Common Order

1. These two Writ Petitions are filed seeking to issue a writ of prohibition restraining the Chairman-cum-Presiding Officer, Additional Industrial Tribunal-cum-Additional Labour Court, Hyderabad-Respondent No.1, from proceeding further with I.D.Nos.30 of 2016 and 39 of 2016 on its file and consequently quash the said proceedings.

2. Since the issue involved is identical, these two writ petitions are being disposed of by way of common order.

3. For convenience, the facts in W.P.No.32875 of 2016 are discussed hereunder:

               (a) The Petitioner herein is a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, and it is engaged in the business of castings for automobiles and tractors, industrial engines, construction equipment and power generation equipment. It has its unit known as 'Ductron Castings Unit' at IDA, Uppal, Hyderabad.

               (b) The said unit has become unviable, and the Petitioner Company incurred recurring losses for the past eight years. The operations were suspended from June 2014, and the said Unit has been totally non-operational from 01.09.2015.

               (c) In the year 2014, the petitioner realized that the further sustenance of the unit is not possible unless some extreme steps are taken to reduce the fixed costs. After due deliberations with the Respondent No.187 Union and apprising them of the reasons for the units unviable situation, the petitioner management introduced a Voluntary Retirement Scheme on 01.09.2014, offering compensation to eligible workmen who opt thereunder. Out of 425 workmen on the units roll as on 01.09.2014, 193 opted for the said VR Scheme by submitting applications in the prescribed Telugu language. All the employees, including respondent Nos.2 to 184 herein, have voluntarily submitted their applications, which were accepted, and they were all paid compensation under the said Scheme, and thus the first VR Scheme itself came to an end.

               (d) Respondent No. 2 was also one such employee who opted under the First VR Scheme, having submitted his application dated 07.09.2014, which was accepted by the Petitioner management.

               (e) All the workmen, who had opted under the First VR Scheme were paid compensation in two instalments and since the VR Scheme introduced by the Petitioner management was in accordance with Section 10 (10C) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 2-BA of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, all the workmen availed the benefit of exemption from the computation of the said compensation as 'Income'.

               (f) Even after downsizing the workforce, thereby reducing the fixed cost towards labour, the petitioner management realized that the efforts to improve the viability of the unit are not likely to yield any positive desired results in the light of technical, commercial and other issues plaguing the unit and in order to protect the interests of the workmen, the petitioner management introduced the second VR Scheme dated 27.05.2015 offering ex-gratia in addition to the VRS compensation and all the remaining 125 workmen opted thereunder, which was accepted by the respondents and all the said workmen were paid compensation, ex-gratia and other dues, which were received by them.

               (g) While things stood thus, after a lapse of more than one year after the first VR Scheme, respondent Nos.2 to 184 filed a petition under section 2-A(2) of the ID Act before respondent No.1 herein, and the following are the brief averments in I.D.No.30 of 2016 before the 1st respondent:

               (1) The Petitioners therein were working in the respondent No.1 organization therein;

               (ii) The petitioners are questioning the action of the respondent No.1 therein in allegedly closing the industry in a purported advertisement issued on 19.08.2015, without prior permission of the state government as illegal, arbitrary, unjust, unlawful, unconstitutional and against the provisions of the ID Act and Articles, 12, 14, 16, 19 & 21 of the Constitution of India, as also various judgments of the Apex Court;

               (iii) The managers of the respondent No.1 company threatened/warned them in such a way to "get away them from the Company" stating that "the company is in loss" and if only all of them resign voluntarily, the company will survive, otherwise, false allegations and cases will be foisted against them for terminating them from the services;

               (iv) That the workmen were harassed by the respondent No.1 therein in different ways and they were forced to resign by deploying the police in the establishment to threaten them and that they came to know from the reliable source that the recognized union colluded with the management regarding forcible settlement of the services of the workmen;

               (v) That out of the blue, the respondent No.1 placed plain white papers before them and forcibly obtained their signatures and after few days, the management has paid some amounts to them through cheques, (which is dubbed by them as 'Forcible Retrenchment' in violation of the provisions of the ID Act);

               (h) The prayer is as follows:

               "It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble court may be pleased to declaring the action of the 1st respondent in termination of the workmen from service in without following the Sec.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and other provisions of the law and also closing the company by an advertisement issued on 19/08/2015 without prior permission of the State Government as illegal, arbitrary, unjust, unlawful, unconstitutional and against to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and against to an Article 12, 14, 19 & 21 of Constitution of India and also various judgments of an Apex Court, consequentially pass award to the workmen to reinstate the service of the workmen in an organization of the 1st Respondent and pass such other order or orders may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.

               It is further prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to suspend the oral termination from service of the workmen in without following the Sec.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and other provisions of the law and also in issuing proceedings of the 1st Respondent in closing the company by an advertisement issued on 19/08/2015 without prior permission of the State Government and reinstate the petitioner service with full back wages in an organization of the 1st respondentpending disposal of the above petition and pass such other order or orders may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.”

               In this regard, the present writ petitions are filed.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits as follows:

               (a) The enquiry by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as contemplated under Section 2-A of the ID Act is and shall be limited to adjudication of the validity of termination, discharge, dismissal or retrenchment of an individual 'workman' by his employer and the scope of such enquiry/jurisdiction cannot be enlarged at all, so as to decide the broader questions of ceased employer-employee relationship.

               (b) Section 2-A of the ID Act only permits 'an individual workman' to make an application directly to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of a dispute connected with or arising out of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of the services of such 'individual workman'. Whereas, respondent No.1 exceeded the jurisdiction thereunder in entertaining a purported application filed by respondent No.2 herein for himself and on behalf of the respondent Nos.3 to 184 collectively, which is impermissible, particularly when the averments in the petition disclose that the said workmen had opted under the Voluntary Retirement Schemes introduced by the petitioner management and were paid amounts through cheques.

               (c) Respondent No.1 being a creature of the statute, derives power by virtue of a reference under Section 10 of the ID Act or the like, and cannot assume jurisdiction and entertain a purported petition under section 2-A of the ID Act even when the averments in the petition themselves unequivocally indicate that respondent Nos.2 to 184 have ceased to be 'workmen' on account of their being relieved after the acceptance of their VRS applications.

               (d) The Labour Court constituted under Section 7 of the ID Act has no inherent jurisdiction like that of a Civil Court, because the powers are very clearly proscribed by the statute itself as per several judicial pronouncements, to entertain a petition of the nature involved in the present writ petition. The prayers in the petition filed by respondent Nos.2 to 184 are totally beyond/outside the scope and ambit of the powers of the Labour Court/Tribunal under Section 2-A(2) of the ID Act and amount to exceeding the jurisdiction and exercise of non-existing jurisdiction, which deserves to be prohibited by this Court.

               (e) Respondent Nos. 2 to 184 herein were admittedly relieved from the services, pursuant to their opting for VR Schemes which were introduced by the petitioner management and therefore, they cannot now raise any dispute without any cause whatsoever, much less, on the alleged closure of the unit, purportedly seeking re- employment or reinstatement. Even on this ground, the purported ID raised by respondent Nos. 2 to 184 under Section 2-A of the ID Act is without jurisdiction and the question of maintaining or raising any valid 'industrial dispute' as against the petitioner company does not even remotely arise and consequently, respondent No.1 would not have jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain the present dispute as against the petitioner herein and hence the proceedings in the impugned ID are totally without jurisdiction and are liable to be quashed straightaway.

               (f) The expression 'workman' as defined in Section 2(s) of the ID Act relates only to those who are existing employees. The only addition to existing employees is statutorily provided under Section 2(s) of the ID Act, viz., dismissed, discharged, and retrenched employees, and their grievances can be looked into by the Fora created under the Act. In the instant case, respondent Nos.2 to 184 had resigned/voluntarily retired from the services of the petitioner company pursuant to the VR schemes introduced by the Management and therefore, they cannot be covered by the expression 'workmen' at all insofar as the petitioner is concerned.

               (g) Even from the very pleadings/averments made by the respondent No.2 in his petition before respondent No.1, it is evident that as many as 183 employees like him had opted the VR scheme announced by the petitioner’s Company and all of them have got relieved pursuant thereto and vast majority of them have no complaints whatsoever as threat, force, etc., as is sought to be pleaded by respondent Nos.2 to 184 herein. Therefore, ex-facie the very petition filed under Section 2-A of the ID Act is frivolous and incredible and therefore, respondent No.1 ought not to have entertained such a petition.

               (h) Even from the documents filed along with the impugned proceedings do not demonstrate any ingredients for the invocation thereof, and there is a total lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent No.1 and the total lack of bonafides on the part of respondent Nos.2 to 184.

               (i) From the prayers in the petition under Section 2-A(2) of the I.D.Act, it is clearly evident that the grievance, if any, is the alleged closure of the Union, which completely goes out of the purview of Section 2A of the ID Act and at any rate, cannot give rise to reinstatement/re-employment of respondent Nos.2 to 184, who have ceased to be 'workmen' under Section 2(s) of the ID Act.

               (j) The petition filed under Section 2-A(2) of the ID Act, purportedly in Form K4 prescribed under the AP Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958, is evidently signed by respondent No.2 herein alone, who claims to represent the remaining 182 persons, who have opted for the VR scheme, by filing the affidavit on their behalf as well.

               (k) Form K4 read with Rule 11 (6) of the Rules, even assuming that it is directory in nature, permits an individual workman to present the application under Section 2-A (2) of the ID Act to the Labour Court/Tribunal, but does not permit one person to represent 182 other persons, but the 1st respondent erroneously entertained the petition under Section 2-A(2) of the ID Act.

               (l) Respondent Nos.2 to 184 stated that the petitioner allegedly violated Section 25-FF of the ID Act, which deals with compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings. Admittedly and undisputedly, there is no transfer of undertaking in the instant case, and therefore, Section 25-FF of the ID Act is irrelevant.

               (m) It is misleading to state that the petitioner issued an advertisement on 19.08.2015 regarding the closure of the Unit, when it is a mere news item carried by the newspaper. The alleged advertisement of closure of the unit without the permission of the State Government is illegal and unconstitutional, and it is also outside the scope of the enquiry contemplated under Section 2-A of the ID Act.

               (n) Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid averments and prayers, it would automatically lead to the irresistible conclusion that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction at all to entertain I.D. Hence, allow the writ petitions.

5. Respondent No.2 filed a counter affidavit stating as follows:-

               (a) The petitioner has its unit known as 'Ductron Castings Unit' at Uppal, Hyderabad, and it was running well, and there was no proof that it was running at a loss. The Auditing reports were not filed before the competent labour authority, showing that the unit was running at a loss. Although it was running very well without any loss, the petitioner herein, with malafide intention, without following the due procedure, introduced the Voluntary Retirement Scheme and deployed the local police and threatened the labourers to accept the Voluntary Retirement Scheme and paid the terminal benefits by way of cheques to respondent Nos.2 to 186.

               (b) The workmen/respondents herein made a representation to the competent Labour Authority, but the Labour Authority did not take any action against the Management. Subsequently, all the respondents had approached a recognized Trade Union, but unfortunately, the recognized Trade Union also colluded with the management. The petitioner forcibly implemented a compulsory retirement scheme, which is against the law and also against the catena of judgments of this Court and the Apex Court.

               (c) It is false to state that the manufacturing at the unit had stopped from 01.09.2015 and there was sufficient production during that time. While so, the petitioner displayed CRS on the board, but the respondents herein have not come forward to take compulsory retirement. The petitioner deployed a large number of local police and forced the respondents to sign the compulsory retirement scheme documents. The respondents herein opposed the illegal and criminal action of the petitioner, and quarrels took place, and some criminal cases were also registered against some of the respondents due to the influence of the petitioner. Out of 425 workmen, 193 were forcibly terminated on 01.09.2014 with terminal benefits.

               (d) The said scheme was introduced by the petitioner without any notice or representation to the competent labour authority. The petitioner, depending upon the local police, introduced a compulsory retirement scheme. The petitioner threatened the respondents herein that if they did not agree to sign the papers for compulsory retirement, not only would they be suspended from service, but they would also be foisted with false cases, would not receive any benefits, and would be thrown out of employment. The respondents, having no other alternative, signed on CRS papers and received some of the amounts in two installments. Subsequently, after the respondents were removed from the petitioner's industry on 07.09.2014, on 27.05.2015, the second term CRS was introduced by the petitioner without following due procedure, and a large police force was again deployed in the industry, and the labourers signed the CRS papers. Some of the amounts paid to employees were increased, and they were forced to sign CRS documents. Between the first and second batches of CRS, there is a significant difference the way the Management emoluments to employees, which is illegal and arbitrary.

               (e) The respondents, having no other alternative, approached the 1st respondent to declare the CRS of the petitioner herein as illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory, unlawful and unconstitutional and also against the catena of judgments of this Court and the Apex Court, and also further prayed that to set aside same and pass the award to reinstate the respondents herein in the petitioner's industry.

6. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.2 to 184 submits as follows :-

               (a) The question whether the action of the petitioner in introducing the CRS/VRS and forcing the respondents to sign on it is fair, reasonable, lawful and constitutional can only be decided during the course of the trial in I.D.No.30 of 2016 and I.D.No.39 of 2016 before the 1st respondent. If the petitioner had followed due process of law and obtained VRS papers signed by the respondents herein in a fair and lawful manner, the Tribunal would dismiss ID No.30 of 2016; if not, then ID would be allowed, directing the reinstatement of the respondents herein. The petitioner has an alternative to prove his case before the 1st respondent, but despite having such an alternative remedy, he approached this Court, which is bad in law.

               (b) Respondent Nos.2 to 184 neither voluntarily retired nor opted for the voluntary retirement scheme; only by the force of the management of the petitioner industry, were terminated, retrenched or discharged from the industry, and also forcibly given cheques by the Management of the petitioner’s industry. The 1st respondent will conduct the trial, and it will be determined whether the so called VR Scheme is valid under the law.

               (c) The petitioner company has not produced any material or audit reports to show that the company is running in loss as on the date of introducing the VRS. The petitioner’s company has various branches all over India, even though the respondents were never offered any transfer to other branches, which is against the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as well as against the catena of judgments of the Apex Court. Moreover, the sister concern industry of the petitioner is continuing the business at Madras, even though the petitioner company had not transferred the respondents, as is mandatory under Sec.25-H of the ID Act, 1947.

               (d) This court is not the appropriate forum to decide whether the petitioner company had been closed in accordance with law or not. The same would be decided by the 1st respondent herein, after considering the substantial evidence.

               (e) As the petitioner’s company is running well, it requested the State Government of erstwhile Andhra Pradesh in the year 2008 to allot the land to an extent of Ac. 100.00 guntas for the expansion of the organization. The same was considered by the State Government of erstwhile Andhra Pradesh and allotted the land to an extent of Ac.60.00 guntas at Muppireddypally, Toofran Mandal, Medak District. While it was running well and turning a profit day to day, in August, 2014, the management posted a notice on the factory’s notice board stating that the factory would be forcibly shut down because it was running at a loss. On the pretext that the factory would not run in future, the Management had decided to retrench 200 employees and also announced that if the employees did not make an application voluntarily to retire from service before the concerned authorities of the petitioner’s Organisation, the management would close the factory without paying any remuneration to the employees. Subsequently, one of the personnel managers by the name Sri.Surya Narayana Reddy and one Executive Director Mr.Edward, called the respondents herein to their office one by one and warned them that if they opt for VRS, only the company will survive.

               (f) The petitioner’s Management used to harass the respondents by stating as follows:

               a) if we have come late by a few minutes to duty, we have not been provided a leave card.

               b) Although we have not committed any mistake on duty, we have been transferred to an unknown or new department frequently.

               c) We have been placed in a high manpower requirement area by fixing less manpower and thereby increasing the work load upon us, if we failed to do so anything, they would receive nothing.

               (g) The respondents are eking out their livelihood by working in the petitioner’s organization. The respondents are deprived of their means of livelihood, and hence their lives are kept in the utmost miserable condition. When the employees exceed 100 in number, working in an establishment or industry like the petitioner’s prior permission must be obtained from the concerned authority to shut down the company.

               (h) The Petitioner has given publication in Eenadu on 19.08.2015 stating that the organisation of the petitioner, in order to survive and grow, and also in reconstruction of the organization, terminated the respondents from service through CRS (Compulsory Retirement Service). The Petitioner did not initiate conciliation meetings between the parties in accordance with Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to resolve the problem, as mandated by the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.

               (i) A settlement of service in an establishment should be voluntary but should not be coercive, and the same has been contemplated in the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, but the organisation of the petitioner has not followed the same and forcibly retrenched the employees for closing the establishment, which is illegal in the eyes of the law. Hence, the writ petitions are devoid of merit and are liable to be dismissed.

7. Heard Sri. C.R Sridharan, learned senior counsel representing Sri. G.V.S. Ganesh, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Government Pleader appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 185 in W.P.No.32875 of 2016 and respondent Nos.1 and 90 in W.P.No.45869 of 2016 and Sri Chikkudu Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.2 to 184 in W.P.No.32875 of 2016. Perused the material available on record.

8. Initially, after hearing the matters, on 27.09.2016, this Court granted an interim stay of all further proceedings before the 1st respondent in W.P.No.32875 of 2016.

FINDINGS OF THIS COURT :-

9. The petitioner filed the present writ petitions questioning the filing of the I.D.Nos.30 and 39 of 2016 before the 1st respondent by the unofficial respondents on two grounds, viz., maintainability of the said I.Ds. and the jurisdiction of the 1st respondent in proceeding further in the IDs. It is an undisputed fact that, after filing the IDs, and receiving the notice, the petitioner, without contesting the matter before the 1st respondent, straightaway approached this Court with the above said grounds.

10. A perusal of the proceeding sheet dated 27.09.2016 goes to show that this Court, after considering the submission of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that respondent Nos.2 to 184 retired from service accepting the VRS and received all the benefits under the Scheme only on the ground of VRS, this Court granted an interim stay of all further proceedings.

11. This Court has gone through the averments in ID No.30 of 2016 filed by the respondents herein. The averments stated in the said ID are as follows :-

               ‘The respondents herein questioning the action of the petitioner herein in closing the Industry in advertisement issued on 19.08.2015 without prior permission of the State Government as illegal and unconstitutional and against the provisions of the ID Act, 1947. The respondents herein also stated that the petitioner’s Company is running well and it also requested the State Government of erstwhile Andhra Pradesh in the year 2008 to allot the land to an extent of Ac.100.00 gts. for extension of the Organization and the same was considered by the State Government of erstwhile Andhra Pradesh and allotted the land to an extent of Ac.60-00 gts., at Muppireddypally, Toofran Mandal, Medak District. While the Company is running well and getting profits, in the month of August, 2014, the Management has displayed on the notice board that the factory was going to be forcibly closed because the factory was running in loss. Hence, the factory would not run in future. In that context, the Management had decided to retrench 200 employees and also announced that if the employees would not make application voluntarily to retire from service before the authorities of the petitioner’s organization, the management will close the Factory without paying any remuneration to the employees.

               The Personnel Manager of the Management has threatened the respondents herein by calling them one by one into the room and making them held up in that room and the personal manager by name Surya Narayana Reddy and Mr.Edward, who was Executive Director were used to warn them in such a way to “get away from the company”, “Company is in loss”, if all of the respondents would resign voluntarily from the company then only the company will survive and would run and the employees were threatened by the local police.”

12. The above mentioned facts are disputed facts. Hence, the same would require a full-fledged trial by the 1st respondent. The petitioner, without proceeding further in the matter, simply approached this Court, after receiving the notice, and obtained an interim stay of all further proceedings, which cannot be entertained. To prove his justifiable action, the petitioner did not file the necessary documents and only filed documents relating to the voluntary retirement scheme and the letters of the respondents herein. Moreover, the petitioner did not file the document regarding publication of the Advertisement dated 19.08.2015.

13. This Court is of the considered view that the petitioner can oppose the IDs before the 1st respondent itself, if its action is genuine. If the petitioner had followed due process of law and obtained VRS papers signed by the respondents herein in a fair and lawful manner, all matters would be established either against the respondents herein or against the petitioner herein before the 1st respondent only.

14. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in J.K.COTTON SPINNING AND WEAVING MILLS COMPANY LIMITED Vs. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ((1990) 4 Supreme Court Cases 27)), relating to whether the Labour Court has jurisdiction under Section 2-A of the ID Act, especially when the pleadings disclose that respondent Nos.2 to 184 received the benefits under the Scheme and seized to be employees/workmen.

15. In the above case, at para No.8, it is held as follows :-

               “… the employee’s request contained in the letter of resignation was accepted by the employer and that brought an end to the contract of service. The meaning of term ‘resign’ as found in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary includes ‘retirement’. Therefore, when an employee voluntarily tenders his resignation it is an act by which he voluntarily gives up his job. We are, therefore, of the opinion that such a situation would be covered by the expression ‘voluntary retirement’ within the meaning of clause (i) of Section 2 (s) of the State Act.”

16. In the above mentioned case law, the petitioner himself wrote a letter to the authorities seeking resignation on personal reasons due to family non-co-operation to continue the job. But in the case at hand, there are no resignation letters to the authorities on personal grounds, and there is no non-co-operation of the family members, and only based on the advertisement and on the forcefulness of the petitioner by deploying police, the respondents herein accepted the VRS.

17. Whether the respondents themselves accepted VRS or were under any threat or force, there is no clarity in the writ petitions. The said facts would be established only before the 1st respondent. Hence, the above case is not applicable to the case at hand.

18. In the present case, this Court, on 27.09.2016, after recording the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, granted an interim stay of all further proceedings.

19. Whether the VRS is legal or not, or due to the threatened action of the petitioner, would be known only after a full-fledged trial. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that after receiving the VRS benefits, the respondents cannot file IDs before the 1st respondent cannot be accepted.

20. With regard to ‘workman’, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of Kerala High Court in EVERESTEE Vs. DISTRICT LABOUR OFFICER (1999 (3) LLN 678), wherein it is held as follows :-

               “9. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is beneficial to extract S.2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act :

               “(s) “Workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute.”

21. As per para 9 of the above judgment, the respondents would come under the meaning of workman. In the present case, the respondents approached the 1st respondent, and the case was numbered, and notice was issued to the petitioner herein. The petitioner herein, without participating in the proceedings before the 1st respondent and without proving/disproving the allegations made by the respondents before the 1st respondent, straightway approached this court. On the ground that the respondents herein accepted the VRS and received the benefits, the petitioner obtained an interim stay of all further proceedings. But the petitioner is unable to satisfy this Court, on the basis of the pleadings, whether the respondents’ allegations in their IDs are correct. How the respondents do not fall within the meaning of the term ‘workman’. Mere acceptance of the VR scheme does not prove that the respondents do not fall within the meaning of the term ‘workman’. The petitioner has failed to establish the same. In the said circumstances, the above case law would not apply to the present case.

22. If the petitioner really wanted to prove its case, it would have explained the genuineness of the VR scheme, but without doing so, the petitioner only pleaded about the VR scheme again and again.

23. With regard to the VR scheme, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in K.KOMARAIAH Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-ADDITIONAL LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD AND ANOTHER (2000 SCC Online AP 352), wherein the Apex Court at para No.27 held as follows :-

               “The three authorities relied on by the learned counsel for the management support the view that a person who has voluntarily retired or a person who has voluntarily accepted the compensation under Section 25-FF or a person who has voluntarily submitted resignation cannot be said to be treated as retrenched entitling him for the benefit under section 25-H (2).”

24. In the above mentioned case, the Government directed the 2nd respondent to close down its manufacturing activity. The 2nd respondent sought permission from the Government of Andhra Pradesh under Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to close down the unit, as liquor manufacturing cannot be carried on.

25. In the present case, the petitioner has not sought any prior permission from the Government before closure of the unit and as there is no transfer of ownership from one employer to another, Section 25-FF of the ID Act is not applicable to the case at hand. Hence, the above case would not support the petitioner’s contention.

26. With regard to the VR Scheme, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Madras High Court in K.JAYAPAL Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (2007 (4) L.L.N. 450). In the said case, the petitioner tendered his resignation, which was duly accepted, and he received his terminal benefits. After two years, he sought re-employment on the ground that the resignation letter was tendered without his conscious knowledge and that he was mentally ill during the period in question.

27. But, in the present case, the respondents herein took VRS after the announcement of the VR scheme by the petitioner herein, only under the coercion and undue influence of the petitioner. After accepting the VR scheme, the respondents herein approached the 1st respondent within one year. Moreover, there is no mental illness alleged by the respondents herein while making an application for VRS. Hence, the above case would not apply to the case at hand.

28. With regard to the VR scheme, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in A.K.BINDAL AND ANOTHER VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ((2003) 5 Supreme Court Cases 163). In the said case, the employer was a sick Government company. In the present case, the petitioner’s company is neither a sick company nor a Govt. company, and moreover, it is operating in other places. Hence, the said case is also not helpful to the petitioner’s case.

29. With regard to the jurisdiction, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in GYANENDRA SAHAY Vs. TATA IRON AND STEEL CO. LTD. (2006 (5) SCC 759), wherein the Apex Court held as follows :-

               14. We have also perused the memo of appeal and other representation made by the appellant. The appellant has made a vague allegation that he was forced to take retirement. Neither has he made it specific nor had given the name of any officer who compelled him to write the letter dated 01.04.1995 or exercised undue and excessive pressure to sign the letter of premature/voluntary retirement. Though the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that the appellant was compelled to submit the letter of resignation, the same is not supported by any acceptable evidence. It is settled law that suspicion and doubt cannot take the place of evidence. No finding of fact can be given on mere doubt and suspicion or on the basis of baseless allegations. The appellant having written a letter of voluntary retirement and after having accepted the retiral benefits without any protest cannot now turn round and say that he was compelled to submit his premature/voluntary retirement. The appeal has absolutely no merits and we, therefore, have no hesitation to dismiss the same and to affirm the order passed by the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court.”

30. In the above mentioned case, the appellant wrote in his own handwriting the letter seeking his voluntary/premature retirement and personally submitted the same to the authority concerned. Subsequently, the appellant alleged that he was pressured and coerced to take the retirement. Neither did he make it specific, nor did he give the name of any officer who compelled him to write the letter or exercised undue or excessive pressure to sign the letter.

31. But, in the case at hand, while approaching the 1st respondent, the respondents herein specifically mentioned the persons names who threatened them to accept the VR scheme. The petitioner did not say anything about threatening his own employees against the respondents. The petitioner did not disclose any details regarding the allegations made by the respondents. The same would come out only after a full fledged trial. The petitioners, knowing all these things well and without participating in the proceedings before the Tribunal, succeeded in obtaining a stay of all further proceedings by approaching this Court. Hence, the above case law also supports the respondents’ contentions.

32. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.JAYARAM AND OTHERS Vs. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ((2022) 12 Supreme Court Cases 815), wherein the Apex Court held as follows :-

               “10. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands and put forward all facts before the court without concealing or suppressing anything. A litigant is bound to state all facts which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds some vital or relevant material in order to gain advantage over the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud with the court as well as with the opposite parties which cannot be countenanced.”

33. In the above mentioned judgment, it is held that the petitioner must approach the Court with clean hands and put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything. In the present case, the petitioner did not establish anything, whether it acted legally the respondents or not, and, without participating in the ID proceedings or proving its legality against the respondents herein, it straightaway approached this Court. In the said circumstances, the contention of the respondents that the petitioner should approach the court with clean hands is sustained, and the above case supports the respondent’s contention.

34. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in UTTARANCHAL FOREST DEVELOPMENT CORPN. AND ANOTHER Vs. JABAR SINGH AND OTHERS ((2007) 2 Supreme Court Cases 112), wherein the Apex Court held as follows :-

               “46. On the other hand, the respondents in civil appeals arising out of special leave petitions as detailed infra who approached the Tribunal and the High Court are entitled for the relief of reinstatement, back wages and continuity of service in view of our finding that the appellant Corporation is an industrial establishment and that provisions of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act are attracted.

               48. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the provisions of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are attracted and non-compliance with the said section makes retrenchment order illegal and non est.

35. In the above case, without compliance of Section 25-N, the authorities approached the High Court. In the light of the authorities’ action, the Apex Court observed that the retrenchment order itself is illegal and non-est.

36. Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as follows :-

               “Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen :- (1) No workman employed in any industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until –

               (a) the workman has been given three months’ notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; and

               (b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that Government by notification in the Official Gazette has been obtained on an application made in this behalf.”

37. In the present case, there is also no such implementation of Section 25-N. Hence, the above case law supports the respondent’s contention.

38. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in VASAVI ENGINEERING COLLEGE PARENTS ASSOCIATION Vs. STATE OF TELANGANA AND OTHERS ((2019) 7 Supreme Court Cases 172), wherein the Apex Court held as follows :-

               “18. Judicial restraint in exercise of judicial review was considered in the State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjeev (2005) 5 SCC 181) as follows :-

               “16……. One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is “illegality”, the second “irrationality”, and the third “procedural impropriety”. These principles were highlighted by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (commonly known as CCSU case). If the power has been exercised on a non-consideration or non- application of mind to relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous. If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated.

               19. It needs no emphasis that complex executive decisions in economic matters are necessarily empiric and based on experimentation. Its validity cannot be tested on any rigid principles or the application of any straitjacket formula. The Court while adjudging the validity of an executive decision in economic matters must grant a certain measure of freedom or play in the joints to the executive. Not mere errors, but only palpably arbitrary decisions alone can be interfered with in judicial review. The recommendation made by a statutory body consisting of domain experts not being to the satisfaction of the State Government is an entirely different matter with which we were not concerned in the present discussion. The Court should therefore be loath to interfere with such recommendation of an expert body, and accepted by the Government, unless it suffers from the vice of arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity or violates any provisions of the law under which it is constituted. The Court cannot sit as an appellate authority, entering the arena of disputed facts and figures to opine with regard to manner in which TAFRC ought to have proceeded without any finding of any violation of rules or procedure. If a statutory body has not exercised jurisdiction properly the only option is to remand the matter for fresh consideration and not to usurp the powers of the authority.”

39. In the above said case, the observation of the Apex Court with regard to judicial review is wherever illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety takes place or if not followed, such exercise of power will stand vitiated. In the present case, the petitioner had not participated in the proceedings before the 1st respondent for proving/disproving the illegality or irrationality or procedural impropriety alleged by the respondents and the same was also not disclosed in the present writ petitions. The action of the petitioner company supports the contention of the respondents herein. The Apex Court also observed that the Court cannot sit as an appellate authority, entering the arena of disputed facts and figures to opine with regard to manner in which TAFRC ought to have proceeded without any finding of any violation of rules or procedure. So, in the present case also, the petitioner did not explain how the 1st respondent acted against its jurisdiction and the entire case is only disclosing the VR Scheme. Therefore, the above judgment is supporting the contention of the respondents.

40. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND OTHERS Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (1993 Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases 20), wherein the Apex Court held as follows :-

               “As regards the objection of the violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 5-A of the Act in not affording an opportunity of personal hearing while deciding such objections, we granted an opportunity to the learned Additional Solicitor General to place material after examining the original record. We granted this opportunity to the respondents on account of the reason that the writ petition had been dismissed by the High Court in limine without issuing notice to the respondents and as such the respondents had not been given any opportunity before the High Court to place any material to refute the allegations made by the appellants in this regard. The Additional Solicitor General during the course of the hearing of the matter placed an order of the Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi, dated February 23, 1968 which has been taken on record and for the purposes of identification has been marked as Annexure 'X'. A copy of the said Annexure 'X' was also given to the learned counsel for the appellants. A perusal of the aforesaid order dated March 22, 1968 clearly shows that the Ramjas Foundation Society was represented through Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate who was given a personal hearing. From a perusal of the aforesaid document Annexure 'X' dated February 23, 1968 it is clear that full opportunity of hearing through counsel was afforded to the Ramjas Foundation. It has been further mentioned in this order that the Ramjas Foundation Society was also allowed to file fresh objections if so desired, but Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, learned Advocate for the petitioner Society declined and stated that there was nothing more to add in the previous objection petition. After bringing the said document Annexure 'X' to the notice of the learned counsel for the appellants, no satisfactory explanation or argument came forward on behalf of the appellants. The conduct of the appellants in raising the plea that no opportunity of personal hearing was given to the appellants in respect of the objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act was totally baseless and factually incorrect and such conduct is reprehensible. It is well settled that a person invoking an equitable extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is required to come with clean hands and should not conceal the material facts. The objection regarding not affording an opportunity of personal hearing in respect of objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act was one of the main planks of the grounds raised in the writ petition as well as in the special leave petition filed before this Court and ought we know if such ground had not been taken this Court would have entertained this appeal or not. The appellants have taken the advantage of obtaining the stay order also from this Court which is continuing for the last 14 years as the special leave petition was filed in 1978 itself.”

41. In the above case law, the observation of the Apex Court is that it is well settled that a person invoking an equitable extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is required to come with clean hands and should not conceal the material facts. In the present case, the material facts were not disclosed except for the VR scheme. Therefore, the above case supports the respondent’s contention.

42. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents also relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in MOHAMMAD FAREED PASHA Vs. STATE OF TELANGANA AND OTHERS (2024 (2) ALD 146 (TS) (DB)), wherein the Division Bench of this Court held as follows :-

               “10. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. It is a fundamental principle of law that a person invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must approach the Court with clean hands and should not conceal material facts. It has further been held that there is necessity to save judicial process for becoming abuse to subvert justice. The need to approach the Court with clean hands is all the more necessary as law is not a game of chess (see Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, 1993 Supp. (2) SCC 20; Rajkumar Sani v. State of U.P., (2007) 10 SCC 635; K.D.Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited, (2008) 12 SCC 481; Manoharlal v. Ugrasen, (2010) 11 SCC 557; Amarsingh v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 69 and Shri K. Jayaram v. Bangalore Development Authority, 2021 SCC Online SC 1194).”

43. In the above case law, the Division Bench of this Court observed that a person invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must approach the Court with clean hands and should not conceal material facts. There is a need to protect the judicial process from abuse that subvert justice. In the present case, the material facts were not disclosed except for the VR scheme. The petitioner did not establish the allegations made by the respondents herein. The said case is in favour of the respondents.

44. Learned counsel for the respondents also specifically mentioned with regard to the workman under Section 2(s). The meaning of the ‘workman’ incorporated in the judgment of the High Court of Kerala in EVERESTEE’s case (supra), which is relied upon by the petitioner, is as follows :-.

               “An industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute.”

45. Under the ID Act itself, the respondents herein come under the meaning of ‘workman’. Though there is a VR scheme, the respondents disputed it. The duty of the petitioner is to participate in the proceedings before the 1st respondent, and it must establish its legality before granting VRS to the respondents. Without doing so, simply after filing the IDs, immediately approached this Court under the guise of the VRS Scheme and obtained the interim order and stayed all the proceedings in the IDs before the 1st respondent.

46. The petitioner raised an objection with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction of the 1st respondent in the said IDs by way of filing a writ of prohibition. With regard to the same, this Court relies upon the judgment of the Apex Court in ISHA BEEVI ON BEHALF OF THE MINOR UMAIBEN BEEVI AND OTHERS Vs. TAX RECOVERY OFFICER AND ADDL. P.A. TO COLLECTOR, QUILON AND OTHERS ((1976) 1 SCC 70), wherein at para No.5 observed as follows :-

               “….. The existence of an alternative remedy is not generally a bar to the issuance of such a writ or order. But, in order to substantiate a right to obtain a writ of prohibition from a High Court or from this Court, an applicant has to demonstrate total absence of jurisdiction to proceed on the part of the officer or authority complained against. It is not enough if a wrong section or provision of law is cited in a notice or order if the power to proceed is actually thereunder another provision.”

47. As per the above observation of the Apex Court, once any person approaches the writ court by way of a writ of prohibition, he has to demonstrate the total absence of jurisdiction of the Authority or the Tribunal to proceed further. Without doing so, a writ of prohibition cannot be maintained on the mere ground of respondents accepting the VRS.

48. Moreover, in the ID Act, 1947, the Second Schedule read with Section-7 indicates the matters within the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts, in point No.6 all matters other than those mentioned in the Third Schedule. Schedule Three read with Section 7-A discloses matters within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunals, and point No.11 discloses any other matter that may be prescribed by the appropriate Government.

49. As per the above Schedules of the ID Act, the 1st respondent has the power to exercise its jurisdiction in these matters. Therefore, the petitioner can participate in the proceedings before the 1st respondent and establish all the facts and prove its genuineness against the respondents.

50. Generally, the High Courts, after admitting the matter and after considerable pendency of the writ petition, cannot dismiss the writ petition on the ground that an alternative remedy was not availed. But, in the present case, the question is not about alternative remedy. The respondents herein have already approached the 1st respondent, and proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner. The petitioner can establish its genuineness without approaching this Court before the 1st respondent itself. While approaching this Court, the petitioner did not respond to the respondents’ contentions in the IDs.

51. With the above submissions of the respondents in their counter, the petitioner has failed to establish its genuineness to approach this Court, except for the VR scheme. Hence, to prove genuineness, the petitioner must contest the IDs; if not satisfied with the Tribunal decisions, the petitioner may approach the superior court.

52. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered view that the writ petitions are devoid of merit and are liable to be dismissed.

53. Accordingly, the writ petitions are dismissed. The petitioner is given liberty to prove its fairness, genuineness and, legality against the allegations made by the respondents before the 1st respondent in the IDs. Consequently, the interim stay granted by this court on 27.09.2016 is vacated.

54. As the matter pertains to the year 2016, the Chairman- cum-Presiding Officer, Additional Industrial Tribunal-cum- Additional Labour Court, Hyderabad, is directed to dispose of the IDs, in accordance with law, as early as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No order as to costs.

Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.