1. This revision is filed by the defendant No.2 under Section 115 C.P.C. against the show-cause notice, dated 20.09.2024, issued in pursuance of the order, dated 24.08.2022, in E.P.No.127 of 2021 in O.S.No.457 of 2017 on the file of the Court of the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kurnool.

2. The revision petitioner herein is the defendant No.2. The respondent No.1 is the plaintiff. The respondent No.2 / defendant No.1 died.

3. The facts that lead to filing of this revision petition, briefly stated, are as follows:

                  a. The plaintiff brought the suit against the defendants Nos.1 and 2 for recovery of an amount of Rs.10,81,000/-, being the amount due under the hire purchase agreement, dated 25.05.2015, with subsequent interest and costs. The defendants Nos.1 & 2 remained ex parte. On behalf of the plaintiff firm, the Managing Partner of the plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 and exhibits A1 to A10 were marked. Ex.A1 is the attested copy of acknowledgment of the plaintiff firm bearing registration No.4401 of 1991, dated 27.05.1991, Ex.A2 is the attested copy of partnership deed, dated 24.05.2002, Ex.A3 is the attested copy of Form-A of the plaintiff firm, dated 27.05.1991, Ex.A4 is the original proposal form-cum-Hire Purchase Agreement, dated 25.05.2015, Ex.A5 is the original Hire Purchase Agreement, dated 25.05.2015, Ex.A6 is the original installment details, dated 25.05.2015, Ex.A7 is the computer copy of statement of dues, dated 03.10.2017, Ex.A8 is the office copy of demand notice, dated 01.06.2017, Ex.A9 is the original returned postal cover, dated 13.06.2017 and Ex.A10 is the original returned postal cover, dated 06.06.2017.

                  b. After hearing the plaintiff, the trial Court held that the plaintiff firm proved that the defendant No.1 had executed Ex.A5, hire purchase agreement and the defendant No.2 stood as guarantor in favour of the plaintiff firm and failed to pay the same in spite of demands under Ex.A8 which was refused by the defendants under Exs.A9 and A10, returned postal covers. The trial Court further held that the suit claim of the plaintiff stood proved and the plaintiff is entitled to recover the suit claim as prayed for from the defendants. The operative portion of the judgment, dated 19.10.2020, reads as follows:

                  “In the result, the suit is decreed with costs, directing the defendants jointly and severally to pay a sum of Rs.10,81,000/- to the plaintiff, together with subsequent interest at 12% p.a., from the date of presentation of the suit till the date of decree and with future interest at the rate of 6% p.a., from the date of decree till the date of realization, on the principle amount of Rs.6,43,200/-.”

                  c. Thereafter, the petitioner / defendant No.2 filed I.A.No.318 of 2024 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone delay of 1171 days in filing petition under Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C. and I.A.No.319 of 2024 under Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C to set aside the ex parte decree, dated 19.10.2020, stating as follows:

                  “The respondent / plaintiff filed the suit against me and deceased defendant No.1 for recovery of money with false and created documents. Previously, defendant No.1 borrowed amounts from plaintiff as loan and he cleared said debts. She was set ex parte on 16.08.2018. Because she was intimated regarding the summons to defendant No.1, as he stated that he had cleared debts and that he would look after the matter after receipt of summons in his name, she could not appear before the Court on 16.08.2018.”

                  Thus, she prayed to set aside the ex parte decree, dated 19.10.2020.

                  d. In I.A.No.318 of 2024, no counter was filed. The petition was allowed on 17.12.2024. However, counter was filed by the respondent No.1 / plaintiff in I.A.No.319 of 2024 with the following averments:

                  The petitioner remained ex parte and the decree is passed against them on 19.10.2020. After obtaining the decree, the respondent filed E.P.No.127 of 2021 for recovery of the E.P. amount of Rs.13,83,343/- and the E.P. was closed on 13.10.2022 and the salary attached warrants were served on the drawing officer of the petitioner. As the drawing officer of the petitioner did not send the attached amount, the respondent filed contempt petition in E.A.No.87 of 2024 and the drawing officer sent a letter to the Court stating that attached amount is being deducted from the salary of the petitioner. The petition was filed with abnormal delay and there are no grounds to set aside the decree. On 10.07.2018, the petitioner remained ex parte. As she was absent, the Court set her ex parte. Subsequently, the matter underwent several adjournments. Even, the petitioner was aware of the suit proceedings. The petition was filed only to evade payment of the decreed amount. The petition is liable to be dismissed.

                  e. The trial Court dismissed the petition in I.A.No.319 of 2024 on 17.03.2025 holding as follows:

                  ‘Admittedly, despite service of notice on 16.08.2018, and the notice in E.P.No.127 of 2021, and order of attachment, the petitioner did not approach the Court. As no amount had been sent to the Court, inspite of service of order of attachment of salary, the respondent filed a contempt application. Thereafter, the petitioner leisurely appeared before the Court stating that her absence in the trial Court is neither willful nor wanton. In fact, the petitioner herself admits that she believed the words of the defendant No.1 and did not appear before the Court. When the petitioner admitted that the defendant No.1 had availed loan and the suit was decreed, invariably being a guarantor, the petitioner is also liable. In such a case, there is no need to conduct a roving enquiry, particularly as the defendant No.1 died. Even there is no proper reason put forth as to why the petitioner kept quiet for more than 6 years to approach the Court. Absolutely, there is no ground to show the bona fides of the petitioner. Hence, the petition is dismissed.’

                  It is not known whether the said order is challenged. As the matter stood thus, the petitioner / defendant No.2 filed this revision challenging issuance of show-cause notice in E.P.No.127 of 2021 in O.S.No.457 of 2017 on the file of the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kurnool, mainly raising the following grounds:

                  (i) The decree passed was an ex parte decree;

                  (ii) The service was caused on the defendant No.1 through substituted method of publication in newspaper having circulation in Andhra Pradesh, whereas, the defendant No.1 was resident of Wanaparthy and doing job at Addakal in Mahaboobnagar District (now in the State of Telangana) and thus, the publication was got effected so as to get the orders by fraudulent means;

                  (iii) The decree is illegal being passed after the death of the defendant No.1, alleged to be the principal borrower, and the defendant No.2, alleged to be the surety for the defendant No.1, without impleading the legal representatives of the defendant No.1 or informing the death of the defendant No.1 to Court;

                  (iv) The suit itself is not maintainable against the defendant No.2 as the plaintiff failed to take any steps to implead the legal representatives of the defendant No.1;

4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner / defendant No.2 / J.Dr. contends that the execution Court ordered on 24.08.2022 the warrant of attachment of salary of the revision petitioner and thereafter, E.A.No.87 of 2024 was filed as the employer failed to deduct the salary and send the amount to the execution Court and thereupon, on 20.09.2024, a show-cause notice under Order XXI, Rule 46A C.P.C. was issued to the D.D.O. of the revision petitioner. He further submitted that the execution Court failed to consider that the decree is non est for not impleading the legal representatives of the defendant No.1 and when there is no executable decree passed against the defendant No.1, there cannot be any liability fastened against a guarantor / defendant No.2 and consequently, the decree against the defendant No.2 / J.Dr. is also not executable.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following decisions:

                  (i) Jaladi suguna (deceased) through L.Rs Vs. Satya Sai Central Trust and Others((2008) 8 Supreme Court Cases 521), wherein it was held at paragraphs Nos.13 and 14 as follows:

                  “13. Order 22 CPC inter alia deals with death of parties. Rule 4 relates to the procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of the sole defendant. Rule 5 relates to determination of question as to the legal representative. Rule 11 relates to application of Order 20 to appeals. The said rules, to the extent relevant, are extracted below:

                  “4. Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant.:- (1) Where one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.

                  (2) Any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant.

                  5. Determination of question as to legal representative:-- …

                  11. Application of Order to appeals:-- In the application of this Order to appeals, so far as may be, the word 'plaintiff shall be held to include an appellant, the word 'defendant' a respondent, the word 'suit' an appeal. [emphasis supplied]

                  14. When a respondent in an appeal dies, and the right to sue survives, the legal representatives of the deceased respondent have to be brought on record before the court can proceed further in the appeal. Where the respondent-plaintiff who has succeeded in a suit, dies during the pendency of the appeal, any judgment rendered on hearing the appeal filed by the defendant, without bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent - plaintiff on record, will be a nullity. …”

                  (ii) In Ahmed Ali Khan and others Vs. Tayab Khatoon and others(2024 SCC OnLine TS 4188), it was held at paragraph No.22 as follows:

                  “The interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution can be made on limited grounds. For this purpose, the learned counsel for the plaintiff / respondent No.2 placed reliance on the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Jai Singh Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) [2010) 9 SCC 385]. This is trite that interference under Article 227 of the Constitution can be made if order is passed by the Court having no jurisdiction, it suffers from palpable procedural impropriety or a patent illegality. Another view is possible, is not a ground for interference. The power cannot be exercised like ‘bull in china shop’ to correct the errors of judgment of Court acting within the limitation of its jurisdiction (see Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329: (AIR 2010 SCW 6387)….”

6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 / D.Hr. submitted that the plaintiff was not aware of the death of the defendant No.1 and therefore, no steps were taken to get the legal representatives of the defendant No.1 impleaded and that the decree passed against the deceased defendant is valid as he remained ex parte and even the defendant No.2 had not informed to the trial Court about the death of the defendant No.1 and therefore, she cannot contend that the decree is invalid. He further submitted that since the defendant No.2 who is the revision petitioner did not contest the suit, she cannot now contend that the decree passed against her is invalid as the decree remained final and binding, since the petition vide I.A.No.319 of 2024 under Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C. was dismissed and no appeal was preferred against the decree in the suit or the order therein. He further submitted that since the decree is final, valid and binding on defendant No.2, the execution Court rightly proceeded against this J.Dr.

7. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 relied on the decision in Abdul Badud @ Md. Badud Vs. Abdul Quayum S/o late Mohibul Haque and others(C.Misc. No.562 of 2018, dt.21-10-2024 (Patna High Court)). It was held at paragraphs Nos.14 to 20 as follows:

                  “14. From the facts brought before the learned executing court, which the learned executing court has elaborately discussed in the impugned order, it is evident that the petitioner could not claim the decree to be nullity only because some of the defendants died during pendency of the suit. If the heirs of such defendants are already on record and they did not contest the suit or were proceeded ex-parte, by their conduct, such legal heirs are not entitled to any relief on the ground of abatement or decree becoming a nullity against such person.

                  15. So far as the contention of learned senior counsel for the petitioner about the decree as a whole being nullity is concerned, the same is also not sustainable. The decree can become nullity only in cases (i) when the court lacks inherent jurisdiction to pass the decree (ii) the decree has been passed against a dead person and (iii) the decree has been passed in ignorance of provision of law or the law was promulgated making a decree inexecutable after its passing.

                  16. In the present case, even if contention of the petitioner about decree being passed against dead persons is taken to be correct, the decree would not become nullity against all the defendants if right to sue survives against other defendants. Since the suit would not abate as a whole and, for this reason, decree as a whole would not become nullity.

                  17. Moreover, in the present case, it has been contended that the heirs/legal representatives of the deceased defendants are already on record and, in these circumstances, when the estate of the deceased defendants is properly represented, there is no scope of decree becoming nullity at all. Further, the conduct of the petitioner is also pertinent as the same would affect the cause of the petitioner and prejudice it seriously. The petitioner is the son of defendant Rasulan Nessa and the petitioner was himself a party in the trial court as well as one of the appellants in the appellate court. He did not disclose about death of his mother before the learned trial court and even made her deceased mother party in the appellate court. The learned executing court even doubted the genuineness of the death certificates produced by the petitioner for her mother and other defendants. If the mother of the petitioner was already dead, making her one of the parties in the title appeal smacks of malafide on the part of the petitioner and it could be said that the petitioner did not approach the learned executing court with clean hands and, for this reason, the petition of the petitioner was liable to be rejected without granting him further indulgence.

                  18. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi Vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and others reported in [AIR 1970 SC 1475] held that a Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. The following extract from this decision seems apt:

                  “A Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree between the parties or their representatives; it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceedin in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties.

                  When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a Court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record: where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction.”

                  19. It is the established law that an executing Court can neither travel behind the decree nor sit in appeal over the same or pass any order jeopardizing the rights of the parties thereunder and this observation has been made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a number of cases including the case of Topanmal Chhotamal Vs. Kundomal Gangaram & Ors., reported in [AIR 1960 SC 388]. It is only in the limited cases where the decree is by a court lacking inherent jurisdiction or is a nullity, that the same is rendered non est and is thus inexecutable. An erroneous decree cannot be equaled with one which is a nullity. There are no intervening developments as well as to render the decree in-executable. In this regard, reliance could be placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh Vs. Jai Prakash University and others reported in [AIR 2001 SC 2552].

                  20. Since none of the conditions mentioned for making a decree nullity or inexecutable are present in the case, the challenge to the execution proceeding was grounded on wrong footing and even the non-institution of miscellaneous case is not an issue in the facts and circumstances as discussed hereinbefore. Only because no miscellaneous case has been instituted on a vague petition filed on behalf of the petitioner and an erroneous claim of non-executability of the decree has been made, the impugned order would not become assailable.”

8. At this juncture, it is pertinent to mention that as per Order XXII, Rule 4(4) C.P.C., permission to bring the legal representatives of the deceased defendant can be granted by the Court even if such defendant remained ex parte before his death. Order XXII, Rule 4(4) C.P.C. is excerpted hereunder:

                  “4. Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant :--

                  (4) The Court whenever it thinks fit, may exempt the plaintiff from the necessity of substituting the legal representatives of any such defendant who has failed to file a written statement or who, having filed it, has failed to appear and contest the suit at the hearing; and judgment may, in such case, be pronounced against the said defendant notwithstanding the death of such defendant and shall have the same force and effect as if it has been pronounced before death took place.”

9. It is the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the death of the defendant No.1 before passing the decree, therefore, there was no occasion to seek such permission. It is also relevant to refer the provisions of Order XXII, Rule 10A of the C.P.C. by which there is an obligation created to intimate the knowledge of the death of the defendant to the Court. This obligation is on a pleader appearing for a party.

                  “10A. Duty of pleader to communicate to Court death of a party : - Wherever a pleader appearing for a party to the suit comes to know of the death of that party, he shall inform the Court about it, and the Court shall thereupon give notice of such death to the other party, and, for this purpose, the contract between the pleader and the deceased party shall be deemed to subsist.”

                  If the defendant in the case on hand did not appear through an advocate, there is no such obligation.

10. In T. Gnanavel Vs. T.S.Kanagaraj and Anr(AIR 2009 SC 2367= (2009)14 SCC 294), the Supreme Court dealt with facts similar, but, not exactly the same, and held as follows:

                  “5. At this stage, we may now narrate the facts of this case. The appellant was a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract for sale which was filed in the Court of City Civil Judge, Chennai against the sole defendant, since deceased (hereinafter referred to as

                  `the defendant'). … In order to evict the appellant from the suit property, the defendant also filed an eviction petition against the appellant on the ground of willful default treating him as a tenant. In the suit for specific performance, the defendant had filed a written statement denying the material allegations made in the plaint but finally had failed to appear and contest the suit. Be it mentioned herein that during the pendency of the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, the defendant died. The death of the defendant, however, was not brought on record by the plaintiff - appellant. Thereafter, without the knowledge of such death, the trial Court passed an ex parte decree for specific performance of the contract. The respondents, who are the heirs and legal representatives of the defendant, after pronouncement of the judgment in the aforesaid suit for specific performance of the contract, filed an application for causing abatement of the same on 23rd of March, 2005, from which the plaintiff / appellant came to know that the defendant had died. The appellant thereafter filed an application in the suit before the trial court praying for exemption from bringing the heirs and legal representatives of the defendant and the same was allowed by the trial court.

                  6. It may be mentioned herein that the suit for specific performance was filed after the aforesaid civil revision case for eviction of the appellant was dismissed by the High Court.

                  7. … As noted herein earlier, the trial court allowed the said application filed by the appellant under Order XXII Rule 4(4) of the C.P.C. In the month of June 2005, the appellant filed an execution petition to execute the decree for specific performance of the contract for sale in which objection under Section 47 of the C.P.C. contending that the decree was inexecutable, was raised. However, the objection raised under Section 47 of the C.P.C. on the question of decree being inexecutable was dismissed by the executing court by an order dated 14th of September, 2005. Being aggrieved by the dismissal order passed by the executing court in the eviction proceedings holding that it was incorrect to say that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller was inexecutable in view of the decree passed by the civil court in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, the appellant filed civil revision petitions, namely, CRP Nos.1453 and 1454 of 2005 before the High Court. By an order dated 15th of November, 2005, the trial court, in the suit for specific performance of the contract, held that the decree passed in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale was not a nullity and being aggrieved by the said order of dismissal, the respondents also filed a revision petition being CRP No.62 of 2006. All the three revision petitions filed by the appellant and the respondents were taken up analogously by the High Court and the High Court by the impugned order held that once the defendant had died and the civil court passed a decree in ignorance of the same and thereafter without there being any exemption obtained by the plaintiff / appellant under Order XXII Rule 4(4) to bring the heirs and legal representatives of the defendant on record before the judgment was pronounced, the ex parte decree so passed in favour of the plaintiff / appellant became a nullity. In view of the aforesaid order, the High Court dismissed the civil revision cases filed by the appellant and allowed the civil revision case filed by the respondents. It is against this common judgment of the High Court that a Special Leave Petition was filed before this Court, which on grant on leave was heard by us in the presence of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.

                  8. ... The issue, which is to be decided in this appeal, whether the decree passed by the civil court in ignorance of the death of the defendant, without granting any exemption to the appellant before the judgment was pronounced, as required under Order XXII Rule 4 (4) of the CPC, is sustainable in law.

                  13. … As noted herein earlier, a plain reading of Order XXII Rule 4 (4) of the C.P.C. would clearly show that the Court is empowered to exempt a plaintiff from the necessity of substituting the heirs and legal representatives of any such defendant who has failed to file a written statement or who, having filed it, had failed to appear and contest the suit at the time of hearing of the same, but such an exemption can only be granted before the judgment is pronounced and in that case only, it can be taken against the said defendant notwithstanding the death of such defendant and such a decree shall have the same force and effect as it was pronounced before the death had taken place. … In any view of the matter, Order XXII Rule 4(4) of the CPC clearly says that such exemption to bring on record the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased could be taken or granted by the court only before the judgment is pronounced and not after it.

                  14. … That being the position, we are, therefore, of the view that since in this case, admittedly, exemption was obtained after the judgment was pronounced, the provision of Order XXII Rule 4(4) of the C.P.C. would not be attracted.

                  16. … This view has also been expressed by Madras High Court in a decision reported in Elisa and others vs.

                  A. Doss, [AIR 1992 Mad. 159], in which the Madras High Court in paragraph 3 had observed as follows :-

                  … Of course, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to file a written application seeking such exemption, as the rule does not require one. Under the said rule, the court must apply its mind and think it fit, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to grant the exemption. For granting such exemption, the defendant who died should have remained ex parte, either without filing the written statement or after filing the written statement. It is clear from the language of the said rule that the order of exemption shall be passed before a judgment in the case is pronounced. …

                  17. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the High Court had rightly interpreted the provision of Order XXII Rule 4(4) of the C.P.C. and accordingly held that the decree passed by the trial court on 20th of December, 2002, in O.S. No. 3946 of 1999 was a nullity in the eye of law as the defendant had died during the pendency of the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale and no exemption was sought at the instance of the plaintiff / appellant to bring on record the heirs and legal representatives of the defendant before the judgment was pronounced.

                  18. There is another submission that needs to be considered at this stage. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant had contended that the respondents were duty bound under the provisions of Order XXII Rule 10-A of the C.P.C. to intimate the knowledge of the death of the defendant to the court as well as to the appellant, which they had failed to do and therefore, the trial court was correct in law to grant exemption to the appellant from bringing on record the heirs and legal representatives of the defendant after the decree was passed. As had already been mentioned above, the conditions laid down in the above mentioned rule are clear to the effect that the exemption to be granted by the court has to be obtained before the judgment is delivered and not after it. Therefore, we are not in a position to accept the contention of the appellant to this effect. Further, the respondents had disputed the fact that they had not intimated the information relating to the death of the defendant to the appellant. This Court is not entitled to go into the question of determining the veracity of the statements made by either party. Before parting with this aspect of the matter, it is also an admitted position that the appellant had not raised the question regarding the applicability of the provision under Order XXII Rule 10-A of the C.P.C. before the High Court and, therefore, we also cannot permit the appellant from raising such question for the first time in this Court.”

11. As can be seen from the record and the arguments advanced before this Court, though the grounds raised by the revision petitioner about the nullity of the decree were mentioned in the petitions in I.As.Nos.318 and 319 of 2024 as noted above, no such mention was made before the execution Court so far. After the show-cause notice to the D.D.O. of J.Dr No.2, as her salary is being deducted, she rushed to this Court challenging the execution proceedings on the ground of non est decree. The proceeding dismissing I.A.No.319 of 2024 is part of the proceeding on trial side and not on execution side. The revision petitioner ought to have filed a counter raising the same grounds to oppose execution of the decree or at least in any manner brought to the notice of the Court on execution side. The proceedings in execution are separately taken and not in continuation of the proceedings on trial side, including the petition under Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C. The execution Court has no opportunity to decide the question whether the decree before it is executable or not against the J.Dr. No.2 on the grounds raised by her in the I.As. filed on trial side. So, this Court is of the view that the revision petitioner shall forthwith raise these grounds before the execution Court as the question of executability of a decree on the ground of nullity can be decided under Section 47 C.P.C. The conduct of the defendant No.2 in not contesting the suit and intimating the death of the defendant No.1 to Court may also be relevant. Under these circumstances, it is required to be examined by the execution Court

                  (i) whether the decree against the defendant No.1 is valid without impleading his legal representatives as he died after he remained ex parte, but before passing the judgment and (ii) whether the decree against the defendant No.2 is valid or not, if the decree against the defendant No.1 is considered as non est, in other words whether the defendant No.2 can be independently made liable (so that the decree against the defendant No.2 can be executed). For this purpose, the revision petitioner has to agitate before the execution court.

12. In the result, the revision petition is disposed of giving liberty to the revision petitioner to raise the grounds which are mentioned before this Court to challenge the executability of the decree against her before the execution Court by taking appropriate measures and thereafter, the execution Court shall pass an order on merits within one (1) month thereafter.

                  There shall be no order as to costs.

                  Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.