1. Since these Writ Petitions involve a common question of law, those are heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

2. In the lead case i.e. in W.P.(C) No.24661 of 2025, the petitioner seeks a direction from this Court to quash the communications dated 31.07.2025 and 21.08.2025 and to declare that the petitioner school is not a motor transport undertaking under the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, and is not liable to compulsory registration thereunder.

I.      FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:

3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

                  (i)       The petitioner is a private unaided CBSE-affiliated school run by DAV College Managing Committee, New Delhi, situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, and imparting education from Nursery to Class XII to more than 2500 students.

                  (ii)      For facilitating transportation of interested students and staff, the petitioner runs a school transport facility through buses as an ancillary service to education, and states it has around 11 vehicles operating after obtaining permission from the Police Commissionerate (Bhubaneswar– Cuttack) and the Commerce and Transport Department.

                  (iii)     The State has issued a “Policy on Transport of School Children, 2016” (Resolution No. 6395 dated 31.08.2016), stated to have been framed pursuant to directions of the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (W.P.(C) No. 13029/1985) , to regulate school children transportation within Odisha.

                  (iv) On 31.07.2025, Opposite Party No. 3 issued Communication Letter No. 5098/JLC, Bhubaneswar Range, directing the petitioner to apply for registration as a “Motor Transport Undertaking” in Form-I under the Odisha Motor Transport Workers Rules, 1966 through the PAReSHRAM portal, alleging applicability of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, and warning of action under Section 32 for non-compliance.

                  (v)      The petitioner replied on 11.08.2025 disputing applicability of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, relying on policy and case law, and requesting withdrawal/waiver of the direction to register.

                  (vi)     On 21.08.2025, Opposite Party No. 3 issued a further Communication Letter No. 5798/JLC reiterating the direction to register through PAReSHRAM by 02.09.2025 and stating prosecution would be initiated under Section 32 if the petitioner failed to comply.

                  (vii)    The writ petition has been filed seeking quashing of the communications dated 31.07.2025 and 21.08.2025 on the plea that the petitioner is not a “Motor Transport Undertaking” within Section 2(g) of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961.

                  (viii)    In the counter affidavit, the deponent (Divisional Labour Commissioner, Bhubaneswar), states he is duly authorised by Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 3, asserts the petitioner is covered by the Act, and relies on judicial precedents and the petitioner’s charging of transport fees to support registration and regulatory enforcement.

                  (ix)     The opposite parties additionally state that several educational institutions in Bhubaneswar have already obtained registration under the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, and claim the petitioner school has itself submitted an application in Form-I through the PAReSHRAM portal while also filing this writ petition.

II.     SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:

4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions:

                  (i)       The impugned communications dated 31.07.2025 and 21.08.2025 directing registration under the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 are illegal, arbitrary, erroneous, and unsustainable, and therefore liable to be quashed.

                  (ii)      The petitioner is a private educational institution and not a “Motor Transport Undertaking” under Section 2(g) because its buses are run only as an ancillary facility to education, not as a commercial transport business.

                  (iii)     The statutory definition requires carriage “for hire or reward,” and the petitioner asserts there is no such commercial element in its school transport arrangement, hence the Act is inapplicable.

                  (iv)     The State’s “Policy on Transport of School Children, 2016,” framed pursuant to M.C. Mehta (Supra), regulates school conveyance comprehensively, including duties and liabilities of workers, yet it does not mandate registration of schools under the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, and the petitioner claims similarly placed schools are not registered under the Act.

                  (v)      The petitioner claims it is already extending statutory and welfare benefits to bus staff such as CPF/EPF, ESI and allowances, and therefore meets welfare objectives without being brought under the Motor Transport Workers Act framework.

                  (vi)     The petitioner asserts its transport service operates in deficit for FY 2024– 25, and bus fare collected is only administrative in nature; since the activity is not profit-oriented, treating it as a motor transport undertaking is unjustified.

                  (vii)    The opposite party’s reliance on Section 38 (exemptions) is said to be misconceived because Section 38 presupposes the existence of a “motor transport undertaking,” and since the petitioner is not one, the exemption provision is irrelevant and cannot be used to compel registration.

                  (viii)    The petitioner alleges violation of principles of natural justice because despite a detailed reply dated 11.08.2025 with precedents and policy- based objections, Opposite Party No. 3 mechanically reiterated the direction on 21.08.2025 without proper consideration.

                  (ix)     The petitioner contends that school bus drivers and staff are not “motor transport workers” for the purposes of the Act as the transport is incidental to education and not “hire or reward” in the commercial sense.

                  (x)      The petitioner pleads that the impugned action is discriminatory and biased as, according to it, DAV schools in Bhubaneswar were targeted and other schools in the State were not subjected to similar directions.

                  (xi)     The petitioner argues Opposite Party No. 3 exceeded jurisdiction by compelling registration under an Act not applicable to schools, and that such coercive action harms the petitioner’s goodwill and burdens an educational institution contrary to its regulated status under separate transport rules for educational vehicles under the Motor Vehicles law framework.

                  (xii)    The petitioner also relies on the Motor Vehicles Act definition of “private carrier” as being tied to carriage of goods in connection with trade/business and argues that a school bus does not fit that concept, supporting its case that it cannot be roped in as a “motor transport undertaking”.

III.    SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:

5.     The Learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions:

                  (i)       The petitioner’s buses and workers engaged for transporting students and staff fall squarely within the definition of “motor transport undertaking” under Section 2(g) of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, therefore registration is mandatory and the notices are lawful.

                  (ii)      The petitioner is not providing free transport; it is charging transportation fees from students and staff, which constitutes carriage for “hire or reward,” bringing the undertaking within the statutory ambit.

                  (iii)     The opposite parties rely on the Madras High Court decision in Christian Medical College Association, Vellore v. Government of Tamil Nadu (W.A. No. 1607 of 2015) to submit that when an institution provides transport services on payment, it amounts to an undertaking covered by the Act.

                  (iv)     Reliance is placed on the Supreme Court judgment in Municipal Council, Raipur v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1970 SC 1923) and the Allahabad High Court decision in Star Paper Mill, Saharanpur v. State of U.P. (1973 (2) LLJ 433) for interpreting Section 2(g) and the meaning of “hire or reward”.

                  (v)      The “Policy on Transport of School Children, 2016” does not exempt educational institutions from registration under the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, and it is specifically denied that other schools are not registered under the Act.

                  (vi)     The opposite parties assert that multiple educational institutions have already obtained registration under the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, including named institutions with registration numbers, and further state that another school has applied through the PAReSHRAM portal.

                  (vii)    The opposite parties contend that the petitioner’s own pleadings admit collection of bus fare, which directly satisfies the “hire or reward” element under Section 2(g), making the registration direction legally justified irrespective of whether the transport service runs in deficit.

                  (viii)    It is asserted that the Motor Transport Workers Act provides welfare, health facilities, and service conditions under Chapters IV and V which are in addition to EPF/ESI, and denying registration indicates an intent to avoid providing the statutory benefits available to motor transport workers.

                  (ix)     The registration fee is stated to be nominal under the State’s fee structure (graded by number of workers) and hence cannot be justified as a burden affecting profit/loss; deficit is irrelevant because the Act contains no exemption for financially loss-making activities.

                  (x)      There is no legal provision exempting the petitioner from the Act, and neither the Supreme Court nor the Orissa High Court has carved out any such exemption for educational institutions running paid transport.

                  (xi)     The opposite parties deny violation of natural justice and state the petitioner was rightly issued notice because the Act applies, and Section 32 provides penal consequences for wilful disobedience of lawful directions and contraventions.

                  (xii)    The opposite parties state that several schools and educational institutions in Bhubaneswar were issued similar letters for registration, and deny any bias or selective targeting.

                  (xiii)    The opposite parties assert Opposite Party No. 3 has statutory authority to issue notices as an Inspector under the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, based on a State notification dated 03.12.2018, and therefore has not exceeded jurisdiction.

                  (xiv)   It is contended that compliance with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 does not dispense with compliance under the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, as both are distinct enactments operating in different fields.

                  (xv)    The writ petition is described as devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed, with the stated object of enforcement being to extend regulated welfare and service protections to drivers and other motor transport workers engaged by the petitioner.

IV. JUDGMENT AND ANALYSIS:

6. Heard Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed before this Court.

7. The core question that arises for determination is whether the petitioner school’s transport facility qualifies as a “motor transport undertaking” under Section 2(g) of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (hereinafter “the Act”), thereby requiring registration and compliance with that Act. The petitioner contends that its school bus service is purely incidental to its educational activities and not run for any commercial purpose, whereas the opposite parties assert that since the school transports students for a fee, it squarely falls within the ambit of the Act.

8. Section 2(g) of the Act defines a “motor transport undertaking” to mean “an undertaking engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by road for hire or reward, and includes a private carrier”. On a plain reading, the definition has two elements: (1) carrying passengers or goods by road, and (2) doing so “for hire or reward.” It also expressly “includes a private carrier,” indicating that even undertakings not engaged in public transport but using vehicles for their own business or purpose are covered. In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner school operates buses to carry children and staff by road. The crux of the matter is whether this carriage is “for hire or reward” as per the Act.

9. The statutory phrase “for hire or reward” is broad. It is not limited to profit-making enterprises. In fact, a plethora of judicial precedents have emphasized that the Motor Transport Workers Act is a welfare legislation and its definitions should not be narrowed.

10. The Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Council, Raipur (Supra) held that even a municipal council’s transport service, used to carry garbage without charging any fee, came within the definition of a motor transport undertaking. The Supreme Court reasoned that including “private carriers” shows the legislature’s intent to cover undertakings of a non-commercial nature as well. In that case, although the municipality was not carrying passengers for profit, it was using vehicles for a public function; thus it was held to be an “undertaking” engaged in road transport for reward. The relevant excerpts are produced below:

                  “The main argument which the learned counsel urges is that the word "includes" in the definition of the expression "motor transport undertaking" helps him because this shows that it is only an undertaking of a commercial nature which was intended to be included within the definition of "motor transport undertaking". He says that a Municipal Council is not carrying on any business but is carrying on statutory obligations imposed upon it and, therefore, a Municipal Council cannot be called an undertaking. We are unable to accept this contention. First, the Act provides for the welfare of motor transport workers and regulates the conditions of their work. Such beneficial acts are not, as a rule, construed strictly. Secondly, the words of the definition are plain and not susceptible of any reasonable limitation. It seems to us that by using the word "includes" the. Legislature undoubtedly intended to enlarge the meaning of the expression "motor transport undertaking". The words "private carrier" have been given a specific meaning in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and it is difficult to limit this specific meaning on any reasonable basis. Further, s. 38 of the Act, which exempts certain transport vehicles, also proceeds on the basis that a private carrier who is carrying on activities which are not commercial would be included within the expression "motor transport undertaking”.”

11. Similarly, the Allahabad High Court in Star Paper Mill, Saharanpur (Supra) found that a company using its own fleet of lorries to haul raw materials for its business was a motor transport undertaking, even though this was ancillary to its main business of manufacturing paper.

12. These rulings highlight that the existence of a “hire or reward” element does not require a profit motive, any form of carrying passengers or goods for some consideration or as part of one’s business can suffice.

13. In the present case, the school admittedly collects transportation fees from students who avail of the bus service. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that this fee is charged merely to cover costs and that the transport facility runs at a deficit, implying the service is not run for profit. However, the Act does not condition its applicability on the transport activity being profitable. Charging any amount as a consideration for providing transportation means the service is being provided “for hire or reward” in the legal sense.

14. The Madras High Court, in Christian Medical College (Supra), held that once is shown that the institution charges a fee for transporting its own students or employees, it would definitely fall within the definition of a motor transport undertaking, dehors the fact that its principal activity is education and not transport. The relevant excerpts are produced below:

                  “Though such a categorical averment has been made in the counter affidavit, filed in the Writ Petition itself, the appellant has not come forward to deny the same by filing a rejoinder. Therefore, the aforesaid averment relating to levy of charges, by the appellant, for offering transport services to its students/ doctors / employees stands uncontroverted. Once it is found that the appellant Institution charges a fee for transporting its own students / doctors / employees, it would definitely be a Motor Transport Undertaking within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Motor Transport Workers Act 1961, in view of the categorical pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Municipal Council Raipurs case, and that of the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Star Paper Mills’s case, referred to supra, dehors the fact that its principal activity is Education and not transport of passengers.”

15. In other words, if an educational institution provides transport and recovers a fee (even if nominal or to defray expenses), that activity is transportation for reward. This Court finds that reasoning persuasive. The petitioner’s buses are not carrying students gratis or as a purely charitable courtesy; they operate against payment of a bus fee, bringing the service within the ambit of “hire or reward.”.

16. The petitioner strenuously contended that its main object is to impart education, not to run a transport enterprise, and that ferrying students is only an incidental facility without any commercial flavour. Indeed, courts have recognized that the core character of an educational or industrial establishment is not transportation. However, the critical distinction is the presence of a hire or reward element. Where no fare at all is collected and the service is purely incidental (essentially a free amenity), it strengthens the claim that the institution is not engaged in transport “for hire or reward”.

17. In the petitioner’s case, however, this Court has already found that a fare is levied on students. That sets the case apart from those where transportation was provided free of cost. Once a charge is imposed, the activity cannot be regarded as a purely incidental charitable act; it becomes a service rendered for consideration. The incidental nature of the transport service to the school’s primary purpose does not, in law, exempt it from the Act if the service meets the statutory definition. Thus, the focus is on the character of the activity, not the primary business of the employer. Here, the petitioner’s transport activity has the character of a paid service, bringing it within the scope of the Act’s protective regime for motor transport workers.

V.     CONCLUSION:

18. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner’s transport facility satisfies the statutory ingredients of a “motor transport undertaking” under Section 2(g) of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961. The collection of transportation charges from students, irrespective of the quantum or profitability, constitutes carriage for hire or reward in the legal sense, thereby attracting the applicability of the Act.

19. The fact that transportation is ancillary to the petitioner’s primary educational function does not dilute the character of the activity where consideration is admittedly levied. Being a welfare legislation, the Act warrants a broad and purposive interpretation so as to extend its protective umbrella to motor transport workers engaged in such undertakings. Consequently, the petitioner cannot seek exemption from statutory compliance on the ground of its non-commercial or educational character.

20. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed.

21. Accordingly, all the connected Writ Petitions are dismissed.

22. Interim order, if any, passed earlier in any of the above-mentioned Writ Petitions stands vacated.