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CDJ 2026 Kar HC 086 print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Karnataka
Case No : Regular Second Appeal No. 101 of 2026 (INJ)
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI V HOSMANI
Parties : Sadiq Khan Versus The Manager, DCB Bank, Tumakuru
Appearing Advocates : For the Appellant: V.B. Siddaramaiah, Advocate. For the Respondent: ----
Date of Judgment : 22-01-2026
Head Note :-
Civil Procedure Code - Section 100-

Comparative Citation:
2026 KHC 3755,
Judgment :-

(Prayer: This RSA is filed under Sec.100 of CPC., against the judgment and decree dated 26.11.2025 passed in ra no.162/2025 on the file of principal judge, family court, at tumakuru, dismissing the appeal and confirming the order and decree dated 19.11.2024 passed on ia no.iv in os no.193/2024 on the file of vi additional civil judge and vii jmfc, Tumakuru.)

Oral Judgment:

1. Challenging judgment and decree dated 26.11.2025 passed in RA no.162/2025 passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Tumakuru, confirming order dated 19.11.2024 passed by VI Additional Civil Judge and VII JMFC, Tumakuru, on IA no.IV in OS no.193/2024, this appeal is filed. And for sake of convenience parties would be referred as per their ranks before trial Court.

2. Sri VB Siddaramaiah, learned counsel for appellant submitted appeal was by plaintiff in OS no.193/2024 filed for relief of permanent injunction restraining defendant from interfering with plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of site no.34, Khata no.3852/34 (old Khata no.3852), E-Swathu no.152500904100320471 of Heggere Grama Panchayat (hereinafter referred to as 'Suit Property'). In plaint, it was stated, after plaintiff acquired title and possession over suit property under registered sale deed dated 23.08.2016, his name was entered in revenue records and he was paying tax.

3. Later, he also got constructed an RCC roofed house after obtaining licence/building plan approval from concerned authorities and was residing with family members therein. It was stated, defendant had sanctioned loan of Rs.11,61,116/- to plaintiff on execution of Memorandum of Deposit of Title Deeds on 05.04.2018, agreeing to recover same with interest in 180 monthly installments. However, plaintiff faced financial crisis during Covid-19 pandemic and made request to defendant. And, though agreed, defendant went against same and attempted to recover balance installments of loan amount by interfering with plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of suit property.

4. It was also stated, apart from original documents of suit property, defendant had also received 14 blank cheques from plaintiff, which were misused. It was stated, title deeds were collateral security and steps taken by defendant were contrary to law. It was stated, cause of action for suit arose on 05.04.2018, when plaintiff executed Memorandum of Deposit of Title Deeds and 3 days prior to filing of suit and when defendant interfered with peaceful possession over suit property.

5. On service of summons, defendant entered appearance and filed application under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('CPC', for short). Plaintiff opposed same by filing objections contending that it was not maintainable without filing written statement along with supportive documents, that plaintiff was owner in possession of suit property having purchased it under sale deed dated 23.08.2016 and application was filed to dilate proceedings. It was also contended, as per law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court for consideration of an application for rejection of plaint, only averments in plaint along with appended documents were to be looked into.

6.     In view of same, trial Court framed following:

                  Points

                  1)       Whether defendant has made out grounds to allow application?

                  2)       What order?

7. And after answering, point no.1 in affirmative and point no.2 was answered by allowing application and rejecting plaint.

8. Aggrieved, plaintiff filed RA.no.162/2025 on various grounds, based on which first appellate Court framed following points for its consideration:

                  POINTS:

                  1)       Whether trial Court is justified in rejecting the plaint in O.S.no.193/2024?

                  2)       What order or decree?

9. After answering point no.1 in affirmative, it answered point no.2 by dismissing appeal. Aggrieved thereby, plaintiff had filed this appeal.

10. At outset, learned counsel submitted plaintiff was differently-abled person and though obtained loan from defendant, suit property was sole residential property of plaintiff and his family. In case, injunction as sought were not granted, plaintiff and his family members would be thrown to street affecting their right to shelter. It was further submitted, defendant was attempting to arbitrarily dispossess plaintiff without consideration of request for re-scheduling of monthly installments.

11. It was submitted, both Courts failed to notice that plaintiff's suit was not to evade or delay proceedings for recovery of due amounts, but only for protection against arbitrary dispossession. Therefore, both Courts erred in invoking bar of suit under Sections 34 and 35 of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI). It was further submitted, there was non-conformity with legal position that while considering an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, trial Court was to confine itself to plaint averments and not referred to defence set-up by defendant/s. Therefore, impugned judgment and decree passed by both Courts was contrary to law and liable to be set-aside. It was also contended that first appellate Court failed to follow mandate of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC and in light of same, following substantial question of law would arise for consideration:

                  1)       Whether the trial Court and the 1st appellate Court are justified in holding that a civil suit for bare injunction is barred under Sections 34 and 35 of SARFAESI Act, without examining whether the measures under sections 13(4) were lawfully initiated and completed?

                  2)       Whether rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is sustainable when disputed questions of fact regarding possession, residential use, and legality of dispossession are involved?

                  3)       Whether the Courts below failed to consider the constitutional right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution of Indian, especially when the secured asset is a residential house of a differently- abled person?

                  4)       Whether the Courts below committed a jurisdictional error by mechanically applying the bar under SARFAESI Act without examining the maintainability of a civil suit where allegations of arbitrary and high-handed action are pleaded?

                  5)       Whether the judgment and decree of the trial Court and the 1st appellate Court are otherwise justifiable under the facts and circumstances of the case?

12. Heard learned counsel, perused impugned judgments and copy of plaint made available for perusal by learned counsel for plaintiff.

13. This appeal under Section 100 of CPC is by unsuccessful plaintiff in suit for permanent injunction. While before trial Court, plaint was rejected as a consequence of allowing application under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC filed by defendant - Bank, immediately after entering appearance, Appellate Court dismissed appeal and confirmed order passed by trial Court.

14. Substantial question of law proposed for consideration is that same are contrary to settled principles of law regarding rejection of plaint, on two counts. Firstly, that suit filed by plaintiff was for permanent injunction simpliciter alleging illegal interference with plaintiff's possession over suit property, and secondly, that trial Court traveled beyond plaint averments while considering application filed for rejection of plaint.

15. It is not in dispute that even prior to filing written statement, defendant had application for rejection of plaint. However, in view of ratio laid down in Admar Mutt Kaliya Mardana Krishna Devaru v. Vishalakshi, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Kar 11958, same would be permissible.

16. Law regarding consideration of application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is fairly well settled. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, reported in AIR 2004 SC 1801, held real object of Order VII, Rule 11 of CPC is to keep out of Courts irresponsible law suits and to ensure that filing of suit is not an abuse of process of Court. In Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra)(D) Thr Lrs reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 562, it held:

                  "The power conferred on the Court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.

                  1. Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law.

                  2. The documents filed along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint.

                  3. In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.

                  4. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration."

17. In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. reported in (2007) 5 SCC 614, it is held:

                  "It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact."

18. While passing impugned order, trial Court has referred to plaint averments and noted that plaintiff had borrowed loan from defendant - bank and admitted to have defaulted in repaying same, causing defendant to initiate action for recovery. Though, plaintiff has not disclosed mode and manner of same, it is vaguely alleged that defendant attempted to interfere with plaintiff's possession over suit property. Despite alleging such interference by defendants as illegal, failure of plaintiff to disclose particulars of interference, indicating that suit is filed only to stall recovery proceedings initiated by Bank against defaulting debtor - plaintiff. Result of involving financial institutions in litigation against recovery proceedings, stalling same by orders of stay are well spoken about by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India v. Satyawati Tandon reported in 2010 (8) SCC 110.

19. There is no dispute about bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts in case of disputes falling within scope of Debt Recovery Tribunals, contained in Sections 34 and 35 of SARFAESI. Consequently, conclusion of trial Court that suit was barred by law, would be in accordance with law. And reference to provision of law barring suit cannot be challenged on ground that same would amount to traveling beyond plaint.

20. It is seen that while dismissing appeal, first appellate Court has re-examined plaint averments to concur with findings of trial Court. Hence, no substantial question of law much less those propounded would arise for consideration.

                  Consequently, appeal is dismissed.

 
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