Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This writ petition is directed against Ext.P4 order of externment dated 24.11.2025, passed against the petitioner by the 3rd respondent, invoking Section 15(1)(a) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P) Act for the sake of brevity]. By the said order, the petitioner has been interdicted from entering the limits of the District Police Chief, Ernakulam Rural, for a period of six months from the date of the receipt of the order.

2. The records available before us reveal that it was after considering the recurrent involvement of the petitioner in criminal activities that the District Police Chief, Ernakulam Rural, submitted a proposal for the initiation of proceedings against the petitioner under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act before the authorised officer, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ernakulam Range. For initiation of proceedings, the petitioner was classified as a “known rowdy” as defined under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act.

3. Altogether three cases in which the petitioner got involved have been considered by the competent authority for passing Ext.P4 externment order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.1362/2025 of Kuruppampadi Police Station, registered alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 308(2), 308(3) r/w 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short “BNS”) and the petitioner was arrayed as the 2nd accused in the said case.

4. Heard Sri. E. A. Haris, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order impugned by way of this writ petition has been passed on improper application of mind and without arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. The learned counsel further submitted that there is unreasonable delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the externment order after the date of the last prejudicial activity, and the said delay will certainly snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of the externment. On these premises, it was urged that the impugned order warrants interference.

6. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that there is no unreasonable delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the externment order. According to the Public Prosecutor, some minimal delay is inevitable while passing an order, especially when it is the duty of the authority to ensure adherence to the natural justice principles while passing such an order. It was further submitted that the authority needs a reasonable time to collect the details of the cases in which the petitioner was involved, and therefore, the minimum delay in submitting the proposal is quite natural, and the same is only negligible.

7. As already stated altogether, three cases formed the basis for passing Ext.P4 externment order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.1362/2025 of Kuruppampadi Police Station, registered alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 308(2), 308(3) r/w 3(5) of BNS and the petitioner was arrayed as the 2nd accused in the said. The incident that led to the registration of the said case occurred on 16.04.2025. The petitioner was arrested in the said case on 11.09.2025. Subsequently, he was released on bail on 30.09.2025. Notably, it was thereafter, on 13.10.2025, that the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act was initiated against him. Subsequently, on 24.11.2025, the externemnt order was passed. Virtually, there is a delay of around six months in mooting the proposal and more than seven months in passing the externment order after the commission of the last prejudicial activity.

8. While considering the said delay, it is to be noted that the case with respect to the last prejudicial activity was registered on 13.08.2025. The petitioner was arrested in the said case on 11.09.2025 and he was subsequently released on bail on 30.09.2025. As the petitioner was in jail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity from 11.09.2025 till 30.09.2025, there was obviously no basis for any apprehension regarding the repetition of criminal activities by him. Therefore, the delay that occurred during that period is liable to be discarded. Moreover, three cases formed the basis for passing the Ext.P4 externment order. Therefore, some minimum time is naturally required to collect and verify the details of the cases in which the petitioner got involved.

9. Moreover, unlike in the case of an order of detention passed under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act, even if some delay has occurred in passing an order of externment, the same has no serious bearing, as the consequences of both the orders are different. Because an order of detention is a grave deprivation of the personal liberty of the person detained. It stands on a different footing when compared to an order of externment. We are cognizant that Section 15 of the KAA(P) Act also visits the person concerned with an intrusion to his personal liberty within the limit of Article 21, especially when the said order restrains a citizen from his right to travel in any part of India. However, when a detention order under Section 3 is compared with an order of externment passed under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act, the latter visits a person with lesser deprivation of liberty. Therefore, the nature of proceedings under Section 3 and Section 15 is inherently different. In this regard, we are fortified by the decision in Stalin C.V. v. State of Kerala and others [2011 (1) KHC 852]. Moreover, an order under Section 15 can be treated only as equivalent to a condition imposed in a bail order, especially when the same only curtails the movement of the petitioner. Consequently, we have no hesitation in holding that there is no inordinate delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing Ext.P4 order.

10. However, it is evident that of the three cases considered by the jurisdictional authority, the first was registered in the year 2021, while the second and third were registered in the year 2025. The nature of the offences alleged in those cases is not of a grave character. Therefore, taking into account the aforesaid aspects, as well as the family constraints highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, we are of the considered view that the period of externment deserves to be reduced.

11. The Supreme Court in Deepak S/o Laxman Dongre v. State of Maharashtra and Others [(2023) 14 SCC 707], while dealing with a preventive detention order passed under the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 held that:

                  “On a plain reading of Section 58, it is apparent that while passing an order under Section 56, the competent authority must mention the area or District or Districts, in respect of which the order has been made. Moreover, the competent authority is required to specify the period for which the restriction will remain in force. The maximum period provided for is of two years. Therefore, an application of mind on the part of the competent authority is required for deciding the duration of the restraint order under Section 56. On the basis of the objective assessment of the material on record, the authority has to record it subjective satisfaction that the restriction should be imposed for a specific period. When the competent authority passes an order for the maximum permissible period of two years, the order of externment must disclose an application of mind by the competent authority and the order must record its subjective satisfaction about the necessity of passing an order of externment for the maximum period of two years which is based on material on record. Careful perusal of the impugned order of externment dated 15th December, 2020 shows that it does not disclose any application of mind on this aspect. It does not record the subjective satisfaction of respondent No.2 on the basis of material on record that the order of externment should be for the maximum period of two years. If the order of externment for the maximum permissible period of two years is passed without recording subjective satisfaction regarding the necessity extending the order of externment to the maximum permissible period, it will amount to imposing unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right guaranteed under clause (d) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India.”

12. Moreover, this Court in Dinchu Mohanan v. State of Kerala and another [2015 (2) KHC 101] held that the court is empowered to annul, amend, or confirm the order of externment passed under Section 15(1) of the KAA(P) Act. Keeping in mind the above propositions of law and considering the nature and the gravity of the offence attributed to the petitioner as well as his family constraints, we are of the view that the impugned order requires modification regarding the duration of the period of externment.

                  In the result, the writ petition is allowed in part, and Ext.P4 order is modified to the extent that the writ petitioner shall be interdicted from entering the limits of the District Police Chief, Ernakulam Rural, for a period of three months from the date of receipt of Ext.P4 order.