Anil K. Narendran, J.

1. The appellant filed W.P.(C) No.12344 of 2025, invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P1 sale notice dated 07.03.2025 issued by the 2nd respondent Special Sale Officer of the 1st respondent Kanjirappally Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., which is a Co-operative Society; and a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to grant a six month time to clear the alleged debt due to the 1st respondent Co- operative Society under Ext.P1 sale notice. The document marked as Ext.P2 is a copy of the objection dated 19.03.2025 made by the petitioner to Ext.P1 sale notice.

2. The appellant-petitioner is the respondent in E.P.No.452 of 2023 on the file of the 2nd respondent Special Sale Officer. The said execution petition was filed by the 1st respondent Co-operative Society for executing the award passed by the 2nd respondent, as the Arbitrator, in A.R.C.No.238 of 2021.

3. The appellant-petitioner had earlier approached this Court in W.P.(C)No.12671 of 2024, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding respondents 1 to 4 herein to stop all further proceedings pursuant to Ext.P5 notice dated 27.11.2023 issued by the 2nd respondent Special Sale Officer and Ext.P6 attachment notice dated 30.12.2023; and a writ of mandamus commanding respondents 1 to 4 herein to grant interest waiver, in accordance with the directions of the Apex Court, and circulars issued by the Reserve Bank of India and the Central Government, and allow him to remit the due amount in installments.

4. W.P.(C)No.12671 of 2024 was disposed of by Ext.P3 judgment dated 18.06.2024, granting liberty to the petitioner to pay Rs.42,86,034/- as on 11.06.2024, along with all applicable charges and interest, in 20 equal monthly installments, commencing from 30.07.2024. In Ext.P3 judgment, it was made clear that if the petitioner defaults payment of two installments, as ordered above, further action pursuant thereto can be taken, without obtaining further orders from this Court. Ext.P3 judgment dated 18.06.2024 of the learned Single Judge reads thus;

                  “When this matter was called today, the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank submitted that, the total outstanding in the loan account of the petitioner, as on 11.06.2024, is Rs.42,86,034/-; and that if he is willing to pay the same in not more than 20 equal monthly installments, his client will not stand in the way of this Court disposing of this writ petition on such terms.

                  2. Sri. C.P. Udayabhanu-learned counsel for the petitioner, fully agreed to the afore and prayed that this writ petition be thus ordered.

                  3. In the afore circumstances, I allow this writ petition, granting liberty to the petitioner to pay Rs.42,86,034/- as on 11.06.2024, along with all applicable charges and interest, in 20 equal monthly installments, commencing from 30.07.2024.

                  Needless to say, if the petitioner continues to pay as afore, all recovery action against the petitioner will stand deferred; but if he defaults payment of two installments as ordered above, further action pursuant thereto can be taken forward, without having to obtain further orders from this Court.”        (underline supplied)

5. Going by the averments in paragraph 4 of the statement of facts in W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025, pursuant to Ext.P3 judgment dated 18.06.2024 in W.P.(C)No.12671 of 2024, the petitioner remitted only an amount of Rs.5,25,000/-, as against the dues as on 11.06.2024 amounting to Rs.42,86,034/-, along with all applicable charges and interest. The petitioner will be able to pay the balance amount due to the 1st respondent Co- operative Society, within a maximum period of six months.

6. In W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025, a counter affidavit dated 22.05.2025 was filed on behalf of the 1st respondent Co- operative Society, producing therewith Ext.R1(a) award dated 26.08.2022 of the Arbitrator in A.R.C.No.238 of 2021. Ext.R1(a) award has become final and conclusive. Since the amount was not paid, the Society was compelled to initiate execution proceedings as E.P.No.452 of 2023. The petitioner, having violated the conditions stipulated in Ext.P3 judgment, cannot challenge the same cause of action in a subsequent writ petition. In the counter affidavit, it is stated that the 1st respondent is presently running at a net loss of Rs.7 crores, and the Non- Performing Assets (NPAs) are 33%. Unless the amounts are recovered, the Society will not be able to repay its depositors. Paragraphs 5 to 7 of the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent read thus;

                  “5. It is submitted that the total amount due from the petitioner to the Society as on 25.04.2025 comes to Rs.41,07,972/- with future interest, costs and expenses.

                  6. The Society is to recover the amount due to it, since for the smooth functioning of the society and its financial stability, it is to recover the amounts due from the defaulters. If the bank is not enable to recover the amount, it is submitted that it will result in a situation where it will not be able to carry out the business in a financially viable manner.

                  7. It is submitted that Society is presently running at a net loss of 7 crores and the NPA is 33%. Unless the amounts are recovered, the Society will not be able to repay to its depositors.”        (underline supplied)

7. On 12.11.2025, the appellant-petitioner filed I.A.No.2 of 2025 in W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025 seeking an order to amend the writ petition for incorporating para 7 in the statement of facts and ground C and also an additional relief, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to grant time to the appellant-petitioner for clearing the alleged debt due to the 1st respondent Co-operative Society as per Ext.P1 sale notice dated 07.03.2025, up to 28.02.2026.

8. After considering the rival contentions, the learned Single Judge dismissed W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025 by the impugned judgment dated 12.11.2025. Paragraph 2 and also the last paragraph of the judgment dated 12.11.2025 read thus;

                  “2. In this writ petition, it is the case of the petitioner that, after the judgment in W.P.(C)No.12671 of 2024, the petitioner paid a sum of Rs.5.25 lakhs towards the loan liability. It is stated that the petitioner will be in a position to pay the balance amount due to the Bank within a maximum period of six months. This writ petition is dated 21.03.2025. The sale pursuant to Ext.P1 did not take place. More than six months have elapsed since the date of filing of this writ petition. Even today, the petitioner is not in a position to clear the liability, and an interlocutory application has been filed today seeking an amendment of the writ petition seeking time up to 28.02.2026 to clear the liability.

                  Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank and in the facts and circumstances noticed above, I am of the opinion that the petitioner has not made out any case for the grant of the reliefs sought for in the writ petition. The period of six months originally sought to clear the liability has elapsed. Thus, there is no bona fides in the claim of the petitioner. The writ petition fails, and it is accordingly dismissed.”        (underline supplied)

9. Challenging the judgment dated 12.11.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025, the appellant- petitioner is before this Court in this writ appeal, invoking the provisions under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958.

10. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner, the learned Standing Counsel for Kanjirappally Service Co- operative Bank for respondents 1 and 2 and also the learned Senior Government Pleader for respondents 3 to 5.

11. The learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner would submit that the appellant may be granted further time to pay off the entire dues in respect of the loan availed from the 1st respondent Co-operative Society. Though the petitioner filed I.A.No.2 of 2025 in W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025 seeking an order to amend the writ petition, for seeking an additional relief to grant time for clearing the alleged debt due to the 1st respondent Co- operative Society, as per Ext.P1 sale notice dated 07.03.2025, up to 28.02.2026, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by the impugned judgment dated 12.11.2025, without passing any orders on the application for amendment. The dismissal of the writ petition, without taking up and deciding the amendment application, amounts to failure to decide an essential issue, which itself constitute a valid ground for interference in this intra-court appeal. When the petitioner is taking steps for the sale of the property, in order to raise funds to clear the alleged debt due to the 1st respondent Co-operative Society, the learned Single Judge ought to have granted extension of time as sought for. The learned Single Judge failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to prevent manifest injustice, especially when no third-party interests are created and the petitioner was before this Court with clear hands and bona fide intent.

12. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for Kanjirappally Service Co-operative Bank, for respondents 1 and 2 would contend that the reasoning of the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment dated 12.11.2025 in W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025 is neither perverse nor patently illegal, which warrants no interference in this intra-court appeal filed under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. After the disposal of W.P.(C)No.12671 of 2024, by Ext.P4 judgment dated 18.06.2024, the appellant-petitioner, who failed to pay off the liability amounting to Rs.42,86,034/- as on 11.06.2024, along with all applicable charges and interest, in 20 equal monthly installments, commencing from 30.07.2024, cannot again approach this Court in another writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the 1st respondent Co-operative Society to grant six month time to clear the debt due under Ext.P1 sale notice. As pointed out in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 1st respondent, the Society is presently running at a net loss of Rs.7 crores, and the Non-Performing Assets are 33%. Unless the amounts are recovered, the Society will not be able to repay its debtors.

13. In respect of the loan availed by the appellant- petitioner from the 1st respondent Co-operative Society, the arbitrator has passed Ext.R1(a) award dated 26.08.2022. For executing the said award, the 1st respondent filed E.P.No.452 of 2023 before the 2nd respondent Special Sale Officer. In that execution petition, the 2nd respondent had issued Ext.P1 sale notice dated 07.03.2025, which was under challenge in W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025 filed by the appellant. Though a writ of certiorari was sought for in the said writ petition against Ext.P1 sale notice, a reading of the impugned judgment dated 12.11.2025 of the learned Single Judge would make it explicitly clear that the relief pressed at the time of consideration of W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025 was the alternative relief sought for in that writ petition, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to grant six month time to the petitioner for clearing the alleged debt due to the 1st respondent Co-operative Society, under Ext.P1 sale notice. The said fact is evident from the grounds raised in this writ appeal and also the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner, which we have noted hereinbefore at paragraph 11.

14. As already noticed hereinbefore, the appellant herein had earlier approached this Court in W.P.(C)No.12671 of 2024, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents 1 to 4 herein to stop all further proceedings pursuant to Ext.P5 notice dated 27.11.2023 issued by the 2nd respondent Special Sale Officer and Ext.P6 attachment notice dated 30.12.2023. In that writ petition, the appellant has also sought for a writ of mandamus commanding respondents 1 to 4 herein to grant interest waiver, in accordance with the directions of the Apex Court, and the circulars issued by the Reserve Bank of India and the Central Government, and allow the appellant to remit the due amount in installments. By Ext.P3 judgment dated 18.06.2024, W.P.(C)No.12671 of 2024 was disposed of, granting liberty to the appellant to pay Rs.42,86,034/- as on 11.06.2024, along with all applicable charges and interest, in 20 equal monthly installments, commencing from 30.07.2024. In that judgment, it was made clear that if the appellant herein defaults on payment of two installments as ordered above, further action pursuant thereto can be taken forward, without having to obtain further orders from this Court.

15. Going by the averments in paragraph 4 of the statement of facts in W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025, pursuant to Ext.P3 judgment dated 18.06.2024 in W.P.(C)No.12671 of 2024, the appellant herein remitted only an amount of Rs.5,25,000/-. Therefore, it is an admitted fact that the appellant had defaulted payment of the debt due to the 1st respondent Co-operative Society in terms of the directions contained in Ext.P3 judgment. As provided in Ext.P3 judgment, further action was taken in E.P.No.452 of 2023 in A.R.C.No.238 of 2021, which had resulted in the issuance of Ext.P1 sale notice dated 07.03.2025 by the 2nd respondent Special Sale Officer.

16. On 22.03.2025, the appellant filed W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025 stating that he will be able to pay the balance amount due to the 1st respondent Co-operative Society, within a maximum period of six months. In the said writ petition, which came up for admission on 27.03.2025, notice before admission was ordered. Thereafter, on 11.04.2025, the learned Single Judge granted interim stay of confirmation of sale pursuant to Ext.P1 sale notice for a period of two months. On 10.06.2025, a counter affidavit dated 22.05.2025 was filed in W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025, on behalf of the 1st respondent Co-operative Society, opposing the reliefs sought for. On 10.06.2025 and 18.08.2025, the interim order was extended by two months. Thereafter, on 16.10.2025, the interim order was extended by three months.

17. Since W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025 is one filed on 22.03.2025, the six month time for clearing the alleged debt due to the 1st respondent Co-operative Society under Ext.P1 sale notice, as sought for in that writ petition, expired on 22.09.2025. It is after the expiry of the said period, the appellant has chosen to file I.A.No.2 of 2025 in W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025, on 12.11.2025, for amending the writ petition seeking an additional relief to grant time up to 28.02.2026 to clear the alleged debt due to the 1st respondent Co-operative Society, as per Ext.P1 sale notice.

18. In the impugned judgment dated 12.11.2025, the learned Single Judge noticed that though more than six months have elapsed since the filing of the writ petition, even on 12.11.2025, the petitioner is not in a position to clear the liability. Moreover, a reading of the affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.2 of 2025 would show lack of bona fides on the part of the appellant herein in filing such an application for amendment, to seek extension of time up to 28.02.2026, to clear the dues as per Ext.P1 sale notice. Paragraph 2 of the said affidavit contains a statement to the effect that, during the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner has arranged for the sale of the property. A buyer has come forward to purchase the property, who has agreed  to  pay  the  entire  sale  consideration  on  or  before 28.02.2026.

19. The details of the buyer or the sale consideration are not disclosed in the affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.2 of 2025. After taking note of the default committed by the petitioner in paying the debt due to the 1st respondent Co-operative Society, in terms of the directions contained in Ext.P3 judgment dated 11.04.2024 in W.P.(C)No.12306 of 2024, the learned Single Judge dismissed W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025, without considering I.A.No.2 of 2025 filed on 12.11.2025 for amending the writ petition. In the facts and circumstances of the case, which we have noticed hereinbefore, the learned Single Judge cannot be found fault with in adopting such a procedure while dismissing W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025. The contentions to the contra raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner are liable to be rejected as untenable and we do so.

20. In Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam [AIR 1965 SC 1150], a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, if the underlying rule of constructive res judicata is not applied to writ proceedings, it would be open to the party to take one proceeding after another and urge new grounds every time, and would be inconsistent with considerations of public policy.

                  The relevant observations made at paragraph 8 read as under;

                  “8. ….. the rule of constructive res judicata which is pleaded against him in the present appeal is, in a sense, a somewhat technical or artificial rule prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. This rule postulates that if a plea could have been taken by a party in a proceeding between him and his opponent, he would not be permitted to take that plea against the same party in a subsequent proceeding which is based on the same cause of action; but basically, even this view is founded on the same considerations of public policy, because if the doctrine of constructive res judicata is not applied to writ proceedings, it would be open to the party to take one proceeding after another and urge new grounds every time; and that plainly is inconsistent with considerations of public policy …..”

                  (underline supplied)

21. The ‘Henderson Principle’ is a foundational doctrine in common law that addresses the issue of multiplicity in litigation. It embodies the broader concept of procedural fairness, abuse of process and judicial efficiency by mandating that all claims and issues that could and ought to have been raised in a previous litigation should not be relitigated in subsequent proceedings. The extended form of res judicata, known as constructive res judicata, contained in Section 11, Explanation VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, originates from this principle.

22. In Henderson v. Henderson [(1843) 3 Hare 999] the English Court of Chancery speaking through Sir James Wigram, Vice-Chancellor, held that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation and the adjudication of a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties so litigating are required to bring forward their whole case. Once the litigation has been adjudicated by a Court of competent jurisdiction, the same parties will not be permitted to reopen the lis in respect of issues which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest but were not, irrespective of whether the same was due to any form of negligence, inadvertence, accident or omission. It was further held that the principle of res judicata applies not only to points upon which the Court was called upon by the parties to adjudicate and pronounce a judgment, but also to every possible or probable point or issue that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and the parties ought to have brought forward at the time. The relevant observations read as under;

                  “In trying this question I believe I state the rule of the Court correctly when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. ….”      (underline supplied)

23. The above proposition of law came to be known as the ‘Henderson Principle’ and underwent significant evolution, adapting to changing judicial landscapes and procedural requirements. The House of Lords in Johnson v. Gore Wood and Co. [(2002) 2 A.C. 1], upon examining the ‘Henderson Principle’, authoritatively approved it. In Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. Zodiac Seats UK Ltd. [(2014) A.C. 160], Lord Sumption JSC further expounded the ‘Henderson Principle’ as although separate and distinct from cause of action estoppel or res judicata yet having the same underlying public interest that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. Even in a common law action, it was said by Blackburn, J. in Newington v. Levy [(1870) L.R. 6 C.P. 180] that the doctrine of res judicata applies to all matters which existed at the time of giving of the judgment and which the party had an opportunity of bringing before the Court.

24. The ‘Henderson Principle’ was approvingly referred to and applied by a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain [(1977) 2 SCC 806] as the underlying principle for res judicata and and constructive res judicata for assuring finality to litigation. The Three-Judge Bench found that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If, in such a case, a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. The Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process. Res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. This is, therefore, another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. Thatis whythis other rulehas sometimes been referred to as constructive res judicata, which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle. The relevant observations made by the Three-Judge Bench read thus;

                  “3. The principle of estoppel per rem judicatam is a rule of evidence. As has been stated in Marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council [(1939) 2 K.B. 426 at p. 437], it may be said to be “the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action”. This doctrine is based on two theories: (i) the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of the community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the interest of the individual that he should be protected from the multiplication of litigation. It therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action, for otherwise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the courts to recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgment, or give rise to another cause of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the general principle of res judicata.

                  4. But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If, in such a case, a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process and Somervell, L.J., has answered it as follows in Greenhalgh v. Mallard [(1947) All ER 255 at p. 257]: “I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.

                  This is therefore another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has sometimes been referred to as constructive res judicata, which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle.” (underline supplied)

25. In Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the fundamental policy of the law is that there must be finality to litigation. Multiplicity of litigation benefits not the litigants whose rights have been determined, but those who seek to delay the enforcement of those rights and prevent them from reaching the rightful beneficiaries of    the adjudication. The ‘Henderson Principle’, in the same manner as the principles underlying res judicata, is intended to ensure that grounds of attack or defence in litigation must be taken in one of the same proceedings. A party that avoids doing so does it at its own peril. In deciding as to whether a matter might have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the court must ask itself as to whether it could have been urged. In deciding whether the matter ought to have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the court will have due regard to the ambit of the earlier proceedings and the nexus which the matter bears to the nature of the controversy. In holding that a matter ought to have been taken as a ground of attack or defence in the earlier proceedings, the court is indicating that the matter is of such a nature and character and bears such a connection with the controversy in the earlier case that the failure to raise it in that proceeding would debar the party from agitating it in the future. The doctrine itself is based on public policy flowing from the age-old legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, which means that in the interest of the State, there should be an end to litigation and no party ought to be vexed twice in a litigation for one and the same cause.

                  25.1.   In Celir LLP [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], the Apex Court reiterated that the ‘Henderson Principle’ is a core component of the broader doctrine of abuse of process, aimed at enthusing in the parties a sense of sanctity towards judicial adjudications and determinations. It ensures that litigants are not subjected to repetitive and vexatious legal challenges. At its core, the principle stipulates that all claims and issues that could and should have been raised in an earlier proceeding are barred from being raised in subsequent litigation, except in exceptional circumstances. This rule not only supports the finality of judgments but also underscores the ideals of judicial propriety and fairness.

                  25.2.   In Celir LLP [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], the Apex Court noticed that there are four situations where, in second proceedings between the same parties, doctrine res judicata as a corollary of the principle of abuse of process may be invoked; (i) cause of action estoppel, where the entirety of a decided cause of action is sought to be relitigated; (ii) issue estoppel or, ‘decided issue estoppel’, where an issue is sought to be relitigated, which has been raised and decided as a fundamental step in arriving at the earlier judicial decision; (iii) extended or constructive res judicata, i.e., ‘unraised issue estoppel’, where an issue is sought to be litigated which could, and should, have been raised in a previous action but was not raised; (iv) a further extension of the aforesaid to points not raised in relation to an issue in the earlier decision, as opposed to issues not raised in relation to the decision itself. As part of the broader rule against abuse of process, the ‘Henderson Principle’ is rooted in the idea of preventing the judicial process from being exploited in any manner that tends to undermine its integrity. This idea of preventing abuse of judicial process is not confined to specific procedure rules, but rather aligned to a broader purport of giving quietus to litigation and finality to judicial decisions. The essence of this rule is that litigation must be conducted in good faith, and parties should not engage in procedural tactics that fragment disputes, prolong litigation, or undermine the outcomes of such litigation. It is not a rigid rule but rather a flexible principle to prevent oppressive, unfair, or detrimental litigation.

                  25.3.   In Celir LLP [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], the Apex Court held that piecemeal litigation where issues are deliberately fragmented across separate proceedings to gain an unfair advantage is in itself a facet of abuse of process of law and would also fall foul of the ‘Henderson Principle’. Merely because one proceeding initiated by a party differs in some aspects from another proceeding or happens to be before a different forum, will not make the subsequent proceeding distinct in nature from the former, if the underlying subject matter or the seminal issues involved remains substantially similar to each other or connected to the earlier subject matter by a certain degree, then such proceeding would tantamount to ‘relitigating’ and the ‘Henderson Principle’ would be applicable. Parties cannot be allowed to exploit procedural loopholes and different fora to revisit the same matters they had deliberately chosen not to pursue earlier. Thus, where a party deliberately withholds certain claims or issues in one proceeding with the intention to raise them in a subsequent litigation disguised as a distinct or separate remedy or proceeding from the initial one,         such Subsequent litigation will also fall foul of the ‘Henderson Principle’. Similarly, where a plea or issue was raised in earlier proceedings but later abandoned, it is deemed waived and cannot be relitigated in subsequent proceedings. Allowing such pleas to be resurrected in later cases would not only undermine the finality of judgments but also incentivize strategic behaviour, where parties could withdraw claims in one case with the intention of reintroducing them later. Abandonment signifies acquiescence, barring its reconsideration in subsequent litigation. This ensures that judicial processes are not misused for tactical advantage and that litigants are held accountable for their procedural choices. Parties must litigate diligently and in good faith, presenting their entire case at the earliest opportunity.

                  25.4.   In Celir LLP [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], the Apex Court held that the ‘Henderson Principle’ operates on the broader contours of judicial propriety and fairness, ensuring that the judicial system remains an instrument of justice rather than a platform for procedural manipulation. Judicial propriety demands that courts maintain the finality and integrity of their decisions, preventing repeated challenges to settled matters. Once a matter has been adjudicated, it should not be revisited unless exceptional circumstances warrant such reconsideration.

Repeated litigation of the same issue not only wastes judicial resources but also subjects the opposing party to unnecessary expense and harassment. judicial processes are not merely technical mechanisms but are rooted in principles of equity and justice.

26. As laid down by a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court  in Nawab  Hussain  [(1977)  2  SCC  806],  as  the underlying principle for res judicata and constructive res judicata or assuring finality to litigation. The same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If, in such a case, a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. The Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process. Res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. This is,  therefore, another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That        is why this other rule has sometimes been referred to as constructive res judicata, which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle.

27. As reiterated by the Apex Court in Celir LLP [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727], the ‘Henderson Principle’ is a core component of the broader doctrine of abuse of process, aimed at enthusing in the parties a sense of sanctity towards judicial adjudications and determinations. It ensures that litigants are not subjected to repetitive and vexatious legal challenges. At its core, the principle stipulates that all claims and issues that could and should have been raised in an earlier proceeding are barred from being raised in subsequent litigation, except in exceptional circumstances. This rule not only supports the finality of judgments but also underscores the ideals of judicial propriety and fairness.

28. As already noticed hereinbefore, a reading of the impugned judgment dated 12.11.2025 of the learned Single Judge would make it explicitly clear that the relief pressed at the time of consideration of W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025 was the alternative relief sought for in that writ petition, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to grant six month time to the petitioner for clearing the alleged debt due to the 1st respondent Co-operative Society, under Ext.P1 sale notice.

29. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, after the disposal of W.P.(C)No.12671 of 2024 by Ext.P3 judgment dated 18.06.2024, the appellant-petitioner who had defaulted payment of the debt due to the 1st respondent Co- operative Society in A.R.C.No.238 of 2021, in terms of the directions contained in that judgment, cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, again by filing another writ petition, i.e., W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025, seeking six month time to clear the debt due to the 1st respondent Co-operative Society under Ext.P1 sale notice dated 07.03.2025, which is one issued by the 2nd respondent Special Sale Officer, on account of the default committed by the appellant in complying with the directions contained in Ext.P3 judgment regarding payment of the entire dues amounting to Rs.42,86,034/- as on 11.06.2024, along with all applicable charges and interest.

                  In the above circumstances, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment dated 12.11.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.12344 of 2025. This writ appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.