1. With the consent of the petitioner's Advocate, the case is heard on merits.

2) This civil revision under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity "CPC") has been preferred by the petitioner/defendant No. 1 against impugned order dated 15.09.2025 (Annexure P/1) passed by learned XVIth Civil Judge, Senior Division, District Ratlam (M.P.) in Civil Suit No.1540 of 2021, whereby an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC filed on behalf of the petitioner/defendant No. 1, has been rejected.

3) The facts of the case, in brief, are that the respondent No. 1/plaintiff filed a suit before learned Trial Court for declaration of title and a permanent injunction against the petitioner/defendant No. 1 in respect of land bearing Survey No. 142, admeasuring 1.625 hectares situated at village Magarkheda, Tehsil, Indore. Anwar Patel (father of plaintiff/respondent Waqar Patel) entered into an agreement to sale the land with the petitioner Islam Patel in the year 1996. After the death of Anwar, petitioner/Islam filed Civil Suit No. 89-A/1999 for specific performance against Anwar's widow namely Asha Bee (defendant No. 6) and her two minor sons (including Waqar, minor). Asha Bee filed a counter-claim on behalf of herself and the minor sons.

4) On 18.09.2003, learned X th Additional District Judge, Indore, decreed Islam's suit for specific performance on merits and dismissed the counter-claim.

5) Subsequently, Waqar Patel filed Civil Suit No. 1540/2021 seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction against the petitioner regarding the same land, impleading his mother Asha Bee as defendant No. 6.

6) In response, petitioner filed two applications before the Trial Court viz. under Section II of CPC (res judicata): the issue of title/ownership was already decided in the earlier suit (No.89-A/1999) against respondent/Waqar and his mother; their counter-claim was dismissed on merits, so the present suit is barred. Another application was filed under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC (rejection of plaint) on three grounds; firstly, the plaint admits that petitioner/Islam is in possession and cultivating the land, yet Waqar seeks only declaration and injunction without claiming possession, hence, the suit is barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Waqar, a minor defendant attained majority years ago but filed the present suit in the year 1999, after the limitation period under Article 60 of the Limitation Act had expired. Overall, the plaint does not disclose a cause of action and is liable to be rejected.

7) The Trial Court dismissed both the applications, against which, petitioner preferred present civil revision challenging aforesaid orders.

8) It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Trial Court has committed grave jurisdictional errors and material irregularities in dismissing the applications. Learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the facts of the application under Section 11 of CPC, having the issue of title to the suit land was directly and substantially is issue in the former Suit No. 89A/1999, which was decreed in favour of the petitioner on 18.09.2003, declaring him the owner. The counter-claim for possession filed by respondent No. 1's mother/Asha Bee and minor sons was rejected. The present suit seeks re-declaration of the same title, which is barred by res judicata under Section 11 of CPC, including Explanation IV, as the matter in issue (title and ownership) is the same, even if reliefs differ. The Trial Court gravely erred in holding that the subject matter and reliefs are different, ignoring constructive res judicata. He has also contended that the Trial Court has overlooked documents filed by the petitioner and its own order dated 15.09.2025 acknowledging consent by Asha Bee and her children.

9) So far as the question of rejection of the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is concerned, the plaint admits the suit land is in petitioner's possession. Yet, respondent No. 1 seeks only declaration and injunction without claiming possession, rendering the suit defective for want of consequential relief. The Trial Court has erred in granting liberty to amend the plaint while dismissing the application, which is impermissible. Learned Trial Court also failed to consider that the suit is time-barred. respondent No. 1, aged 27 years as per his affidavit, attained majority years ago but did not challenge the 2003 decree within 3 years of attaining majority (Article 60, Limitation Act). The deliberate omission of possession relief confirms the claim is barred, as possession could not be sought due to lapse of time. Learned Trial Court wrongly relied on the Division Bench order in Second Appeal No. 204 of 2002 without appreciating factual distinctions. It is therefore, prayed that this petition be allowed and impugned order dated 15.09.2025 be set aside.

10) Learned counsel for respondents/plaintiffs, argued in support of the impugned order and submitted that no illegality, irregularity or impropriety has been committed by the Court below in dismissing the applications filed under Order 11 of CPC and Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. Hence, learned counsel prays for dismissal of the revision petition.

11) Heard and considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.

12) As far as the impugned order with respect to the rejection of application under Section 11 and Order VII Rule 11 CPC is concerned,

13) It is found that the Trial Court rightly held that the present suit is not barred by res judicata. The earlier suit Civil Suit No. 89-A/1999 was filed for specific performance of an agreement to sale, decreed in favour of the petitioner /Islam Patel on merits, declaring him entitled for execution of the sale deed and ownership upon compliance. The counter-claim filed by Asha Bee (on behalf of herself and minor sons, including respondent No. 1/Waqar Patel) was dismissed.

14) Res judicata under Section 11 of CPC requires that the matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided in the former suit between the same parties in a competent Court. The core issue in earlier suit was the validity of the year 1996 agreement to sale and the petitioner's right to specific performance. Title/ownership was adjudicated incidentally as consequential to granting specific performance, not as the primary relief. The present suit Civil Suit No. 1540/2021 seeks declaration of title and permanent injunction on grounds potentially challenging the basis of the former decree (e.g., validity of the decree itself or fraud/minority-related issues). This is a distinct cause of action, even though relating to the same property.

15) Constructive res judicata, (Explanation IV to Section 11) does not apply, as the reliefs and subject matter differ. The counter-claim in the former suit sought possession/cancellation, but its dismissal on merits does not conclusively bar a fresh declaration suit by a former minor defendant (now major) raising new grounds not fully litigated. A minor defendant in a specific performance suit is bound by the decree, but a subsequent challenge to title (post-majority) is not automatically barred if it involves matters not "might and ought" to have been raised defensively in the former suit. The parties litigated under the same title, but the reliefs (specific performance vs. for declaration of title) and primary issues differ. Precedents confirm that dismissal of a counter-claim becomes final if not appealed separately, but here the subsequent suit by a privy (former minor) on title is not identically barred. Thus, learned Trial Court's findings that subject matter and reliefs differ is sound, no grave error in appreciating documents or facts.

16) So far as the question for rejection of the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is concerned, learned Trial Court has correctly rejected the application for rejection of the plaint. The plaint, read as a whole, discloses a cause of action and is not barred on the face of it.

17) Bar under Section 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963, reads as under :-

          "The proviso to Section 34 bars a mere declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further/consequential relief (e.g., possession), omits to do so. However, where the plaintiff admits dispossession (as here, admitting petitioner's possession), a suit for bare declaration without possession is not maintainable if consequential relief is omitted."

18) On this aspect, the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi, (1973) 2 SCC 60 , wherein in paras 1 and 4 following was stated :-

          "1. This is a plaintiffs' appeal by special leave. Ram Saran and Raghubir Saran, the plaintiffs are brothers. They jointly owned suit property with Chhabili Kuer widow of Lalita Prasad. After the death of Chhabili Kuer on February 8, 1971, Ganga Devi the defendant in the suit came forward as the legal representative of Chhabili Kuer and got the mutation effected in her name in the place of the deceased Chhabili Kuer. In 1958, the plaintiffs brought this suit for a declaration that they are the sole owners of the suit properties. They did not claim possession either of the entire or even any portion of the suit properties.

          4. We are in agreement with the High Court that the suit is hit by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. As found by the fact-finding Courts, Ganga Devi is in possession of some of the suit properties. The plaintiffs have not sought possession of those properties. They merely claimed a declaration that they are the owners of the suit properties. Hence the suit is not maintainable. In these circumstances, it is not necessary to go into the other contention that the suit is barred by limitation."

19) Similarly, in the case of Vasantha (Dead) Thr. LR vs. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam (Dead) Thr. LRs, 2024 INSC 109) hold that if the plaintiff is not in possession, seeking only declaration (without possession) attracts the proviso bar, rendering the suit non-maintainable. Learned Trial Court exercised jurisdiction properly; no impropriety in dismissing the applications.

20) It is well-settled that rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is a drastic power which must be exercised only when the conditions expressly provided therein are strictly met. In the present case, the burden to prove lies on the plaintiffs/respondents and only on the ground of not submitting documents as stated in the application, it cannot be ascertained that the suit is not maintainable, and is liable to be rejected.

21) The jurisdiction under Section 115 of CPC is supervisory and narrow. Interference is warranted only when the order suffers from jurisdictional error, material irregularity, or manifest perversity. The impugned order does not suffer from any such infirmity. The trial court has exercised its discretion judiciously and in accordance with settled principles.

22) Therefore, on the basis of foregoing analysis and settled position of law, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Trial Court has not committed any error in rejecting the petitioner's applications filed under Section 11 of CPC and under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. Hence, the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court is based upon the cogent reasons and does not require any interference.

23) Accordingly, the impugned order dated 21.07.2025 is affirmed and present petition being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed.

No order as to costs.