whether the plea that the suit is barred under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 can be permitted to be raised for the first time at the second appellate stage. No doubt, this Court had framed the additional substantial question of law by stating reasons as to why the said question is being framed by this Court. But that by itself does not mean that this Court should necessarily answer the same in the affirmative, especially when the pleadings in this case disclose that the objection as regards the maintainability of the suit was not raised in the written statement.
19. In Venugopal Company (M/s.) v. G. Sasikumar and Others [2022 (1) KHC 169], a Single Bench of this Court held that the plea that the maintainability of a suit by a partner of an unregistered firm cannot be gone into if there are no proper pleadings with regard to the said contention in the written statement.
20. A Division Bench of this Court in Nortrans Marine Services (P) Ltd. and another v. Cargo Care International and Others [2020 KHC 804] held that in order to consider the question of maintainability of the suit under Section 69 of the Partnership Act 1932, the same should be raised in the written statement.
21. However, a subsequent Division Bench in Capithan Exporting Co. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [2024 (6) KHC 69 (DB)] without noticing the earlier Division Bench decision in Nortrans Marine Services(P) Ltd (supra) held that the bar under Section 69 of the Partnership Act, 1932 is an institutional bar and the suit cannot be saved.
22. In light of the conflicting views, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the reference to a larger bench is inevitable to resolve the conflict. But then, this Court must consider whether the bar under Section 69 actually arises in this case and if so, whether this is a fit case for reference before the larger bench.
23. Before considering the said issue, it will be worthwhile to note that the Supreme Court in Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra & Anr [(2014) 16 SCC 623], held that in a case of conflicting views expressed by a Bench of co-equal strength, if the subsequent decision does not take note of the earlier binding decision, the subsequent decision cannot have any precedential value. This Court, however, is not venturing into the question as to whether it can hold the decision in Capithan Exporting Co. (supra) as per incurium qua Nortrans Marine Services (P) Ltd. and another (supra). Suffice to say that the Division Bench in Capithan Exporting Co. (supra) did not take note of the binding precedent in Nortrans Marine Services(P) Ltd. (supra). Hence, this Court is of the considered view that applying the ratio decidendi culled out by the Supreme Court as above, reference to a larger bench is unnecessary.
24. It is indisputable that, in the facts of this case, the contention regarding the maintainability of the suit under Section 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, was not raised by the appellant in his written statement. Going by the bench decision of this court in Nortrans Marine Services (P) Ltd. (supra), the maintainability of the suit for want of registration under Section 69(1) of the Partnership Act, 1932 must be raised in the written statement and without which the said question cannot be raised for the first time in the second appeal.
25. Nevertheless, this Court has examined the question as to whether the bar under Section 69(1) actually arises in this case. In the nature of the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff, it must be held that as far as the relief No.1 is concerned, the same is not hit by the bar under Section 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 going by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Raptakos Brett and Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184].
26. Thus the additional substantial question framed by this court is answered as follows:
“The suit is not barred under Section 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 and that in order to raise the said plea, there should be a specific pleading in the written statement in terms of Order-VIII Rule-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”
27. Having found that the suit is not barred under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act 1932, this Court must decide i) whether the suit as such framed is maintainable, ii) whether the finding of the courts below is perverse. As far as the declaratory relief sought for by the plaintiff that he is not liable for the subsequent liability created pursuant to the reconstituted firm, the 1st defendant had already admitted that the said declaration can be granted. Therefore, the decree could be sustained based on the admission under Order-XII Rule-6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
28. However, insofar as reliefs 3 to 5 are concerned, it cannot be said so. Admittedly, the partnership deed of the year 1978 has not seen the light of the day. For reasons unexplained, both parties failed to bring the same on record. Since the plaintiff is claiming that he continues to be the partner of the firm and that he requires the profit to be distributed in terms of the said deed, it was incumbent upon him to have produced the deed. But since the 1st defendant also failed to produce the said deed, the nature of the sharing of the profits between the partners remained in the dark. But, despite these infirmities, the trial court proceeded to find that the plaintiff is entitled to 1/3 share, whereas the other family members are entitled to 2/3 share. On what basis, the said finding was rendered is not clear to this Court. Insofar as the reconstituted partnership deed is concerned, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact because, even after the firm is stated to be reconstituted, the appellant had addressed to his brother to come forward and sign the agreement for renewal of license with the BPCL. On what basis the said letter was issued is not satisfactorily explained. Therefore, at this distance of time, it will be wholly inappropriate for this Court to unseat the concurrent findings as regards the applicability of the 1984 partnership deed because of a voluntary act of the 1st defendant. Moreover, as rightly found by the courts below, a reading of Ext.A1 would show that the signature of the plaintiff is seen only on the last page, which is an unstamped paper, which is not explained by the 1st defendant. It is also not explained as to why the plaintiff is retiring from the firm. Though an explanation is given that he had secured a job in the Railways, and therefore, as per Rule 15 of the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966 there is a bar to continue with an office of profit. But, one fails to comprehend, despite this embargo on the plaintiff to continue as a partner of the firm, why the 1st defendant still chose to address the plaintiff under Ext.A12. The content of Ext.A12 reads as under:
“The BPCL has forwarded the application form for renewal of the petrol pump (dealership) licence.
You are requested to meet me in person and put your signature in the application from. They have given us only 15 days time to execute the agreement. Therefore you are requested to execute the same within 23rd August 2003.”
(sic)
29. Since the appellant himself has addressed to the plaintiff to come forward to execute necessary licence agreement with the BPCL Company, this Court is inclined to think that the 1984 partnership deed has not taken effect. Therefore, the findings rendered by the courts below concurrently on the subsistence of 1978 partnership deed and also the effect of 1984 partnership deed do not call for any interference.
30. However, the said reasoning cannot be applied insofar as reliefs 3 to 5 in the plaint are concerned. There is no explanation from the side of the plaintiff as to how he is claiming 1/3 share of profit of the partnership firm. Equally so, there is no explanation as to how the other family members are entitled to the remaining shares. This obscurity cannot be resolved finally by this Court in the absence of the partnership deed dated 29.5.1978. Even assuming that this deed was available, even then, the plaintiff will have to necessarily sue for dissolution of the firm and also for sharing of the profits. Therefore, it is clear that the framework of the suit itself is bad and that the finding of the courts below as regards the sharing of the profits of the firm is certainly perverse.
31. It is pertinent to mention that the plaintiff did not remit any court fee for the settlement of the accounts. It is also beyond doubt that from 1984 onwards till 2018, he was employed in the Railways. Therefore, even assuming that a declaratory relief is granted to him, he can continue only as a dormant partner, thereby indicating that he is not entitled to any profit for the said period. In such circumstances, in the absence of any clear evidence as regards these aspects, a remand by this Court is inevitable. In this context, this Court finds considerable force in the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent/plaintiff that even if the latter part of the reliefs under 3 to 5 is held against the plaintiff, then, his remedy to institute a separate suit for settlement of accounts having been reserved by the courts below, such right will have to be left open by this Court. Alternatively, it is also pleaded that since the parties have been litigating from 2006 onwards, let the suit be remanded for the limited purpose of considering the settlement of accounts alone, enabling the plaintiff to remit the court fee for the said purpose.
32. In view of the fact that the appellant and the respondents are brothers, it is only just and proper for this Court to grant an opportunity for the plaintiff to have the accounts of the firm settled by an appropriate measure in the present suit and not to drive the parties to a fresh litigation. In the above circumstances, the substantial questions of law framed by this Court are answered as follows:
i) The framework of the suit is not proper inasmuch as, apart from the declaratory relief, none of the reliefs could be sustained.
ii) The finding of the courts below that the plaintiff is entitled to â…“ share and the other family members are entitled to proportionate â…” share is perverse and liable to be set aside.
33. As an upshot of this discussion, the judgment and decree dated 3.8.2011 in O.S.No.385/2006 on the files of the Principal Sub Court, Kottayam as affirmed by judgment dated 1.10.2014 in A.S.No.191/2011 by the Additional District Court-II (Special), Kottayam are liable to be interfered for the limited purpose and the suit, O.S.No.385/2006 on the files of the Principal Sub Court, Kottayam is liable to be restored, with the following directions:
(a) The finding of the courts below that the partnership deed dated 7.8.1984 is inoperative insofar as the 2nd respondent /plaintiff is concerned, is sustained.
(b) All other findings regarding the respective shares of the parties in the partnership deed are set aside.
(c) O.S.No.385/2006 shall stand restored to the files of the Principal Sub Court, Kottayam.
(d) The 2nd respondent/plaintiff, if so advised, may remit the court fee for the purpose of settlement of accounts and also for dissolution of the firm by incorporating suitable relief.
(e) The appellant/1st defendant is given liberty to produce a copy of the partnership deed dated 29.5.1978 and also the profit and loss account of the firm.
(f) Since the plaintiff was a government employee employed in the Railways from 1984 till 2018, and having not participated in the profit sharing of the firm, while settlement of the accounts is being carried out, the plaintiff will not be entitled to any profit derived from the firm for the period 1984 to 2018.
(g) The parties shall appear before the trial court on 06.01.2026.
(h) The trial court shall give an opportunity to both the plaintiff and the 1st defendant to adduce sufficient evidence and shall grant six postings each for the plaintiff and the defendant to adduce further evidence.
(i) On completion of the evidence, the trial court shall proceed with the trial and dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of six months from the date of completion of pre-trial steps.
(j) All pending applications stand closed.
(k) Costs made easy.
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