Anil K. Narendra, J.
1. The petitioner filed O.A.No.1274 of 2022 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal at Thiruvananthapuram, invoking the provisions under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking an order directing the 1st respondent State to allow pension to the applicant for the 26 years of regular service rendered by her; an order directing the 2nd respondent Secretary to Government, SC/ST Development Department to modify Annexure A4 order dated 04.07.2011 terminating the applicant from service, so as to grant pension for the 26 years of service rendered by her; to set aside Annexure A11 communication dated 06.12.2018 of the 3rd respondent District Collector, which deny pension benefits to the applicant; to direct the 1st respondent State to consider and pass orders on Annexure A13 representation dated 01.07.2022 made by the applicant, within a time limit, after hearing the applicant.
2. Along with O.A.No.1274 of 2022, the petitioner- applicant has produced Annexures A1 to A14. A copy of O.A.No.1274 of 2022 is marked in this original petition as Ext.P1. In O.A.No.1274 of 2022, on behalf of the 1st respondent State, a reply statement dated 21.06.2024 was filed, opposing the reliefs sought for, a copy of which is marked in this original petition as Ext.P2. The applicant filed Ext.P3 rejoinder dated 11.06.2025. The learned counsel for the applicant has also submitted Ext.P4 argument notes dated nil.
3. After considering the rival contentions, the Tribunal passed Ext.P5 order dated 27.08.2025 in O.A.No.1274 of 2022, whereby that original application stands dismissed, for the reasons stated therein. Paragraphs 9, 10 and also the last paragraph of that order read thus;
“9. Admittedly, the applicant was terminated from service. As per Rule 29(a) of KSR Part III, it is stipulated that resignation, dismissal or removal from service entails forfeiture of past service. The respondents place reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court in E.K. Varghese [2016 (1) KHC 35], wherein the constitutionality of this rule has been upheld by the Hon'ble High Court.
10. In the light of the fact that the applicant was terminated from service under the provisions in Rule 29(a) of KSR Part III, we do not find the contention of the applicant that she is eligible for pension for the period she served under the 2nd respondent is sustainable.
Accordingly, this Original Application is dismissed.”
4. Challenging Ext.P5 order dated 27.08.2025 of the Tribunal in O.A.No.1274 of 2022, the petitioner-applicant is before this Court in this original petition, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-applicant and the learned Senior Government Pleader for the respondents.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner-applicant would contend that the reasoning of the Tribunal in Ext.P5 order dated 27.08.2025 in O.A.No.1274 of 2022 is perverse and patently illegal, which warrants interference in the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Tribunal passed Ext.P5 order, without properly understanding the effect of Annexure A6 order dated 18.08.2017 of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.10617 of 2017, and also Annexure A8 order dated 03.10.2018 in M.A.No.1617 of 2018 in Civil Appeal No.10617 of 2017. In view of Annexures A6 and A8 judgment/ order of the Apex Court, the Tribunal ought to have favourably considered the claim made by the petitioner-applicant for pension for the 26 years of regular service rendered by the applicant, by directing the 2nd respondent Secretary to Government, SC/ST Development Department to modify Annexure A4 order dated 04.07.2011, whereby the applicant was terminated from service.
7. On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Pleader for the respondents would submit that the Tribunal has stated valid reasons in Ext.P5 order dated 27.08.2025 for dismissing O.A.No.1274 of 2022. The reasoning of the Tribunal in Ext.P5 order is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting any interference by this Court in the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The challenge made by the petitioner-applicant against Annexure A4 order dated 04.07.2011 of the 2nd respondent Secretary to Government, SC/ST Development Department terminating the service of the petitioner-applicant as Confidential Assistant Gr-II, Collectorate, Thiruvananthapuram, as well as order dated 11.04.2021 issued by Kerala Institute of Research, Training and Development Studies (KIRTADS) rejecting her claim as a member of Scheduled Caste (SC) ‘Vannan’ community, were rejected by the judgment dated 12.03.2013 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.19487 of 2011. W.A.No.647 of 2013 filed by the petitioner-applicant ended in dismissal by Annexure A5 judgment dated 03.02.2017. Annexures A6 and A8 judgment/order of the Apex Court, would not enable the petitioner-applicant to raise a claim for pension for the service rendered by her before the order of termination, or to approach the Tribunal by filing an original application seeking an order directing the 2nd respondent Secretary to Government, SC/ST Development Department to modify Annexure A4 order dated 04.07.2011, terminating the applicant from service.
8. In paragraphs 6 to 8 of Ext.P5 order dated 27.08.2025, the Tribunal has considered the contention of the applicant that she is eligible for the benefits, as sought for in O.A.No.1274 of 2022. Paragraphs 6 to 8 of Ext.P5 order read thus;
“6. Learned counsel for the applicant reiterated the contention that Annexure A6 and A8 orders of the Apex Court have to be interpreted as treating her disputed period of service as eligible for all benefits includes pensionary benefits also. According to the counsel for the applicant, pension is an accrued benefit for the service already rendered and therefore such a benefit cannot be declined. The learned Government Pleader reiterated the contention that the applicant was terminated from service under Rule 29 A of KSR Part II; this entails forfeiture of the prior service for any retirement benefits.
7. The applicant had entered service claiming the benefit of being a member of the Scheduled Caste community. Subsequently, the PSC found that the applicant's claim was not genuine. Through the process laid under the law, the applicant's claim for Scheduled Caste status was verified and found to be not admissible. This resulted in her termination from service vide Annexure A4 order dated 04.07.2011. Through the interim orders in W.P.(C) No.19487 of 2011, the applicant continued to be in service. This W.P.(C), as well as the Review Petition No.290 of 2013 and the Writ Appeal No.647 of 2013, were dismissed. From the date of her termination till the final disposal of the Writ Appeal, she was not given the benefit of salary or other benefits. Vide Annexure A6 Order, the Apex Court had ordered that the applicant is eligible for salary for the period which she had actually worked. It was also clarified that the salary that would have been payable to a regular employee at the relevant time, which includes the benefits under Pay Revision, Increments, DA, etc., is what is payable. These benefits were calculated and disbursed to the applicant.
8. The contention of the applicant that she is eligible for the benefits as ordered in the various judgments cited is considered as follows:
8.1 OP No.22554 of 1999. In this case, the applicant was removed from service for unauthorised absence. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble High Court directed that the petitioner's removal from service may be treated as compulsory retirement only. Evidently, compulsory retirement does not entail forfeiture of the past service.
8.2 In Anila K.K. and others v. State of Kerala and others [2009 (3) KHC 986], the question under consideration was whether the finding that the petitioners are not eligible for reservation benefits will apply prospectively or not. The Hon'ble High Court found that the benefits accrued till the date of the order were not disturbed. It was further clarified that this would mean the employment secured by the petitioners or any promotion granted to them shall not be cancelled or disturbed.
8.3. In Shalini v New English High School Association and others [(2013) 16 SCC 526], the question under consideration was whether termination of employment after passage of several decades, on the finding of the Scrutiny Committee, makes the petitioner disentitled to the benefits already granted. The Apex Court found that since there was no falsity in the claim of the applicant, it could not be considered that the petitioner had produced any false certificate. Accordingly, the termination from employment was set aside, and reinstatement in service was ordered.
8.4. In Vijayan v. State of Kerala [2013 (2) KHC 149], the question under consideration was whether the community certificate issued by a competent authority can be cancelled merely on the finding that the person does not belong to the community as claimed. In this judgment, the Hon'ble High Court set aside the order passed by the Scrutiny Committee to correct the school records
8.5. In K.N. Haridasan v. State Bank of Travancore [2017 (2) KLT 952], by the time the caste status was finally decided, the applicant had retired from service. The Hon'ble High Court found that the employer had allowed the petitioner to continue in service till the superannuation even without any indicting order from the court. The Hon'ble High Court also found that pension is an essential concomitant to the past service, it cannot be termed as a future benefit, and therefore upheld the claim of the petitioner for pension.”
9. The challenge initially made by the petitioner-applicant against Annexure A4 order dated 04.07.2011 issued by the 2nd respondent was rejected by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the judgment dated 12.03.2013 in W.P.(C)No.19487 of 2011. Annexure A4 order dated 04.07.2011 was marked in that writ petition as Ext.P11. Annexure A3 order dated 11.04.2011 of the Scrutiny Committee for Verification of Community Certificate, rejecting her claim as a member of the Schedule Caste (SC) ‘Vannan’ community was also under challenge in W.P.(C)No.19487 of 2011, which was marked as Ext.P10. In the order dated 11.04.2011, the Scrutiny Committee found that the applicant belongs to the Other Backward Community (OBC) ‘Veluthedath Nair’. Her father, mother, sister and other siblings also belong to ‘Veluthedath Nair’ community. A copy of the enquiry report dated 04.01.2001 of the Vigilance Cell of Kerala Institute of Research, Training and Development Studies (KIRTADS) was marked as Ext.R1(a), along with the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent in W.P.(C)No.19487 of 2011.
10. Challenging the judgment dated 12.03.2013 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.19487 of 2011, the petitioner- applicant filed W.A.No.647 of 2013, which ended in dismissal by Annexure A5 judgment dated 03.02.2017. In paragraph 12 of that judgment, the Division Bench noticed the specific stand taken in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 1st respondent State and the 2nd respondent Scrutiny Committee. Paragraph 12 of Annexure A5 judgment reads thus;
“12. The specific stand taken in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 1st and 2nd respondents is that, the anthropology investigation conducted by KIRTADS on the caste status of the appellant revealed without any shadow of doubt that she belongs to Other Backward Community (OBC) Veluthedath Nair. Her father, mother, sister and other siblings also belong to Veluthedath Nair Community. Exhibit R1(a) is a copy of the enquiry report dated 04.01.2001. Before the completion of the enquiry by KIRTADS, the appellant was called for a personal hearing. However, she could not produce any satisfactory material to show that she is eligible for the reservation benefit of the Vannan community. In the meantime, the claim of the appellant's sister Smt.Seena.S.V. also came before the KIRTADS. So KIRTADS made an enquiry for both the appellant and her sister. In that enquiry, it was revealed that the caste status of the appellant's parents is undoubtedly Veluthedath Nair, and as such her claim as a member of Vannan community (SC) cannot be accepted, and she cannot be allowed to grab or hold a post intended for those entitled to reservation as a member of the Scheduled Caste community.”
11. In Annexure A5 judgment dated 03.02.2017 in W.A.No.647 of 2013, the Division Bench found that a reading of the judgment dated 12.03.2013 in W.P.(C)No.19487 of 2011 would show that, the learned Single Judge, after meticulously considering the pleadings and materials on record, with reference to the law laid down by this Court as well as the Apex Court, concluded that there is absolutely no illegality or irregularity in the orders impugned, i.e., Exts.P10 and P11, warranting an interference in the writ appeal. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge in the judgment dated 12.03.2013 is perfectly legal, which warrants no interference in the writ appeal. Paragraphs 13 to 17 of Annexure A5 judgment read thus;
‘13. Other than the SSLC book, which is marked as Exhibit P1, the appellant could not produce any material in support of her claim as a member of the Vannan community. In view of the Government order on the subject, namely G.O.(P)No. 2/90/SCST DD, caste status cannot be proved solely on the basis of the SSLC book. Accordingly, a detailed enquiry was conducted. The Scrutiny Committee issued a show cause notice to the appellant and her sister on 23.12.2012, pursuant to which, the appellant and her sister submitted Exhibits R1(d) and R1(c) requests for further time to furnish a reply. Thereafter, the appellant submitted Exhibit R1(d) reply through the Commissioner, Land Revenue, which was received by the Scrutiny Committee on 29.03.2003. In the meantime, the appellant filed O.P.No.17296 of 1998 before this Court, in which an interim order of stay of proceedings initiated against the appellant was granted on 08.10.1998, until further orders. The stay was vacated only on 16.01.2007, when this Court allowed the said original petition and quashed the proceedings against the appellant, after permitting the authorities to conduct an appropriate investigation on the caste status of the appellant. Thereafter, the Scrutiny Committee, after considering the report of KIRTADS in detail and after conducting its own enquiry, after giving ample opportunity to the appellant to prove her caste status, found that there is no reason to accept the caste claim of the appellant since it has been undoubtedly revealed that she belongs to OBC Veluthedath Nair. Accordingly, the Scrutiny Committee issued Exhibit P10 proceedings dated 11.04.2011 rejecting the caste claim of the appellant. In Exhibit P10, it was found that the appellant's father and mother belong to Veluthedath Nair community, and as such, the appellant and her sister cannot belong to a different community. Since the appellant and her sister could not prove their claim as members of the Vannan community (SC), the Scrutiny Committee rejected their claim and decided to forward a copy of Exhibit P10 proceedings to the Government for issuing necessary further orders. The Government, after examining the case in detail, issued Exhibit P11 order dated 04.07.2011 declaring that the appellant, her sister and members of their family do not belong to the SC Vannan community but belong to the OBC Veluthedath Nair. It was also held that none of the members of their family shall be eligible for any of the benefits exclusively intended for the members of the Scheduled Caste. If any of them has availed the benefit meant for the members of the Scheduled Caste, all such benefits shall be stopped. The Government has ordered further that the service of the appellant shall be terminated forthwith and another eligible member of the Scheduled Caste community shall be appointed, if her appointment was on consideration as a member of the Scheduled Caste community. However, no action has been taken against the appellant's sister because she is a physically handicapped person and got a provisional appointment for the first instance as a physically disabled person and subsequently got regularised as per the orders issued by the Government.
14. Before the learned Single Judge, the appellant contended that she was not given a reasonable opportunity before the Scrutiny Committee to substantiate her caste status. It was after considering the pleadings and materials on record, the learned single Judge repelled the said contention of the appellant. The learned single Judge has also found that no evidence was adduced by the appellant to prove her caste status as Vannan. On the other hand, after an extensive enquiry, it was found that the maternal parents of the appellant are also members of OBC Veluthedath Nair. It is also found that on account of some similarities of traditional occupation, a few members belonging to Veluthedath Nair community have infiltrated into the Scheduled Caste/Vannan/Mannan Community, for which they have employed various fraudulent methods. It is also indicated that there has been an organised move by the members belonging to Veluthedath Nair community to style themselves as the Scheduled Caste Vannan Community. Therefore, in the report, it has been concluded that the appellant and her sister were wrongly admitted as Scheduled Caste Vannan in school records and hence, the community certificates issued on the basis of such entries in the school records are false and require to be set right.
15. The appellant would contend that, as the religion or caste of a child is told by his/her parents, the child has no choice in that matter and therefore he/she cannot be accused of having done anything fraudulently. After considering the said contention of the appellant with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned single Judge held as follows in paragraph (14) of the judgment, which reads thus;
“14. Having regard to the factual circumstances involved in the above case, I cannot, but agree with the view expressed by the KIRTADS and Scrutiny Committee. The petitioner did not opt to give any evidence other than what they had stated in the writ petition. This is not a case wherein the petitioner can be said to have submitted a fraud, in availing the status of SC while in School. But the fact remains that the petitioner's father or parents were involved in a fraud by making an entry in the school register regarding the community, which is entitled to Scheduled Caste status, and substantial benefits had been derived by the petitioner as a Scheduled Caste for a long period of time, even during her educational career. The facts remain that at least, at some point of time petitioner was aware of the fact that she was not a Scheduled Caste but she was labelled as one, and her father and mother were Veluthedathu Nairs. Such being the situation, when she obtained the certificate of caste based on an incorrect entry in the S.S.L.C. Certificate, which is apparently false, the fraud and deceit are made out.”
16. After considering the materials on record, the learned single Judge has also found that ample opportunity was given to the appellant when the matter was pending before the KIRTADS, and as such, there are absolutely no grounds to warrant an interference with the impugned orders. It was in such circumstances, the writ petition was dismissed, upholding Exhibits P10 and P11 orders.
17. A reading of the judgment of the learned single Judge would show that, after meticulously considering the pleadings and materials on record, with reference to the law laid down by this Court as well as the Apex Court, the learned single Judge came to the conclusion that there is absolutely no illegality or irregularity in the orders impugned, warranting an interference in this appeal. The said reasoning of the learned single Judge is perfectly legal, which warrants no interference in this appeal.’
12. In paragraphs 18 and 19 of Annexure A5 judgment in W.A.No.647 of 2013, the Division Bench considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant (petitioner-applicant herein) regarding the entitlement of the appellant to salary for the period during which she has worked as Confidential Assistant Gr.II. The Division Bench held that when the appellant is not a member of Schedule Caste (SC) ‘Vannan’ community, she is not entitled to any leniency from this Court. When the interim order granted by this Court was subject to the final outcome of W.P.(C)No.19487 of 2011 and that writ petition was dismissed, the appellant is not entitled to any such relief. Paragraphs 18 and 19 and also the last paragraph of Annexure A5 judgment, read thus;
“18. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that, on the strength of the interim order granted by this Court, the appellant is continuing in service from the year 2011 onwards. However, she has not been paid any salary. According to the learned counsel, since the appellant continued in service from 2011 onwards on the strength of the interim order granted by this Court, she is entitled to salary for the period during which she has worked as Confidential Assistant Gr.II. We are unable to accept the said submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant.
19. Admittedly, the appellant is not a member of the Vannan community, who is entitled to the reservation intended for the Scheduled Caste. In such circumstances, the appellant is not entitled to any leniency from this Court. When the interim order granted by this Court is subject to the final outcome of that writ petition, and since the writ petition is dismissed, the appellant is not entitled to any such relief.
In the result, the appeal fails, and the same is accordingly dismissed.”
13. Annexure A5 judgment dated 03.02.2017 of the Division Bench in W.A.No.647 of 2013 was under challenge before the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.10617 of 2017. The said Civil Appeal was disposed of by Annexure A6 judgment dated 18.08.2017, wherein the Apex Court found that, in the nature of the order proposed to be passed in the Civil Appeal, it is not necessary to issue notice to the respondents, namely, the State of Kerala and others. In Annexure A6 judgment it is stated that, though the Apex Court is not inclined to interfere with Annexure A5 judgment dated 03.02.2017 of the Division Bench in W.A.No.647 of 2013, as far as the relief regarding salary for the period the appellant had worked is concerned, the Apex Court was of the view that it would be just proper and equitable to pay her salary for the said period. Therefore, by Annexure A6 judgment, the Civil Appeal was disposed of by modifying Annexure A5 judgment of the Division Bench in W.A.No.647 of 2013, to the extent that the appellant shall be entitled to the salary for the period she had actually worked, pursuant to the interim orders passed by the High Court. In case the salary for the said period has not already been paid, it was ordered that the same shall be paid within a period of three months from the date of production of a copy of that judgment. Annexure A6 judgment reads thus;
“Leave granted.
2. In the nature of order we propose to pass in this appeal, it is not necessary to issue notice to the respondents.
3. Though we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order, as far as the relief regarding salary for the period the appellant has worked is concerned, we are of the view that it would be just proper and equitable to pay the salary to the appellant.
4. Therefore, the judgment under challenge will stand modified to the extent that the appellant shall be entitled to the salary for the period she has actually worked, pursuant to the interim orders passed by the High Court. In case, the salary for the said period has not already been paid, the same shall be paid within a period of three months from the date of production of a copy of this order
5. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of.
6. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
7. There shall be no orders as to costs.”
(underline supplied)
14. On the strength of Annexure A6 judgment dated 18.08.2017 of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.10617 of 2017, the petitioner-applicant was ordered to be paid a sum of Rs.8,84,099/- as arrears of salary for the period from July 2011 to May 2017, vide Annexure A7 proceedings dated 21.12.2017 of the Deputy Collector (Vigilance). On the ground that the salary as per Pay Revision for the aforesaid period was denied, the petitioner-applicant filed M.A.No.1617 of 2018 in Civil Appeal No.10617 of 2017. That Miscellaneous Application was disposed of by Annexure A8 order of the Apex Court dated 03.10.2018. In Annexure A8 order in M.A.No.1617 of 2018, it was observed that ‘salary’ would mean the actual salary that would have been payable at the relevant time, which includes the benefits under the Pay Revision, Increment, DA, etc., as would have been payable to a regular employee for the period she actually worked. Therefore, by Annexure A8 order, M.A.No.1617 of 2018 was disposed of by directing that the benefits as above shall be computed and paid, if not already paid, within two months from the date of that order. Annexure A8 order dated 03.10.2018 of the Apex Court in M.A.No.1617 of 2018 in Civil Appeal No.10617 of 2017 reads thus;
“This application has been filed with the following prayer:-
(a) direct the Respondents to pay the salary after applying the pay revision and increments for the respective period during the period the Petitioner had actually worked in the Respondent Department for the period from March, 1997 to May, 2017.
Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant and the learned counsel appearing for the State.
In our Judgment dated 18.08.2017, we have specifically held that the applicant/appellant shall be entitled to the salary for the period she has actually worked pursuant to the interim orders passed by the High Court.
The 'salary' would mean the actual salary that would have been payable at the relevant time, which includes the benefits under the pay revision, increment, DA etc., as would have been payable to a regular employee for the period she actually worked.
The benefits as above shall be computed and paid, not already paid, within two months from today.
In view of the above, the misc. application along with the interlocutory application is disposed of.”
(underline supplied)
15. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner-applicant is that in view of Annexures A6 and A8 judgment/order of the Apex Court, the Tribunal ought to have favourably considered the claim made by the applicant for pension for the 26 years of regular service rendered by her, by directing the 2nd respondent Secretary to Government, SC/ST Development Department to modify Annexure A4 order dated 04.07.2011, whereby she was terminated from service.
16. As already noticed hereinbefore, the challenge made by the petitioner-applicant against Annexure A4 order dated 04.07.2011 of the 2nd respondent Secretary to Government, SC/ST Development Department terminating her service as Confidential Assistant Gr-II, as well as order dated 11.04.2011 issued by Kerala Institute of Research, Training and Development Studies (KIRTADS) rejecting her claim as a member of Scheduled Caste (SC) ‘Vannan’ community, were repelled in the judgment dated 12.03.2013 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No. 19487 of 2011. W.A.No.647 of 2013 filed by the petitioner against the said judgment ended in dismissal by Annexure A5 judgment dated 03.02.2017.
17. A reading of Annexure A6 judgment dated 18.08.2017 in Civil Appeal No.10617 of 2017 would show that though the Apex Court was not inclined to interfere with Annexure A5 judgment dated 03.02.2017 of the Division Bench in W.A.No.647 of 2013, as far as the relief regarding salary for the period the petitioner herein had worked is concerned, the Apex Court was of the view that it would be just proper and equitable to pay her salary for the said period. Therefore, by Annexure A6 judgment, the Civil Appeal was disposed of by modifying Annexure A5 judgment of the Division Bench in W.A.No.647 of 2013, to the extent that the appellant shall be entitled to the salary for the period she had actually worked, pursuant to the interim orders passed by the High Court. Therefore, by Annexure A6 judgment, it was ordered that in case the salary for the said period has not already been paid, the same shall be paid within a period of three months from the date of production of a copy of that judgment. Thereafter, in Annexure A8 order dated 03.10.2018 in M.A.No.1617 of 2018, the Apex Court observed that ‘salary’ would mean the actual salary that would have been payable at the relevant time, which includes the benefits under the pay revision, increment, DA, etc., as would have been payable to a regular employee for the period she actually worked. Therefore, by Annexure A8 order, the Apex Court ordered that the benefits as above shall be computed and paid, if not already paid, within two months from the date of that order.
18. A reading of Annexure A6 judgment dated 18.08.2017 of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.10617 of 2017 would make it explicitly clear that no interference has been made by the Apex Court in Annexure A5 judgment dated 03.02.2017 of the Division Bench in W.A.No.647 of 2013 to the extent of declining interference on the judgment dated 12.03.2013 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.19487 of 2011, upholding Exts.P10 and P11 orders in that writ petition, i.e., the order dated 11.04.2011 of the Scrutiny Committee for Verification of Community Certificate, rejecting the claim of the petitioner-applicant as a member of Schedule Caste (SC) ‘Vannan’ community; and Annexure A4 order dated 04.07.2011 of the 2nd respondent Secretary to Government, SC/STDevelopment Department terminating the service of the petitioner-applicant as Confidential Assistant Gr-II. Therefore, relying on Annexure A6 judgment of the Apex Court dated 18.08.2017 in Civil Appeal No.10617 of 2017 or Annexure A8 order dated 03.10.2018 in M.A.No.1617 of 2018, the petitioner-applicant cannot approach the Kerala Administrative Tribunal in O.A.No.1274 of 2022, invoking the provisions under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking an order directing the 2nd respondent to modify Annexure A4 order dated 04.07.2011, terminating the applicant from service, so as to grant her pension for the 26 years of service rendered.
19. A reading of Annexure A6 judgment dated 18.08.2017 of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.10617 of 2017 would make it explicitly clear that the direction contained therein regarding payment of salary for the period during which the petitioner- applicant had actually worked, pursuant to the interim orders passed by the High Court, was issued by the Apex Court, as the Apex Court was of the view that it would be just proper and equitable to pay her salary for the said period. Such a direction issued by the Apex Court in a justice-oriented approach, as against the strict rigors of the law, in the exercise of the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, does not constitute a binding precedent, unlike Article 141 of the Constitution. Therefore, Annexure A6 judgment or Annexure A8 order of the Apex Court would not enable the petitioner-applicant to raise a claim for pension for the service rendered by her before the order of termination, or an order directing the 2nd respondent to modify Annexure A4 order dated 04.07.2011, whereby the applicant was terminated from service, so as to grant her pension for the 26 years of service rendered. In Ext.P5 order dated 27.08.2025 in O.A.No.1274 of 2022, the Tribunal has also found that in view of the provisions contained in Rule 29(a) of Part III, Kerala Service Rules (KSR), resignation of the public service or the dismissal or removal from it, entails forfeiture of past service. A Division Bench of this Court in State of Kerala and others v. E.K. Varghese [2016 (1) KHC 35] held that the said Rule does not suffer from the vice of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
20. The ‘Henderson Principle’ is a foundational doctrine in common law that addresses the issue of multiplicity in litigation. It embodies the broader concept of procedural fairness, abuse of process and judicial efficiency by mandating that all claims and issues that could and ought to have been raised in a previous litigation should not be relitigated in subsequent proceedings. The extended form of res judicata, known as constructive res judicata, contained in Section 11, Explanation VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, originates from this principle.
21. In Henderson v. Henderson [(1843) 3 Hare 999], the English Court of Chancery speaking through Sir James Wigram, Vice-Chancellor, held that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation and the adjudication of a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties so litigating are required to bring forward their whole case. Once the litigation has been adjudicated by a Court of competent jurisdiction, the same parties will not be permitted to reopen the lis in respect of issues which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest but were not, irrespective of whether the same was due to any form of negligence, in advertence, accident or omission. It was further held that the principle of res judicata applies not only to points upon which the Court was called upon by the parties to adjudicate and pronounce a judgment, but also to every possible or probable point or issue that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and the parties ought to have brought forward at the time. The relevant observations read as under;
“In trying this question I believe I state the rule of the Court correctly when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. ….” (underline supplied)
22. The above proposition of law came to be known as the ‘Henderson Principle’ and underwent significant evolution, adapting to changing judicial landscapes and procedural requirements. The House of Lords in Johnson v. Gore Wood and Co. [(2002) 2 A.C. 1], upon examining the ‘Henderson Principle’, authoritatively approved it. In Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. Zodiac Seats UK Ltd. [(2014) A.C. 160], Lord Sumption JSC further expounded the ‘Henderson Principle’ as although separate and distinct from cause of action estoppel or res judicata yet having the same underlying public interest that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. Even in a common law action, it was said by Blackburn, J. in Newington v. Levy [(1870) L.R. 6 C.P. 180] that the doctrine of res judicata applies to all matters which existed at the time of giving of the judgment and which the party had an opportunity of bringing before the Court.
23. The ‘Henderson Principle’ was approvingly referred to and applied by a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain [(1977) 2 SCC 806] as the underlying principle for res judicata and and constructive res judicata for assuring finality to litigation. The Three-Judge Bench found that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If, in such a case, a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. The Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process. Res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. This is, therefore, another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has sometimes been referred to as constructive res judicata, which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle. The relevant observations made by the Three-Judge Bench read thus;
“3. The principle of estoppel per rem judicatam is a rule of evidence. As has been stated in Marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council [(1939) 2 K.B. 426 at p. 437], it may be said to be “the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action”. This doctrine is based on two theories: (i) the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of the community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the interest of the individual that he should be protected from the multiplication of litigation. It therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action, for otherwise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the courts to recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgment, or give rise to another cause of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the general principle of res judicata.
4. But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If, in such a case, a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process and Somervell, L.J., has answered it as follows in Greenhalgh v. Mallard [(1947) All ER 255 at p. 257]: “I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.
This is therefore another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has sometimes been referred to as constructive res judicata, which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle.” (underline supplied)
24. In Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the fundamental policy of the law is that there must be finality to litigation. Multiplicity of litigation benefits not the litigants whose rights have been determined, but those who seek to delay the enforcement of those rights and prevent them from reaching the rightful beneficiaries of the adjudication. The ‘Henderson Principle’, in the same manner as the principles underlying res judicata, is intended to ensure that grounds of attack or defence in litigation must be taken in one of the same proceedings. A party that avoids doing so does it at its own peril. In deciding as to whether a matter might have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the court must ask itself as to whether it could have been urged. In deciding whether the matter ought to have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the court will have due regard to the ambit of the earlier proceedings and the nexus which the matter bears to the nature of the controversy. In holding that a matter ought to have been taken as a ground of attack or defence in the earlier proceedings, the court is indicating that the matter is of such a nature and character and bears such a connection with the controversy in the earlier case that the failure to raise it in that proceeding would debar the party from agitating it in the future. The doctrine itself is based on public policy flowing from the age-old legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, which means that in the interest of the State, there should be an end to litigation and no party ought to be vexed twice in a litigation for one and the same cause.
24.1. In Celir LLP [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], the Apex Court reiterated that the ‘Henderson Principle’ is a core component of the broader doctrine of abuse of process, aimed at enthusing in the parties a sense of sanctity towards judicial adjudications and determinations. It ensures that litigants are not subjected to repetitive and vexatious legal challenges. At its core, the principle stipulates that all claims and issues that could and should have been raised in an earlier proceeding are barred from being raised in subsequentlitigation, except in exceptional circumstances. This rule not only supports the finality of judgments but also underscores the ideals of judicial propriety and fairness.
24.2. In Celir LLP [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], the Apex Court noticed that there are four situations where, in second proceedings between the same parties, doctrine res judicata as a corollary of the principle of abuse of process may be invoked; (i) cause of action estoppel, where the entirety of a decided cause of action is sought to be relitigated; (ii) issue estoppel or, ‘decidedissue estoppel’, where an issue is sought to be relitigated, whichhas been raised and decided as a fundamental step in arriving atthe earlier judicial decision; (iii) extended or constructive resjudicata, i.e., ‘unraised issue estoppel’, where an issue is soughtto be litigated which could, and should, have been raised in aprevious action but was not raised; (iv) a further extension of theaforesaid to points not raised in relation to an issue in the earlierdecision, as opposed to issues not raised in relation to the decision itself. As part of the broader rule against abuse of process, the ‘Henderson Principle’ is rooted in the idea of preventing the judicial process from being exploited in any manner that tends to undermine its integrity. This idea of preventing abuse of judicial process is not confined to specific procedure rules, but rather aligned to a broader purport of giving quietus to litigation and finality to judicial decisions. The essence of this rule is that litigation must be conducted in good faith, and parties should not engage in procedural tactics that fragment disputes, prolong litigation, or undermine the outcomes of such litigation. It is not a rigid rule but rather a flexible principle to prevent oppressive, unfair, or detrimental litigation.
24.3. In Celir LLP [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], the Apex Court held that piecemeal litigation where issues are deliberately fragmented across separate proceedings to gain an unfair advantage is in itself a facet of abuse of process of law and would also fall foul of the ‘Henderson Principle’. Merely because one proceeding initiated by a party differs in some aspects from another proceeding or happens to be before a different forum, will not make the subsequent proceeding distinct in nature from the former, if the underlying subject matter or the seminal issues involved remains substantially similar to each other or connected to the earlier subject matter by a certain degree, then such proceeding would tantamount to ‘relitigating’ and the ‘Henderson Principle’ would be applicable. Parties cannot be allowed to exploit procedural loopholes and different fora to revisit the same matters they had deliberately chosen not to pursue earlier. Thus, where a party deliberately withholds certain claims or issues in one proceeding with the intention to raise them in a subsequent litigation disguised as a distinct or separate remedy or proceeding from the initial one, such subsequent litigation will also fall foul of the ‘Henderson Principle’. Similarly, where a plea or issue was raised in earlier proceedings but later abandoned, it is deemed waived and cannot be relitigated in subsequent proceedings. Allowing such pleas to be resurrected in later cases would not only undermine the finality of judgments but also incentivize strategic behaviour, where parties could withdraw claims in one case with the intention of reintroducing them later. Abandonment signifies acquiescence, barring its reconsideration in subsequent litigation. This ensures that judicial processes are not misused for tactical advantage and that litigants are held accountable for their procedural choices. Parties must litigate diligently and in good faith, presenting their entire case at the earliest opportunity.
24.4. In Celir LLP [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], the Apex Court held that the ‘Henderson Principle’ operates on the broader contours of judicial propriety and fairness, ensuring that the judicial system remains an instrument of justice rather than a platform for procedural manipulation. Judicial propriety demands that courts maintain the finality and integrity of their decisions, preventing repeated challenges to settled matters. Once a matter hasbeen adjudicated, it shouldnot berevisited unless exceptional circumstances warrant such reconsideration. Repeated litigation of the same issue not only wastes judicial resources but also subjects the opposing party to unnecessary expense and harassment. judicial processes are not merely technical mechanisms but are rooted in principles of equity and justice.
25. As laid down by a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Nawab Hussain [(1977) 2 SCC 806], as the underlying principle for res judicata and constructive res judicata for assuring finality to litigation. The same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If, in such a case, a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. The Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process. Res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. This is, therefore, another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construingthe general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has sometimes been referred to as constructive res judicata, which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle.
26. As reiterated by the Apex Court in Celir LLP [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], the ‘Henderson Principle’ is a core component of the broader doctrine of abuse of process, aimed at enthusing in the parties a sense of sanctity towards judicial adjudications and determinations. It ensures that litigants are not subjected to repetitive and vexatious legal challenges. At its core, the principle stipulates that all claims and issues that could and should have been raised in an earlier proceeding are barred from being raised in subsequent litigation, except in exceptional circumstances. This rule not only supports the finality of judgments but also underscores the ideals of judicial propriety and fairness.
27. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, conclusion is irresistible that placing reliance on Annexure A6 judgment dated 18.08.2017 of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.10617 of 2017 or Annexure A8 order dated 03.10.2018 in M.A.No.1617 of 2018, the petitioner- applicant cannot raise a claim for pension for the service rendered by her before the order of termination, or seek an order directing the 2nd respondent to modify Annexure A4 order dated 04.07.2011, whereby she was terminated from service, so as to grant pension for the 26 years of service rendered by her.
In the above circumstances, we find absolutely no reason to interfere with Ext.P5 order dated 27.08.2025 of the Tribunal in O.A.No.1274 of 2022. This original petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.
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