Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated 28.09.2025 passed against one Vysakh Chandran, S/o. Chandrakumar, (herein after referred to as 'detenu'), under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P) Act for the sake of brevity]. The petitioner herein is the wife of the detenu. After considering the opinion of the Advisory Board, the said order stands confirmed by the Government vide order dated 08.12.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months with effect from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that on 23.07.2025, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Ernakulam Rural, the 4th respondent, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act, before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. Altogether, four cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the detention order. Out of the said cases considered, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity against the detenu is Crime No.667/2025 of Vadakkekkara Police Station, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 20(b)(ii)A and 22(b) of the NDPS Act.

3. We have heard Sri. Ajeesh M. Ummer, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order is vitiated, as the same is passed without proper application of mind and disregarding the procedural safeguards envisaged in the KAA(P) Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the investigation in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is still in progress and registration of FIR alone is not sufficient to classify the said case as a qualified one to be reckoned for passing a detention order under the KAA(P) Act. The learned counsel urged that, unless and until the FSL report is received, it cannot be said that the contraband seized in this case is MDMA, and the jurisdictional authority is not justified in considering the last case registered against the detenu for passing the detention order. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the copy of the detention order was not served on the detenu and that itself is a ground to set aside the said order.

5. In response, Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor, asserted that the detaining authority passed the impugned order after being fully satisfied that there were sufficient materials to prove the involvement of the detenu in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the detaining authority passed Ext.P1 order after arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction, and hence, no interference is warranted in the said order. The learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the contention of the petitioner that the copy of the detention order was not served on him is absolutely false and cannot be sustained.

6. From the rival contentions raised, it is evident that the principal question arising in this writ petition is whether the detenu was supplied with a copy of the detention order at the time of execution of the impugned order. In order to verify the veracity of the petitioner’s contention regarding non-service of the detention order, we have perused the records of the case made available before us by the learned Public Prosecutor. Upon such perusal, we are convinced that the petitioner’s contention that a copy of the detention order was not served on the detenu is baseless. The records clearly reveal that the detention order was duly served on the detenu at the time of its execution, and there is a written endorsement to the effect that the detenu had received a copy of the impugned order as well as copies of the relied-upon documents. Moreover, a signature purporting to be that of the detenu appears beneath the said endorsement. Being so convinced, we are of the view that the petitioner’s contention regarding non-service of the detention order is unsustainable. Consequently, the grievance of the detenu that he was handicapped in making a representation before the Government as well as the Advisory Board lacks merit and credibility.

7. A perusal of the records reveals that it was after considering the recurrent involvement of the detenu in criminal activities that the jurisdictional authority passed Ext.P1 detention order. As evident from records, altogether four cases in which the detenu got involved formed the basis for passing Ext.P1 order. Out of the said cases considered, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is Crime No.667/2025 of Vadakkekkara Police Station, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 20(b)(ii)A and 22(b) of the NDPS Act. The allegation in the said case is that on 08.07.2025, the detenu was found possessing 3.05 gm of MDMA, 10.75 gm of Ganja and 79.73 gm of Hashish Oil in the house in which he was residing for the purpose of sale in contravention of the provisions of the NDPS Act. The detenu, who is arrayed as the sole accused in the said case, was arrested on 08.07.2025 itself. Subsequently, he got bail in the said case on 26.08.2025. It was on 23.07.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody, the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act was mooted. The sequence of the events narrated above clearly reveals that there was no delay, either in mooting the proposal or in passing Ext.P1 detention order. Likewise, from a perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that the jurisdictional authority was fully cognizant of the fact that the detenu was on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity. That apart, in the impugned order, it is specifically stated that the bail conditions imposed on the detenu in the order granting bail to him are insufficient to deter him from engaging in criminal activities. It is evident that the sufficiency of the bail condition was duly considered by the jurisdictional authority while passing the detention order.

8. The principal contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, apart from the registration of the FIR, there are no materials to indicate the involvement of the detenu in the case registered in respect of the last prejudicial activity. We agree that the mere registration of an FIR, by itself, is not sufficient to treat a case as a qualified one for initiating proceedings under the KAA(P) Act. It is now well settled, by a catena of judicial pronouncements, that in addition to the registration of an FIR, there must be “something more” to treat a case as a qualified one for the purpose of passing an order under the KAA(P) Act. At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that the jurisdiction exercised under the KAA(P) Act is one of suspicion. Therefore, there is no legal requirement that a final report should be filed in a case in order to treat it as a qualified one for passing a detention order under the Act. However, as already noted, there must be some material, apart from the mere registration of an FIR, to indicate the complicity of the detenu in the commission of the offence.

9. Keeping the above principles in mind and reverting to the facts of the present case, it is seen that in the case registered in respect of the last prejudicial activity, the detenu is arrayed as the sole accused. The specific allegation against him is that he was in possession of various narcotic substances in the house in which he was residing. Notably, the detenu was apprehended red-handed along with the contraband. Therefore, he cannot be heard to contend that, apart from the registration of an FIR, there is no material to establish his complicity in the commission of the said crime.

10. The further contention of the petitioner that the nature of the contraband could be determined only after receipt of the Forensic Science Laboratory report is also without substance. The detecting officer arrested the detenu after being subjectively satisfied that the contraband seized included ganja, hashish oil, and MDMA. Therefore, it cannot be contended that, for the purpose of passing a detention order, the jurisdictional authority ought to have waited for the FSL report confirming the nature of the contraband seized. Moreover, as already observed, the jurisdiction under the KAA(P) Act is one based on suspicion, and the filing of a final report is not a prerequisite for treating a case as a qualified one for consideration of a detention order. Hence, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard is liable to fail.

                  In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition stands dismissed.