Muralee Krishna S., J.

1. The appellants, who are third parties and are sought to be impleaded as respondents 2 to 4 in OP(DRT)No.350 of 2025 and as respondents 1 to 3 in OP(DRT)No.348 of 2025 filed W.A.No.3045 of 2025 and W.A.No.3046 of 2025, respectively, under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the common interim order dated 18.11.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in those original petitions. Since the point to be considered in these writ appeals is the same, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

2. The petitioners in OP(DRT)No.350 of 2025 are the applicants in S.A.No.182 of 2025 pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal I, Ernakulam (‘the Tribunal’ for short). Similarly, the petitioners in OP(DRT)No.348 of 2025 are the applicants in S.A.No.183 of 2025 pending before the Tribunal. The petitioners in both the OP(DRT)s are borrowers and guarantors of term loans availed by them from the Union Bank of India (‘the Bank’ for short), which is the 4th respondent in both the writ appeals. When the loan accounts were classified as Non Performing Assets (‘NPA’ for short) and the bank initiated recovery steps under the provisions of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’ for short), the petitioners filed the respective S.A.s before the Tribunal contending that the secured assets are agricultural land and they are exempted under Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act. According to the petitioners, during the pendency of the S.A.s, the 4th respondent-bank issued a fresh e-auction sale notice dated 19.09.2025, which was produced before the Tribunal as Annexure A11. Therefore, the petitioners filed interlocutory applications under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act to amend the SAs to incorporate the challenge against the said notice, which were numbered as I.A.No.3940 of 2025 in S.A.No.182 of 2025 and I.A.No.3942 of 2025 in S.A.No.183 of 2025. They have also filed interlocutory applications in the SAs for stay, production of the valuation report and appointment of an Advocate Commissioner. Alleging that the inaction on the part of the Tribunal in disposing of those interlocutory applications amounts to failure of jurisdiction under Section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act, petitioners in the OP(DRT)s approached this Court by filing the respective original petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking a direction to the Tribunal to consider and dispose of the interlocutory applications within a time frame fixed by this Court and also other ancillary reliefs.

3. On 18.11.2025, when the original petitions came up for consideration, the learned Single Judge passed the impugned common interim order, which reads thus:

                  “Petitioner is directed to remit an amount of Rs.1,16,00,000/-(Rupees one crore sixteen lakhs only) on or before 28.11.2025 by 5 pm.

                  2. The total outstanding amount as on 04.11.2025 is Rs.3,96,31,161.77/- and the balance to be remitted by the petitioner as on date comes to Rs.2,31,99,477.77/- with other charges and interest.

                  3. The amount already deposited, and the amount sought to be deposited shall be kept in a separate account. Since I have permitted the petitioner to pay the amount, 75% balance, if tendered by the auction purchaser, need not be accepted for the time being.

                  Post on 02.12.2025, interim order is extended till then.”

4. The appellants, who are the auction purchasers of the properties which were offered as secured assets by the borrowers and guarantors, who are sought to be impleaded in the original petitions, filed these writ appeals seeking leave of this Court to challenge the interim order dated 18.11.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge.

5. On 08.12.2025, when these writ appeals, along with the applications filed by the appellants seeking leave to appeal came up for consideration, this Court allowed the interlocutory applications filed in both the writ appeals by the appellants seeking leave to challenge the impugned interim order passed by the learned Single Judge. In that order, it was made clear that the question of maintainability of the writ appeals will be decided after numbering the writ appeals.

6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants, the learned counsel for the original petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel for the Bank.

7. The learned counsel for the original petitioners raised a preliminary objection that these writ appeals are not maintainable since the original petitions are filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. To that argument, the learned counsel for the appellants would submit that though the original petitions are filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the interim relief under challenge granted by the learned Single Judge is the one that can be granted only by exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and therefore the writ appeals are maintainable against the impugned order.

8. Since the contesting respondents-original petitioners in these intra court appeals raised the question of maintainability of an appeals under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the impugned interim order which according to the original petitioners is one passed invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and whereas according to the appellants the directions in that impugned order are of the nature that can be passed only by exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we answer the said point first.

9. In State Bank of India v. M /s Kinship Services (India) (P) Ltd. [2013 (4) KHC 21], a Division Bench of this Court, considered the appeal filed against an interim order passed by a learned Single Judge staying confirmation of sale till further orders in respect of one item of property which is sought to be sold in an auction scheduled in a proceedings under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. By relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in State of M.P. v. Sanjay Keralkar [(2009) 17 SCC 766], the Division Bench held that the nature of the interim relief granted therein by the learned Single Judge is nothing but a discretion exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

10. In Sanjay Keralkar [(2009) 17 SCC 766], the Apex Court held thus:

                  “2. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties, we are unable to sustain the order passed by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissing the appeal as preferred by the appellant herein on the ground that the appeal had been preferred against an order passed under Article 227 of the Constitution. We have had occasion to look into the petition which had been filed before the Single Bench of the High Court, which has been styled as writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench of the High Court appears to have not taken into consideration the fact that the petition had been styled as a writ petition under Article 226 as well and that the frame of the petition was that of a writ petition as would also be evident from the prayers made therein.

                  3. We are unable to agree with the High Court that the learned Single Judge had passed order under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and that the appeal was not maintainable”.

11. Jogendra Sinhji Vijay Singhji v. State of Gujarat [(2015) 9 SCC 1], the Apex Court held thus:

                  “Where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226, If the judgment under appeal falls squarely within four corners of Article 227, it goes without saying that intra-court appeal from such judgment would not be maintainable. On the other hand, if the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court for issuance of certain writ under Article 226, although Article 227 is also mentioned, and principally the judgment appealed against falls under Article 226, the appeal would be maintainable. What is important to be ascertained is the true nature of order passed by the Single judge and not what provision he mentions while exercising such powers. A statement by a Single judge that he has exercised power under Article 227, cannot take away right of appeal against such judgment if power is otherwise found to have been exercised under Article 226. The vital factor for determination of maintainability of the intra court appeal is the nature of jurisdiction invoked by the party and the true nature of principal order passed by the Single judge”.

                  (Underline supplied)

12. In General Manager, Northern Railways v. Harleen Kaur [2025 SCC Online Del 1317], the High Court of Delhi, while considering the question of maintainability of an intra-Court appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, held thus:

                  “7. A bare perusal of the provisions as quoted above would reveal that Letters Patent Appeal would not lie against a judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of appellate jurisdiction or against an order made in exercise of or against an order made by the Court which is subject to superintendence of this Court.

                  8. The jurisdiction available to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is primarily in the nature of superintendence and accordingly, the Letters Patent Appeal would not lie in the instant matter”.

13. The Bombay High Court in Advani Oerlikon Ltd. v. Machindra Govind Makasare [AIR 2011 Bom. 84] while considering the issue whether an appeal can lie under clause 15 of the letter patent against a decision of a Single Judge rendered in the petition invoking Articles 226 /227 of the Constitution of India, held thus:

                  “20. Upon this discussion, we now proceed to answer the questions formulated in the order of reference:

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                  Re: 5 : The cause title, the averments and prayers in the petition can be taken into account while deciding whether the petition is one under Art.226 and / or 227 of the Constitution.

                  Re: 6 : If the petitioner elects to invoke Art.226 and / or 227 of the Constitution and the facts justify such invocation, a Letters Patent Appeal against the order of the Learned Single Judge would be maintainable even though the Single Judge has purported to exercise jurisdiction only under Art.227 of the Constitution. The fact that the Learned Single Judge has adverted only to the provisions of Art.227 of the Constitution would not bar the maintainability of such an appeal. The true test is whether the facts justify the invocation of Art.226 and Art.227 and this has to be determined on the facts of each case having due regard to (i) the nature of the jurisdiction invoked; (ii) the averments contained in the petition; (iii) the reliefs sought; and (iv) the true nature of the principal order passed by the Single Judge. The true nature of the order passed by the Single Judge has to be determined on the basis of the principal character of the relief granted. The fact that an ancillary direction has been issued under Art.227 of the Constitution would not dilute the character of an order as one with reference to Art.226. What has to be ascertained is the true nature of the order passed by the Single Judge and not what provision is mentioned while exercising this power.

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                  Re: 9 : In a situation where a petition is filed under Art.227 of the Constitution and judgment is rendered in favour of the Petitioner, recourse to an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is not barred to the Respondent before the Single Judge merely on the ground that the petition was under Art.227. In State of Madhya Pradesh v.. Visan Kumar Shiv Charanlal (supra), the appeal before the Division Bench was filed by the Respondent to the proceedings before the Single Judge in a petition which had been instituted under Art.227. Accepting the submission that a nomenclature is of no consequence and it is the nature of the reliefs sought and the controversy involved which determine which Article is applicable, the Supreme Court held that the appeal before the Division Bench was maintainable. A similar position arose in the decision of the Supreme Court in M.M.T.C. v.. Commissioner of Commercial Tax (supra). The Division Bench of the High Court had held that since the petition before the Single Judge was under Art.227 of the Constitution, an appeal at the behest of the Respondent to the petition was not maintainable. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in holding that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable since the High Court did not consider the nature of the controversy and the prayers involved in the Writ Petition”.

                  (underline supplied)

14. In the judgment dated 26.06.2025 in W.A. No.1514 of 2025, this Court held thus:

                  “9. In State Bank of India v. M/s. Kinship Services (India) (P) Ltd. [2013 (4) KHC 21] a Division Bench of this Court, after taking note of the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sanjay Kerlaker [(2009) 17 SCC 766], held that a writ appeal can be entertained under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 against the interim order dated 06.09.2013 passed by the learned Single Judge in O.P.(DRT)No.2931 of 2013, staying confirmation of sale till further orders in respect of one item of property, which was sought to be sold in the auction scheduled to be held on 11.09.2013 under SARFAESI proceedings, since the nature of the interim relief granted by the learned Single Judge is nothing but a discretion exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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                  11. In the case on hand, the first relief sought for in O.P.(DRT)No.173 of 2025 is an order directing the 1st appellant Bank to keep in abeyance the proceedings for dispossession of the petitioners until Ext.P2 appeal filed before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal get listed and orders passed on Ext.P3 stay petition and Ext.P4 application for waiver of pre-deposit, which is one invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The direction contained in the impugned judgment dated 16.06.2025 of the learned Single Judge, which is under challenge in this writ appeal, i.e., the direction to the appellants to keep in abeyance further coercive steps against the respondents under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, till appropriate orders are passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai, in Ext.P3 application for stay and Ext.P4 application for waiver of pre- deposit, is one granted by the learned Single Judge in exercise of the discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In view of the law laid down by the Division Bench in M/s. Kinship Services (India) (P) Ltd. [2013 (4) KHC 21], we find that the challenge made in this writ appeal against the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge to the extent of granting such a direction against the 1st appellant Bank is perfectly maintainable in an intra court appeal filed under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act.       (Underline supplied)

15. In the judgment dated 23.07.2025 in W.A.No.1571 of 2025, this Court held thus:

                  “13. While going through the direction issued by the learned Single Judge in the instant case, in the light of the judgment in M/s. Kinship Services (India) (P) Ltd. [2013 (4) KHC 21], we are of the considered opinion that the order of the learned Single Judge not to take coercive steps against the 1st respondent till a decision is taken by the Debts Recovery Tribunal is the one that can be passed only under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 227 of the Constitution of India”.

16.    It is true that the original petitions were filed by the petitioners under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, seeking certain directions to the Tribunal. In OP(DRT)No.350 of 2025, the petitioners sought the following reliefs:

                  “i. Issue a direction to the Debts Recovery Tribunal–I, Ernakulam, to consider and dispose of I.A.Nos.3940, 3939 and 3840 of 2025 in S.A. No. 182 of 2025 within a time frame fixed by this Hon’ble Court.

                  ii.       To stay all further proceedings pursuant to the e-auction sale notice dated 23.09.2025 issued by the respondent bank, pending disposal of S.A.No.182 of 2025 before the Tribunal.

                  iii.       To declare that the secured assets being agricultural lands included in the Data Bank maintained under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008, are exempted from the operation of the SARFAESI Act by virtue of Section 31(i).

                  iv.      To call for the records pertaining to the proceedings in S.A.No.182 of 2025 dated 22.10.2025 on the file of the Hon’ble Debt Recovery Tribunal– I, Ernakulam, and to set aside the said proceedings as illegal, arbitrary, and passed without proper application of mind.

                  v.       To direct the respondent bank to produce the original valuation reports relied upon for fixing the reserve prices in each of the sale notices, including the latest valuation report, if any, obtained prior to the auction dated 15.10.2025, as well as the valuation report, if any, prepared at the time of creation of the mortgage;

                  vi.      To stay all further proceedings related to the properties in question till the final disposal of the S.A.”

17. Similarly, in OP(DRT)No.348 of 2025, the petitioners sought the following reliefs:

                  “i. Issue a direction to the Debts Recovery Tribunal–I, Ernakulam, to consider and dispose of I.A.Nos.3943, 3944 and 3945 of 2025 in S.A.No.183 of 2025 within a time frame fixed by this Hon’ble Court.

                  ii.       To stay all further proceedings pursuant to the e-auction sale notice dated 19.09.2025 issued by the respondent bank, pending disposal of S.A.No.183 of 2025 before the Tribunal.

                  iii. To declare that the secured assets being agricultural lands included in the Data Bank maintained under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008, are exempted from the operation of the SARFAESI Act by virtue of Section 31(i).

                  iv. To call for the records pertaining to the proceedings in S.A.No.183 of 2025 dated 22.10.2025 on the file of the Hon’ble Debt Recovery Tribunal–I, Ernakulam, and to set aside the said proceedings as illegal, arbitrary, and passed without proper application of mind.

                  v. To direct the respondent bank to produce the original valuation reports relied upon for fixing the reserve prices in each of the sale notices, including the latest valuation report, if any, obtained prior to the auction dated 15.10.2025, as well as the valuation report, if any, prepared at the time of creation of the mortgage;

                  vi. To stay all further proceedings related to the properties in question till the final disposal of the S.A.”

18. The above reliefs sought by the petitioners in the respective original petitions would show that the petitioners want to stall the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act initiated by the bank against them. Therefore, all the reliefs sought in the original petitions cannot be termed as falling under the purview of supervisory jurisdiction exercisable by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

19. It is true that in some of the judgments cited supra, such as Sanjay Keralkar [(2009) 17 SCC 766], Jogendra Sinhji Vijay Singhji [(2015) 9 SCC 1] and Machindra Govind Makasare [AIR 2011 Bom. 84], the cases were filed by quoting both Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. But the principle laid down in the above-referred judgments would make it clear that while considering the challenge against the orders passed by the Court, what is relevant is the nature of such orders. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, preventing acceptance of the balance bid amount from the auction purchasers, can only be treated as one passed under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Similar is the case of the direction of the learned Single Judge to keep the amount already deposited by the appellants in separate accounts.. Therefore, we find that the present writ appeals are maintainable against the common impugned order dated 18.11.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge in OP(DRT)No.348 of 2025 and OP(DRT)No.350 of 2025.

20. Now coming to the merits of the appeals, the grievance of the appellants is that the right to deposit the balance auction amount is a valuable right of the auction purchaser under the law, and the said right cannot be taken away in an original petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Whereas the contention of the Bank is that the original petition itself is not maintainable under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, since the remedy available to the original petitioners against an order by the Tribunal is before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.

21. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel on either side submitted that as far as the property in respect of which the full amount is deposited by the auction purchasers- appellants, the sale certificate was already issued by the bank. The balance of the sale price cannot be received in respect of the remaining items of properties due to the impugned order of the learned Single Judge.

22. Having considered the submissions made at the Bar and the materials placed on record, we are of the opinion that the appellants can raise the question of maintainability of the original petitions before the learned Single Judge, since the original petitions are still pending consideration therein. No prejudice will be caused to the appellants by not permitting them to deposit the balance bid amount for a short period, as ordered by the learned Single Judge, since the question of maintainability of the original petitions itself is yet to be decided, referring to the statutory provisions and the principles laid down in various judgments of the Apex Court.

                  In such circumstances, without expressing anything on the legal and factual contentions raised by the parties regarding the maintainability of the original petitions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the original petitioners and also without interfering with the impugned common order of the learned Single Judge., these writ appeals are disposed of, however, making it clear that the appellants can raise the question of maintainability of the original petitions before the learned Single Judge. Needless to mention that the appellants can point out the necessity of early hearing of the matter, if they are so advised, by filing appropriate applications in the respective original petitions.