(Prayer: Petition under Sections 10 to 12 of Contempt of Courts Act 1971 praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit file herein the High Court may be pleased to be pleased to summon and punish the Respondents under Sections 10 and 12 of Contempt of Courts Act to the extent not granting interest for intentionally and willfully not implementing the orders of this Court passed in W.RNo.24837/2021 dated 28-3-2023 to the extent of interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum while paying a total amount of Rs.17,75,559/- under Sections 10 and 12 of Contempt of Courts Act and to pass)

1. This Contempt Case has been filed against the orders dated 28.03.2023 in W.P.No.24837 of 2021 to the extent of interest at the rate of 12% per annum while paying a total amount of Rs.17,75,559/- under Sections 10 to 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

2. W.P.No.24837 of 2021 is filed claiming the following relief:

                  “..to issue a Writ, Order or Direction, more in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority in Ref No.VPRO-CDA/CL- II/01/2017 dated 16.04.2018 "reduction of basic pay to the minimum in the cadre of Development Officer Grade- I", Orders passed by the Appellate Authority in Ref.No.590-A dated 05.07.2019 "modifying the punishment to that of reduction of basic pay to 5 increments permanently" and the orders passed by the Revisional Authority Ref No.495-M dated 22.04.2020 modifying the punishment to that of "reduction of basic pay by 3 increments permanently" as illegal, arbitrary and violation of Articles 14, 16, 21 and 311 (2) of Constitution of India and consequently declare that the entire orders imposed are without power and jurisdiction and the petitioner is entitled to all the regular pay benefits without there being any reduction in the pay with interest @ 12% on arrears and to pass such other order or orders..”

3. On 28.03.2023, this Court allowed the writ petition with the following direction:

                  “Accordingly this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the Revisional Authority dated 22.04.2020 and order of Appellate Authority dated 05.07.2019 and orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority dated 16.04.2018 are hereby set aside and the Petitioner is entitled to all the regular pay benefits in accordance with law. No costs.”

4. It is submitted that, the order passed by the learned single Judge was confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.581 of 2023 dated 22.01.2024. Thereafter, the matter was carried to the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of SLP No.10556 of 2024 and the same was dismissed on 26.06.2024. It is submitted that, in view of the initial punishment order of Reduction of Basic Pay to the Minimum Time Scale in the cadre of Development Officer Grade-I vide order dated 16.04.2018, the pay of the petitioner was reduced to minimum in the cadre of Development Officer Grade-I till 05.07.2019 and the punishment was modified to that of reduction of basic pay to 5 increments permanently. The said order was implemented till the Revisional Authority modified the punishment on 22.04.2020 to that of Reduction of Basic Pay by 3 increments permanently and the said punishment was implemented till the retirement of the petitioner in the month of June, 2022. The respondents calculated the incremental arrears from the date of original punishment orders i.e. 16.04.2018 and arrived at Rs.10,53,376/- and paid the same. The earlier pensionary benefits like Gratuity, Earned Leave Encashment and Commuted Value of Pension were paid without counting incremental arrears, should also be revised. He submits that the differential amounts viz., Earned Leave Encashment of Rs.2,49,796/-; Commuted Value of Pension Rs.98,966/- ; pension arrears of Rs.1,25,898/- and other differential amounts of rs.79,523/-; thus  totaling to Rs.17,75,559/- was paid to the petitioner in the month of July, 2024.

5. Respondent Nos.1 to 4 filed common counter affidavit, wherein it is stated that, the petitioner had categorically admitted that a total amount of Rs.17,75,559/- is paid and the petitioner had filed contempt only for the interest portion which is not granted by the Courts, thus the Contempt, as alleged by the petitioner is not maintainable. The petitioner is claiming interest basing on his own understandings and perceptions. A reading of the directions issued by the Courts does not direct the respondents to pay the interest, except setting aside the orders of the Revisional Authority, Appellate Authority and Disciplinary Authority, while directing the petitioner that he is entitled to all regular pay benefits in accordance with law. It is prayed that, since there is no deliberate or intentional disobedience on the part of the respondents, requested this Court to close the contempt proceedings against the respondents.

6. During hearing, Sri P.V. Ramana, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the writ petition is allowed which includes payment of interest at the rate of 12% per annum, the action of the respondents in only paying the differential amounts, without granting 12% interest are in violation of the orders of this Court. He further submits that the respondents having suffered orders before the learned single judge and confirmed by the Division Bench and confirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court allowing the W.P, W.A and SLP with interest @12%, the question of denying the said interest portion is an act of intentional and willful disobedience of the orders of this Court. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Bihar vs. Meera Tiwary((2020) 17 SCC 305), Dr. Poornima Advani vs. Government of NCT [Civil Appeal No.2643 of 2025 dated 18.02.2025], Laxmikant Sharma vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & others [SLP (Civil) No.18907 of 2025] and judgment of High Court of Allahabad in Shiv Shankar Mishra vs. State of U.P [SAD No.10 of 2015 dated 15.01.2015] to contend that appellant is entitled to the payment of interest from the date of filing the writ petition and the appellant would also be entitled to the payment of interest on the pensionary payment which was unlawfully withheld and that the interest shall be admissible to the appellant @9% p.a. With the above submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondents have not complied with the orders of this Court, obviously for reasons best known to them, which amounts to contempt, as defined under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and that the respondents are liable for punishment as per Section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and requested to punish them in accordance with law.

7. On the other hand, Sri P. Bhaskar, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the matter has been carried in Writ Appeal and also before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and nowhere, there is a direction to pay the interest as sought for in the prayer by the petitioner herein, as such, the petitioner cannot invoke jurisdiction of this Court under the contempt proceedings.

8. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jharesar Prasad Paul vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly(AIR 2002 SCC 2215) and Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and MD, ONGC vs. M. George Ravishekaran(AIR 2014 SUPREME COURT 950). On the strength of the principle laid in the above judgments, he could contend that, the court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and not consider the question as to what the judgment or order should contain. Further, if the judgment or order does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order and requested to close the contempt proceedings.

9. Heard the submissions of the respective counsel and perused the material available on record, and also the judgments relied by the counsels.

10. For determination of the issues in this Contempt Case, the following points arise for consideration:

                  (1) Whether once the writ petition is allowed which amounts to allowing the entire prayer of the writ petition in the writ petition or not ?

                  (2) Whether if the respondents are directed to pay all regular pay benefits in accordance with law is includes interest or not ?

                  (3) Whether non-payment of interest along with arrears / withhold amount by the respondents is amounts to contempt or not ?

11. POINT No.1

                  It is better for the sake of discussion to extract the orders of this Court as below:

                  “Accordingly this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the Revisional Authority dated 22.04.2020 and order of Appellate Authority dated 05.07.2019 and orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority dated 16.04.2018 are hereby set aside and the Petitioner is entitled to all the regular pay benefits in accordance with law. No costs.”

                  The order of this Court as extracted above is expressly clear, categorical and straightaway allowed the writ petition by setting aside all the proceedings, due to which the petitioner’s pensionary benefits were withheld by the respondents is contrary to law. It is settled principle of law that once the writ petition is allowed, it means that allowing the entire prayer in the writ petition. Therefore, it is better to extract the prayer in the writ petition which reads as under:

                  “..to issue a Writ, Order or Direction, more in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority in Ref No.VPRO-CDA/CL- II/01/2017 dated 16.04.2018 "reduction of basic pay to the minimum in the cadre of Development Officer Grade- I", Orders passed by the Appellate Authority in Ref.No.590-A dated 05.07.2019 "modifying the punishment to that of reduction of basic pay to 5 increments permanently" and the orders passed by the Revisional Authority Ref No.495-M dated 22.04.2020 modifying the punishment to that of "reduction of basic pay by 3 increments permanently" as illegal, arbitrary and violation of Articles 14, 16, 21 and 311 (2) of Constitution of India and consequently declare that the entire orders imposed are without power and jurisdiction and the petitioner is entitled to all the regular pay benefits without there being any reduction in the pay with interest @ 12% on arrears and to pass such other order or orders..”

                  The prayer in the writ petition is specifically praying not only withheld amount as entitled by the petitioner but that to be paid along with interest @ 12% p.a and also for compensation. The admitted case of both parties is that the respondents paid all the pensionary benefits as entitled by the petitioner but not paid the interest as prayed. The case of the respondents herein is that while passing orders does not neither specifically directed nor observed about the entitlement of interest along with regular benefits to be entitled by the petitioner. In the absence of specific direction regarding the entitlement of interest the petitioner is not entitled any interest even though he prayed in the writ petition. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled only regular benefits but not interest. The said contention of the respondents is certainly contrary to jurisprudence under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which explains once the writ petition is allowed, which means allowing the prayer of the writ petition in toto.

                  Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered against the respondents.

12. POINT No.2

                  On perusal of the 2nd limb, the order of this Court specifically directed the respondents to pay all regular benefits in accordance with law. Therefore, payment of regular benefits in accordance with law should be paid without interest or along with interest. As contended by learned counsel for the petitioner, in view of ratios laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court as well this Court, the settled law is that the pensionary benefits which were erroneously withheld by the respondents should be paid along with interest only. The said contention was upheld by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dr. Poornima Advani vs. Government of NCT which reads thus:

                  16. The concept of awarding interest on delayed payment has been explained by this Court in the case of Authorised Officer Karnataka Bank v. M/s R.M.S. Granites Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 12294 of 2024, we quote the following observations:-

                  “It may be mentioned that there is misconception about interest. Interest is not a penalty or punishment at all, but it is the normal accretion on capital. For example if A had to pay B a certain amount, say ten years ago, but he offers that amount to him today, then he has pocketed the interest on the principal amount. Had A paid that amount to B ten years ago, B would have invested that amount somewhere and earned interest thereon, but instead of that A has kept that amount with himself and earned interest on it for this period. Hence equity demands that A should not only pay back the principal amount but also the interest thereon to B. [See: Alok Shanker Pandey v. Union of India : AIR 2007 SC 1198.]”

                  17. Thus, when a person is deprived of the use of his money to which he is legitimately entitled, he has a right to be compensated for the deprivation which may be called interest or compensation. Interest is paid for the deprivation of the use of money in general terms which has returned or compensation for the use or retention by a person of a sum of money belonging to other.

                  18. As per Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edn.): “interest” is the compensation fixed by agreement or allowed by law for use or detention of money or for the loss of money of one who is entitled to its use, especially, the amount owned to a lender in return for the use of the borrowed money.

                  20. In the case of Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa v. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1 SCC 508, a Constitution Bench of this Court opined that a person deprived of use of money to which he is legitimately entitled has a right to be compensated for the deprivation, call it by any name. It may be called interest, compensation or damages. This is also the principle of Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code.

                  25. If on facts of a case, the doctrine of restitution is attracted, interest should follow. Restitution in its etymological sense means restoring to a party on the modification, variation or reversal of a decree or order what has been lost to him in execution of decree or order of the Court or in direct consequence of a decree or order. The term “restitution” is used in three senses, firstly, return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status, secondly, the compensation for benefits derived from wrong done to another and, thirdly, compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another.

                  26. In Hari Chand v. State of U.P., 2012 (1) AWC 316, the Allahabad High Court dealing with similar controversy in a stamp matter held that the payment of interest is a necessary corollary to the retention of the money to be returned under order of the appellate or revisional authority. The High Court directed the State to pay interest @ 8% for the period, the money was so retained i.e. from the date of deposit till the date of actual repayment/refund.

                  31.The respondents are directed to pay an amount of Rs.4,35,968/- (Rupees. Four Lakh Thirty Five Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Eight Only) towards interest within a period of two months from today without fail.

                  Similarly, in State of Bihar vs. Meera Tiwari (Supra 1) Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:

                  “12. We are unable to accept the argument of the learned ASG that the High Court modified or expanded the scope of the original order in the writ proceedings in contempt. The concerned authorities were directed to fully redress the grievances of the petitioner, and/or in other words, to release the retiral dues of late Sh. Amardeo Tiwari in full. The dues necessarily had to be computed having regard to the salary and allowances pertaining to the post which Sh. Amardeo Tiwari, since deceased, had held at the time of his retirement.

                  15. In proceedings for contempt, the High Court is entitled to pass orders for effective enforcement of an order of which violation is alleged. By the order dated 21.9.2004, the High Court directed the authorities to finalize the retiral dues on account of Shri Amardeo Tiwari, since deceased. The High Court directed release of the retiral dues of Shri Amardeo Tiwari, since deceased, in entirety and not in part.”

                  In Shiv Shankar Mishra vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (Supra) a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court explains the service law, the claim of interest on delayed payment of arrears of salary as well as pensionary benefits under Article 226 of Constitution of India as under:

                  6. The present case is an unfortunate instance where an employee has been left in the lurch after having rendered long years of service. Both the arrears on account of salary as well as pensionary dues have not been paid on time. When the appellant had moved a writ petition before the Court, an order was passed on 11 September 2013 directing the payment of the admitted arrears within four months and for immediate steps to determine the pensionary dues. This order was not complied with following which, he was constrained to file contempt proceedings. It is only thereafter that on 18 March 2014 the payment of arrears of salary from August 2010 until February 2013 was made. It was only then that the appellant was also paid arrears on account of gratuity, pension and other retiral dues. There was no reason or justification to withhold the payment of salary during the period when the appellant had worked when salary fell due for payment or for the non payment of pensionary and retiral dues, the latter within a reasonable period of retirement. There was no lapse on the part of the appellant. The paucity of funds cannot surely be held up as an excuse not to pay the salary of an employee who had worked for the period for which his salary is due. Similarly, pensionary dues constitute a rightful entitlement of an employee. The State cannot be heard to say that it would fail to pay the pension on time and yet excuse itself from the liability to pay interest.

                  7. In the case of State of Kerala Vs M Padmanabhan Nair and Som Prakash1, the Supreme Court held as follows:

                  "Pension and gratuity are no longer any bounty to be distributed by the Government to its employees on their retirement but have become, under the decisions of this Court, valuable rights and property in their hands and any culpable delay in settlement and disbursement thereof must be visited with the penalty of payment of interest at the current market rate till actual payment."

                  9. We, therefore, have come to the conclusion that the learned Single Judge was not justified in declining the prayer for the payment of interest. Insofar as the payment which was made to the appellant on 18 March 2014 is concerned, the appellant was clearly entitled to the payment of interest from the date of the filing of the writ petition in 2010 (Writ -A No. 47141 of 2010). The appellant would also be entitled to the payment of interest on the pensionary payment which was unlawfully withheld from March 2014 until actual payment is made. We direct that interest shall be admissible to the appellant at the rate of 9% per annum from the date on which the respective payments on account of arrears of salary, or as the case may be, towards pensionary dues became due and payable as directed earlier. Interest shall be computed in terms of the aforesaid directions within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. The order of the learned Single Judge declining interest shall to that extent stand set aside and be substituted by the aforesaid directions.

                  As contended by learned counsel for respondents that the judgment or order does not contain any order regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein, then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of for clarification of the order instead of exercising contempt jurisdiction, for which he relied upon the judgment in Jhareswar Prasad Paul and another vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly and others(AIR 2002 Supreme Court 2215) which reads as under:

                  “The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the applicant. The court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have contained. At the cost of repetition be it stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. If this limitation is borne in mind then criticisms which are sometimes leveled against the courts exercising contempt of court jurisdiction "that it has exceeded its powers in granting substantive relief and issuing a direction regarding the same without proper adjudication of the dispute" in its entirety can be avoided. This will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings because the party which is prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed in the contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing fresh directions is likely to challenge that order and that may give rise to another round of litigation arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain the majesty and image of courts. Judging the case in hand on the touchstone of the principles noted above, we find that the directions issued by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment in effect granted substantive reliefs not covered by the judgment/order passed in the original proceeding. In the judgment no direction was issued by the High Court that the writ petitioners will be admitted to the cadre of Upper Division Clerks/Assistants in the Directorate. As noted earlier, they have all along been holding the posts of Clerk- cum-Cash Collector which are ex-cadre posts. Entry of such persons into the cadre of Upper Division Clerk/Assistants has to be considered taking into account various aspects of the matter.

                  As contended by learned counsel for respondents, this Court should not go beyond four corners of the order alleged to be flouted in view of ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and MD, ONGC vs. M. George Ravishekaran and others(AIR 2014 SUPREME COURT 950) which reads as under:

                  “15B. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission of contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged. Courts must not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or willful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor the plea of equities can be considered. Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above. The above principles would appear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at the bar, namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Another vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly and Others[3], V.M.Manohar Prasad vs. N. Ratnam Raju and Another[4], Bihar Finance Service House Construction Cooperative Society Ltd. vs. Gautam Goswami and Others[5] and Union of India and Others vs. Subedar Devassy PV[6].”

                  On perusal of judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, it is clear and categorical that the jurisprudence of service law under Article 226 of the Constitution of India demands claim of interest on delayed payment of arrears of salary as well as delayed payment of pensionary benefits in spite of direction of this Court and petitioner is entitled for regular benefits in accordance with law. Therefore the jurisprudence of service law mandates payment of interest on delayed payment of pensionary benefits. It is settled law that the pensionary benefits of an employee like petitioner is statute right equal to the fundamental right as defined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India i.e., right to livelihood. Therefore, the term “regular benefits in accordance with law” certainly includes interest. The ratio laid down by learned counsel for the respondents since there is no specific direction, the Court should not go beyond the orders of this Court in contempt jurisdiction or contempt jurisprudence is not available for the respondents since the direction is regular benefits in accordance with law. Therefore, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for respondents are not applicable. This Court certainly is determining the issue within the terms of the order of this Court.

                  Hence Point No.2 is answered against the respondents.

13. POINT No.3

                  Having held Point Nos.1 and 2 against the respondents as stated supra, the impugned action of the respondents is contrary to the jurisprudence of service law in view of settled principle of law as held by Hon’ble Apex Court that pension and gratuity are no longer any bounty to be distributed by the Government to its employees on their retirement but have become, under the decisions of this Court, valuable rights and property in their hands and any culpable delay in settlement and disbursement thereof must be visited with the penalty of payment of interest at the current market rate till actual payment. Therefore, the action of the respondents certainly amounts to deviation to the orders of this Court and the respondents not complied with the orders of this Court in true spirit as directed. Hence the respondents are liable for punishment under Sections 10 and 12 of Contempt of Court Act, 1971.

14. In view of forgoing discussions, Respondent Nos.2 and 3 are liable to pay Rs.2,000/- each as costs for violation of law to be payable in favour of the Member Secretary, Andhra Pradesh State Legal Services Authority, High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravathi within a period of four (04) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and after such payment the cost memo shall be filed with the Registrar (Judicial), High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati within one (01) week thereafter.

15. Accordingly, the Contempt Case is allowed.

                  Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this contempt case shall stand closed.