1. The petitioner/appellant filed the present Interlocutory Application with a prayer to condone the delay of 371 days in filing the Second Appeal against the Decree and Judgment passed in A.S.No.108 of 2017, dated 26.07.2023 on the file of the III Additional District Judge, Guntur, in dismissing the appeal suit filed against the Decree and Judgment passed in O.S.No.988 of 2010, dated 30.03.2016, on the file of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, (FTC) Guntur.

2. The case of the petitioners as per the affidavit of the petitioner No.2 in brief is as follows:-

                  I. The brother of the petitioner No.2 by name Goddeti Sambasiva Rao pursued the case with their counsel in the courts below and has taken the certified copies of the judgments. He pleaded that soon after the receipt of the certified copies of the judgments at the end of September, 2023, he got an occasion to shift his house from Door No.2-202, Mallayyapalem Road, Parthipadu Village & Mandalam, Guntur District, to Door No.3-7, Block No.3, Parthipadu Village & Mandalam, Guntur District, and due to inadvertent mistake, the copies of the judgments were mixed up with other documents in the house and, in spite of their sincere efforts, the petitioners could not trace them.

                  II. The petitioner further pleaded that on 16.09.2024, his son by name Naga Vamsi, while riding a motorbike on Vijayawada-Guntur National Highway, met with an accident near Mangalagiri and joined in AIMS, Mangalagiri. The petitioner further pleaded that, in their locality there is a tradition to perform ceremonies to village deities after recovery from any misfortune in the homes, as such, after the petitioner’s son recovered, on 12.12.2024, they reorganized their house as part of the village deity ceremony, where the petitioner found the certified copies of the judgments and immediately, he rushed to his counsel and filed the present second appeal before this Court along with the Interlocutory Application vide I.A.No.1 of 2025, seeking to condone the delay of 371 days in filing the second appeal.

3. The case of the respondent No.1/plaintiff as per the counter affidavit in brief is as follows:-

                  I. The respondent No.1 pleaded that the certified copies were made available on 19.09.2023, but the petitioner No.2 did not mention the date of shifting the house of his brother. He pleaded that when the case was pursued by the petitioner No.3 and he lost the copies of the judgments and decree during the course of the shifting of his house, as to how the same were found in the house of the petitioner No.2 is not properly explained by the petitioners and the same was created only for the purpose of filing the present second appeal and to drag on the proceedings. He further pleaded that the petitioners were totally negligent and did not assign proper reasons for condoning the inordinate delay and the appeal has been filed only with a mala fide intent to prolong the proceedings, thereby causing the respondent No.1 to suffer and roam around the Courts and preventing him from enjoying the fruits of the case. He pleaded that the reason shown by the petitioners in the affidavit is not a valid reason much less a sufficient cause for condoning the inordinate delay of 371 days and requested to dismiss the interlocutory application vide I.A.No.1 of 2025.

4. Heard learned counsel appearing on both sides on record.

                  “Now the point for determination is whether the petitioner has shown any sufficient cause to condone the delay of 371 days in filing the Second Appeal?”

POINT:

5. The undisputed facts are that the mother of the plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant No.1 for seeking relief of declaration that the registered gift deed said to have been executed by the mother of the plaintiff in favour of the defendant was void and pending the suit the mother of the plaintiff died and the plaintiff was brought on record in the said suit and the said suit was decreed, against which an appeal was preferred by the defendant No.1 vide A.S.No.224 of 2007, on the file of the Principal District Court, Guntur, and the said appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution on 21.07.2009, and the said judgment passed by the trial Court has become final.

6. The plaintiff herein filed the suit in O.S.No.988 of 2010, on the file of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, (FTC), Guntur, seeking relief of eviction of the defendants from the plaintiff schedule property and the said suit was decreed on 30.03.2016. Against which an appeal in A.S.No.108 of 2017, on the file of the III Additional District Judge, Guntur, was filed by the defendant Nos.1 to 6, and the said appeal was also dismissed on merits by the First Appellate Court on 26.07.2023.

7. The present second appeal is filed by the defendant Nos.1 to 5 with a delay of 371 days. As seen from the material available on record, the petitioners filed a copy application for certified copy of the decree and judgment in A.S.No.108 of 2007 of the First Appellate Court on 27.07.2023, and the appellants received a certified copy of the decree and judgment in the month of September, 2023 itself, and they have filed an appeal on 23.12.2024 with an abnormal delay of 371 days.

8. The contention of the petitioner is that his brother Goddeti Sambasiva Rao, i.e., the petitioner No.3 pursued the case with their counsels in the Courts below. The contention of the petitioner herein is that his brother Goddeti Sambasiva Rao got occasion to shift his house from Door No.2-202, Mallayyapalem Road, Parthipadu Village & Mandalam, Guntur District to Door No.3-7, Block No.3, Parthipadu Village & Mandalam, Guntur District, and during the shifting of the house, due to inadvertent mistake, the copies of the judgments were mixed up with the other documents in his house and in spite of the best sincere efforts, they could not trace them. There is no whisper in the affidavit of the petitioner that when his brother shifted his house at Parthipadu Village from Door No.2-202 to Door No.3-7 of the same village. As seen from the affidavit of the petitioner, it is surprising to note that it was reiterated by the petitioner in the affidavit that the alleged so called missing certified copy of the decree and judgment by the petitioner No.3 were found in the house of the petitioner No.2 herein, but not in the house of the petitioner No.3. Therefore, the explanation offered by the petitioner is vague and unclear.

9. Another explanation offered by the petitioner to condone the delay of 371 days in filing the second appeal is that on 16.09.2024, his son by name Naga Vamsi, while going on a two-wheeler, met with an accident and he joined in the AIMS, Mangalagiri. As per the case sheet of the patient i.e., the son of the petitioner in the AIMS Hospital, which is enclosed to the petition filed by the petitioner reveals that the patient was unwilling to admit in the hospital and that he was treated as outpatient. Moreover, the accident took place on 16.09.2024, but the certified copy of the decree and judgment was ready by 19.09.2023, and the petitioner obtained the certified copy of the decree and judgment by the month of September, 2023. Therefore, the explanation offered by the petitioner to condone the inordinate delay of 371 days is vague, unclear and not properly explained.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed a case law of this Court in Tatina Kasi Visweswara Rao Vs. Tatina Sitaratnam and others.

                  The facts in the aforesaid case law are different to the instant case. The facts in the aforesaid case law are that a suit in O.S.No.50 of 2001 was filed before the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Tadepalligudem, and the said suit was dismissed, against which an appeal was preferred before the First Appellate Court. The said appeal was allowed by the First Appellate Court and the second appeal was filed with a delay of 247 days. Here, in the present case, the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff was decreed, and the First Appellate Court also confirmed the said decree and judgment passed by the trial Court. But, the petitioner herein filed the second appeal with an abnormal delay of 371 days and the said delay is not properly explained by the petitioner.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed a case law of the Apex Court in Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai(AIR 2012 SUPREME COURT 1629).

                  The facts in the aforesaid case law are different to the instant case. The present case was not involving the State and its Agencies. In the aforesaid case law also, the Apex Court held that “the delay not to be condoned as matter of course on ground that dismissal will cause injury to public interest when delay is due to total lethargy or utter negligence of its officers.”

12. In a case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. and Ors. Vs the Special Deputy Collector (LA)( Manu/SC/0285/2024), the Apex Court held as follows:

                  “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

                  (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

                  (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

                  (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

                  (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

                  (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

                  (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

                  (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

                  (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”

13. In a case of Basawaraj and Ors. Vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer(Manu/SC/0850/2013), the Apex Court held as follows:

                  “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.”

14. In a case of Mahant Bikram Dass Chela Vs. Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab, Chandigarh and Ors.( Manu/SC/0019/1977: (1977) 4 SCC 69), the Apex Court held as follows:

                  “21. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-matter and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around s. 5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every day's delay. These and similar considerations which influence the decision of S. 5 applications are out of place in cases where the appeal itself is preferred within the period of limitation but there is an irregularity in presenting it. Thus, in the instant case, there was no occasion to invoke the provisions of s. 5, Limitation Act, or of rule 4, Chapter 1, of the High Court Rules. If the Division Bench were, aware that rifle, 3 of Chapter 2-C is directory, it would have treated the appeal as having been filed within the period of limitation, rendering it inapposite to consider whether the delay caused in filing the appeal could be condoned.”

15. In a case of Basawaraj and Ors. Vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer(Manu/SC/0850/2013), the Apex Court further held as follows:

                  “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

16. The law is well settled that an appeal has to be filed within the stipulated period, prescribed under the law. Belated appeals can only be condoned if sufficient reason is shown before the Court for the delay. The appellant, who seeks condonation of delay, must explain the delay of each day. The Courts should not be pedantic in their approach while condoning the delay and explanation of each day’s delay should not be taken literally, but the fact remains that there must be a reasonable explanation for the delay.

17. Considering the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case laws, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the considered view that the expression “sufficient cause” as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides are in favour of petitioners. In the present case, there are several laches on the part of the petitioners, and there is clear negligence and inaction in pursuing the matter. In such circumstances, the delay cannot be condoned liberally.

18. For the aforesaid reasons, there are no merits in the present Interlocutory Application. Resultantly, the Interlocutory Application vide I.A.No.01 of 2025 is dismissed. Since the petition to condone the delay of 371 days in filing the Second Appeal vide I.A.No.01 of 2025 is dismissed, the Second Appeal is liable to be rejected. The Registry is hereby instructed to return the document filed by the petitioner in I.A.No.02 of 2025 to the petitioner on proper identification and obtain acknowledgment.

                  As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending and the Interim Order granted earlier, if any, shall stand closed.