(Prayer: This MFA is filed under Section 54(1) of Land Acquisition Act, praying to allow this appeal by modifying the judgment and award dated 22.06.2006 passed by the civil judge (sr.dn) Bagalkot in lac no.908/2005 and enhance the compensation amount from Rs.1,84,000 per acres to 2,34,000 per acres, in the interest of justice and equity.)

Cav Judgment:

1. The present appeal is filed by the appellants-private parties to allow the present appeal and modify the judgment and award dated 22.06.2006, passed in LAC No.908/2005 and enhance the compensation amount from Rs.1,84,000/- per acres to Rs.2,34,000/- per acres on the file of the Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.), Bilagi (herein after referred to as ‘the Reference Court’ for short).

2. The appellants/respondent herein is claimants/respondent before the Reference Court.

3. For convenience of reference, the parties herein are referred to as arrayed before the before this Court.

4. I.A.No.1/2020 is filed by the appellants with the accompanying affidavit to condone the delay of 4828 days in filing the present appeal.

                  IA No.1/2020

Submissions on behalf of the appellants

5. Shri Pandappa Bhimappa Ragha states that he is the appellant in the present appeal and is swearing this affidavit on his own behalf and on behalf of the other appellants, being conversant with the facts of the case.

6. The appellant submits that he is poor and uneducated, and the acquired land was the sole source of livelihood for his family, having potential for sugarcane cultivation. Due to acquisition, the family was displaced and forced to migrate to different places, including Goa, for labour work. Though compensation was received, the same was exhausted towards family needs and internal disputes, leaving the appellants without financial means and stability.

7. He further submits that after returning to his parental home, he contacted his counsel and was advised to file an appeal before this Court for enhancement. However, due to poverty, illiteracy, displacement, and continuous struggle for livelihood after acquisition, the appeal could not be filed within the prescribed period. The delay is bona fide, unintentional, and caused by circumstances beyond the control of the appellants.

8. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on the following judgments:-

                  *        Ningappa Thotappa Angadi through LR’s v. The Special Land acquisition Officer reported in (2020) 19 SCC 599;

                  “7. We find that the issue raised in this appeal is no  longer  res  integra.  This  Court  in Dhiraj Singh v. State of Haryana [Dhiraj Singh v. State of Haryana, (2014) 14 SCC 127: (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 236] held that : (SCC p. 131, paras 14-15)

                  “14. The appellants are identically situated and there is no reason to meet out a different treatment to them. We also note that, while in these cases, the High Court had refused to condone the delay and dismissed the LPAs of the appellants, other LPAs were allowed by the High Court itself by condoning the delay of the same magnitude in the same circumstances.

                  15. Equities can be balanced by denying the appellants' interest for the period for which they did not approach the court. The substantive rights of the appellants should not be allowed to be defeated on technical grounds by taking hypertechnical view of self-imposed limitations. In the matter of compensation for land acquisition, we are of the view that approach of the court has to be pragmatic and not pedantic.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

                  8.       xxx

                  9. It is undeniable that this Court vide judgment dated 11-11-2016 passed in Ningappa Thotappa Angadi v. LAO [Ningappa Thotappa Angadi v. LAO, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1864] has set aside the order of the High Court and restored the compensation as was awarded by the Reference Court. In the cited case, this Court held as follows : (SCC OnLine SC para 4)

                  “4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties to some length and carefully perused the material on record. We are of the considered opinion  that  the  impugned  judgment [LAO v. Veerabhadrappa Marithammappa, 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 833] and order of the High Court deserves to be set aside and judgment and order passed by the Reference Court restored. We say so because, this Court has in a similar appeal directed against the very same order set aside the impugned judgment and restored the enhancement granted by the Reference Court. We see no reason to take a different view in the present case. We, accordingly, allow this appeal and while setting aside the impugned judgment insofar as the same relates to the appellant, restore the judgment and order passed by the Reference Court. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs.”

                  * Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana and others by order dated 23.04.2025 passed in SLP No.670/2020; and

                  “12. This Court has noticed that in Delhi Air Tech Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Anr.10, with reference to Coffee Board, Karnataka, Bangalore v. Commission of Commercial Tax Karnataka¹¹ that while the State has the power of eminent domain, the owner of a land can only be divested thereof in accordance with the procedure established by law after appropriately compensating them. This is in view of Article 300 A and 31A of the Constitution of India.”

                  *        Bhag Singh & Others v. Union Territory of Chandigarh through the Land Acquisition Collector, Chandigarh reported in AIR 1985 SC 1576.

                  “3. We are of the view that when the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench took the view that the claimants whose land was acquired by the State of Punjab under the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, were entitled to enhanced compensation and the case of the appellants stood on the same footing, the appellants should have been given an opportunity of paying up the deficit court fee so that, like other claimants, they could also get enhanced compensation at the same rate as the others. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench should not have, in our opinion, adopted a technical approach and denied the benefit of enhanced compensation to the appellants merely because they had not initially paid the proper amount of court fee. It must be remembered that this was not a dispute between two private citizens  where  it  would  be  quite  just  and legitimate to confine the claimant to the claim made by him and not to award him any higher amount than that claimed though even in such a case there may be situations where an amount higher than that claimed can be awarded to the claimant as for instance where an amount is claimed as due at the foot of an account. Here was a claim made by the appellants against the State Government for compensation for acquisition of their land and under the law, the State was bound to pay to the appellants compensation on the basis of the market value of the land acquired and if according to the judgments of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, the market value of the land acquired was higher than that awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector or the Additional District Judge, there is no reason why the appellants should have been denied the benefit of payment of the market value so determined. To deny this benefit to the appellants would tantamount to permitting the State Government to acquire the land of the appellants on payment of less than the true market value. There may be cases where, as for instance, under agrarian reform legislation, the holder of land may, legitimately, as a matter of social justice, with a view to eliminating concentration of land in the hands of a few and bringing about its equitable distribution, be deprived of land which is not being personally cultivated by him or which is in excess of the ceiling area with payment of little compensation or no compensation at all, but where land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it would not be fair and just to deprive the holder of his land without payment of the true market value when the law, in so many terms, declares that he shall be paid such market value. The State Government must do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not, as far as possible, except in cases where tax or revenue is received or recovered without protest or where the State Government would otherwise be irretrievably be prejudiced, take up a technical plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim of the citizen. We are, therefore, of the view that, in the present case, the Division Bench as well as the learned Single Judge should have allowed the appellants to pay up the deficit court fee and awarded to them compensation at the higher rate or rates determined by them.”

Submissions on behalf of the Respondent-State:-

9. The respondent-State opposes the application for condonation of delay and contends that admittedly, the appeal has been filed after an inordinate delay of 4828 days, for which no sufficient or acceptable explanation has been offered.

10. It is well settled that every day’s delay must be explained by showing sufficient cause. The reasons assigned in the affidavit, namely that, after acquisition the appellants went to Goa for labour work. Hence, the averments made by the appellants for condonation of delay are vague, bald, and do not satisfactorily explain the enormous delay as mandated under law.

11. The respondent submits that the appellants have failed to show any diligence or bona fide effort in prosecuting their remedy within the prescribed period. If such inordinate delay is condoned, it would cause serious hardship and prejudice to the respondent, whereas no prejudice would be caused to the appellants if the application is dismissed. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the respondent-State placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by her LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board and Others, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, wherein it has been held that no litigant should be permitted to be lethargic or apathetic and misuse the process of law.

12. Further, reliance was placed on the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 and Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition officer reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81, wherein it has been held that the expressions “liberal approach”, “justice-oriented approach” or “advancement of substantial justice” cannot be invoked to defeat the law of limitation or to revive stale and time-barred claims under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and that Courts are not justified in condoning inordinate delay even by imposing conditions. All averments not specifically traversed are denied and the appellants are put to strict proof thereof.

13.    In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the respondent-State placed reliance on the following judgments:-

                  * Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing  Board,

reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969;

                  264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.

                  * Prakash and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer by order dated 12.06.2024 passed in MFA No.8540/2015(LAC)

14. Heard learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the parties.

15. Having considered the contentions advanced, it is observed that the Apex Court and the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the aforesaid judgments relied upon by the respondent-State held that the approach of the Courts in condoning the delay should be pragmatic when sufficient cause is shown. However, in the instant case, the appellants failed to establish sufficient cause to condone such enormous delay of more than 13 years.

16. Further, the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court in Katiji’s case (supra), Basawaraj’s case (supra), and Shivamma’s case (supra), on law of limitation is well settled,  wherein  it  has  been  consistently  held  that expressions such as “liberal approach”, “justice-oriented approach” or “advancement of substantial justice” cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to revive stale and time-barred claims under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It has further been held that Courts would not be justified in condoning inordinate delay by imposing conditions; as such an approach would undermine the object and sanctity of the law of limitation.

17. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, this Court finds that the appellants have failed to show sufficient cause to condone the enormous delay of 4828 days i.e., more than 13 years, in filing the present appeal. The averments made in the affidavit accompanying the application are vague, general, and unsupported by any cogent material. Further, reasons stated in the affidavit such as migration for labour work, displacement after acquisition, receipt and utilisation of compensation and subsequent discussion with the advocate do not constitute a satisfactory or acceptable explanation for condoning such an inordinate delay. Entertaining such applications would amount to revival of a dead and settled right, which is impermissible under law.

18. If such enormous delay is condoned without sufficient cause, it would confer an undue advantage on litigants who are fence sitters, lack diligence, and approach the Court at their convenience, thereby defeating the very object of the law of limitation. It would also unsettle rights of the parties that have attained finality by the reference Court long ago and cause serious prejudice to the respondent, besides opening floodgates for similarly placed persons to reopen concluded proceedings. The concept of finality of litigation and public policy underlying limitation laws cannot be ignored. In the absence of sufficient cause, the appellants are not entitled for condonation of delay, and the application is liable to be dismissed.

19. In view of the aforementioned discussions, this Court proceeds to pass the following:

                  ORDER

                  (i)       IA No.1/2020 is hereby dismissed.

                  (ii)      In view of inordinate delay of 4828 days in filing the present appeal, the present appeal shall not survive for consideration. Hence, the present appeal is dismissed.

                  Accordingly, the appeal and other pending applications, if any shall stand dismissed.