1. Sri.Baby K.P., who is the sole accused in Crime No.794/2025 of Binanipuram Police Station, Ernakulam, has filed this criminal appeal under Section 14A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 as amended in 2018 [hereinafter referred to as 'SC/ST POA Act, 2018' for short], challenging order dated 09.01.2026 in Crl.M.P. No.2402/2025 on the files of the Special Court for SC/ST (POA) Act cases, Ernakulam, whereby the learned Special Judge dismissed the anticipatory bail plea at the instance of the appellant.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel appearing for the defacto complainant, in detail. Perused the verdict under challenge, the case diary placed by the learned Public Prosecutor and also gone through decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the defacto complainant.

3. Parties in this appeal shall be referred as ‘accused’ and ‘defacto complainant’, hereafter.

4. In a nutshell, the allegation of the prosecution is that, the accused, who does not belong to either Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community, on knowing the said fact and also noticing that, a complaint was lodged by the defacto complainant, who is a member of Scheduled Caste community, against the accused alleging that the accused had been flowing waste water through the property of one Thresiamma to the residence of the defacto complainant, got infuriated and in consequence thereof at about 06.30 p.m. on 26.07.2025, the defacto complainant was alerted by his wife stating that somebody from the road calling abusive words by calling caste name of the defacto complainant and also uttering that, the defacto complainant has been in the habit of raising unnecessary complaints before the Police and later it was heard by the defacto complainant that it was the accused who did the overt acts. In the FIS itself, it was stated that the occurrence was witnessed by one George and his wife Thresiamma, who were present at the place of occurrence and the abusive words were uttered on the public road, abutting the house of the defacto complainant. There is further allegation that, again at about 07.00 a.m. on 27.07.2025, the accused repeated the overt acts and thereby abused and ashamed the defacto complainant, who is a member of Scheduled Caste community within public view and thereby committed the offences punishable under Section 296 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [hereinafter referred as ‘BNS’ for short] and under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act, 2018.

5. The learned counsel for the accused raised multifold contentions to unsustain the verdict of the Special Court, while pressing for grant of anticipatory bail to the accused, after setting aside the order impugned. According to the learned counsel for the accused, the entire case is foisted because of rivalry and according to him, the accused lodged complaint against the defacto complainant initially and thereafter the defacto complainant lodged complaint alleging flowing of waste water through the property of another to the house of the defacto complainant by the accused. According to the learned counsel for the accused, since such a civil dispute has been pending, this case was foisted with a view to put the accused behind the bars alleging commission of non-bailable offence under the SC/ST (POA) Act.

6. Apart from contending that, this case arose out of a civil dispute, the learned counsel for the accused also submitted that, going by the prosecution records, no third parties heard the accused calling the defacto complainant by his caste name and uttering abusive words and according to him, in order to attract an offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act, 2018, merely abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. At the same time, saying caste name would also not constitute an offence, as held by the Apex Court in the decision reported in [2026 KHC 7023] Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto v. State of Bihar and Another.

7. The learned counsel for the accused also placed decision of the Apex Court reported in [MANU/SC/7954/2008  :   2008  (3)  ACR  2674  (SC)  : 2008 (69) AIC 25] Swaran Singh and Others v. State through Standing Counsel and Others] with reference to paragraph Nos. 28 and 34 to contend that, since the FIR referred therein did not show that any member of the public was present, when the accused therein uttered the abusive words, it was held by the Apex Court that, then the place of occurrence is not within the public view.

8. Apart from that, the learned counsel for the accused placed decisions of this Court in Binesh and Others v. State of Kerala and Others reported in [2019 ICO 2840 : 2020 (1) KHC 240 : 2020 (1) KLD 98] and XXX v. State of Kerala and Another reported in [2022 ICO 2262 : 2023 (1) KLT SN 27], to assert the same point.

9. Whereas, it is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the defacto complainant that, in this case, the occurrence was on the public road abutting the house of the defacto complainant and the same was witnessed by third parties. Therefore, the place of occurrence is a place within public view as contemplated under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act, 2018 and in this regard, the learned counsel placed decision of the Apex Court reported in [2025 SCC  OnLine  SC  1886  :  2025  INSC  1067]  Kiran  v. Rajkumar  Jivraj  Jain  and  Another, with reference to paragraph Nos.7 and 8. The same are extracted as under:

                  “7. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the respondent-accused was not a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community. The appellant belonged to scheduled caste community known as “Mang” or “Matang”. The allegations made in the FIR lodged by the complainant was that he was addressed by the accused with abusive casteist utterance “Mangatyano, you are became very arrogant, you are staying in the village and voting against”. The appellant was addressed as above by the accused outside the house of the appellant where others were present

                  7.1     The accused persons beat the complainant with iron rod and threatened to burn the house. The mother and aunt of the appellant-complainant were also meted out similar treatment with intimidation and were addressed with same casteist slur. The use of the word “Mangatyano” was with a clear intention to humiliate the complainant because he belonged to the said Scheduled Caste community. In the said abusive utterances and conduct by the accused, the caste nexus was established. The complainant was humiliated with casteist and abusive approach for the reason that he did not vote in favour of particular candidate one Bahubali-accused No.8 in the Assembly Election as desired by the respondent- accused.

                  7.2     The incident as above took place outside the house of the complainant, it was a place within public view. The term “any place within public view” was considered by this Court in Swarn Singh (supra) and Hitesh Verma (supra) was also subsequently referred to in the decision of this Court in Karuppudayar vs. State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalguid Trichy & Ors.9 wherein the Court drew distinction between “public place” and “any place within public view”. It was held that if the offence is committed outside the building, for example in the lawn outside the house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lawn outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view.

                  8. In the present case, as noted above, the incident took place outside the house of the appellant which could be viewed by anybody. It was indeed a place within public view. There is no gainsaying that in the facts of the case all ingredients necessary to prima facie constitute offences under Section 3 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Act, 1989 as alleged in the FIR stood satisfied. Furthermore, the occurrence of incident was fortified by recovery of clothes and weapons.”

10. The learned Public Prosecutor zealously opposed grant of anticipatory bail pointing out that, in this case, prima facie, the offences are made out. Therefore, grant of bail is specifically barred under Section 18 of the SC/ST (POA) Act, 2018.

11. On perusal of the prosecution allegations, it could be gathered that, when the defacto complainant filed complaint before the Police regarding flowing of waste water through a pipe to his residence by the accused and when the accused came to know about the complaint, at about 06.30 p.m. on 26.07.2025, the accused reached the public road infront of the house of the defacto complainant and started abusing the defacto complainant by calling his caste name and by using abusive words and it was so informed by his wife and later it was heard by the defacto complainant. The specific allegation further is that, at about 07.00 a.m. on 27.07.2025 also, the accused repeated the same and on this premise the prosecution alleges commission of the offences punishable under Section 296 of the BNS and under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act, 2018.

12. As far as the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the accused, stating that the entire case is foisted, the same could not be found, as the prosecution records would show that, the allegations are made out, prima facie. Insofar as the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the accused that he lodged a complaint initially, in fact, no documents forthcoming to appraise this contention as a bona fide one and lodging of such a complaint is a remote probability, since the aggrieved party herein is the defacto complainant.

13. Coming to the contention raised by the learned counsel for the accused that, the place of occurrence in the instant case is not a place within the public view, the legal position is not in dispute. It is the well settled law that, in order to attract offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act, 2018, use of abusive words must be in a place within the public view. For the purpose of the offence, a place within public view can either by a public place or a private place. When the place is a public place, naturally presence of third party public is very much available and in the case of a private place, when the abusive words were used in the presence of third parties, then a private place also would become a place within the public view for the purpose of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act, 2018. In fact, this legal position is well settled as per the decisions herein above extracted, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the accused as well as the learned counsel for the defacto complainant.

14. Coming to the place of occurrence herein, indisputably, the same is a public road adjoining the house of the defacto complainant. In the FIS itself, it has been stated that allegation of abusing the defacto complainant by the accused by calling his caste name was witnessed by one George and his wife Thresiamma. It is relevant to note that, during the investigation, the Investigating Officer recorded the statements of Smt. Sreedevi, the wife of the defacto complainant and Smt.Reesa and they have given statement that, they had witnessed the occurrence. If so, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the accused that, the place of occurrence herein is not in a place within public view is found to be unsustainable and the place is to be held, prima facie, as a place within public view.

15. It is equally well settled law that, if the prosecution allegations in toto do not substantiate, prima facie, offences under the SC/ST (POA) Act, anticipatory bail is liable to be granted, since the bar under Section 18 SC/ST (POA) Act, 2018, would not apply in such cases. Conversely, when the prosecution  records  would  show,  prima  facie,  the commission of prosecution allegations, grant of anticipatory bail is specifically barred under Section 18 of the SC/ST (POA) Act, 2018.

16. Having appraised the facts in this case as discussed, it could be seen that the allegations are made out, prima facie. In such a case, grant of anticipatory bail is specifically barred. Therefore, the Special Judge rightly dismissed the petition and the impugned order is only to be confirmed.

                  In the result, this appeal stands dismissed, confirming the order of the Special Court, with a direction to the appellant/accused to surrender before the Investigating Officer forthwith. Failing which the Investigating Officer is at liberty to arrest the appellant/accused to proceed with the investigation.