1. The present appeal has been filed inter alia challenging the impugned order of conviction and sentence passed against the Appellant by the learned Addl. District Judge & Sessions Judge- cum-Special Judge, Nuapada vide his judgment dtd.30.11.2018 in S.A. Case No. 101/2017. Vide the impugned judgment the Appellant has been convicted and sentenced to undergo R.I. for two years and pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- for the offence under Sec. 451 of the I.P.C. and in default, further R.I. for one month. The Appellant is also convicted and sentenced to undergo R.I. for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default R.I. for 3 months for the offence under Sec. 376(2)(f)(i) of the I.P.C.. The Appellant is also sentenced to undergo R.I. for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default R.I. for 3 months more for the offence under Sec. 6 of the POCSO Act. It is however directed that, all the substantive sentences so imposed shall run concurrently and the UTP period be set off.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the Appellant contended that prosecution was set into motion with lodging of the F.I.R. by the mother of the victim on 02.11.2017 in Sinapali P.S. Case No. 236 dtd.02.11.2017 for the offence under Sec. 376(2)(f)(i) of the I.P.C. and Sec. 4/6 of the POCSO Act. The F.I.R. story as narrated reads as follows:-

                  “In the morning of 2.11.2017 both Kanti and Bhikari had gone to their agricultural field to harvest paddy by leaving their minor children including the victim at their residence. Such agricultural field is at a short distance from the house of Kanti and Bhikari. While working in the field around 8 A.M, Kanti Tandi returned to her home to drink water. On entering into his home, she found that the UTP was ravishing her minor victim daughter, who by then was 9 years old. Looking at the presence of the mother of the victim, the UTP- accused fled away. Then on being asked by Kanti, the victim told to her that while the victim was separating the pebbles from the rice, the accused pulled the victim to the house, removed the leggin worn by the victim and ravished her. Kanti then called her husband and narrated the incident.”

                  2.1.    It is contended that after completion of the investigation, final form was submitted against the present Appellant for the offence under Sec. 376(2)(f)(i) of the I.P.C. r.w. Sec. 451 and Sec. 6 of the POCSO Act. The Appellant accordingly was charged and faced the trial for the offence under Sec. 376(2)(f)(i) /451 of the I.P.C. and Sec. 6 of the POCSO Act.

                  2.2.    Learned counsel appearing for the Appellant contended that the prosecution in order to establish the case examined as many as 25 nos. of witnesses. While P.W. 12 is the victim, P.W. 11 is the informant/mother of the victim. P.W. 13 is the father of the victim and P.W. 22 is the I.O. of the case. Similarly, P.W. 24 is the concerned Doctor who examined the victim.

                  2.3.    It is contended that in view of evidence of the P.Ws. so recorded, more particularly the evidence of P.W. 12, the mother of the victim-P.W. 11 and P.W. 24 who examined the victim, there was no material to implicate the Appellant for the offence under Sec. 376(2)(f)(i) of the I.P.C. r.w. Sec. 6 of the POCSO Act and Sec. 451 of the I.P.C.

                  2.4.    P.W. 11 in her cross-examination submitted as follows:-

                  “My family and the family f the accused had gone together to earn our livelihood in Andhrapradesh.

                   xxx    xxx     xxx

                  It is a fact that prior to five years my family had quarreled with the family of the accused as my cow had damaged the crop of the accused.”

                  2.5.    P.W. 24 who examined the victim in his examination-in- chief stated as follows:-

                  “(ii) No blood or stain is found on her cloths.

                  (iii) No recent clinical sign of recent sexual intercourse but it will be confirmed after vaginal swab report.

                  (viii) The urine pregnancy test is negative as per the Lab. Report No. 14152 dt.3.11.2017.”

                  2.6.    Learned counsel appearing for the Appellant taking into account the evidence of P.W. 11 and 24 as well as that of P.W. 23 who examined the Appellant, contended that since no recent sexual intercourse was found on the body of the victim, on the face of the evidence of the victim and other P.Ws, the Appellant could not have been convicted and sentenced for the offence under Sec. 376(2)(f)(i)/451 of the I.P.C. and Sec. 6 of the POCSO Act.

                  2.7.    It is also contended that because of his implication the Appellant was apprehended on 02.11.2017 itself and continuing in custody since then. It is also contended that since as per the medical report there was no recent sign of sexual intercourse on the body of the victim, conviction and sentence of the Appellant vide the impugned judgment is not sustainable in the eye of law. In support of his submission reliance was placed to a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jagdish Prasad & Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (Criminal Appeal Nos. 102 and 108 of 1981 decided on 25.03.1992). Hon’ble Apex Court in Para 6 of the judgment has held as follows:-

                  “6. As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated provided the testimony of that single witness is found out entirely reliable. In that case, there will be no legal impediment for recording a conviction. But if the evidence is open to doubt or suspicion, the court will require sufficient corroboration. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of this Court in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, MANU/SC/0039/1957 : 1957CriLJ100C wherein this Court has classified the testimony of a witness into three categories. viz. (1) wholly reliable (2) wholly unreliable, and (3) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable and observed that though in the first two categories of classification, there may not be any difficulty in coming to a conclusion either accepting or rejecting the testimony but it is in the third category of cases that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony either direct or circumstantial.”

                  2.8.    Reliance was also placed to a decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of Balwan Singh Vs. State of Haryana (Criminal Appeal No. 269-SB of 1990 decided on 10.01.1994). The High Court in Para 5 of the Judgment has held as follows:-

                  “5. Careful perusal of the testimony of the aforesaid three material witnesses referred to above shows that Manju a child witness had not specifically mentioned that the accused too had taken off his Kachha. The version given by Ram Kishan and Dharam Vir PWs is to the effect that the accused too had removed his own Kachha and after Manju was made to lie on the ground the accused was attempting to commit rape on her. It is significant to note that there was no mark of injury on the person of Manju prosecutrix. In case she had been made to lie on the bare ground and the appellant who was strong man in his twenties had attempted to commit rape on her, then Manju normally would be expected to receive some injury on her person particularly on her back. Absence of any injury on the person of the prosecutrix contradicts the version given by Ram Kishan and Dharam Vir PWs referred to above. Even otherwise, it would be difficult to believe that the appellant would attempt to commit rape on Manju in the evening at about 5.15 p.m. when several people would be expected to be present in the nearby two or three shops and Baithak of Surja near the place of occurrence. Absence of any injury on the private parts of the prosecutrix is another factor which contradicts the ocular account given by Ram Kishan and Dharam Vir PWs that the accused had attempted to commit rape on the prosecutrix.”

3. Learned Addl. Govt. Advocate on the other hand while supporting the impugned order of conviction and sentence so passed vide the impugned judgment dtd.30.11.2018, contended that after his implication pursuant to the F.I.R. lodged by the mother of the victim on 02.11.2017, statement of the victim was recorded under Sec. 164 of the Cr.P.C.. In her statement so recorded under Sec. 164 Cr.P.C., victim stood with the F.I.R. allegation. Not only that the victim while being examined as P.W. 12, in her cross-examination in Para 8 submitted as follows:-

                  “8. It is a fact that the accused had ravished me completely by making full penetration by laying me on the ground and by sleeping upon me.”

                  3.1.    It is contended that in view of such statement of the victim in her cross-examination, which clearly proves the F.I.R. allegation, no further proof is required to be made and basing of such solitary statement of the victim, order of conviction and sentence can be passed and the same has been rightly passed in the present case against the Appellant.

                  3.2.    In support of his submission, reliance was placed to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Birka Shiva Vs. The State of Telangana reported in 2025 INSC 863. Hon’ble Apex Court in Para 18 of the judgment has held as follows:-

                  “18. The prosecution has sought conviction of the appellant under Section 376 IPC, asserting that he had committed forcible sexual intercourse with the victim. It is trite law that a conviction for rape can be sustained solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix/victim, provided that her evidence inspires confidence in the mind of the Court and appears to be natural and truthful.”

                  3.3.    Reliance was also placed to a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deepak Kumar Sahu Vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2025 INSC 929. Hon’ble Apex Court in Para 5.6, 5.6.1, 5.6.4 and 5.7 of the judgment has held as follows:-

                  “5.6 It is an opt-reiterated dictum of law that in cases of rape, the testimony of the prosecutrix alone may be sufficient and sole evidence of the victim, when cogent and consistent, could be properly used to arrive at a finding of the guilt. In the State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Manga Singh, (2019) 16 SCC 759, this Court in terms stated that conviction can be rested on the testimony of the prosecutrix alone.

                  The conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence. The conviction can be based solely on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the courts to insist for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law, but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. Minor contractions or small discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing the evidence of the prosecutrix.”

                  (Para 10)

                  5.6.1 It was further asserted that corroboration is not an essential requirement for conviction in the cases of rape.

                  It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the "probabilities factor" does not render it unworthy of credence. As a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence. However, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence may not be available. In such cases, solitary testimony of the prosecutrix would be sufficient to base the conviction, if it inspires the confidence of the court.

                  (Para 11)

                  5.6.4 From a recent decision in Raju alias Umakant vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2025 SCC OnLine SC 997), following observations could be noticed:

                  “…….a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice but a victim of another person's lust and it will be improper and undesirable to test her evidence with suspicion. All that the law mandates is that the Court should be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of charge levelled by her and if after keeping that aspect in mind if the Court is thereafter satisfied that the evidence is trustworthy, there is nothing that can stop the Court from acting on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. [See State of Rajasthan v. N.K. the Accused, (2000) 5 SCC 30, Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, 1951 SCC 1213, State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewal Chand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550, State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384]” (Para 18)

                  5.7 The last submission on behalf of the appellant that there were discrepancies in the evidences of victim (PW-2) and her brother (PW-11) has no room to stand, for, no material discrepancy could be noticed by the Court on comparison of the evidence of the two witnesses. Even otherwise, discrepancies in evidence which are of minor nature not going to the root have to be ignored. This Court observed in Lok Mal alias Loku (supra) that in criminal jurisprudence the principle is that the evidence of prosecutrix in case of rape is of the same value as that of an injured witness and conviction can be made on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, while reiterating this.”

                  3.4.    Learned Addl. Govt. Advocate accordingly contended that since allegation of sexual assault on the victim who is a minor at the relevant point of time has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt, order of conviction and sentence so passed against the Appellant needs no interference.

4. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties and considering the submission made, this Court finds that basing on the F.I.R. lodged by the mother of the victim-P.W. 11 on 02.11.2017, Sinapali P.S. Case No. 236 dtd.02.11.2017 was registered for the offence under Sec. 376(2)(f)(i)/451 of the I.P.C. and Sec. 4/6 of the POCSO Act. After completion of the investigation, final form was submitted against the Petitioner for the offence under Sec376(2)(f)(i)/451 of the I.P.C. and Sec. 6 of the POCSO Act.

                  4.1.    Appellant faced the trial after being charged for the aforesaid offences. It is found that the prosecution in order to prove its case, examined as many as 25 nos. of witnesses, which includes P.W. 12 as the victim and P.W. 11, the informant/mother of the victim.

                  4.2.    Even though in his deposition P.W. 24 who examined the victim, found no sign of sexual intercourse, but this Court taking into account the statement of the victim in Para 8 of her cross- examination, is of the view that in view of such statement of the victim, no further proof is required to be made with regard to the allegation made against the Appellant. Placing reliance on the decisions so cited supra and the evidence of P.W. 12 in Para 8 of her cross-examination, this Court finds no illegality or irregularity with the impugned order of conviction and sentence, passed vide judgment dtd.30.11.2018 in S.A. No. 101/2017 by the learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Nuapada.

                  4.3.    Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the order of conviction and sentence so passed vide the impugned judgment dt.30.11.2018 and dismiss the appeal.