Judgment & Order (Cav)
1. Heard Mr. S. Borthakur, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. N.J. Khataniar, learned Standing Counsel for the Elementary Education Department, being respondent Nos.1 - 3, Mr. S. Bora, learned standing counsel, SSA, appearing for the respondent No.4 and Mr. A. Chaliha, learned Standing Counsel for Finance department, being respondent No. 5.
2. In this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged the order, dated 01-09- 2022, issued under Memo No.PMA.52/2020/Pt./30-A by the Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Elementary Education Department and/or any other consequential order(s)/ action(s) and/ or to issue direction to the respondent authority to release the arrear 5% Dearness Allowance/ Dearness Relief from July, 2019 to December, 2021 and 11% & 3% Dearness Allowance/Dearness Relief from July, 2021 to August, 2022 payable to the members of the petitioner Association who have been working as Assistant Teacher in different Lower Primary/Upper Primary schools in the State of Assam.
Background Facts:-
3. The background facts, leading to filing of the present petition, is briefly stated as under:-
“The members of the Petitioner Association, are all TET qualified Teachers appointed in different LP/UP Schools in the state of Assam since 2012, onwards under SSA. They were initially appointed on fixed pay and since April, 2013 they have been receiving their salary at par with the pay structure of regular teacher. They have been granted the benefit of the 7th Pay Commission w.e.f. 01-04-2017. Thereafter, the Government, Vide notification dated 1-7-2020, has provided some additional service benefits to the contractual teachers, who were engaged during 2012-2017 and joined on or before 01-01-2018.
Thereafter, the Govt. has decided to pay 5% DA/DR to the teachers w.e.f. July, 2019, 11% D.A w.e.f. 01/07/2021, 3% w.e.f. 01/07/2021 and 3% w.e.f. 01/01/2022 and issued different OM/Notifications. The Government also paid to the regular teachers the arrear amount accrued on such enhanced D.A. But, the Government, instead of paying the arrear of the said DA/DR, had passed the impugned order, dated 01-09- 2022, issued under Memo No.PMA.52/2020/Pt./30-A, and thereby depriving of the members of the petitioner Association from getting the arrear DA/DR. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have preferred the present application for equitable relief.”
4. The respondent No.1 has filed its affidavit in opposition, wherein, it had taken a stand that the said claim of the petitioner association is wholly misconceived, untenable and devoid of legal foundation. Being contractual employees engaged under a specific scheme, the petitioners cannot claim parity with regular Government employees, whose service conditions are governed by statutory rules. It is also stated that the entitlement of the petitioners to D.A. and other allowances is strictly regulated by the terms of their contractual engagement and by specific orders or notifications, issued by the competent administrative department, from time to time and as such they have no vested right or enforceable claim to seek D.A. benefits from the dates applicable to regular employees of the State Government. It is also stated that the Government in the Department of School Education, after due consideration of all relevant facts including the financial and resource position of the State, had taken a conscious decision to extend the benefit of enhanced Dearness Allowance to contractual teachers and staff under SSA, Assam only prospectively.
Accordingly, vide Notification No. PMA.52/2020/170, dated 19.01.2022, the Government allowed payment of ennanced D.A. @ 5% w.e.f. 01.01.2022, to the Contractual and State Pool Teachers under SSA, Assam, and subsequently, vide Notification No. PMA.52/2020/Pt./30, dated 01.09.2022, further enhancement of 10% w.e.f. 01.09.2022 and 7% w.e.f. 01.04.2023 was sanctioned. Said notifications were issued in exercise of the powers vested in the competent authority of the Elementary Education Department and represent independent policy decisions applicable to contractual employees under the SSA framework. The same cannot be equated with or automatically linked to the Office Memorandum of the Finance (Estt-A) Department, which are applicable only to regular State Government employees governed by statutory service rules. As such, there arises no occasion or legal justification for payment of arrears of D.A. for the earlier periods as claimed by the petitioners.
The Government, having extended the benefit of enhanced D.A. prospectively, has fully discharged its obligation in accordance with policy decisions applicable to the category of employees, to which the petitioners belong. Further, it is stated that the Office Memorandum of the Finance (Estt-A) Department No. FEG.08/2017/95, dated 18.08.2021 (enhancement @ 11% w.e.f. 01.07.2021), OM No. FEG.08/2017/108 dated 06.12.2021 (enhancement @ 3% w.e.f. 01.07.2021), and OM No. FEG.08/2017/115 dated 25.04.2022 (enhancement @ 3% w.e.f. 01.01.2022) are applicable only to regular Government employees and pensioners. These OMs are not automatically applicable to contractual employees, serving under schemes such as SSA. The petitioners' reliance upon these OMs to claim parity is, therefore, misplaced and legally unsustainable. It is also stated that the petitioners' members were initially engaged on contractual basis at a fixed remuneration, under a written agreement with the respective School Management Committees for a specific term. The said contractual terms did not confer entitlement to Dearness Allowance or other allowances as admissible to regular employees. Their service conditions remained distinct and independent from those of permanent Government employees.
Subsequently, vide Notification No. ΡΜΑ.38/2020/26 dated 01.07.2020, the Government, as a matter of policy, extended certain benefits to these contractual teachers, such as continuity of service, leave and entitlement of salary, with effect from 01.07.2020. However, the said notification does not confer any right to Dearness Allowance or any other allowance as applicable to regular employees of the State Government. Similarly, vide Notification No. PMA.38/2020/27, dated 01.07.2020, analogous benefits were extended to Assistant Teachers (State Pool) under SSA, but even this notification remains silent with regard to any entitlement of allowances including D.A. Hence, the contractual or State Pool teachers under SSA cannot derive any right to claim D.A. at par with regular employees of the Government. Further, it is stated that the Government, in extending the benefit of D.A. prospectively, under Notifications dated 19.01.2022, and 01.09.2022, has acted within its lawful authority and financial prudence. The petitioners cannot demand retrospective monetary benefits merely by analogy or comparison with regular employees, in the absence of any statutory or contractual provision supporting such a claim.
Further contention is that the Director of Elementary Education, Assam, vide advertisement No. E-532785/8, dated 06.08.2024, initiated a Special Recruitment Drive (SRD) for regularization of Contractual and State Pool Teachers under SSA, Assam, against 35,133 regular posts of Assistant Teachers. And pursuant to the said drive, a substantial number of such teachers have already been regularized and brought under the regular pay structure of the State Government, thereby enjoying full benefits admissible under service rules. And as such, the claims and reliefs sought by the petitioners are wholly untenable both in law and on facts. The petitioners have already been granted enhanced D.A. benefits in accordance with departmental policy decisions, and no arrears or retrospective benefits are admissible to them. The writ petition is therefore liable to be dismissed.
5. The petitioners association has filed reply to the affidavit in opposition of the respondent No.1, denying the statement and averments made therein. It is stated that the members of the petitioner Association are the contractual employees. And that only on the basis of the promise made by the authorities, the petitioner Association has raised the grievance. It is stated that as disclosed by the letter, dated 28-07-2017, the Govt. has taken decision for giving same benefit to the contractual teachers that of regular teachers in the year 2017 itself. Having deciding to do so the authority, cannot now say that the enhancement of Dearness Allowance from July 2019 to August, 2022 at different rates will not be applicable with respect of the members of the petitioner Association.
The argument that the members of the petitioner Association cannot claim parity of regular Govt. employees is contrary to the decision taken by the Govt., and that the petitioner have been seeking enhancement of their Dearness Allowance prior to January, 2022 to which they are entitled on the basis of the decision taken by the Govt. and the stand so taken by them is bereft of merit and liable to be discarded. Having taken a policy decision to give the members of the petitioner Association benefit equal that of regular employees, now they cannot turn back to say that the members of the petitioner Association are not entitled to such benefit.
It is more surprising that the authorities of the Education department, for number of occasions, have submitted before this Court that the Govt. is positively considering the grievance of the petitioners. Based on such assurance, this Court was also pleased to give time to the Education department, as is apparent from the order dated 7-1-2025, 7-2-2025, 22-4-2025, 14-5-2025, 23-5- 2025, 6-8-2025 and 29-8-2025 of this Court. It is further stated that respondent No.1 has confused the State Pool Teachers with the Contractual Teachers, while the state pool teachers were appointed since the period 2017 on contractual basis, the members of the petitioner Association, on the other hand, were appointed since 2012 and the salary structure of the petitioners was fixed at per Revision of Pay Rule, 2010, w.e.f.1-4-2013. The members of the petitioner Association are not raising the grievance on behalf of State Pool teachers.
6. Mr. Borthakur, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the members of the petitioners’ Association are all TET qualified Teachers and they were appointed in different LP/UP Schools in the state of Assam since 2012, onwards under SSA. Though, initially they were appointed on fixed pay, since April, 2013 they have been paid salary at par with the pay structure of regular Teacher and they have been granted the benefit of the 7th Pay Commission w.e.f. 01-04-2017, vide letter 28.07.2017, No. PMA-457/2017/30. He also submits that vide Notification dated 1-7-2020, the Govt. has provided some additional service benefits to the Contractual Teachers, who were engaged during 2012-2017 and joined on or before 01-01-2018.
6.1. Mr. Borthakur also submits that by issuing different OM/Notifications, the Govt. has decided to pay 5% DA/DR to the teachers w.e.f. July, 2019, 11% D.A w.e.f. 01/07/2021, 3% w.e.f. 01/07/2021 and 3% w.e.f. 01/01/2022 and also paid to the regular Teachers the arrear amount accrued on such enhanced D.A. But, vide impugned order, dated 01-09-2022, the Govt. has deprived of such benefit to the members of the petitioner’s Association.
6.2. Mr. Borthakur also submits that the members of the petitioner’s Association and the regular teachers are discharging the same responsibility and works and as such depriving them of the benefit of arrear pay amounts to discrimination and violative of Article 14,16(1) of the Constitution of India. Under such circumstances, Mr. Borthakur has contended to allow this petition. In support of his submissions, Mr. Borthakur has referred following decisions:-
(i) E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., reported in (1974) 4 SCC 3,
(ii) Rofiqul Islam vs. State of Assam & Ors. reported in 2025 (6) GLT 810,
7. Per contra, Mr. Khataniar, learned standing counsel for the respondent Nos.1—3, has opposed the petition and raised following points for consideration of this Court:
(i) The members of the petitioners' Association were initially engaged on contractual basis at a fixed remuneration, under a written agreement with the respective School Management Committees for a specific term. The said contractual terms did not confer entitlement to Dearness Allowance or other allowances as admissible to regular employees. Their service conditions remained distinct and independent from those of permanent Government employees.
(ii) The Government, having extended the benefit of enhanced D.A. prospectively, has fully discharged its obligation in accordance with policy decisions applicable to the category of employees to which the petitioners belonging.
(iii) They have no vested right or enforceable claim to seek D.A. benefits from the dates applicable to regular employees of the State Government, whose service conditions are governed by statutory rules.
(iv) The Govt., after due consideration of all relevant facts including the financial and resource position of the State, had taken a conscious decision to extend the benefit of enhanced Dearness Allowance to contractual teachers and staff under SSA, Assam only prospectively.
(v) The petitioners cannot demand retrospective monetary benefits merely by analogy or comparison with regular employees, in the absence of any statutory or contractual provision supporting such a claim.
7.1. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, Mr. Khataniar submits that there is no merit in this petition and therefore, it is contended to dismiss the same. He has also referred following decisions in support of his submission:
(i) State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh, reported in (2009) 9 SCC 514.
(ii) State of Bihar v. Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee, reported in (2019) 18 SCC 301.
8. In view of the rival contentions made by the parties in their respective pleading and also the rival submissions made by the their respective counsels, the issue to be decided by this Court is:-
(i) Whether the members of the petitioners Association are discharging the same duties like the regular teachers and if so denial of arrear DA to the member of petitioners’ Association has violated the provision of Article 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India?
9. Having heard the submission of learned Advocates of both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and also perused the order, dated 01-09-2022, issued under No.PMA.52/2020/Pt./30 by the Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Elementary Education Department (Annexure-H). Also gone through the decisions referred by Mr. Borthakur, learned counsel for the petitioners.
10. From the contentions being made in the respective pleadings of the parties and also from the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, following facts and circumstances emerges:-
(i) Sadou Axom Prathamik TET Uttirno Sikshak Samaj, is an association of all TET qualified Teachers appointed in different LP/UP Schools in the state of Assam since 2012, onwards under SSA.
(ii) They were appointed on fixed pay and since April, 2013 they have been receiving their salary at par with the pay structure of regular Teacher.
(iii) They have been granted the benefit of the 7th Pay Commission w.e.f. 01-04-2017.
(iv) The Government, vide notification dated 1-7-2020, has provided some additional service benefits to them, who were engaged during 2012-2017 and joined on or before 01-01-2018.
(v) The Govt. has decided to pay 5% DA/DR to the teachers w.e.f. July, 2019, 11% D.A w.e.f. 01/07/2021, 3% w.e.f. 01/07/2021 and 3% w.e.f. 01/01/2022 and issued different OM/Notifications.
(vi) The Govt. has also paid to the regular Teachers the arrear amount accrued on such enhanced D.A.
(vii) The Govt. instead of paying the arrear of the said DA/DR, to the members of the petitioner’s Association, had passed the impugned order, dated 01-09-2022, issued under Memo No.PMA.52/2020/Pt./30-A, and depriving the members of the petitioner’s Association from getting the arrear DA/DR.
(viii) It is not in dispute that the members of the petitioners Association, being the contractual teachers are discharging the same duties like the regular teachers. There is no contention in this regard in the affidavit filed by the respondent No.1 nor there is any submission made by Mr. Khataniar, learned standing counsel for the respondent Nos.1—3, during argument.
11. In this context, this Court deemed it appropriate to reproduce the impugned order, dated 01-09-2022, issued under No.PMA.52/2020/Pt./30, and depriving the members of the petitioner’s Association from getting the arrear DA/DR, herein under:-
GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM ELEMENTARY EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
Dispur, Guwahati-6
No. PMA.52/2020/Pt/30 Dated Dispur, the 1st September, 2022
O R D E R
In pursuance of the Govt. Notification No. PMA.52/2020/170 dated 19/01/2022, the Contractual Teachers (Contractual & State Pool) and Other Staff/ Officers under SSA, Assam have been drawing 17% Dearness Allowance (D.A.) w.e.f. January, 2022. Meanwhile, Govt. in Finance Department further enhanced 17% D.A. (11% w.e.f. 01/07/2021 vide OM No. FEG.08/2017/95 dated 18/08/2021.3% w.e.f. 01/07/2021 vide OM No. FEG.08/2017/108, dated 06/12/2021 and 3% w.e.f. 01/01/2022 vide OM No. FEG.08/2017/115 dated 25/04/2022). As such Government in Elementary Education Department is pleased to allow the following D.A. benefits to the Contractual Teachers and Other Staff/Officers under SSA, Assam.
1. 10% enhancement of D.A. w.e.f. 1st September, 2022.
2. Balance 7% enhancement of D.A. w.e.f. 1st April, 2023.
3. Henceforth, D.A. will be released immediately as and when State Govt. announces.
Sd./-
Dr. Bijoya Choudhury, IAS,
Secretary to the Govt. of Assam Elementary Education Department
Memo No.PMA.52/2020/Pt./30-A Dated Dispur, the 1st September, 2022
12. It is to be noted here the letter, dated 28.07.2017, by which the Commissioner and Secretary to the Government of Assam has decided to extend the benefit of 7th Pay Commission is also reproduced herein below for proper appreciation of the rival contention of the parties.
GOVT. OF ASSAM
ELEMENTARY EDGUCATION DEPARTMENT
Dispur, Guwahati-6
No.PMA 457/2017/30 Dated, Dispur the 28th July 2017
From: Shri Preetom Saikia, IAS, Commissioner & Secretary to the Govt. of Assam.
To: The Mission Director, SSA, Assam, Kahilipara, Guwahati-19.
Sub.: Regarding giving benefits of 7th Pay Commission to the teachers and staff of SSA, Assam.
Ref.: Your letter (sic) dated 29-06-2017 in File No.SSA/ Esstt./ Enhancement/Salary- IA/530/2011/Vol.I.
Madam,
In inviting a reference to the above, I am directed to state that from the beginning it was decided that the contractual L.P/UP teachers under SSA will get same benefit of regular teacher under the Directorate of Elementary Education, Assam.
Accordingly, you are requested to extend the 7th Pay Commission benefit to the contractual teacher of SSA w.e.f. 01-04-2017. Here, it may be pointed out that regarding allowing Grade Pay of Rs.8700/- to untrained Graduate Teachers as per 7th Pay Commission under the Directorate of Elementary Education, Assam who have been drawing Grade Pay of Rs.2500/- as per ROP 2010, the matter was referred to Finance (PRU) Deptt., and as per their advice, the matter has been placed before the Anomaly Committee and their decision recommendation is awaited. As such, while extending benefit of 7th Pay Commission to the contractual teachers under SSA, above matter may be kept in mind.
As regards, for extending benefit of 7th Pay Commission to the non-teaching staff under SSA, matter may be placed before the Executive Committee for their guidance and subject to availability of fund under contingency unlike teachers and also in the line of the Notification No.SSA/Esstt./33/2003 /2152 dated 03-07-2012.
Accordingly, you will make a calculation with regard to the similar categories of employees under the State Govt. and then place it before the Executive Committee for their consideration. The Executive Committee may extend the same benefit or 70% as per Notification dated 03-07-2012.
It may be noted that issues of extending benefit of 7th Pay Commission to contractual teachers & non-teaching staff under SSA are not same.
Yours faithfully
Sd./-Illegible
Commissioner & Secretary to the Govt. of Assam,
Elementary Education Department
Memo No.PMA.457/2017/30-A Dated Dispur, the 28th July, 2017
13. Thus, from the letter No.PMA 457/2017/30, Dated, 28.07.2017, issued by the Commissioner & Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Elementary Education Department and addressed to the Mission Director, SSA, Assam reveals that the Govt. has decided that the contractual L.P/UP teachers under SSA will get same benefit of regular teacher under the Directorate of Elementary Education, Assam.
13.1. It also appears that the impugned order dated 01.09.2022 was passed based upon Govt. Notification, No. PMA.52/2020/170 dated 19.01.2022, (Annexure-F), which read as under:-
GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
ORDERS BY THE GOVERNOR OF ASSAM, DISPUR GUWAHATI-6
NOTIFICATION
Dated Dispur, the 19th January, 2022 No. PMA.52/2020/170. In pursuance of the Cabinet decision in the meeting held on 01.01.2022, the Governor of Assam is pleased to enhance 5% Dearness Allowance for Contractual Teachers and other Staff/Officers under SSA, Assam with effect from 01.01.2022.
Further, decisions on repayment of arrears will be taken later on.
Sd./-
Dr. B.K. Chakravarthy. IAS
Principal Secretary to the Government of Assam, Education Department
Memo No.PMA.52/2020/170-A Dated Dispur, the 19th January, 2017
14. Form the impugned order dated 01.09.2022, it becomes apparent that Govt. in Finance Department further enhanced 17% D.A. (11% w.e.f. 01/07/2021 vide OM No. FEG.08/2017/95 dated 18/08/2021, 3% w.e.f. 01/07/2021 vide OM No. FEG.08/2017/108 dated 06/12/2021 and 3% w.e.f. 01/01/2022, vide OM No. FEG.08/2017/115 dated 25/04/2022). However, the Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Elementary Education Department had allowed the D.A. benefit to the contractual teachers as under i.e. 10% enhancement of D.A. w.e.f. 1st September, 2022, and balance 7% enhancement of D.A. w.e.f. 1st April, 2023. The dates can be depicted in the chart below:-
15. Thus, it appears that though the respondent No.1 had passed the impugned order dated 01.09.2022, pursuant to the Notification No. PMA.52/2020/170, dated 19.01.2022, yet a careful perusal of the said Notification, dated 19.01.2022, indicates that the Governor of Assam has decided to enhance 5% DA for the contractual teachers and other staffs/Officers under SSA with effect from 01.01.2022. In view of above facts and circumstances, the impugned order dated 01.09.2022, appears to be contradictory not only to the Notification, dated 19.01.2022, but also to its own letter dated 28.07.2017, whereby the Government had decided to extend the benefit of 7th Pay Commission to the teachers and staffs of SSA. In view of the letter dated 28.07.2017, whatever benefit is being extended to the regular Teachers under the 7th Pay Commission, the same has to be extended to the Contractual Teachers and staffs also.
16. However, a classification is being sought to be made by the respondent No.1 in its affidavit in opposition and also by the learned standing counsel for the respondent No.1 between the regular teachers and contractual teachers that the contractual terms of the petitioners, who were initially engaged on contractual basis at a fixed remuneration, did not confer entitlement to Dearness Allowance or other allowances as admissible to regular employees and that their service conditions remained distinct and independent from those of permanent Government employees.
16.1. Unfortunately, such contractual terms had not been placed on record before this Court to substantiate such a plea. Rather, the letter dated 28.07.2017 (Annexure-B) goes to show that the Government had decided to extend the benefit of 7th Pay Commission to the teachers and staffs of SSA. If D.A. is enhanced to the regular teachers under the 7th Pay Commission from time to time, the respondent No.1 is bound by its own decision to extend similar benefit to the contractual teachers also.
16.2. Moreover, in para No.10 of this judgment it has already been held that there is no dispute that the members of the petitioner’s Association, being the contractual teachers are discharging the same duties like the regular teachers. There is no contention in this regard in the affidavit filed by the respondent No.1 nor any submission was made by Mr. Khataniar, learned standing counsel during his argument. In view of above, the classification, being sought to be made between the regular teachers and contractual teachers appears be not based upon any intelligible differentia.
16.3. It is to be noted here that classification, to be reasonable, must fulfill the following two conditions:-
(i) The classification must be founded on the intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or thing that are grouped together from others left out of the group;
(ii) The differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the act.
The differentia, which is the basis of the classification and the object of the act are two distinct things. What is necessary is that there must be nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the act which makes the classification. It is only when there is no reasonable basis for a classification that legislation making such classification may be declared discriminatory.
16.4. It is well settled that Article 14 of the Constitution of India forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification of persons, objects, and transactions by the legislature for the purpose of achieving specific ends. But, classification must not be “arbitrary, artificial or evasive”. It must always rest upon some real and substantial distinction, bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation. Notably, Article 14 read as under:-
“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”.
The first portion of the article speaks of equality is a guarantee that no individual is above the law. This guarantee is affected by its analogy in the second portion, which provides equal protection of the legislation to individuals. Therefore, any exception to equality is only permissible, if the State has reasonable grounds for different treatment of individuals. Therefore, the validity of state action relies on an assessment of the reasons for state action. This is an important connection in Article 14 between equality and rationality.
16.5. Thus, as submitted by Mr. Borthakur, the learned counsel for the petitioners, this Court afraid the impugned order, dated 01.09.2022, may not withstand the test of reasonable classification, as laid down in the case of E.P Royappa (supra), so referred by him. Notably, in the case of E.P. Royappa (supra) in para No.85, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“85. The last two grounds of challenge may be taken up together for consideration. Though we have formulated the third ground of challenge as a distinct and separate ground, it is really in substance and effect merely an aspect of the second ground based on violation of Articles 14 and 16. Article 16 embodies the fundamental guarantee that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Though enacted as a distinct and independent fundamental right because of its great importance as a principle ensuring equality of opportunity in public employment which is so vital to the building up of the new classless egalitarian society envisaged in the Constitution, Article 16 is only an instance of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14. In other words, Article 14 is the genus while Article 16 is a species. Article 16 gives effect to the doctrine of equality in all matters relating to public employment. The basic principle which, therefore, informs both Articles 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle? It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose. J., ‚a way of life‛, and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be ‚cribbed, cabined and confined‛ within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it effects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would amount to mala fide exercise of power and that is hit by Articles 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from the same vice: in fact the latter comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by Articles 14 and 16.”
16.6. Again in the case of D.S. Nakara vs. Union of India, reported in (1983) 1 SCC 305, Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the principle enunciated in the case of E.P. Royappa (supra). In the said case, the Government issued an office memorandum announcing a liberalized pension scheme for retired government servants, but made it applicable to those who had retired after 31st March, 1979.
16.7. Then dealing with the issue, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the division, that distinguished pensioners into two classes based on their specific date of retirement is completely void of any rational principle and is both arbitrary and unscrupulous, being unrelated to the objective sought to be accomplished by granting liberalized pension. It also violates the equal treatment guaranteed in Art. 14 of the Constitution as well as the pension rules, which were statutory in nature, meted out differential and discriminatory treatment to equals in the matter of calculation of pension from the dates specified in the challenged memorandum.
16.8. In the case of Madhu Limaye v. Supdt. Tihar Jail Delhi, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 525, Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the same principle. In the said case, there were Indian and European Prisoners in the jail. Both were treated differently. European gets better diet. Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that difference between Indian and European prisoners in the matter of treatment and diet violates right to equality under Article 14 of Indian prisoners. They all are prisoners they must be treated equally.
16.9. Therefore, the classification sought to be made by the respondent No.1 and its counsel, left this Court unimpressed. And therefore, this Court is unable to agree with the same. This Court has already held about absence of quarrel at the Bar about the similar nature of duties performed by the members of the petitioner’s Association, being the contractual teachers and also by the regular teachers. In the case of the State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Jagjit Singh, reported in (2017)1 SCC 148, Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛, considering some of its earlier decisions, Hon’ble Supreme Court has deduced the following principles :-
“42.1. The ‚onus of proof‛ of parity in the duties and responsibilities of the subject post with the reference post under the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ lies on the person who claims it. He who approaches the court has to establish that the subject post occupied by him requires him to discharge equal work of equal value, as the reference post (see- Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty, (2003) 5 SCC 188, U.T. Chandigarh, Admn. v. ManjuMathur, (2011) 2 SCC 452 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 348], SAIL v. Dibyendu Bhattacharya, (2011) 11 SCC 122 and National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Ananta Kishore Rout, (2014) 6 SCC 756).
42.2. The mere fact that the subject post occupied by the claimant is in a ‚different department‛ vis-à-vis the reference post does not have any bearing on the determination of a claim under the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛. Persons discharging identical duties cannot be treated differently in the matter of their pay, merely because they belong to different departments of the Government (see Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618 and D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 3050).
42.3. The principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛, applies to cases of unequal scales of pay, based on no classification or irrational classification (see- Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618). For equal pay, the employees concerned with whom equation is sought, should be performing work, which besides being functionally equal, should be of the same quality and sensitivity (see -Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers v. Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 91], Mewa Ram Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, (1989) 2 SCC 235, GrihKalyan Kendra Workers' Union v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 619] and S.C. Chandra case [S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, (2007) 8 SCC 279).
42.4. Persons holding the same rank/designation (in different departments), but having dissimilar powers, duties and responsibilities, can be placed in different scales of pay and cannot claim the benefit of the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ (see - Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618, and State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn., (2002) 6 SCC 72). Therefore, the principle would not be automatically invoked merely because the subject and reference posts have the same nomenclature.
42.5. In determining equality of functions and responsibilities under the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛, it is necessary to keep in mind that the duties of the two posts should be of equal sensitivity, and also, qualitatively similar. Differentiation of pay scales for posts with difference in degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality, would fall within the realm of valid classification, and therefore, pay differentiation would be legitimate and permissible (see –Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers v. Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 91 and SBI v. M.R. Ganesh Babu, (2002) 4 SCC 556). The nature of work of the subject post should be the same and not less onerous than the reference post. Even the volume of work should be the same. And so also, the level of responsibility. If these parameters are not met, parity cannot be claimed under the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ (see -State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121) and GrihKalyan Kendra Workers' Union v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 619.
42.6. For placement in a regular pay scale, the claimant has to be a regular appointee. The claimant should have been selected on the basis of a regular process of recruitment. An employee appointed on a temporary basis cannot claim to be placed in the regular pay scale (see Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty, (2003) 5 SCC 188).
42.7. Persons performing the same or similar functions, duties and responsibilities, can also be placed in different pay scales. Such as — ‚selection grade‛, in the same post. But this difference must emerge out of a legitimate foundation, such as — merit, or seniority, or some other relevant criteria (see -State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121).
42.8. If the qualifications for recruitment to the subject post vis-à-vis the reference post are different, it may be difficult to conclude that the duties and responsibilities of the posts are qualitatively similar or comparable (see Mewa Ram Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, (1989) 2 SCC 235) and State of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347.In such a case the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ cannot be invoked.
42.9. The reference post with which parity is claimed under the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ has to be at the same hierarchy in the service as the subject post. Pay scales of posts may be different, if the hierarchy of the posts in question, and their channels of promotion, are different. Even if the duties and responsibilities are same, parity would not be permissible, as against a superior post, such as a promotional post (see Union of India v. Pradip Kumar Dey, (2000) 8 SCC 580] and Hukum Chand Gupta v. ICAR, (2012) 12 SCC 666.
42.10. A comparison between the subject post and the reference post under the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ cannot be made where the subject post and the reference post are in different establishments, having a different management. Or even, where the establishments are in different geographical locations, though owned by the same master (see -HarbansLal v. State of H.P., (1989) 4 SCC 459. Persons engaged differently, and being paid out of different funds, would not be entitled to pay parity (see - Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1.
42.11. Different pay scales, in certain eventualities, would be permissible even for posts clubbed together at the same hierarchy in the cadre. As for instance, if the duties and responsibilities of one of the posts are more onerous, or are exposed to higher nature of operational work/risk, the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ would not be applicable. And also when the reference post includes the responsibility to take crucial decisions, and that is not so for the subject post (see - SBI v. M.R. Ganesh Babu, (2002) 4 SCC 556).
42.12. The priority given to different types of posts under the prevailing policies of the Government can also be a relevant factor for placing different posts under different pay scales. Herein also, the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ would not be applicable (see - State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn., (2002) 6 SCC 72).
42.13. The parity in pay, under the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛, cannot be claimed merely on the ground that at an earlier point of time the subject post and the reference post, were placed in the same pay scale. The principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ is applicable only when it is shown, that the incumbents of the subject post and the reference post, discharge similar duties and responsibilities (see -State of W.B. v. W.B. Minimum Wages Inspectors Assn., (2010) 5 SCC 225).
42.14. For parity in pay scales under the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛, equation in the nature of duties is of paramount importance. If the principal nature of duties of one post is teaching, whereas that of the other is non-teaching, the principle would not be applicable. If the dominant nature of duties of one post is of control and management, whereas the subject post has no such duties, the principle would not be applicable. Likewise, if the central nature of duties of one post is of quality control, whereas the subject post has minimal duties of quality control, the principle would not be applicable (see -U.T. Chandigarh, Admn. v. ManjuMathur, (2011) 2 SCC 452.
42.15. There can be a valid classification in the matter of pay scales between employees even holding posts with the same nomenclature i.e. between those discharging duties at the headquarters, and others working at the institutional/sub-office level (see Hukum Chand Gupta case [Hukum Chand Gupta v. ICAR, (2012) 12 SCC 666), when the duties are qualitatively dissimilar.
42.16. The principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ would not be applicable, where a differential higher pay scale is extended to persons discharging the same duties and holding the same designation, with the objective of ameliorating stagnation, or on account of lack of promotional avenues (see -Hukum Chand Gupta v. ICAR, (2012) 12 SCC 666.
42.17. Where there is no comparison between one set of employees of one organisation, and another set of employees of a different organisation, there can be no question of equation of pay scales under the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛, even if two organisations have a common employer. Likewise, if the management and control of two organisations is with different entities which are independent of one another, the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ would not apply (see S.C. Chandra case [S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, (2007) 8 SCC 279 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 897 : 2 SCEC 943] and National Aluminium Co. Ltd. case [National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Ananta Kishore Rout, (2014) 6 SCC 756 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 353] ).
16.10. Thereafter, Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph No.60 and 61 has held as under:-
“60. Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the application of the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛, in relation to temporary employees (daily-wage employees, ad hoc appointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the employees concerned (before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities as were being discharged by regular employees holding the same/corresponding posts. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ summarised by us in para 42 above. However, insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factual position. We say so, because it was fairly acknowledged by the learned counsel representing the State of Punjab, that all the temporary employees in the present bunch of appeals were appointed against posts which were also available in the regular cadre/establishment. It was also accepted that during the course of their employment, the temporary employees concerned were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities which at some point in time were assigned to regular employees. Likewise, regular employees holding substantive posts were also posted to discharge the same work which was assigned to temporary employees from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity on any of the principles summarised by us in para 42 hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ would be applicable to all the temporary employees concerned, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages on a par with the minimum of the pay scale of regularly engaged government employees holding the same post.
61. In view of the position expressed by us in the foregoing paragraph, we have no hesitation in holding that all the temporary employees concerned, in the present bunch of cases would be entitled to draw wages at the minimum of the pay scale (at the lowest grade, in the regular pay scale), extended to regular employees holding the same post.”
16.11. In view of the finding of this Court in para No.10 of this judgment, and examining the facts and circumstances on the record, and applying the proposition of law that has been laid down in the case of Jagjit Singh (supra), especially in para No. 42, it can safely be concluded that petitioners have been discharging similar duties and responsibilities like those of regular teachers. And that being so, the principle of “equal pay for equal work” as summarised by Hon’ble Supreme Court in para No.42 above, is clearly applicable in the present case.
17. Further, in the case of Surjit Singh and Others (supra) so referred by Mr. Khataniar, Hon’ble Supreme Court has, while dealing with similar issue, held as under:-
“16. In our constitutional scheme, the doctrine of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ has a definite place in view of Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India read with Article 14 thereof. Although as an abstract principle the existence of the applicability of the said doctrine cannot be ignored, the question which arises for our consideration is as to whether the said doctrine could have been mechanically applied as has been done by the High Court in the instant case.
17. We must also place on record the fact that in different phases of development of law by this Court, relying on or on the basis of the said principle, a clear cleavage of opinion has emerged. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s, this Court liberally applied the said principle without insisting on clear pleadings or proof that the persons similarly situated with others are equal in all respects; of late also; this Court has been speaking in different voices as would be evident from the following. This has been noticed specifically by a Division Bench of this Court in S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand [(2007) 8 SCC 279 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 897] , wherein it was held: (SCC p. 289, para 21)
“21. Learned counsel for the appellants have relied on Article 39(d) of the Constitution. Article 39(d) does not mean that all the teachers working in the school should be equated with the clerks in BCCL or the Government of Jharkhand for application of the principle of equal pay for equal work. There should be total identity between both groups i.e. the teachers of the school on the one hand and the clerks in BCCL, and as such the teachers cannot be equated with the clerks of the State Government or of BCCL. The question of application of Article 39(d) of the Constitution has recently been interpreted by this Court in State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh [(2006) 9 SCC 321 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1804] wherein Their Lordships have put the entire controversy to rest and held that the principle, ‘equal pay for equal work’ must satisfy the test that the incumbents are performing equal and identical work as discharged by employees against whom the equal pay is claimed. Their Lordships have reviewed all the cases bearing on the subject and after a detailed discussion have finally put the controversy to rest that the persons who claimed the parity should satisfy the court that the conditions are identical and equal and same duties are being discharged by them. Though a number of cases were cited for our consideration but no useful purpose will be served as in Charanjit Singh [(2006) 9 SCC 321 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1804] all these cases have been reviewed by this Court. More so, when we have already held that the appellants are not the employees of BCCL, there is no question seeking any parity of pay with that of the clerks of BCCL.”
24. It is no longer in doubt or dispute that grant of the benefit of the doctrine of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ depends upon a large number of factors including equal work, equal value, source and manner of appointment, equal identity of group and wholesale or complete identity. This Court, even recently, in Union of India v. Mahajabeen Akhtar [(2008) 1 SCC 368 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 183] , categorically held as under: (SCC pp. 376-77, paras 19 & 24)
“19. The question came to be considered in a large number of decisions of this Court wherein it unhesitatingly came to the conclusion that a large number of factors, namely, educational qualifications, nature of duty, nature of responsibility, nature of method of recruitment, etc. will be relevant for determining equivalence in the matter of fixation of scale of pay. (See Finance Deptt. v. W.B. Registration Service Assn. [1993 Supp (1) SCC 153 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 157 : (1993) 24 ATC 403] , State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia [(1989) 1 SCC 121 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 71 : (1988) 8 ATC 929] , Union of India v. Pradip Kumar Dey [(2000) 8 SCC 580 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 56] and State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn. [(2002) 6 SCC 72 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 822] )
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24. On the facts obtaining in this case, therefore, we are of the opinion that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work has no application. The matter may have been different, had the scales of pay been determined on the basis of educational qualification, nature of duties and other relevant factors. We are also not oblivious of the fact that ordinarily the scales of pay of employees working in different departments should be treated to be on a par and the same scale of pay shall be recommended. The respondent did not opt for her services to be placed on deputation. She opted to stay in the government service as a surplus. She was placed in list as Librarian in National Gallery of Modern Art. She was designated as Assistant Librarian and Information Assistant. Her pay scale was determined at Rs 6500-10,500 which was the revised scale of pay. Her case has admittedly not been considered by the Fifth Pay Revision Commission. If a scale of pay in a higher category has been refixed keeping in view the educational qualifications and other relevant factors by an expert body, no exception thereto can be taken. Concededly it was for the Union of India to assign good reasons for placing her in a different scale of pay. It has been done. We have noticed hereinbefore that not only the essential educational qualifications are different but the nature of duties is also different. Article 39(d) as also Article 14 of the Constitution of India must be applied, inter alia, on the premise that equality clause should be invoked in respect of the people who are similarly situated in all respects.”
How the said principle is to be applied in different fact situation is the only question. Whereas this Court refused to apply the said principle as the petitioners therein did not have the requisite qualification; in Union of India v. Dineshan K.K. [(2008) 1 SCC 586 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 248] , the application of the rule was advocated to be left to an expert body, stating: (Dineshan K.K. case [(2008) 1 SCC 586 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 248] SCC pp. 592- 93, para 16)
“16. Yet again in a recent decision in State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh [(2006) 9 SCC 321 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1804] a Bench of three learned Judges, while affirming the view taken by this Court in State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh [(1996) 11 SCC 77 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 210] , Tilak Raj [(2003) 6 SCC 123 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 828] , Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty [Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty, (2003) 5 SCC 188 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 645] and Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy [Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 225] has reiterated that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a court of law. Inter alia, observing that equal pay must be for equal work of equal value and that the principle of equal pay for equal work has no mathematical application in every case, it has been held that Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who are left out. Of course, the qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. Enumerating a number of factors which may not warrant application of the principle of equal pay for equal work, it has been held that since the said principle requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job, normally the applicability of this principle must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body and the court should not interfere till it is satisfied that the necessary material on the basis whereof the claim is made is available on record with necessary proof and that there is equal work of equal quality and all other relevant factors are fulfilled.”
17.1. In the case of Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee(supra), so referred by Mr. Khataniar, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“104. If a pay structure is normally to be evolved keeping in mind factors such as ‚method of recruitment‛ and ‚employer's capacity to pay‛ and if the limitations or qualifications to the applicability of the doctrine of ‚equal pay for equal work‛ admit inter alia the distinction on the ground of process of recruitment, the stand taken on behalf of the State Government is not unreasonable or irrational. Going by the facts indicated above and the statistics presented by the State Government, it was an enormous task of having the spread and reach of education in the remotest corners. Furthermore, the literacy rate of the State which was lagging far behind the national average was also a matter which required attention. The advances made by the State on these fronts are quite evident. All this was possible through rational use of resources. How best to use or utilize the resources and what emphasis be given to which factors are all policy matters and in our considered view the State had not faltered on any count. As laid down by this Court in the decisions in Joginder Singh [State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh, 1963 Supp (2) SCR 169 : AIR 1963 SC 913] and Zabar Singh [Zabar Singh v. State of Haryana, (1972) 2 SCC 275] , the State was justified in having two different streams or cadres. The attempt in making over the process of selection to Panchayati Raj institutions and letting the cadre of State Teachers to be a dying or vanishing cadre were part of the same mechanics of achieving the spread of education. These issues were all part of an integrated policy and if by process of judicial intervention any directions are issued to make available same salaries and emoluments to Niyojit Teachers, it could create tremendous imbalance and cause great strain on budgetary resources.”
18. But, a careful analysis of both the decisions would reveal that the factual backgrounds of the said two cases are distinguishable from the case in hand. In the case of Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee (supra), it has been held that the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” admit inter alia the distinction on the ground of mode of recruitment, and in the said case, the method of recruitment and standard of selection of Niyojit Teachers was completely different from that of the government teachers. Again, in the case of Surajit Singh (supra) educational qualification, mode of appointment, experience was considered.
19. Herein this petition, it is nobody’s case that the recruitment method, selection agency, educational qualification, and experience of the petitioners, with that of the regular teachers are different. The affidavit in opposition of the respondent No.1 is silent in this regard. There is also no dispute that the members of the petitioner’s Association are discharging the same duties like regular teachers. Over and above, it is the own decision of the respondent authorities to extend the same benefits to the contractual teachers which were extended to the regular teachers in view of Annexure-B, the letter dated 28.07.2017. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that the ratio laid down in the said case would not advance the argument of Mr. Khataniar, learned standing counsel for the respondent Nos.1—3. Accordingly, the same stands overruled.
19.1. Yet, another ground is also being taken by the respondent No.1 in its affidavit that the Government in the Department of School Education, had also considered all relevant facts including the financial and resource position of the State, and thereafter, it had taken a conscious decision to extend the benefit of enhanced Dearness Allowance to contractual teachers and staff under SSA, Assam only prospectively, yet it is well settled in the case of D.S. Nakara (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that financial burden not a valid justification for discrimination. While acknowledging the financial implications of the decision, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the financial capacity of the government cannot be a valid ground for perpetuating discrimination. The government must find ways to meet its obligations to all pensioners equally. Notably, the decision in D.S. Nakara (supra) is five Judges Constitutional Bench decision.
20. In the result, this Court finds sufficient merit in this petition and accordingly the same stands allowed. The impugned order dated 01-09-2022, issued under Memo No.PMA.52/2020/Pt./30-A, by the Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Elementary Education Department, stands set aside and quashed. By a mandamus of this Court, the respondent authority is directed to release the arrear 5% Dearness Allowance/ Dearness Relief from July, 2019 to December, 2021 and 11% & 3% Dearness Allowance/Dearness Relief from July, 2021 to August, 2022 payable to the members of the petitioner’s Association.
21. Let the aforesaid exercise be carried out within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment and order. The petitioner’s Association shall obtain a certified copy of this judgment and order and place the same before the respondent authorities within a period of one week from today.
22. In terms of above, this writ petition stands disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
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