logo

This Product is Licensed to ,

Change Font Style & Size  Show / Hide

24

  •            

 
CDJ 2026 Ker HC 143 print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Kerala
Case No : CRL.A No. 29 of 2026
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN
Parties : Renjith Lal Versus State Of Kerala, Represented By The Public Prosecutor, High Court Of Kerala, Ernakulam & Another
Appearing Advocates : For the Appellant: Shajin S. Hameed, Advocate. For the Respondents: R1 M. Anima, Public Prosecutor.
Date of Judgment : 30-01-2026
Head Note :-
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) -
Judgment :-

1. This Criminal Appeal has been filed by Sri. Renjith Lal, who is the sole accused in Crime No. 2570/2025 of Kilimanoor Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Public Prosecutor in detail.

3. Today the defacto complainant also appeared in person and he also was heard.

4. In this case, the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 118(1), 115(2), 296(b) & 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'BNS', hereinafter) as well as under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, 'SC/ST (PoA) Act' hereinafter), by the appellant/accused.

5. The prosecution case is that, the appellant/ accused, who does not belong to either the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community, wrongfully restrained the defacto complainant, who is a member of Scheduled Tribe community and verbally abused and threatened him at 8.15 pm on 20.11.2025. According to the prosecution, thereafter, the appellant/accused manhandled the defacto complainant by using an iron rod. That apart, the appellant/accused beat on the head of the defacto complainant by using a bamboo stick; and thereby, he sustained injuries. The further allegation is that the appellant/accused called the caste name of the defacto complainant within public view and thereby, abused him within public.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that as per the FIS itself, it could be seen that there were financial transactions in between the defacto complainant and the appellant/accused and in para No. 3 of the appeal memorandum, the appellant/accused specifically contended as under:-

                  “3. The allegation put forwarded by the de facto complainant is false and concocted story. The de facto complainant is the real aggressor. He after borrowing an amount of Rs. 3,50,000/- from the appellant defrauded and cheated him. When the appellant constantly demanded the amount, the de facto complainant issued him two cheques bearing No. 470028 and 556449 in the account maintained by him at State Bank of India, Kallambalam Branch dated 21.10.2025 and 27.10.2025 for an amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- and Rs. 1,50,000/- respectively.”

7. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, after dishonour of the two cheques issued by the  defacto  complainant  in  favour  of  the appellant/accused, when the appellant/accused called the defacto complainant demanding the money, as directed by the defacto complainant, he reached at Kilimanoor on 20.11.2025 and there occurred a scuffle, whereby, the appellant/accused also sustained serious injuries and he underwent treatment. In support of the same, the learned counsel for the appellant placed O.P. Ticket issued from Community Health Centre, Kesavapuram showing that he had approached the doctor with history of trauma head and he was advised to have CT scan examination and X- Ray examination of spine, despite prescribing medicines. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that since the defacto complainant came to know about the dishonour of two cheques issued by him for Rs. 3,50,000/- (Rs. 2,00,000/- and Rs. 1,50,000/- each), on 21.10.2025 and 27.10.2025, a false case has been foisted against the appellant/accused to avoid repayment of the said sum and according to him, as against the defacto complainant also crime was registered at Kilimanoor Police Station as Crime No. 2571/2025 alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 296(b), 126(2), 118(1), 115(2) of the BNS, 2023. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the entire case is foisted and thus, prima facie, the allegations are not at all substantiated and therefore, the order of the Special Judge denying pre- arrest bail to the appellant/accused would require interference and this appeal is liable to succeed.

8. The learned Public Prosecutor opposed the appeal and submitted that going through the FIS, the ingredients for the offences under the SC/ST (PoA) Act to be gathered prima facie and in such a case, grant of anticipatory bail is specifically barred under Section 18 of the SC/ST (PoA) Act. Therefore, the order of the Special Judge is only to be confirmed by dismissing this appeal.

9. The defacto complainant, who is admittedly working as Senior Grade Typist in Jail Department submitted that the allegations stated in the FIS are correct. According to him, there were financial transactions in between the appellant/accused and himself and the same was closed in the year 2017 and on closure of the liability, the title deed entrusted to the appellant/accused was returned. Thereafter, he made complaints against the appellant/accused and also put applications under the Right to Information Act to get certain details. In view of the said development, the appellant/accused has been inimical towards him and as an after thought, he was attacked after abusing him by calling his caste name. Therefore, he opposed grant of anticipatory bail by upsetting the order of the Special Court.

10. On perusal of the FIS, the specific allegation is that when the defacto complainant reached Kilimanoor to go to his wife's house on 19.11.2025 and when the defacto complainant reached Vilakkottukonam, the appellant/accused placed his motor cycle in front of defacto complainant's motor cycle and stopped defacto complainant's motor cycle. When the defacto complainant enquired the reason for the same, the appellant/accused beat on his helmet by using an iron piece and helmet was thrown out. When he fell down, the appellant/accused beaten on his chest and beat on his head by using helmet repeatedly. Thereby, he sustained injury on his eye and his spectacles were broken. Further allegation is that by using a bamboo stick, the appellant/accused beat on his head and also abused him by calling his caste name with criminal intimidation.

11.    It is to be noted that Annexure A is the FIR registered in this case and Annexure C is the FIR registered against the defacto complainant as counter case. On perusal of Annexure A, it is seen that the same was registered on 21:55 on 21.11.2025 and Annexure C was registered on 15:23 on 22.11.2025.

12. On perusal of the First Information Statement given by the appellant/accused, the attack, as alleged, to be seen. However, it is discernible from the contentions raised by the appellant/accused that admittedly there were financial transactions in between the defacto complainant and the appellant/accused and according to the defacto complainant, the same was closed during 2017. But the appellant/accused submitted that the financial liability admitted by the defacto complainant is still subsisting and two cheques alleged to be issued by the defacto complainant for repayment of the said liability to the tune of Rs.3,50,000/-(Rs. 2,00,000/- and Rs. 1,50,000/- each), got dishonoured on 21.10.2025 and 27.10.2025 and when this matter was informed, there was discussion of the same, on the date of occurrence and thereafter, the appellant/accused manhandled the defacto complainant. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the place of occurrence is at Kilimanoor and there is no necessity for the appellant/accused to reach that place with iron piece as well as bamboo stick to attack the defacto complainant. Thus no prima facie case made out from the prosecution allegations, and as such grant of bail under Section 18 of the SC/ST (PoA) Act is not barred.

13. In view of the rival submissions, the court has a duty to look into the allegations and also the attending circumstances to see whether prima facie allegations are believable.

14. The learned counsel for the appellant placed a verdict of the Apex Court in SLP(Crl.) No. 12144 of 2025 dated 12.01.2026, where the Apex Court discussed the ingredients for the offences under Section 3(1)(r) and Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act. The relevant paragraphs 10 to 12 and 15 to 17 are extracted hereunder:-

                  “10. We shall fist proceed to examine whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act respectively are disclosed on a plain reading of the FIR and the chargesheet. The sections read as under:-

                  “3. Punishments for offences atrocities.—

                  [(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— xxx

                  (r)      intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;

                  (s)      abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;”

                  11. This Court in Shajan Skaria v. The State of Kerala & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249, laid down the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act. It reads thus:-

                  “55. The basic ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are:

                  a.       Accused person must not be a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;

                  b.       Accused must intentionally insult or intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;

                  c. Accused must do so with the intent to humiliate such a person; and

                  d. Accused must do so at any place within public view.” (Emphasis supplied)

                  12.     Section 3(1)(r) is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation by the accused is that the person who is subjected to is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In other words, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) cannot stand merely on the fact that the informant/complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless the insult or intimidation is with the intention to humiliate such a member of the community.

                  xxxxxxxx

                  15. Further, for an offence to be made out under Section 3(1)(r), merely abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. At the same time, saying caste name would also not constitute an offence.

                  16. In other words, to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r) it would be necessary that the accused abuses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe “by the caste name” in any place within public view. Thus, the allegations must reveal that abuses were laced with caste name, or the caste name had been hurled as an abuse.

                  17. What appears from the aforesaid is the element of humiliation is present in Section 3(1)(r) as well. It has to be gathered from the intentional insult towards the caste, and the content. The content under Section 3(1)(r) are the abuses hurled at a person belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. However, the intent with which the abuses were hurled must be found to be denigrating towards the caste, resulting into a feeling of caste-based humiliation.”

15. The legal position as discernible from the decision of the Apex Court is the law settled on the matter in issue. Keeping the legal position in mind, on reading the prosecution allegation, it is well discernible that admittedly, there were financial transactions in between the appellant/accused and the defacto complainant. Dishonour of two cheques alleged to be issued by the defacto complainant to the appellant/accused for Rs.1,50,000/- and Rs.2,00,000/-, during the last week of October, 2025 is perceivable from the materials available. Be it so, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is having force in the present case where case and counter case have been registered alleging overt acts to be gathered from the FIS and other records in both crimes. In as much as case and counter case are concerned, investigation and trial to be proceeded simultaneously to find which case is true. Thus indubitably both crimes would require effective investigation to see the truth of the contra allegations. If so, prima facie the allegations in this crime are not fully free from doubts particularly when the occurrence was after three weeks from the date of dishonour of cheques issued by the defacto complainant in favour of the appellant. In such a case, grant of anticipatory bail is not prohibited under Section 18A of the SC/ST (PoA) Act. Therefore, this appeal is liable to be allowed.

                  In the result, this appeal is allowed. The order impugned is set aside. The appellant/accused is granted bail on the following conditions:-

                  i) The appellant/accused shall surrender before the Investigating Officer within seven days from today. On such surrender, the Investigating Officer can interrogate him and effectuate recovery, if any, in between 10.00 a.m. to 3.00 p.m. for two days. In the event of the arrest of the appellant/accused, he shall be produced before the jurisdictional court on the date of arrest itself.

                  ii) The appellant/accused shall be released on bail on he executing bond for Rs.30,000/- (Rupees Thirty Thousand Only) with two solvent sureties, each for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Special Court concerned.

                  iii) The appellant/accused shall not intimidate witnesses or tamper the evidence. He shall co- operate with the investigation and shall be available for interrogation as and when directed by the Investigating Officer.

                  iv) The appellant/accused shall not leave the jurisdiction of the Special Court without prior permission of the court.

                  v) The appellant/accused shall not, directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of this case, so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the court.

                  vi) The appellant/accused shall not involve in any other offence during the currency of bail and any such event, if reported to came to the notice of this court, the same shall be a reason to cancel the bail hereby granted.

 
  CDJLawJournal