Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.

1. The present Appeal has been filed challenging the order dated 22.10.2018 passed by the I Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad (‘Trial Court’), dismissing the petition filed by the appellants under section 34 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘the 1996 Act’) for setting aside the Award dated 24.04.2013. The present Appeal has been filed under section 37 of the said Act.

2. The appellants before this Court were the respondents in the arbitration. The respondent No.1/Contractor in the Appeal was the Claimant in the arbitration. The learned Arbitrator is arrayed as the respondent No.2 in the present Appeal.

3. The respondent No.1/Contractor had raised six claims in the arbitration for the work done in accordance with the Agreement dated 09.03.1994, which was for conversion of Hubli – Londa Section from Meter Gauge to Board Gauge between Dharwad and Mugad Reach – II and execution of miscellaneous works between Dharwad and Mugad Stations. The six claims related, inter alia, to (i) difference in rates payable for excess quantities executed by the respondent No.1/Contractor beyond 25% of the agreed quantities along with additional items, (ii) payment for Earth work deducted towards subsidence allowance, (iii) reimbursement of charges and commission paid to the financiers on the amounts borrowed, (iv) reimbursement of expenditure incurred in continuing overheads and (v) establishments from 01.05.1995 to 31.03.1997 on account of delay in finalisation of bills, (vi) reimbursement of loss of business and profit thereon, interest @ 18% from 01.04.1997 to 01.09.2001 on the total claim amount along with yearly rests.

4. The learned Arbitrator, a retired Judge of this Court, held that the claims of the respondent No.1/Contractor were maintainable and deserved to be allowed. The Arbitrator allowed Claim Nos.1, 2, 4 and 6 in part awarding a total amount of Rs.86,22,337/- and interest @ 18% per annum for the pre-reference period, pendente lite, and from the date of Award to the date of payment.

5. The Trial Court dismissed the appellant’s petition by the impugned order dated 22.10.2018, inter alia, the ground that the Award had been passed after due consideration of the issues raised by the parties and there was no scope for interference in the reasons given by the Arbitrator. The appellant has filed the present Appeal challenging the impugned order dated 22.10.2018.

6. Learned Standing Counsel for the Central Government appearing for the appellants submits that the Trial Court should have set aside the Arbitral Award dated 24.04.2013 since the claims raised by the respondent No.1 were not arbitrable as per Clause 63 of The General Conditions of Contract, 1989 (‘GCC’) which covers the matters deemed as ‘Excepted matters’. Counsel submits that under Clause 63, all disputes and differences arising out of the Contract, regardless of the time at which the dispute was raised and even after termination of the Contract shall be referred by the Contractor to the Railways and the latter shall make and notify its decision within a reasonable period of time. The decision given by the Railways shall be final and binding on the Contractor. Counsel submits that Clause 63 mentions specific Clauses of the GCC covering the disputes raised by the Contractor. Consequentially, the learned Arbitrator could not have decided on the claims raised by the respondent No.1 since the claims fall within ‘Excepted matters’ and were excluded from the purview of arbitration.

7. Standing Counsel further submits that the claims raised by the respondent No.1 are disputed and are beyond the terms of the Agreement entered into between the parties. Counsel also submits that the respondent No.1/Contractor is not entitled to interest of belated payments in view of a prohibition Clause in the Agreement viz., Clause 16(2) of the GCC which states that no interest will be payable upon the earnest money or the security deposit or amounts payable to the Contractor under the Contract but Government securities deposited in terms of Clause 16(1) will be repayable with interest accrued thereon.

8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1/Contractor (the claimant in the arbitration) submits that the challenge to the Arbitral Award and the impugned order dated 22.10.2018 is primarily on three grounds, namely, (i) the No Claim Certificate, (ii) the disputes falling within the category of ‘Excepted matters’, and (iii) bar on the grant of interest. Counsel submits that the findings of the Arbitrator as well as the Trial Court on all the three issues are well-reasoned and within the parameters of the Agreement entered into by the parties. Counsel urges that the scope of interference with an Arbitral Award and the order passed by a section 34 Court is extremely narrow unless the Appeal Court finds the reasons to be perverse. Counsel submits that the appellants have challenged the Award only on facts which is not permissible under the 1996 Act.

9. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and have considered the relevant material placed before us.

10. The brief facts leading to filing of the present Appeal are as follows:

               (i) The appellants and the respondent No.1 entered into an Agreement on 09.03.1994 for gauge conversion of Hubli – Londa section which was a part of the South Central Railway Zone earlier from meter gauge to broad gauge.

               (ii) The Agreement was governed by the Standard General Conditions of Contract, 1989 of the South Central Railway.

               (iii) Clause 64(1) of the GCC provides for Arbitration for settling the disputes.

               (iv) Disputes arose between the parties during the execution of the work. The respondent No.1/Contractor contended that the appellants did not adhere to the terms of Agreement and hence approached the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh by filing Arb.Appl.No.62 of 1998 for appointment of a Sole Arbitrator.

               (v) On 15.12.2000, the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh appointed the respondent No.2 as the Sole Arbitrator. The respondent No.1 made six claims for various sums amounting to Rs.2,71,91,443/-.

               (vi) The learned Arbitrator made the Award on 24.04.2013 by allowing Claim Nos.1, 2, 4, and 6 in part and awarding an amount of Rs.86,22,337/- and interest @ 18% per annum for the spells of period. The Claim Nos.3 and 5 were rejected as the same were not to pressed by the respondent No.1/Contractor.

               (vii) Aggrieved by the Award, the appellants sought for setting aside of the same and filed A.O.P.No.2 of 2014 before the learned Trial Court for that purpose.

               (viii) The impugned order was passed on 22.10.2018 whereby the appellants’ Application for setting aside of the Arbitral Award was dismissed.

               (ix) The present Appeal was filed on 08.04.2019.

               (x) On 28.08.2019, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court granted interim stay of the impugned order dated 22.10.2018 subject to the appellants depositing a sum of Rs.43 lakhs and interest accrued on Rs.83 lakhs @ 18% interest per annum from the date of the Award till the date of payment within two months from that date. The respondent No.1 was permitted to withdraw the amount deposited by the appellants without furnishing any security.

               (xi) On 09.12.2019, the Co-ordinate Bench recorded that the appellants had complied with the order dated 28.08.2019 within the extended period of time granted by the Court.

11. The contentions raised by the appellants in the present Appeal are premised on three grounds. We propose to deal with each of these three grounds under separate heads.

I. No Claim Certificate

12. The appellants state that the respondent No.1 had furnished a ‘No Claim Certificate’ and hence the claims are not arbitrable as furnishing of such Certificate would amount to accord and satisfaction of payment of the full amount. The learned Trial Court was however of the view that the appellants cannot take shelter under the ‘No Claim Certificate’ since (Exhibit C-12) the respondent No.1 received the final bill under protest and as such the matter was referred to the arbitration. The Trial Court also held that the Arbitrator considered the contentions raised by both the parties including the allegation of the claims falling under Clause 63 of the GCC.

13. The Arbitrator considered the issue of ‘No Claim Certificate’ and found that the Certificate was actually a qualified Certificate which did not preclude the respondent No.1/Contractor from raising the said claim. The Arbitrator also found that the respondent No.1/Contractor had consistently demanded consideration of claims until the payment of the final bill and in view of non-consideration, the respondent No.1/Contractor was constrained to submit a qualified No Claim Certificate. The Arbitrator accordingly compared the No Claim Certificate/Exhibit R-8 and Exhibit C-12 and found that some portions in the No Claim Certificate had been struck off with ‘xxxxx’ in respect of ‘except the subsisting claims’ and also that the corrected portion of the Certificate did not bear the initials of the parties.

14. The records were called for and we have checked the relevant exhibits. There is indeed a striking and unexplained discrepancy between Exhibit C-12 and Exhibit R-8. The last line of the Certificate i.e., ‘except the subsisting claims’ has been struck off in Exhibit R-8.

15. We accordingly hold that the Arbitrator was fully justified in finding that Exhibit R-8/No Claim Certificate was not a valid document as opposed to Exhibit C-12 which was a valid document. The Arbitrator accordingly held that the Certificate filed by the respondent No.1 is qualified as being conditional and the claim was thus arbitrable.

16. In National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Boghara Polyfab Private Limited ((2009) 1 Supreme Court Cases 267), the Supreme Court found on similar facts that on the date of signing of the discharge voucher by the respondent, the payment was made after receiving the voucher. Hence, the contents of the voucher that the said amount was received by the appellant for the full and final settlement for the satisfaction of the claims was false and not supported by lawful consideration. The Supreme Court accordingly held that there was no accord and satisfaction in the facts of that case and the dispute was hence arbitrable.

17. We do not find any reason to disagree with the view taken by the Arbitrator who had carefully perused the relevant exhibits to come to a view that the No Claim Certificate was a conditional document and would hence not amount to accord and satisfaction on the part of the respondent No.1/Contractor. Indeed, there cannot be accord and satisfaction if the No Claim Certificate is furnished by the Contractor as a condition precedent for preparing the final bill and for payment of the same.

II. Excepted Matters

18. The appellants contend that the claims raised by the respondent No.1/Contractor fall within ‘Excepted matters’ as provided under Clause 63 of the GCC and hence the claims are not arbitrable. Clause 63 of the GCC provides, inter alia, that all disputes and differences arising out of or in connection with the Contract at any point of time including after termination of the contract and before or after determination of contract shall be referred by the Contractor to the Railway and the latter shall make and notify its decisions within a reasonable period of time after receipt of the representation. Clause 63 further provides that Clauses 18, 22(5), 39, 45(a), 55, 55-A(5), 61(2) and 62(1)(xiii)(B)(e)(b) of the GCC or any Clause of the Special Conditions of the Contract shall be deemed as ‘Excepted matters’ and decisions thereon given by the Railway shall be final and binding on the Contractor and shall be excluded from the purview of arbitration clause and they shall not be referred to arbitration. Hence, the appellants contend that the respondent No.1/Contractor could not have referred the dispute to arbitration and appoint an arbitrator for resolving the dispute.

19. However, a reading of these Clauses would show that the disputes referred to arbitration do not fall within any of these Clauses. For instance, Clause 22(5) deals with the meaning and intent of specifications and drawings. The respondent No.1/Contractor did not refer any dispute with regard to the specifications and drawings to arbitration nor does the Claim No.1 or any other Claim pertain to specifications or drawings. Similarly, Clause 39 of the GCC deals with the rates for extra items of work which means that the claim for payment of additional work will have to be decided by the Committee/Engineer appointed by the Railways and an appeal from the decision of the Engineer shall lie before the Chief Engineer whose decision would then become final and binding on the Contractor and the Railways.

20. Clause 39 of the GCC, which governed the Contract between the parties, provides for the rates for extra items of works. Clause 39 states, inter alia, that any item of work carried out by the Contractor on the instructions of the Engineer which is not included in the accepted Schedule of rates shall be executed at the rates set forth in the Schedule of Rates of Northern Railway. Where there is a dispute with regard to rates payable by the Engineer to the Contractor, the rates payable shall be decided at the meeting to be held between the Engineer and the Contractor, in as short a period as possible after the need for the special item has come to the notice of the parties. In case the Contractor fails to attend the meeting after being notified to do so or in the event of no settlement not being arrived at between the parties, the Railway shall be entitled to execute the extra works by other means and the Contractor shall have no claim for loss or damage that may result from such procedure.

21. Clause 39 of the GCC hence clearly envisages a procedure for settlement of the rates payable by the Engineer/Railway to the Contractor including such rates being decided at the meeting to be held between the parties within as short period as possible. Admittedly, there was no such meeting held between the parties with regard to fixation of rates for the additional works done by the respondent No.1/Contractor. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Railway has also not pointed to any meeting conducted in terms of Clause 39 of the GCC. Hence, there was no decision by the Engineer on the rates for additional work rendered by the respondent No.1/Contractor which can be said to have attained finality.

22. Clause 39(2) of the GCC further provides that the Contractor shall only be entitled to be paid in respect of the additional work according to the rates fixed by the Engineer. If the Contractor is not satisfied with the decision of the Engineer, he may appeal to the Chief Engineer within 30 days of receipt of the decision of the Engineer. It would thus be evident that Clause 39(2) also reiterates the requirement of a final decision of the Engineer with regard to fixation of rates. In the present case, the records do not show any such decision rendered by the Engineer. Raising any claim in the absence of the Railway following the procedure stipulated in Clause 39 of the GCC, the Railway/appellants cannot argue that Clause 39 was beyond the purview of arbitration or would fall under the Excepted Matters under Clause 63.

23. The Trial Court found that it was mandatory on the part of the appellants to arrive at a decision with regard to rejection of the rates quoted by the respondent No.1/ Contractor. The Arbitrator also found that the respondent No.1/Contractor had executed additional quantities of work in excess of 25% than the agreed quantity on the instructions of the appellants. The respondent No.1/Contractor had also submitted protest letters stating that the rates for the additional quantities were not considered by the appellants and were not referred to the Inter-Departmental Committee for finalization of the rates as per the prevalent practices. Moreover, the protests raised by the respondent No.1 during the course of the execution of the additional quantities were recorded in the Site Order Book maintained by the appellants however, the appellants failed to produce the said Book before the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator accordingly found that the respondent No.1/Contractor was entitled to payment of extra rates as claimed and the difference in the rates payable for the excess quantities executed by the respondent No.1 beyond 25% over and above the agreed quantities estimated at Rs.58,67,377/-. The Arbitrator also found that the appellant had not produced any document including record books to negate the claim of the respondent No.1 for additional work done beyond the 25% of the agreed quantity.

24. We find substance in the argument made on behalf of the respondent No.1/Contractor that in order to draw any of the claims under ‘Excepted Matters’ in terms of Clause 63 of the GCC, the procedure prescribed under the Excepted Clauses must be scrupulously followed by the Railways. In the absence of the procedure being complied with, the Railways cannot take recourse of the argument of the claims being within the ambit of Excepted Matters.

25. It should also be mentioned that a blanket reliance on ‘Excepted Matters’ presupposes a dominant party unilaterally dictating the terms of the Contract to the other. This strikes at the root of the bargaining power of the weaker party touching upon the public policy of India and the most basic notions of morality or justice envisaged under sections 34(2)(b)(ii) and (iii) of the 1996 Act.

26. Courts have repeatedly held that the Arbitrator is the master of the facts and any finding of the Arbitrator based on the records placed before him/her should be given due weightage by the High Court. The Supreme Court in Mandhani Construction Corporation Private Limited Vs. Union of India (2010) 1 Supreme Court Cases 549) found that in concluding that the items given were Excepted Matters and non-arbitrable, the High Court had completely ignored the actual findings of the Arbitrator. In Mandhani Construction, it was further held that the procedure prescribed for bringing the claims under Excepted Matters must scrupulously be followed and the clear finding of the Arbitrator that the procedure had not been followed should have been accepted by the High Court. The Supreme Court accordingly held that the finding of the High Court of the items being non-arbitrable was unsustainable.

III. Grant of Interest

27. The appellants say that the respondent No.1/Contractor is not entitled to claim interest in view of Clause 16(2) of the GCC. Clause 16(2) is set out below:

               “16(2) No interest will be payable upon the earnest money or the security deposit or amounts payable to the Contractor under the contract, but Government Securities deposited in terms of Sub-clause

               (1) of this clause will be repayable with interest accrued thereon.”

28. The Arbitrator held that the claim of interest @ 18% per annum on the basis of well-established commercial practices and the raising trend in the price index was worthy of consideration. The Arbitrator accordingly held that the respondent’s claim of 18% interest per annum is just and reasonable and there is nothing unusual in claiming interest for the pre-reference period, pendent lite and from the date of the Award to the date of the payment. The Arbitrator also held that the respondent No.1 had executed the works to the satisfaction of the appellants and the appellants had not pointed out any lapses on the part of the respondent No.1 at any period of time. Moreover, it was not the case of the appellants that the payment on the bills had been delayed due to the lapses on the part of the respondent No.1 and that the appellants had sought to avoid legitimate payments due to the respondent No.1. The Arbitrator accordingly partly allowed Claim Nos.1, 2, 4 and 6 awarding a total of Rs.86,22,337/- and interest @ 18% per annum for the pre-reference period i.e., from the date of final bill to the date of reference to the arbitration, pendent lite and from the date of the Award to the date of payment.

29. The Arbitrator further found that there was inordinate delay on the part of the appellants in making payments to the respondent No.1, i.e., the respondent No.1 had completed the additional quantity of work on 30.04.1995 and the road was opened to traffic but the final bill was paid on 31.03.1997, that too without any explanation by the appellants. The Arbitrator accordingly found that the delayed payments in expenditure on account of overheads and the respondent No.1/Contractor was entitled to recover the same from the appellants.

30. The prohibition on grant of interest under of Clause 16(2) of the GCC was rejected by a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in N.G. Gunani v. The Union of India, rep. by its Chief Engineer, (Construction), South Central Railway, Secunderabad (1996 (4) ALT 1046 (D.B.)). The contention raised by the Southern Central Railway, Secunderabad (respondent before the A.P. High Court) was that the Arbitrator had allowed interest @ 18% per annum on the dues payable to the Contractor which was contrary to Clause 16(2) of the GCC and the Arbitrator had no powers to grant interest. The Court construed Clause 16(2) and held that there was no prohibition on the Arbitrator to grant interest upon determination of the amounts payable to the Contractor and that the Clause only indicated that the Department would not pay interest for the delayed payments where the amounts payable to the Contractor were released after lapse of time. The Court accordingly held that Clause 16(2) of the GCC contains a restriction on the Departmental Officers to allow interest in view of late payment which however does not restrict the power of the adjudicator to determine the interest on delayed payments.

31. A similar construction was given by a Division Bench of this Court to Clause 16(2) of the GCC in a batch of cases in CMA.Nos.1352 of 2017, 260, 319 and 333 of 2018 all of which pertained to Clause 16(2) of the GCC.

32. The issue of awarding pendent lite interest to the claimant/appellant by the Arbitrator was decided by the Supreme Court in Ambica Construction v. Union of India((2017) 14 SCC 323). The Supreme Court held that the Arbitrator was fully justified in granting interest for pendent lite period notwithstanding Clause 16(2) of the GCC. The earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ambica Construction ((2016) 6 SCC 36) barring the Arbitrator from awarding interest pendent lite was held not to be a valid consideration. It may be noted that in the earlier decision, the Supreme Court had only considered the scope of grant of pendent lite interest in light of an express prohibition in the contract.

33. Raveechee and Company v. Union of India (AIR 2018 SC 3109) considered Clause 16(3) of the GCC with regard to non-payment of interest and held that prohibition contained in the said clause cannot bind the Arbitrator with regard to award of interest and that the Arbitrator has the power to award interest pendente lite.

34. The power of the Arbitrator to award interest was again considered and affirmed in Union of India v. Susaka Private Limited and Others ((2018) 2 SCC 182) where the Supreme Court held that it is permissible to award interest in arbitrable claims by the Arbitral Tribunal and section 31(7)(a) and (b) of the 1996 Act empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to award interest on the awarded sum subject to the agreement between the parties. It was further held that the award of an Arbitral Tribunal is binding on the parties since the parties have chosen their own Arbitrator and given him/her the authority to decide the specific disputes raised in the arbitration.

35. We also find from an Extract/copy of the Railway Board’s letter No.78/W1/CT/38, dated 21.10.1979, that Clause 16(2) of the GCC would not bar a claim for interest where a notice is given by the Contractor claiming interest from the date on which the amount is payable/refundable and is denied by the Railway Administration. The Extract relies on section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 which empowers the Court i.e., Arbitrator to make an order on interest.

36. The appellants do not deny that the Extract is applicable to the Agreement entered into between the parties in 1994. The only point taken by learned counsel is that the Extract was not placed in the proceedings before the Trial Court. Further, the Corrigendum placed on behalf of the appellants dated 06.08.1997 prohibiting payment of interest under an Arbitral Award for payment of money relate to Northern Railways. The Corrigendum was not in force at the time of the subject Agreement which was entered into on 09.03.1994.

37. It may be recalled that the Arbitrator was appointed by the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in an application made by the respondent in 1998 for appointment of a Sole Arbitrator. Clause 64 of the GCC also provides for disputes and differences between the parties, inter alia, with regard to construction/operation of the contract and liabilities arising therefrom.

38. The law with regard to interference by the Appeal Court under Section 37 of the 1996 Act is well settled. In Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority ((2022) 4 SCC 116) , the Supreme Court dealt elaborately with the grounds available to the aggrieved party for setting aside an Award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act and reinforced that the scope of interference is limited to the grounds available under the said provision and not otherwise. It was further held that an Award can only be interfered with on the grounds of patent illegality, perversity or being contrary to the public policy of India.

39. A similar view was taken in UHL Power Company Limited v. State of H.P ((2022) 4 SCC 116) where it was also held that interpretation of the relevant clauses of the agreement is within the domain of the Arbitrator and interference is not permissible merely because another view is possible. It was further held that the jurisdiction conferred on Courts under section 37 of the 1996 Act is narrower than that of section 34 of the said Act: Somdatt Builders-NCC-NEC(JV) v. NHAI ((2025) 6 SCC 757).

40. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants do not decide on the controversy which has been argued before this Court.

41. ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. ((2003) 5 SCC 705) dwelt, inter alia, on the intention of the parties being reflected in the construction of the contract for recovery for breach of the contract. The Supreme Court held that the Arbitral Tribunal is thus required to decide the issue in accordance with terms of the agreement. The appellants’ contention with regard to Excepted Matters, No Claim Certificate and interest have been dealt with in that judgment. In fact, the appellants failed to adhere to the procedure envisaged under the terms of the GCC and the Arbitrator rightly construed the implementation of the Clauses stipulated in the GCC in favour of the respondent No.1/Contractor. Admittedly, there is no allegation that the respondent No.1 failed to comply with the terms of the contract.

42. Union of India v. Manraj Enterprises ((2022) 2 SCC 331), which has been cited on the point of grant of interest, does not apply to the facts of the present case. In that case, the Supreme Court construed the expression ‘amounts payable to the Contractor under the Contract’ as being independent of ‘Earnest Money Deposit’ and ‘Security Deposit’ and is to be read disjunctively. This Court is hence of the considered view that the Arbitral Tribunal’s authority to grant interest remains unaltered even under the 1996 Act. In fact, section 31(7)(a) and (b) of the 1996 Act crystallizes the authority of the Arbitral Tribunal to grant interest as it deems reasonable, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.

43. We have already held that the Extract/Railway Board’s Letter dated 21.10.1979 clearly states that Clause 16(2) of the GCC would not bar a claim for interest where the Contractor gives notice claiming interest from the date on which the amount is payable/refundable and the Railway Administration denies such claim. We have also held that the Corrigendum dated 06.08.1997 relied upon by the Railways/appellants was made after the parties entered into the Agreement on 09.03.1994. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. NCC Ltd. ((2023) 2 SCC 539) and Sri Chittaranjan Maity v. Union of India ((2017) 9 SCC 611) cited on the point of interest, will hence be covered by the view expressed by this Court.

44. In the present case, the Arbitral Award dated 24.04.2013 is a detailed Award containing decisions on each and every aspect of the dispute. The Arbitrator has not only considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties but also the relevant records which were placed before him. The Arbitrator has duly considered the Clauses of the GCC, 1989, to arrive at a reasoned Award. In the impugned order dated 22.10.2018, the Trial Court accordingly found no reason to interfere with the Award. Indeed, there was no ground for interference raised by the appellants before the Trial Court amounting to perversity or an Award which would shock the conscience of the Court.

45. As stated above, section 34 of the 1996 Act reinforces that the merits of the dispute cannot be revisited. The Appeal Court should also not substitute its view with that of the Arbitrator unless the view taken is found to be perverse or in violation of the grounds available under section 34 of the 1996 Act. A mere plea that the Award is against the public policy of India or contrary to the established law or contrary to any terms of the agreement will not be sufficient until and unless the applicant/appellant can substantiate the grounds for setting aside/ challenge the material shown to the Court.

46. In the present case, the appellants have not shown any document which would satisfy the requirement under section 34 of the 1996 Act. The challenge on the factual matrix of the dispute militates against the bar on the Court from reviewing the facts already considered in detail by the Arbitrator.

47. We have considered the three heads raised by the appellants individually, i.e., No Claim Certificate, Excepted Matters and grant of Interest and do not find any ground under any of these three heads to interfere with the Arbitral Award or the impugned order of the Trial Court affirming the Arbitral Award. We accordingly find that the Appeal is without merit and should be dismissed.

48. C.M.A.No.620 of 2019, along with all connected applications, is accordingly dismissed. Interim orders, if any, shall stand vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.