Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This writ petition is directed against a detention order passed under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (PITNDPS Act for brevity) against one Anila Raveendran, D/o. Raveendran Pillai ('detenu' for the sake of brevity). The said detention order stands confirmed by the Government, vide order dated 22.10.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of one year with effect from the date of detention.

2. As evident from the records, it was on the basis of a proposal dated 17.05.2025, forwarded by the District Police Chief, Kollam City, that the jurisdictional authority initiated proceedings against the detenu under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act. Algother two cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is Crime No.493/2025 of Sakthikulangara Police Station, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 22(c), 27A and 29(1) of the NDPS Act.

3. We heard Sri. C. R. Jayakumar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Ext.P1 order was passed on improper consideration of facts and without proper application of mind. Relying on the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another, [1991 (1) SCC 128], the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in cases wherein the detenu is under judicial custody, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decision by the Supreme Court. According to the counsel, as the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the case registered against him, it was incumbent upon the authority to satisfy itself that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity. According to the counsel, though in the Ext.P1 order, it is mentioned that the detenu was undergoing judicial custody, it is nowhere mentioned that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail in the case registered against him. It was further submitted that while passing Ext.P1 order, the jurisdictional authority failed to take note of the fact that there was a time gap of more than three years between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu, and the said time gap itself shows that the detenu is not a person having the propensity to be involved in criminal activities repeatedly. On these premises, it was urged that the impugned order of detention is liable to be set aside.

5. In response, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that Ext.P1 detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after complying with all the procedural formalities and after arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the Public Prosecutor, the said order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after being satisfied that a detention order under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act is the only way to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities. It was further contended that the jurisdictional authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody, and it was on being satisfied that there is every chance that the detenu be released on bail, and if so released, he would in all probability indulge in criminal activities further, that the detention order was passed. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, therefore, the order of detention will legally sustain irrespective of the fact that the detenu was under judicial custody while the impugned order was passed.

6. From the rival contentions raised, it is gatherable that the main question that revolves around this petition is whether an order of detention under Section 3(1) of the PINDPS Act can be validly passed against a person who is under judicial custody. While answering the said question, it is to be noted that, through a series of judicial pronouncements rendered by the Apex Court as well as by this Court, it is well settled that there is no legal impediment in passing an order of detention against a person who is under judicial custody. However, an order of detention against a person who is under judicial custody cannot be passed in a casual manner. Undisputedly, a detention order under the PITNDPS Act is a drastic measure against a citizen as it heavily impacts their personal as well as their fundamental rights. When an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to preventive detention is neither warranted nor permissible. When a detenu is in jail, obviously, there is no imminent possibility of being involved in criminal activities. Therefore, before passing a detention order in respect of a person who is in jail, the concerned authority must satisfy itself that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail, and further, if released on bail, the material on record reveals that he will indulge in prejudicial activity if not detained. The circumstances that necessitate the passing of such an order must be reflected in the order itself.

7. In Kamarunnissa’s case (cited supra), the Supreme Court made it clear that a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed even in the case of a person in custody (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable materials placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in probability indulged in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. If the authority passes an order after recording its satisfaction in this regard, such an order would be valid.

8. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Veeramani v. The State of Tamil Nadu [1994 (2) SCC 337] and in Union of India v. Paul Manickam [2003 (8) SCC 342].

9. In view of the said decisions, in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decisions by the Supreme Court.

10. Keeping in mind the above proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court, while reverting to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial acitivity and considered by the authority to pass the impugned order of detention is crime No.493/2025 of Sakthikulangara Police Station, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 22(c), 27A and 29(1) of the NDPS Act. The allegation in the said case is that on 21.03.2025, the detenu was found keeping and possessing 77.26 gm of Methamphetamine, for the purpose of sale in contravention of the provisions contained under the NDPS Act. In the said case, the detenu was caught red-handed with the contraband on 21.03.2025, and since then, she has been under judicial custody. It was on 17.05.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody, that the proposal for proceedings under the PITNDPS Act was initiated. Later, it was on 14.08.2025, the impugned order was passed.

11. In Ext.P1 order, the fact that at the time of passing the said order, the detenu was under custody is specifically adverted to. Moreover, in the impugned order, it is further stated that the detenu applied for bail in the last case registered against her, but her application seeking bail was dismissed on 21.05.2025. Likewise, in the impugned order, it is specifically mentioned that the detenu is trying for bail. In the impugned order, it is further recorded that, considering the detenu’s criminal antecedents, it is evident that the bail conditions are not sufficient to curb her narcotic criminal activities, as she has blatantly violated the bail conditions imposed upon her in the bail order whereby she was granted bail in the penultimate case. Likewise, in the impugned order, it is mentioned that the detenu is an active drug peddler. However, in         the order, the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that “detenu is likely to be released on bail”.

12. Dealing with a similar situation, the Supreme Court in Union of India and another vs. Dimple Happy Dhakad ( 2019 KHC 6662), after considering the dictum laid down in Kamarunissa (cited supra) in paragraph 35 of the judgment, observed as follows;

                  “In the light of the well settled principles, we have to see, in the present case, whether there was awareness in the mind of the detaining authority that detenu is in custody and he had reason to believe that detenu is likely to be released on bail and if so released, he would continue to indulge in prejudicial activities. In the present case, the detention orders dated 17.05.2019 record the awareness of the detaining authority that (i) the detenu is in custody, (ii) that the bail application filed by the detenus have been rejected by the court. Of course, in the detention order, the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that the “detenu is likely to be released. It cannot be said that the detaining authority has not applied its mind merely on the ground that in the detention orders, it is not expressly stated as to the “detenu’s likelihood of being released on bail” and if so released, he is likely to indulge in the same prejudicial activities. But the detaining authority has clearly recorded the antecedents of the detenu and its satisfaction that the detenus, Happy Dhakad and Nisar Aliyar, have the high propensity to commit such offences in the future.”

13. Keeping in mind the above principles laid down by the Supreme Court while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that, in the impugned order, it is not specifically recorded that the detenu is likely to be released on bail. However, in the order, it is stated that the detenu is trying for bail and considering her criminal antecedents, it is evident that bail conditions are not sufficient to curb her narcotic criminal activities. The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is already in custody and she is likely to be released on bail, and on being so released, he is likely to indulge in prejudicial activity, is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived on the materials available and normally, the said subjective satisfaction is not to be interfered with by a court of law. The impugned order reflects that there is a proper application of mind and, based on the materials available on record, the detaining authority subjectively satisfied that there is a reason to believe that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that, on so released, the detenu will in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities. Therefore, merely because of the reason that the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that “the detenu is likely to be released on bail”, it cannot be said that the impugned order lacks satisfaction of the detaining authority regarding the chance of the detenu being released on bail.

14. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the jurisdictional authority failed to take note of the fact that there was a time gap of more than three years between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu, and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived on by the detaining authority is vitiated. It is true that the last prejudicial activity was committed by the detenu on 21.03.2025, whereas the date of occurrence of the penultimate case registered against her (crime No. 1294/2021) is on 07.10.2021. Thus, there is indeed a gap of more than three years between the two incidents. However, it cannot be overlooked that the involvement of a person, even in a single case registered under the NDPS Act, is sufficient to pass a detention order under the PITNDPS Act. Therefore, the time gap between the two cases highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of little consequence in the context of the impugned order.

                  In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and accordingly stands dismissed.