1. The sole accused in C.C. No.26/2006 on the files of the Court of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Kozhikode, has filed this appeal, under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [hereinafter referred as ‘Cr.P.C.’ for short], challenging the conviction and sentence imposed by the Special Judge, against him as per the judgment dated 26.03.2013. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, VACB, Wayanad and the State of Kerala, represented by the Special Public Prosecutor are arrayed as the respondents herein.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Special Public Prosecutor, in detail. Perused the verdict under challenge and the records of the Special Court.

3. Parties in this appeal shall be referred as ‘accused’ and ‘prosecution’, hereafter.

4. The prosecution case is that, the accused, while working as District Officer, Ground Water Department, Wayanad, had abused his position as public servant and committed criminal misconduct and demanded and accepted Rs.50,000/- each from Sri. P.D. Dinesh Babu (PW1), Sri. P.V. Vinod (PW2), during the last week of January, 2003 at his house at Munderi, promising to appoint them as Casual Labourers in the Department and to regularize their service within 3 months. The further allegation is that the accused had accepted an amount of Rs.60,000/- from one Sri. K. Aboobacker, during February, 2002, at the residence of the accused promising to appoint him as Driver in the Department and his service would be regularized within 3 months. Then the accused had given appointment to these persons as Casual Labourers and Driver and had cheated them by not regularizing their appointment and had obtained undue pecuniary advantage of Rs.1,60,000/- by adopting fraudulent method. On this premise, the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 [hereinafter referred as ‘P.C. Act, 1988’ for short] and under Section 420 of Indian Penal Code [hereinafter referred as ‘IPC’ for short] , by the accused.

5. After framing charge, the Special Court recorded evidence and completed trial. During trial, PWs 1 to 19 were examined and Exts.P1 to P27 were marked on the side of the prosecution. Even though, the accused was given opportunity to adduce defence evidence after questioning him under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C, he did not opt to adduce any defence evidence.

6. On appreciation of evidence, the Special Court found that the accused was not guilty for the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC and he was acquitted for the said offence. However, the Special Court found that the accused was guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988. Accordingly, the accused was convicted for the said offences and sentenced as under:

                  In the result, the accused is sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of three months for the offence under Section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs.30,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of three months for the offence under Section 13 (1) (d) r/w. 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The substantive portion of the sentences shall run concurrently. Accused is entitled to get set off under Section 428 of Criminal Procedure Code regarding the period of detention undergone by him if any.

7. The learned counsel for the appellant raised multifold contentions to unsustain the verdict of the Special Court. According to him, in the instant case, no preliminary enquiry was conducted before registering Ext.P25 FIR, then how PW18, who registered the FIR got information regarding the allegation of demand of bribe by the accused could not be gathered therefrom. According to the learned counsel for the accused, in fact, the name of the aggrieved person was not shown in the FIR, though PW18, the Dy.S.P, VACB himself has been styled as the complainant. Therefore, the very basis of the prosecution case is in doubt. He also submitted that, in fact, there was some monetary transaction in between PW1 and PW2 and the same was settled as per Ext.P2 agreement, whereby Rs.24,000/- and Rs.25,000/- respectively returned to PW1 and PW2 being the amount obtained by the accused as deposit. Therefore, the prosecution allegation is absolutely baseless.

8. It is also pointed out that, in this case, Ext.P26 sanction was proved through PW19, the Investigating Officer, without examining the sanctioning authority. He also pointed that, Ext.P26 sanction was not issued by the competent authority as per the Vigilance Manual and he had brought the notice of this Court to relevant paragraph in the Vigilance Manual, in this regard, while contending that the sanction in this case is improper. On these grounds, the learned counsel for the accused pressed for interference in the verdict impugned and to reverse the finding of the Special Court.

9. While supporting the verdict of the Special Court and negating the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the accused, the learned Special Public Prosecutor placed decision of the Apex Court reported in [(2004) 7 Supreme Court Cases 763] State by Police Inspector v. T. Venkatesh Murthy, with reference to paragraph No.14, wherein it has been held as under:

                  “14. In the instant case neither the trial court nor the High Court appear to have kept in view the requirements of sub-section (3) relating to question regarding "failure of justice". Merely because there is any omission, error or irregularity in the matter of according sanction, that does not affect the validity of the proceeding unless the court records the satisfaction that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in failure of justice. The same logic also applies to the appellate or revisional court. The requirement of sub-section (4) about raising the issue at the earliest stage has not been also considered. Unfortunately, the High Court by a practically non- reasoned order, confirmed the order passed by the learned trial Judge. The orders are, therefore, indefensible. We set aside the said orders. It would be appropriate a to require the trial court to record findings in terms of clause (b) of sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) of Section 19.”

10. Similarly, the decision of this Court in Nujum P.A. v. State of Kerala reported in [2025 KHC OnLine 1031 : 2025 KHC 1031 : 2025 KER 71435] has also been placed by the learned Special Public Prosecutor to contend that, examination of the sanctioning authority is not mandatory, when the sanction order itself speaks of application of mind. In paragraph Nos.27 and 28, this Court observed as under:

                  “27. In this context, it is relevant to refer the decision of this Court in Sunil Kumar K. v. State of Kerala reported in [2025 KHC OnLine 983], in Crl.Appeal No.323/2020, dated 12.9.2025, wherein in paragraph No. 12, it was held as under:

                  “12. Indubitably in Neeraj Dutta’s case (supra) the Apex Court held in paragraph No.69 that there is no conflict in the three judge Bench decisions of this Court in B.Jayaraj and P.Satyanarayana Murthy with the three judge Bench decision in M.Narasinga Rao, with regard to the nature and quality of proof necessary to sustain a conviction for offences under Section 7 or 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, when the direct evidence of the complainant or “primary evidence” of the complainant is unavailable owing to his death or any other reason. The position of law when a complainant or prosecution witness turns “hostile” is also discussed and the observations made above would accordingly apply in light of Section 154 of the Evidence Act. In view of the aforesaid discussion there is no conflict between the judgments in the aforesaid three cases. Further in Paragraph No.70 the Apex Court held that in the absence of evidence of the complainant   (direct/primary,oral/documentary evidence) it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution. In paragraph No.68 the Apex Court summarized the discussion. That apart, in State by Lokayuktha Police’s case (supra) placed by the learned counsel for the accused also the Apex Court considered the ingredients for the offences punishable under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act,1988 and held that demand and acceptance of bribe are necessary to constitute the said offences. Similarly as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Aman Bhatia’s case (supra) the Apex court reiterated the same principles. Thus the legal position as regards to the essentials to be established to fasten criminal culpability on an accused are demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused. To put it otherwise, proof of demand is sine qua non for the offences to be established under Sections 7 and 13(1) (d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and dehors the proof of demand the offences under the two Sections could not be established. Therefore mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of bribe or as undue pecuniary advantage or illegal gratification or the recovery of the same would not be sufficient to prove the offences under the two Sections in the absence of evidence to prove the demand.”

                  28. First of all, I shall address the question as to whether the non-examination of the sanctioning authority who issued Ext. P5 is a sufficient reason to discard the prosecution evidence in toto. In this connection the decision placed by the learned Public Prosecutor in Jiyalal’s case (supra) is relevant. The ratio therein is that when the sanction order was clearly passed in discharge of routine official functions and hence there would be a presumption that the same was done in a bona fide manner. Further, though it was open to the accused to question the genuineness or validity of the sanction order, there was no requirement for the prosecution to examine the sanctioning authority as a witness. Same principle has been reiterated by this Court in Ravinathan L’s case (supra). Thus, the law is well settled that when the sanction order indicates that the same was issued in the discharge of routine official functions and shows that the sanctioning authority applied its mind after examining the entire prosecution records, the mere non-examination of the person who authored the sanction order is not fatal to the prosecution.”

11. The learned Special Public Prosecutor also placed decision of this Court in Bennet T.C. v. State of Kerala reported in [2025 KHC OnLine 1086 : 2025 KHC 1086 : 2025 KER 77437] in support of her contention regarding prosecution sanction. It is submitted by the learned Special Public Prosecutor further that, Ext.P2 would not take away the prosecution case in any manner, which was produced by the accused and the copy of the same produced by PW1, since the same were obtained by PW1 and PW2, while making part payment of the bribe money in the pretext of acknowledging the same and the contents therein were not known to PW1 and PW2 as deposed by them.

12. In view of the rival submissions, the points arise for consideration are:

                  1.       Whether the Special Court is justified in finding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 7 of the P.C. Act, 1988?

                  2.       Whether the Special Court is wrongly found that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988?

                  3.       Whether the verdict of the Special Court would require interference?

                  4.       Order to be passed?

13. Point Nos.1 and 2:- In this case, the Special Court relied on the evidence of PW1 and PW2 as well as PW3, to find the ingredients of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988. According to them, they reached the residence of the accused, during the first week of January and the last week of January, when the initial demand was made and subsequently, the amount was accepted in pursuance to the said demand. In this case, the categoric evidence of PW1 and PW2 supported by the evidence of PW3 is that, they jointly went to the house of the accused during the first week of January, 2003, after it was informed by the accused to PW3 that, he could provide job as Casual Labourers in the Ground Water Department to PW1 and PW2 on payment of Rs.50,000/- each as bribe. According to PW1 to PW3, when they visited the accused in his residence on the first week of January, 2003, the accused demanded Rs.50,000/- each from PW1 and PW2 on promising to arrange job as Casual Labourers in the Ground Water Department and to regularize their employment thereafter, pursuant to the said demand, on the last week of January, 2003, PWs 1 to 3 together reached the house of the accused and paid Rs.50,000/- each and the said amounts were accepted by the accused.

14. PW1 deposed that, as per Ext.P1 Joining Report, he joined for duty on 18.02.2003. Similarly, PW2 also jointed duty as Casual Labourer on 13.02.2003 as per Ext.P5 Joining Report. Their evidence further is that, later the accused failed to provide employment for a whole month and accordingly, they were compelled to discontinue the work, since they did not derive sufficient income thereof and they were not made permanent employees. PW1 and PW2 admitted receipt of Rs.24,000/- and Rs.25,000/- respectively, as contended by the accused in terms of Ext.P2 and their consistent evidence is that, when the accused failed to provide them employment as agreed and also to regularize their employment, they made complaints to the then MLA Ramachandran Master and a mediation talk was arranged on his behalf and as part of the mediation arrangement at the intervention of PW8, Rs.24,000/- and Rs.25,000/- were paid to PW1 and PW2, with assurance to pay the balance within a week. It is true that, on reading Ext.P2, it has been stated that those amounts were paid to PW1 and PW2 as deposit, as they willfully relinquished the job. During cross-examination of PW1 and PW2, though they conceded acceptance of Rs.24,000/- by PW1 and Rs.25,000/- by PW2, the contents of Ext.P2 were denied on the assertion that they simply signed in the agreement acknowledging the receipt of money and without knowing the contents therein.

15. In this case, the prosecution made allegation that, apart from receipt of bribe as Rs.50,000/- each from PW1 and PW2, the accused received Rs.60,000/- as bribe from one K.Aboobacker, during the month of February, 2002, on promising to appoint him as driver in the Ground Water Department, with assurance to regularize his service within three months. But, the said K.Aboobacker was also denied regular employment. The prosecution examined PW5, the father-in-law of the said K.Aboobacker and he deposed that, Aboobacker is the husband of his daughter. Aboobacker is now employed in Dubai. He worked as Casual Labourer at Ground Water Department. At that time accused was District Officer. PW6 and PW7 told him that if Rs.60,000/- was paid, there was chance for getting a job in Ground Water Department. Himself along with Aboobacker, PW6 and PW7 went to the house of the accused.  He  gave  Rs.60,000/-  to  PW6  and  PW6  gave  the amount to the accused and the accused asked Aboobacker to join duty and he worked for a few days. Thereafter he told that the remuneration obtained by him was meager and he could not continue his employment. PW5 met the accused and demanded the amount paid to him. He told that he did not have the entire amount with him. He would give a portion of the amount received by him. PW5 told that he wanted the entire amount and returned from the house of the accused.

16. PW6 and PW7 told that, if Rs.60,000/- was paid to the accused, there was chance for getting job in the Ground Water Department. But, when PW6 and PW7 were examined, they turned hostile to the prosecution.

17. PW1 and PW2 also deposed about the source of money, by which they have paid the amount to the accused. The Special Court relied on the evidence of PWs 13 to 18 in this regard. The same are extracted as under:

18. PW13 had given evidence that he had been working as an agriculturist and he was also doing the business in cattle. He had purchased a buffalo from PW2 for Rs.10,000/-. PW2 had sold the buffalo in connection with procurement of job. In cross- examination he had stated that he knows PW2 for the last 40 years. PW2 had only having one buffalo. He was not prepared to give the amount to PW2 without selling the buffalo. Buffalo gave 8 liters milk daily, when he purchased it. He denied the suggestion that he was giving false evidence that he had purchased buffalo from PW2.

19. PW14 had given evidence that he had been working as an agriculturist and he had purchased motor from PW2 for Rs.15,000/-, PW2 had sold the motor for raising funds for procuring job. In cross-examination he had stated that the motor sold by PW2 was used for agricultural purpose by PW2. He does not know whether PW2 can irrigate his land without this motor. He cannot say the oldage of the motor. He denied the suggestion that he was giving false evidence that he had purchased motor from PW2

20. PW15 had given evidence that he had conducted the wholesale shop in medicine at Mananthavady. PW2 had worked in his shop as a staff up to 2002. When PW2 resigned his job, he gave Rs.20,000/- to him. In cross-examination he had stated that he gave the amount not as arrears of wages. He gave the amount as gratitude for the service rendered by PW2 for improving his business. He had not given statement to the Police that he gave Rs.20,000/- to PW2 as arrears of wages. He entered the amount given by him to PW2 in the register kept in the shop. No receipt was obtained for the amount paid by him. Register was not shown to the Vigilance officials as they had not demanded it. He was in possession of document to show that PW2 had worked in his shop.

21. PW16 had given evidence that he had worked as Branch Manager of Muthoot Fin Corp, Mananthavady. He received summons issued from the Court for production of Gold Loan Register for the period from 27-01-2003 to 30-01- 2003. Original register was lost. He filed Ext.P-16 Affidavit before the Court to that effect and has also filed 2 additional Affidavits which are marked as Ext.P-17 and P-18. He had produced copy of the Gold Loan Ledger No.E.24001 to E-24100, which is marked as Ext.P-19 and Pledge and Audit Report which is marked as Ext.P-20 and Released Audit Report which is marked as Ext.P-21 and Pledge Advance Interest for the Day which is marked as Ext.P-22 and Release and Interest Statement which is marked as Ext.P-23. These documents were kept in his office. In cross-examination he had stated that he joined as Branch Manager on 09-09-2009. Ext.P-19 to P-23 documents are not handled by him. First entry shown as Ext.P-19 is the pledge amount. Entry shown as cash credit was the amount repaid. An amount of Rs.10,000/- was shown as debit on 28-01-2003 and it was closed on 08-05-2003. Details of the ornaments are taken from Pledge and Audit Report. He does not know whether PW1 was permanent customer of the institution.

22. PW17 had given evidence that he had worked in Muthoot Fin Corp, Mananthavady Branch from 22-03-2003 onwards. He had produced Gold Loan Pledge Register kept in the branch for the period from 27-01-2003 to 30-03-2003 to the Vigilance Police on 28-02-2005 and signed in Ext.P-24 Mahazar prepared at the time of seizure of that document. He had taken back the Register after executing Ext.P-24(a) Kychit. Ext.P-19 is the copy of Gold Loan Pledge Register. In Ext.P-19, it was recorded that, on 28-01-2003, PW-1 had taken Rs.10,000/- by pledging gold ornaments and the details are entered in Receipt No. 13534 which is marked as Ext.P-19(a). In cross-examination he had stated that he had not worked as Manager, when PW1 pledged ornaments. He was the Manager, when those ornaments were released to him. He does not know whether PW1 used to pledge gold ornaments in the branch regularly.

23. PW18 had given evidence that on 02-09-2004, when he had been working as Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance & Anti-Corruption Bureau, Wayanad he had registered the crime V.C.10/2004 under Section 13(1)(c) r/w. 13(2) of P.C. Act, 1988 and under Section 420 of IPC. Ext.P-25 is the F.I.R registered by him. He has seized Ext.P-1, P-4 to P- 8     documents produced by PW-4 on 13-09-2004 as per Ext.P- 9 Mahazar and Ext.P-2 document produced by PW-1 on 04- 10-2004 as per Ext.P-3 Mahazar and Ext. P-2(a) document produced by the accused on 06-10-2004 as per Ext.P-14 Mahazar and the Gold Loan Pledge Register produced by PW- 17 on 28.02.2005 as per Ext.P-24 Mahazar.

24. The learned counsel for the accused argued that, in order to prove the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988, demand and acceptance of bribe by the accused is absolutely necessary. In fact, this legal position is not in dispute.

25. Now, it is necessary to address the ingredients required to attract the offences under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988. The same are extracted as under:-

                  Section 7:- Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act. – Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government Company referred to in clause (C) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

                  Section 13:- Criminal misconduct by a public servant. – (1) A public servant is said to commit the   offence    of   criminal   misconduct,-

                  a) xxxxx

                  (b)      xxxxx

                  (c)      xxxxxx

                  (d)      If he,- (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest. xxxxx

                  (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than four years but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.

26. In this connection, it is relevant to refer a 5 Bench decision of the Apex Court in [AIR 2023 SC 330], Neeraj Dutta v. State, where the Apex Court considered when the demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the P.C.Act, 1988, to be said to be proved along with ingredients for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and in paragraph No.68, it has been held as under :

                  "68. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under:

                  (a)      Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the  prosecution  is  a sine  qua  non  in  order  to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act.

                  (b)      In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.

                  (c)      Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.

                  (d)      In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:

                  (i)       if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.

                  (ii)      On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act

                  iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1) (d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act

                  (e)      The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.

                  (f)      In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.

                  (g)      In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1) (d) and (ii) of the Act.

                  (h)      We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.”

27. Thus, the legal position as regards to the essentials under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act, 1988, is extracted above. Regarding the mode of proof of demand of bribe, if there is an offer to pay bribe by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on  record,  the  Court  has  the  discretion  to  raise  a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. The mode of proof of demand and acceptance is either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law.

28. In this context, it is relevant to refer the decision of this Court in Sunil Kumar K. v. State of Kerala reported in [2025 KHC OnLine 983], in Crl.Appeal No.323/2020, dated 12.9.2025, wherein in paragraph No. 12, it was held as under:

                  “12. Indubitably in Neeraj Dutta’s case (supra) the Apex Court held in paragraph No.69 that there is no conflict in the three judge Bench decisions of this Court in B.Jayaraj and P.Satyanarayana Murthy with the three judge Bench decision in M.Narasinga Rao, with regard to the nature and quality of proof necessary to sustain a conviction for offences under Section 7 or 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, when the direct evidence of the complainant or “primary evidence” of the complainant is unavailable owing to his death or any other reason. The position of law when a complainant or prosecution witness turns “hostile” is also discussed and the observations made above would accordingly apply in light of Section 154 of the Evidence Act. In view of the aforesaid discussion there is no conflict between the judgments in the aforesaid three cases. Further in Paragraph No.70 the Apex Court held that in the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary,oral/documentary evidence) it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution. In paragraph No.68 the Apex Court summarized the discussion. That apart, in State by Lokayuktha Police’s case (supra) placed by the learned counsel for the accused also the Apex Court considered  the  ingredients  for  the  offences punishable under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act,1988 and held that demand and acceptance of bribe are necessary to constitute the said offences. Similarly as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Aman Bhatia’s case (supra) the Apex court reiterated the same principles. Thus the legal position as regards to the essentials to be established to fasten criminal culpability on an accused are demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused. To put it otherwise, proof of demand is sine qua non for the offences to be established under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and dehors the proof of demand the offences under the two Sections could not be established. Therefore mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of bribe or as undue pecuniary advantage or illegal gratification or the recovery of the same would not be sufficient to prove the offences under the two Sections in the absence of evidence to prove the demand.”

29. Here, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the accused, the name of the complainant shown in Column No.6(a) of the FIR is the name of the Dy.S.P. and in the FIS, the allegation is that the accused, S. Radhakrishnan, while working as a public servant in the capacity of the District Officer, Ground Water Department, abused his position and accepted Rs.1,60,000/- as illegal gratification from Sri.P.D. Dinesh Babu, Sri.V.V. Vinod and Sri.K.Aboobacker, promising to appoint them as CLR workers in the District Office with offer to regularize their appointment and thereafter failed to do the same. Along with Ext.P25 FIR tendered in evidence through PW18, a report also was filed on the date of registration of FIR viz. on 02.09.2004 and the same also was received by the Special Court along with the FIR at about 4.15 pm on 02.09.2004. In the said report, there is reference as to a vigilance enquiry vide Ref.No.E11(VE 2/2004 WYD) 36343/2003 dated 11.08.2004 of the Director of Vigilance and ACB, Thiruvananthapuram.

30. Thus, it would appear that, the FIR was not registered without any substance and it was registered as a result of Vigilance Enquiry report dated 11.08.2004, though the same was not tendered in evidence.

31. It is true that, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the accused, in corruption cases, a preliminary enquiry is envisaged as per the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in [(2014) 2 SCC 1] Lalita Kumari v. Government of  U.P.  and  Others, but the same is not mandatory. Therefore, even without conducting preliminary enquiry, FIR registered on getting disclosure of a cognizable offence, could not suffer from any legal infirmity.

32. In the instant case, during cross-examination of PW18, nothing was asked as to how he got information regarding the allegation in the FIR or whether any preliminary enquiry had been conducted. Therefore, PW18 had no occasion to disclose these aspects. It is in this context, the report filed before the Special Court by PW18 and received by the Court at about 4.15 p.m. on 02.09.2004 with due endorsement of the Special Judge assumes significance and the same would indicate that there was a Vigilance Enquiry and the contents thereof led to registration of Ext.P25 FIR. Therefore, the challenge against the FIR found to be unsustainable.

33. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the accused, the law is well settled on the point that, while granting sanction to prosecute an accused, if the sanctioning authority applies his mind and take a decision, with reasons to find that the public servant deserves to be prosecuted by granting  sanction,  there  is  no  necessity  to  examine  the sanctioning authority. Similarly, as pointed out by the learned Special Public Prosecutor, as per the decision in Bennet T.C.’s case (supra) there is no mandate in law that, sanctioning authority must be examined as a witness, when the sanction itself speaks of application of mind. Therefore, non-examination of the sanctioning authority is of no much significance in the present case. In fact, it was through PW19, the Final Report was filed and while examining PW19, Ext.P26 sanction was tendered in evidence, without any objection. Thus, no objection was raised by the accused/appellant as to the legality of Ext.P26 sanction before the Special Court.

34. It is pertinent to note that, the law laid down by the Apex Court in Paul Varghese v. State of Kerala reported in [2007 (2) KHC 400 : JT 2007 (5) SC 525 :

2007 (2) KLT 529] and State by Police Inspector v. T. Venkatesh Murthy reported in [(2004) 7 SCC 763], is that the validity of sanction does not, by itself, affect the validity of the proceedings. A defect, omission, or irregularity in the sanction would warrant interference only if the court is satisfied that such defect has resulted in a failure of justice.

35. In State of Goa v. Babu Thomas reported in [2005 KHC 1803 : 2005 (4) KLT SN 87 : 2005 (8) SCC 130 : AIR 2005 SC 3606], the Apex Court distinguished the decision in State by Police Inspector v. T.Venkatesh Murthy’s case (supra) and held in paragraph 11 as under:

                  “11. Referring to the aforesaid provisions, it is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the Court should not, in appeal, reverse or alter any finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge on the ground of the absence of any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under subsection (1), unless the Court finds a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. In this connection, a reference was made to the decision of this Court rendered in the case of State v. T. Venkatesh Murthy (2004) 7 SCC 763 : (2004) SCC (Cri) 2140). Reference was also made to the decision of this Court in the case of Durga Dass v. State of H.P. (1973) 2 SCC 213 : (1973) SCC (Cri) 762) where this Court has taken the view that the Court should not interfere in the finding or sentence or order passed by a special Judge and reverse or alter the same on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless the Court finds that a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. According to the counsel for the appellant no failure of justice has occasioned merely because there was an error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required because evidence is yet to start and in that view the High Court has not considered this aspect of the matter and it is a fit case to intervene by this Court. We are unable to accept this contention of the counsel. The present is not the case where there has been mere irregularity, error or omission in the order of sanction as required under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. It goes to the root of the prosecution case. Sub-section (1) of Section 19 clearly prohibits that the Court shall not take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction as stated in clauses (a), (b) and (c).”

36.    Reference may also be made to the decision of the Apex Court in Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka reported in [(2015) 14 SCC 186]. In paragraph 22 of the said judgment, the Apex Court held as under:

                  “The legal position regarding the importance of sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is thus much too clear to admit equivocation. The statute forbids taking of cognizance by the court against a public servant except with the previous sanction of an authority competent  to  grant  such  sanction  in  terms  of clauses (a), (b) and (c) to Section 19(1). The question regarding validity of such sanction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The competence of the court trying the accused so much depends upon the existence of a valid sanction. In case the sanction is found to be invalid, the court can discharge the accused relegating the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution in accordance with law. If the trial court proceeds, despite the invalidity attached to the sanction order, the same shall be deemed to be non est in the eyes of law and shall not forbid a second trial for the same offences, upon grant of a valid sanction for such prosecution.”

37. In the latest decision of the Apex Court reported in [2025 INSC 654] Dashrath v. The State of Maharashtra, the Apex Court referred Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and the decision reported in [(2015) 2 SCC 33] Manzoor Ali Khan v. Union of India, and held in paragraph Nos.12 and 13 that, it is no longer res integra that requirement of sanction has a salutary object. Provisions requiring sanction to prosecute, either under Section 19, PC Act or Section 197 of the (now repealed) Cr. PC or under Section 218 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 are intended to protect an innocent public servant against unwarranted and mala fide prosecution. Indubitably, there can be no tolerance to corruption which has the effect of undermining core constitutional values of justice, equality, liberty and fraternity; however, at the same time, the need to prosecute and punish the corrupt is no ground to deny protection to the honest. This is what was held by this Court in its decision in Manzoor Ali Khan v. Union of India while repelling a challenge raised in a Public Interest Litigation to the constitutional validity of Section 19 of the PC Act. Even otherwise, merely because there is any omission, error or irregularity in the matter of granting sanction, that does not affect the validity of the proceedings unless the court records its own satisfaction that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice.

38. In another decision of the Apex Court reported in [2025 INSC 50], The State of Punjab v. Hari Kesh, after referring the decision of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka Lokayukta Police v. S.Subbegowda reported in [(2023) 17 Supreme Court Cases 699 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 911], the Apex Court considered the combined effect of sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 19 and reiterated that, in view of sub-section (3) clearly forbids the court in appeal, confirmation or revision, the interference with the order passed by the Special Judge on the ground that the sanction was bad, save and except in cases where the failure of justice had occurred by such invalidity.

39. Going by the decisions extracted hereinabove, majority of the decisions would emphasize the point that, failure of justice if not occasioned, by way of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in sanction, the same by itself is not a ground to interfere the finding, sentence or order passed by the Special Judge. It is the fundamental principle of interpretation of statute that, when provisions of a statute are interpreted, the interpretation should be by giving effect to all the provisions, without making any of the provisions redundant or inoperative. Thus, contra view if taken, the same is akin to making sub-section 3(a) of Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988, redundant.

40. Here, on reading Ext.P26 sanction, no recital regarding acceptance of bribe could be gathered, though demand of the same is stated. In fact, merely on the ground that the word acceptance was not stated in the sanctioning order, the challenge against the order of sanction raised to the Appellate stage could not be countenanced in view of the saving provision viz. Section 19(3)(a) of P.C. Act, 1988, unless the Appellate Court could not found ‘failure of justice’. In the instant case, the learned counsel for the accused not pointed out anything to see ‘failure of justice’ or ‘failure of justice’ could not be found from the materials available. Therefore, the challenge against the prosecution sanction raised at the Appellate stage found to be not acceptable.

41. According to the learned counsel for the accused, in this case, even though as per Ext.P2, Rs.24,000/- and Rs.25,000/- were paid to PW1 and PW2 and the Investigating Officer revealed repayment of the said amount, the Special Court framed charge without reducing the said amounts. Even though, this argument appears to be impressive at the first flush, a second thought would throw light on the fact that, in fact, the genuineness of Ext.P2 and acceptance of Rs.24,000/- and Rs.25,000/- by PW1 and PW2 before evidence, is only a disputed fact, the Court could not frame charge based on the same in negation to the prosecution allegation otherwise. Therefore, this challenge also would not yield in favour of the accused.

42. On re-appreciation of evidence, this Court is of the firm view that, the ingredients to attract offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988, have been proved by the prosecution, without any reasonable doubts. Therefore, the finding of the learned Special Judge that the accused committed the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988, is only to be justified. In consequence thereof, the conviction entered into by the learned Special Judge is liable to sustain.

43. Coming to the sentence, I am of the view that some leniency in the matter of sentence can be considered, in the interest of justice.

44. Point Nos.3 and 4:- In the result, this appeal stands allowed in part. The conviction imposed by the learned Special Judge is confirmed. In the interest of justice, the sentence imposed against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988, is modified as under:

                  i.        The accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months, for the offence under Section 7 of the P.C. Act, 1988.

                  ii.       The accused is also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.30,000/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, for the offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988.

                  iii.       The substantive sentence shall run concurrently and the default sentence shall run separately, after the substantive sentence.

                  iv.      The period of detention undergone by the accused in this case will be set off against the substantive sentence of imprisonment.

45.    The order suspending sentence and granting bail to the accused stands vacated, with direction to the accused to appear before the Special Court, forthwith, to undergo the modified sentence, failing which, the Special Court is directed to execute the sentence, without fail.

                  Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Special Court, forthwith, for information and compliance.